Russo-German-Italian Axis vs. Western Allies WWII

Russo-German-Italian Axis vs. Western Allies WWII occurs because

  • Russo-German-Italian Triple Alliance won WWI

    Votes: 17 29.3%
  • Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia got different leadership and made a full alliance

    Votes: 14 24.1%
  • Fascist Russia, Germany, and Italy allied after WWI

    Votes: 20 34.5%
  • Soviet Russia and Communist Germany allied after WWI

    Votes: 22 37.9%

  • Total voters
    58

General Zod

Banned
This thread is meant to discuss the strategic course of a WWII where a Russo-German-Italian Axis fights British-Commonwealth-American "Allies". Various different PoDs and scenarioes are provided below. Pick whatever you deem more interesting and/or plausible.

Some common assumptions to all scenarioes: Japan may be an ally of UK-USA, fight its own separate war to conquer China but be otherwise neutral, or start a parallel war against the Allies to conquer South East Asia, but is never a member of the Axis. The strategic alliance between Germany, Italy, and Russia never breaks down up to and throughout WWII (with a possible exception for one PoD option, see below). France (and Italy if it's not a member of the Axis in the first place) begins the war on the Allies' side, but is invaded, occupied, and turned into a satellite of the Axis. Owning to either pre-WWII events or the outcome of the first phase of the war, Germany owns Austria, Bohemia-Moravia, Netherlands, Flanders, Western Poland (either the 1914 borders or the 1939 partition), Luxemburg, Alsace, and all of Lorraine; Russia owns Finland, Eastern Poland (either the 1914 borders plus Galicia or the 1939 partition), the Baltics, and Bessarabia-Bukovina; Italy owns Nice, Savoy, Corsica, South Tyrol, Austrian Littoral, Dalmatia, Albania; Hungary is an Axis satellite and owns Slovakia, Backa, western Crisana, and northern Transylvania; Romania is an Axis satellite as well and owns southern Transylvania and the Banat.

Note: please remember that in NO scenario Hitler is the leader of Germany nor Stalin of Russia by the time the alliance occurs, so the psychological issues of both are not a valid objection.

A) "Revanchist Entente teams up with the USA for a rematch". Germany, Russia, and Italy form the Triple Alliance in the 1880s (Bismarck has a prophetic epiphany about European alliance systems in the early-mid 1870s, so he purposefully backs Russian claims in the Balkans and opposes A-H ones since the Congress of Berlin in 1878, see here for detailed discussion of the PoD) and fight WWI against the Quadruple Entente (Britain, France, Austria-Hungary, and the Ottoman Empire) to a total victory. Besides the above settlement, Germany, Russia, and Italy partitioned the French colonial empire and the Middle East, plus bits of the British and Japanese colonial possessions (Germany: Morocco, half of Algeria, Gabon, Middle Congo, Ubangi-Shari, half of French Western Africa, Palestine, Syria, Iraq/Kuwait, Indochina; Russia: Northern Anatolia, the Turkish Straits, Persia, Afghanistan, Manchuria; Italy: half of Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Ethiopia, Djibouti, all of Somalia, Chad, half of French Western Africa, Malta, Cyprus, southern Anatolia). Egypt-Sudan has been turned into a German-italian protectorate and the control of the Suez Canal is shared by Germany, Italy, and Russia. Both Japan and Britain got it off lightly, only losing Manchuria and being expelled from the Mediterranean, northeastern Africa, and the Middle East, respectively. A generation later, the TA has maintained its strategic partnership thanks to strong economic and political links, but has developed a worsening strategic rivalry with the USA and Britain over hegemony of Asia, while Nazi France and militarist Japan got increasingly revanchist. Eventually, these tensions exploded in WWII.

B) "Smart totalitarians stick together". Owning to the deaths of Hitler and Stalin in late 1939 (respectively succeeded by Goering and Molotov), and Anglo-French intervention in the Winter War, the leaderships of Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia, and Fascist Italy are able to sign a strategic alliance, the Tripartite/Axis Pact in early 1940, with a full military alliance, economic cooperation, and a partition of Eurasia: Germany lays claims to Benelux, France, Scandinavia, Western Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Syria, Palestine, Iraq/Kuwait, central and southern Africa; Russia to Finland, Eastern Poland, Bessarabia, the Baltics, Bulgaria, Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, and India; Italy to Yugoslavia, Greece, northern and northeastern Africa. All three regimes gradually shift their ideology and propaganda to deemphasize ideologic hostility to each other and emphasize the one with Western democracies. Nazi Germany revises its geopolitical aims to see central-southern Africa as its Lebenstraum, and targets northern and western Europe for racial-political assimilation, while Soviet Russia redefines the Middle East, Central, and South Asia as its main direction of expansion. A demilitarized zone on the German-Russian border is established with air recognition rights for both parties and transition rights for allied expeditionary forces.

C) "Fascists stick together". Owning to the victory of the Whites in the Russian Civil War and a takeover by far-right not-Nazi nationalists in Germany, both Germany and Russia develop vanilla fascist (not Nazist) regimes in the 1920s-1930s and an increasing economic, military, and political cooperation which blossoms into a full military alliance, soon joined by Fascist Italy and Hungary, against the increasing hostility of France and Britain. Albeit the Axis bloc was initially strong enough to bully the Western powers into allowing the Axis rearmement and partition of various countries in Central and Eastern Europe, eventually enough was enough and war erupted.

D) "Communists stick together". Italy initially is not a full member of the Alliance initially (albeit it soon becomes a conquered satellite). An unfortunate string of circumstances causes victory of Trotzki in the struggle for leadership of Soviet Russia in the the 1920s and a Communist takeover in Germany in the early 30s. The two Communist powerhouses are soon able to build an efficient economic, political, and military partnership, and their combined forces and influence overrun Central Europe in the mid-late 1930s. Alternatively, Germany fell to Communism in 1919, combined forces of Communist Germany and Soviet Russia overrun Central Europe, the revolution in Germany makes the internationalist Trotski-Zinoviev faction seize the leadership in Soviet Russia, and develop a constructive German-Russian leadership of the communist bloc. The Entente powers are too exausted by WWI to stage a counteroffensive, so they fortify on the Rhine and the Alps. They regret the decision a generation later, when the Communist bloc has developed enough to overrun Westren Europe.

Pick whatever option do you prefer, discuss the merits of the variosu PoDs, but please do not forget to discuss the strategic issues, course, and outcome of WWII in this scenario.The thread is meant as a wargame, after all. The scenario provides you with the ultimate land vs. naval, America vs. Europe, German-Russian vs. Anglo-Saxon, Oceania vs. Eurasia, and in all but one option, Democracy vs. Totalitarianism, titanic struggle.
 
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An unfortunate string of circumstances causes the victory of Communist regimes in Germany, Hungary, and Russia, and their combined forces overrun Central Europe in 1919-21.
That is materially impossible unless some miracle happens. You could maybe place it in the '30s, but 1919-21 is out of reach for defeated germany with no real army and a terrible economic crisys, and maybe for russia too who had her own troubles making the economy work (the NEP had just been implemented).
 

Germaniac

Donor
Nazi German would never, and when I say never I mean it, join in an alliance with Russia (Whether Soviet or Not). Hitler Wanted the East and a fascist state in the east isn't going to change that, Did a fascist state in Austria stop him from attacking.

So that takes two out. Communist Germany and Soviet Russia is the second most unlikely. A communist Germany is a much more progressive and actual Communist state. Germany had a middle class, in Russia the peasants skipped the Marx part and jumped over the middle class working folk. A German Communist state would be basically exactly as Marx wanted it. A germany led by the likes of Rosa Luxemburg would be NOTHING LIKE SOVIET UNION THEY WOULD BE COMPLETELY OPPOSED TO EACH OTHER. In fact you might see a war between the two, as Trotsky would be a closer representation of Pure communism than Stalin and his ilk were, so the germans would gravitate towards him more.

The MOST likely and actually possible is that German Empire-Russian Empire-Kingdom of Italy form alliance in WW1. This unlike the others makes real sense. Though you would have to find a different reason for war and France would have to be agressor. Nicholas of Russia was a germanophobe like his father. You would likely need Alexander I to remain for considerable time and allow Alexander II to die before he becomes emperor and Grad Duke Vladimir chosen to be emperor instead of his grandson.

Thus You have an Alliance between OTL Germany, a weaker economic Russia but a more stable one, and An OTL Italy. Likely Great Britain will not join the war as it still has very good relations with Russia and knows it will not win a land war (even though it might :)) France and likely Austria will get trounced and France will be fored to give up most of its colonies and give considerable amounts of reperations to the Victors. German will likely absorb AH German lands and AH Poland with a free Hungary and the rest to Russia. France will likely become Far right nationalist and OTL Italy goes fascist. France declares war on Germany again France eventually looses. Not a World War but it might ally with Japan
 
So that takes two out. Communist Germany and Soviet Russia is the second most unlikely. A communist Germany is a much more progressive and actual Communist state. Germany had a middle class, in Russia the peasants skipped the Marx part and jumped over the middle class working folk. A German Communist state would be basically exactly as Marx wanted it. A germany led by the likes of Rosa Luxemburg would be NOTHING LIKE SOVIET UNION THEY WOULD BE COMPLETELY OPPOSED TO EACH OTHER. In fact you might see a war between the two, as Trotsky would be a closer representation of Pure communism than Stalin and his ilk were, so the germans would gravitate towards him more.
This is fast becoming my pet peeve. Where does this assumption come from that a communist Germany in the early 1920s would have no effect whatsoever on the political development of the RSFSR (assuming that it exists in the timeline)? There're several problems with this assumption.

The first is that a communist Germany butterflies away the Russo-centrism of the USSR[-analogue]. Lenin's still around and Trotsky's still influential at this time (not to mention Zinoviev and others), and these people were all for the integration of the RSFSR with central and western european socialist powers, since this would lessen the influence of peasants and would increase by orders of magnitude the productive capacity available to socialists. The problem was that the central and western europen socialist powers failed to materialize; if they had, forget about a USSR boundary in Belarus. Not only is it in the Russians' interests, it is in the Germans' interests as well. German socialists were highly regarded, and would have occupied key positions in whatever supra-national body emerged. Even if they hadn't, they would have been extremely prominant in the Comintern, and would have been able to secure the political independence of that body vis a vis the various states. This is in contrast to OTL, where the Comintern fell under the domination of the Russian party and thus the USSR. I doubt very much that the Germans would want to pass up this chance to extend their political influence and power into Russia.

The second is that butterflying away a Russo-centric USSR virtually guarantees that Stalin's going to remain a relative nonentity. Prior to his gaining the leadership of the Russian party (which was by no means certain even in 1922, and the PoD is before this) he was a virtually unknown figure internationally, and relied on allies to get his positions into Comintern discussions. A more powerful Comintern and a German party that's contesting influence with the Russian party in both the Comintern and the supra-national confederation is going to stop Stalin dead in his tracks; the stage has simply become too large for him. ITTL, Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Miasnikov (sic.) are going to be much more influential than IOTL, not only because their positions would seem to have been proved right, but because they were well-established players internationally, while Stalin was very much a Russian figure. So no Commie Civil War, because the political divergence IOTL isn't allowed to take place by virtue of the nature and placement of the PoD. Instead of a Luxemburgist Germany facing off against a Stalinist Soviet Union you'd have one supra-national entity whose political positions would remain along the lines of the Second Comintern Congress, and probably tending left of those.

I do agree with malaspina that including Hungary is just impossible. I can think of no reasonable PoD that allows for both a successful Hungarian and German revolution; you'd need multiple PoDs, some in Germany, some in Hungary, to the extent that your AH would become mightily contrived. Pick one and stick with it: personally, I'm fond of the "commie Germany and Russia overrun Poland" scenario *prepares to get trolled*, since commie Hungary couldn't even beat a proto-state (Czechoslovakia) or one that had been overrun just a couple years earlier (Romania). I find it hard to believe that commie Hungary could help in overrunning southeastern Europe, given their poor performance IOTL.
 

General Zod

Banned
Nazi German would never, and when I say never I mean it, join in an alliance with Russia (Whether Soviet or Not). Hitler Wanted the East and a fascist state in the east isn't going to change that, Did a fascist state in Austria stop him from attacking.

I had foreseen that obvious objection, and adjusted the PoDs accordingly.

Someone apparently missed the bits in the Nazi-Soviet scenario where it is told that both Hitler and Stalin die in late 1939 and a saner Nazi (Goering) and Soviet (Molotov) leadership take over, with a more flexible geopolitical and ideological vision and less paranoia and megalomania, and in the All-Fascist scenario where it is told that Germany becomes a Fascist not-Nazi regime. No Lebenstraum genocidal racists, but Napoleonic far-right expansionists. Please read the PoDs.

In fact you might see a war between the two, as Trotsky would be a closer representation of Pure communism than Stalin and his ilk were, so the germans would gravitate towards him more.

That is materially impossible unless some miracle happens. You could maybe place it in the '30s, but 1919-21 is out of reach for defeated germany with no real army and a terrible economic crisys, and maybe for russia too who had her own troubles making the economy work (the NEP had just been implemented).

Good points, I have adjusted the All-Communist scenarios so that Trotski wins the power struggle in Soviet Russia in the 20s and Germany goes Communist in the early 30s.

The MOST likely and actually possible is that German Empire-Russian Empire-Kingdom of Italy form alliance in WW1. This unlike the others makes real sense.

My PoD is that Bismarck has an epiphany about the harmful nature of A-H alliance in the 1870s, so he starts strongly backing Russian interests since the Congress of Berlin.

Though you would have to find a different reason for war and France would have to be agressor.

My PoD makes that irrelevant. By the time WWI occurs, the Russo-German-Italian Triple Alliance has been into place, with no serious conflict of claims and strong economic links, for decades. Several different WWI trigger points for this scenario are possible, see here.

Nicholas of Russia was a germanophobe like his father.

This is not entirely true, and certainly not in a manner that would derail the scenario. See the Willy-Nicky correspondence, and the Bjorko Treaty.

You would likely need Alexander I to remain for considerable time and allow Alexander II to die before he becomes emperor and Grad Duke Vladimir chosen to be emperor instead of his grandson.

I suppose you are talking about Alexander II and III here, otherwise your point is incomprehensible. Yes, Alexander III may be a slight problem, but not a serious one to the PoD. There are ways around it: a) he might have a change of heart about Germany when Bismarck strongly backs Russia at the Congress of Berlin b) Alexander II lives a decade longer (the shift in foreign relationships changes his schedule and butterflies away the assassination), makes Russia more liberal and akin to the German Empire, and entrenches the alliance, Alexander III only has a short reign and changes things little c) his elder borther never catches tuberculosis and takes the throne d) he dies early. All in all, IMO butterflying Alexander II's assassination is the option that supports the scenario better, although it is far from essential.

Likely Great Britain will not join the war as it still has very good relations with Russia and knows it will not win a land war (even though it might :))

Given the PoD, Russia has no incentive to befriend Britain whatsoever. It remains its main strategic rival. At the most, Britain might assume that the Russo-German bloc is too powerful to fight, even with the Austrians, the French, and the Ototmans (an accurate assumption), and throw Paris and Vienna to the wolves. However, this requires to give up the balance of power on the continent and concede the Middle East to the Russo-Germans. Not an easy price to pay fro London, esp. the latter.

France and likely Austria will get trounced and France will be fored to give up most of its colonies and give considerable amounts of reperations to the Victors. German will likely absorb AH German lands and AH Poland with a free Hungary and the rest to Russia. France will likely become Far right nationalist and OTL Italy goes fascist. France declares war on Germany again France eventually looses. Not a World War but it might ally with Japan

Germany absorbs Austria and Bohemia-Moravia, (and Luxemburg, Lorraine, Netherlands, and Flanders), Italy Trento, Kustenland, Dalmatia, (and Nice, Savoy, Corsica), Russia Austrian Poland, Galicia, and Bukovina, Hungary keeps Slovakia, Backa, and half Transylvania, their satellites keep the rest. France loses all of its colonial empire to Germany and Italy, plus Lorraine, Nice, Savoy, Corsica, Nord. The Ottoman Empire too is partitioned (Germany: Syria, Iraq/Kuwait, Palestine; Russia: northern Anatolia, Persia, Afghanistan; Italy: southern Anatolia). Italy does not go fascist with a much larger war booty and a stronger economy.

It becomes a World War when the TA bloc attempts to expand in Asia and picks a serious rivalry with the USA and the UK, which make an alliance of convenience (or a parallel war to) with revanchist fascist France and militarist Japan.
 

General Zod

Banned
This is fast becoming my pet peeve. Where does this assumption come from that a communist Germany in the early 1920s would have no effect whatsoever on the political development of the RSFSR (assuming that it exists in the timeline)? There're several problems with this assumption.

The first is that a communist Germany butterflies away the Russo-centrism of the USSR[-analogue]. Lenin's still around and Trotsky's still influential at this time (not to mention Zinoviev and others), and these people were all for the integration of the RSFSR with central and western european socialist powers, since this would lessen the influence of peasants and would increase by orders of magnitude the productive capacity available to socialists. The problem was that the central and western europen socialist powers failed to materialize; if they had, forget about a USSR boundary in Belarus. Not only is it in the Russians' interests, it is in the Germans' interests as well. German socialists were highly regarded, and would have occupied key positions in whatever supra-national body emerged. Even if they hadn't, they would have been extremely prominant in the Comintern, and would have been able to secure the political independence of that body vis a vis the various states. This is in contrast to OTL, where the Comintern fell under the domination of the Russian party and thus the USSR. I doubt very much that the Germans would want to pass up this chance to extend their political influence and power into Russia.

The second is that butterflying away a Russo-centric USSR virtually guarantees that Stalin's going to remain a relative nonentity. Prior to his gaining the leadership of the Russian party (which was by no means certain even in 1922, and the PoD is before this) he was a virtually unknown figure internationally, and relied on allies to get his positions into Comintern discussions. A more powerful Comintern and a German party that's contesting influence with the Russian party in both the Comintern and the supra-national confederation is going to stop Stalin dead in his tracks; the stage has simply become too large for him. ITTL, Trotsky, Zinoviev, and Miasnikov (sic.) are going to be much more influential than IOTL, not only because their positions would seem to have been proved right, but because they were well-established players internationally, while Stalin was very much a Russian figure. So no Commie Civil War, because the political divergence IOTL isn't allowed to take place by virtue of the nature and placement of the PoD. Instead of a Luxemburgist Germany facing off against a Stalinist Soviet Union you'd have one supra-national entity whose political positions would remain along the lines of the Second Comintern Congress, and probably tending left of those.

Your political points have much merit. However, the point of malaspina also has much merit that Germany and Russia might be just too weak in 1919-21 to resist a rollback by the Entente powers. The point is debatable, and requires to decide whether Britain, France, and Italy could still muster the will and resources to kick back the Communists from Central Europe when they take power in Germany, or they just build a sanitayr cordon on the Rhine and the Alps. IMO the point is debatable, so I'm going to make two options, for Germany going Communist in 1919 or in 1933.

I do agree with malaspina that including Hungary is just impossible. I can think of no reasonable PoD that allows for both a successful Hungarian and German revolution; you'd need multiple PoDs, some in Germany, some in Hungary, to the extent that your AH would become mightily contrived. Pick one and stick with it: personally, I'm fond of the "commie Germany and Russia overrun Poland" scenario *prepares to get trolled*, since commie Hungary couldn't even beat a proto-state (Czechoslovakia) or one that had been overrun just a couple years earlier (Romania). I find it hard to believe that commie Hungary could help in overrunning southeastern Europe, given their poor performance IOTL.

Agreed, mention of Hungary has been removed.
 
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Your political points have much merit. However, the point of malaspina also has much merit that Germany and Russia might be just too weak in 1919-21 to resist a rollback by the Entente powers. The point is debatable, and requires to decide whether Britain, France, and Italy could still muster the will and resources to kick back the Communists from Central Europe when they take power in Germany, or they just build a sanitayr cordon on the Rhine and the Alps. IMO the point is debatable, so I'm going to make two options, for Germany going Communist in 1919 or in 1933.
IMHO a more likely scenario (for a Germany going commie in the early 1920s) is a cordon sanitaire running Rhine-Main-Sudetes-Carpathians-Prut. The Allies have the military force on the ground to take a significant bite out of southern Germany, but not, I think, to occupy the whole country. There's also the political element; these are troops who, for the most part, were relieved at the Armistice and didn't want to fight any more. They'd be occupying foriegn territory, not defending their own, and what little elan they had to begin with would drain away soon.

I realize the situations are very different, but for a frame of reference we should take a look at the allied intervention in the Russian Civil War, where they failed to make any significant impact. Of course, the allies have a big advantage vis a vis Germany in that they have a land front and land-based supply lines, but their indiginous allies are correspondingly weaker and they can't play off nationalist resentments (as they did in Baku, Estonia, and Ukraine) in Germany. Hence, I don't think the allies could occupy the whole country. If the PoD gives a commie Germany in 1919-1922, I'd think a split along essentially the southern border of the North German Confederation (with the exception of the Rhineland, which was in the NGC and would not be in this case), enforced by Allied troops in South Germany, would be reasonable.

Also, here's a map of the "common assumptions in all scenarios", though it only shows Europe.

2pslj7q.jpg


A companion map, with the lime green showing what I believe to be a reasonable frontier between socialism and capitalism:

se6a0k.png
 
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General Zod

Banned
IMHO a more likely scenario (for a Germany going commie in the early 1920s) is a cordon sanitaire running Rhine-Main-Sudetes-Carpathians-Prut. The Allies have the military force on the ground to take a significant bite out of southern Germany, but not, I think, to occupy the whole country. There's also the political element; these are troops who, for the most part, were relieved at the Armistice and didn't want to fight any more. They'd be occupying foriegn territory, not defending their own, and what little elan they had to begin with would drain away soon.

I realize the situations are very different, but for a frame of reference we should take a look at the allied intervention in the Russian Civil War, where they failed to make any significant impact. Of course, the allies have a big advantage vis a vis Germany in that they have a land front and land-based supply lines, but their indiginous allies are correspondingly weaker and they can't play off nationalist resentments (as they did in Baku, Estonia, and Ukraine) in Germany. Hence, I don't think the allies could occupy the whole country. If the PoD gives a commie Germany in 1919-1922, I'd think a split along essentially the southern border of the North German Confederation (with the exception of the Rhineland, which was in the NGC and would not be in this case), enforced by Allied troops in South Germany, would be reasonable.

I wouldn't say your idea about a division of communist-capitalist Germany in the 1919 PoD is unreasonable, quite the contrary, but for various reasons (not the least the fact I wish to keep the resources-industrial-manpower pool and the strategic balance roughly equal for Axis countries among all PoD options) I feel compelled to declare it incompatible with the scenario as given. Please assume that whatever butterfly you think plausible and sufficient is at work here to deny any significant success for an Entente intervention in Communist Germany, be it philo-Communist insurrections in France and Italy, early Red victory in RCW and Soviet military assistance to German Communists, economic depression in Western countries (plausible if Germany and Central Europe go Communist in addition to the financial burden of WWI), or a mix of the above, crippling Entente efforts.

The Entente powers eventually have to write off Central Europe and build a wall in Alsace-Lorraine and the Alps, while the Russo-German Commies happily sweep Austria, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary. Of course, this shall avail them very little in the long term, since after the Communist bloc has rebuilt its economy and developed its industries and military, it shall come crashing defenses in France, Benelux, and Italy. The scenario assumes that whatever the PoD, the Western powers lose Western Europe (including Italy in the all-Communist PoD) to the Axis bloc when WWII erupts as soon as IOTL or sooner, and it is left to the USA-UK-Commonwealth bloc to fight the uphill struggle to win back Europe (if they can at all).

Also, here's a map of the "common assumptions in all scenarios", though it only shows Europe.

Thanks, it was very nifty. I think Europe only would be meaningful to show, since the rest of the world would be too different in the various scenarioes. Also take into account that this map is the effect of pre-WWII settlements and early war events converging by the magic of geopolitical butterflies ;) to produce the same territorial-strategic outcome (roughly equivalent to OTL mid-late 1940) at the start of the scenario.

As for the second map, sorry, very nifty, but it defies the purpose of the exercise (strategic equality between PoD options; lacking Italy in the Axis bloc before the war is nowhere as harmful to that as lacking half of Germany). :p
 
I wouldn't say your idea about a division of communist-capitalist Germany in the 1919 PoD is unreasonable, quite the contrary, but for various reasons (not the least the fact I wish to keep the resources-industrial-manpower pool and the strategic balance roughly equal for Axis countries among all PoD options) I feel compelled to declare it incompatible with the scenario as given. Please assume that whatever butterfly you think plausible and sufficient is at work here to deny any significant success for an Entente intervention in Communist Germany, be it philo-Communist insurrections in France and Italy, early Red victory in RCW and Soviet military assistance to German Communists, economic depression in Western countries (plausible if Germany and Central Europe go Communist in addition to the financial burden of WWI), or a mix of the above, crippling Entente efforts.
Nuts to your scenario! :p

Seriously, if there's no significant allied backlash, it feels like a commiewank to me, but it's your scenario, so I'll leave it alone and just hash up a TL.
 
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General Zod

Banned
A note: I felt compelled to provide various PoDs and a poll to enliven the scenario and make it more about geopolitics and strategy, and less about political minutiae.

Therefore, pick whatever option do you prefer, discuss the merits of the various PoDs, but please do not get sidetracked by the fact I provided a poll and don't forget to discuss the strategic issues, course, and outcome of WWII in this scenario. The thread is meant as a wargame, after all. The scenario provides you with the ultimate continental vs. peripheral, land vs. naval, America vs. Europe, German-Russian vs. Anglo-Saxon, Oceania vs. Eurasia, and in all but one option, Democracy vs. Totalitarianism (well, more or less, militarist Japan ITTL is the possible odd ally for Western democracies much as Soviet Russia was in IOTL) titanic struggle. Let your strategic juices flow.
 
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General Zod

Banned
Seriously, if there's no significant allied backlash, it feels like a commiewank to me.

Not it isn't, it's a Russia-Germany vs. USA-UK WWII.

The All-Commie option is just one of four, I provided several just (and took care to arrange the PODs as to remove Hitler and Stalin) because I did not want the discussion get mired in arguing the political merits of the PoD and ignore the strategic scenario, not to mention the obvious (and annoying) objection that Hitler and Stalin would soon backstab each other well before WWII is over.

Historical evidence tells that such a scenario came quite close to fruition in late 1940 IOTL, and came short owning to excessive Hitlerite paranoia and Stalinist greed about the Balkans, so I could have just picked a PoD about that missed opportunity, or Allied intervention in the Winter War, but to defuse the expected knee-jerk objection that Hitler was too megalomanic and Stalin too paranoid, to resist backstabbing the ally before war with the Western democracies was over, so I played safe and purposefully changed German and Russian leadership in the PoD options.
 
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Aww, grand strategy? Must you?

If you must...

THE AXIS

IMHO, a major priority for the Axis early in the war (aside from gobbling oh-so-doomed France, and thus securing the Channel ports) is going to be securing the Eastern Mediterranian. Given the lineup, this means they'll be going after Cyprus, Malta, and Suez. This is obviously going to antagonize Greece, and possibly Turkey, depending on whether or not Russia demands use of the Straits, and what regimes are in power. No idea whether Italian forces are adequate to the task. Assuming the Axis isn't foolish and allows Italy time to properly rearm, they might very well be. If they're not, Russia's going to have to base her Black Sea Fleet, or part of it, in the Dodecanese in the interbellum, or seize the Straits at the start of the war.

Of course, this strategy leaves little for Germany and Russia to do, other than occupy France, so they'll be looking for a theater. Scandinavia seems a fair battlefield between the British and the Russo-Germans, with the Russians having a[n almost unusable] land connection and the Germans an excellent base in Copenhagen. What, you say, it's Danish? Our paras say differently.

Once the Eastern Med is secured, Russia can attack India, probably through Persia since Afghanistan's infrastructure is basically nil. This also gives the Russians and Italians the opportunity to squeeze British possessions in the Middle East. The other major avenue of attack on Britain is against Britain itself, which the Axis can actually develop proper landing ships for given their lack of any continental enemies, actual or conceivable.

THE ENTENTE

The Entente knows that its strategy has to be one of encirclement on a grand scale. Particularly in the early years of the war, it will primarily be on the defensive, but if it can maintain naval control over the Eastern Mediterranian, it has a good basis for counteroffensives once the Axis has exhausted its naval momentum. The Entente has to try to gain the loyalty of the peripheral countries (Greece, Turkey, Persia) which shouldn't be too difficult due to the Axis' tendency to ride roughshod over countries in their way. It also has to do something to ensure the survival of these countries, particularly Greece and Persia.

Of course, Britain will be doing all this in the first few months, France keeping all her forces in France in a futile attempt to defend it, and the USA nowhere near theater. The US might be better employed in the Pacific and Arctic, in an invasion of Siberia and Archangel. These are distractions, particularly in Siberia, but if they can divert enough troops, India could be secured from invasion before an invasion even begins.

From there, it's just a matter of picking a spot, landing forces, seizing territory, working inland, and repeating. Dalmatia and Albania are good targets for this, connected to Italy only by sea and providing a way to liberate the Balkans. Another good candidate would be southern France, since this option bypasses the main German concentrations in the Channel ports, and threatens a wheeling move around the Alps and into the German heartland.
 

General Zod

Banned
Aww, grand strategy? Must you?

If you must...

Hey, nobody stops you from churning out all kinds of nifty TLs, quite the contry, gimme, gimme. :D;)

I stressed the point about strategy just because I would not want posters to argue about the PoDs alone (or worse just dismiss the idea with "Hitler would never do it" without properly reading the PoD). But discussing them and strategy both, or creating TLs, very very appreciated.

Give us your TLs. Just don't ever mention Barbarossa, until the Axis flags are raised in Washington. :D

THE AXIS

IMHO, a major priority for the Axis early in the war (aside from gobbling oh-so-doomed France, and thus securing the Channel ports) is going to be securing the Eastern Mediterranian. Given the lineup, this means they'll be going after Cyprus, Malta, and Suez. This is obviously going to antagonize Greece, and possibly Turkey, depending on whether or not Russia demands use of the Straits, and what regimes are in power. No idea whether Italian forces are adequate to the task. Assuming the Axis isn't foolish and allows Italy time to properly rearm, they might very well be. If they're not, Russia's going to have to base her Black Sea Fleet, or part of it, in the Dodecanese in the interbellum, or seize the Straits at the start of the war.

Of course, this strategy leaves little for Germany and Russia to do, other than occupy France, so they'll be looking for a theater. Scandinavia seems a fair battlefield between the British and the Russo-Germans, with the Russians having a[n almost unusable] land connection and the Germans an excellent base in Copenhagen. What, you say, it's Danish? Our paras say differently.

Once the Eastern Med is secured, Russia can attack India, probably through Persia since Afghanistan's infrastructure is basically nil. This also gives the Russians and Italians the opportunity to squeeze British possessions in the Middle East. The other major avenue of attack on Britain is against Britain itself, which the Axis can actually develop proper landing ships for given their lack of any continental enemies, actual or conceivable.

THE ENTENTE

The Entente knows that its strategy has to be one of encirclement on a grand scale. Particularly in the early years of the war, it will primarily be on the defensive, but if it can maintain naval control over the Eastern Mediterranian, it has a good basis for counteroffensives once the Axis has exhausted its naval momentum. The Entente has to try to gain the loyalty of the peripheral countries (Greece, Turkey, Persia) which shouldn't be too difficult due to the Axis' tendency to ride roughshod over countries in their way. It also has to do something to ensure the survival of these countries, particularly Greece and Persia.

Of course, Britain will be doing all this in the first few months, France keeping all her forces in France in a futile attempt to defend it, and the USA nowhere near theater. The US might be better employed in the Pacific and Arctic, in an invasion of Siberia and Archangel. These are distractions, particularly in Siberia, but if they can divert enough troops, India could be secured from invasion before an invasion even begins.

From there, it's just a matter of picking a spot, landing forces, seizing territory, working inland, and repeating. Dalmatia and Albania are good targets for this, connected to Italy only by sea and providing a way to liberate the Balkans. Another good candidate would be southern France, since this option bypasses the main German concentrations in the Channel ports, and threatens a wheeling move around the Alps and into the German heartland.

Well, this are rather nifty ideas, kudos. A bit points: about the Germans and Russians having little to do and seeking a theater, I thoguht it was obvious that a rather signfiicant amount of allied operational coordination and combined forces, and a rather massive amount of expeditionary forces, would be necessary for the Axis in this WWII (yet another reason I provided a saner and mutually-trusting Axis leadership in the PoD). It would be more than a little dumb to leave the Italians and the Russians alone with the rather daunting task of kicking the Anglo-Americans out of the Middle East and North Africa, not to mention making further inroads into India and Africa both. I do fully expect a massive German Expeditionary corps to suppy the Italians in North Africa and the Russians in the Middle East, as well as a massive Russian Expeditionary corps to help the Germans in France, and the Italo-Germans in North Africa. The whole point of this Eurasian compact is to make full use of combined resopurces and inner ilines to make concentrical expansion against Anglo-Saxon naval power, if the Axis sticks to each other's "natural" theaters and the Heer is twiddling their collective thumbs while the Russians and Italians bleed in Persia, they are doomed, American power would eat them.

Also about Sealion: I was always persuaded that combined German-Russian industrial and manpower pool was the only way to make it feasible (with 1940s technology; in WWI the Russo-Germans should most likely sitck with creating a super-fleet and an airtight blockade), but I wonder how much preparation it would take, and whether USA air and naval power could make the island unassailable against Russo-German onslaught, or not.

Also, Southern France ? Isn't it just too much close to European heartland ? Could the Anglo-Americans ever land enough men and equipment not to be eaten alieve by massive Axis counterattack (again, fully assuming the Axis coordinates its forces and resources at least as efficiently as the Allies did in OTL WWII) ??? I agree that Scandinavia, Spain-Portugal, and the Balkans are peripheral enough to stage a major landing with a decent chance of success, but IMO France or Italy are kinda suicidal if Americans don't have nukes to blow the way open. German-Russian industrial potential is close enough to Anglo-American one, that the Allies can forget having anything close to the massive air superiority they had in OTL Sicily/Salerno/Normandy. Naval, perhaps, but air, never.
 
Your first point, about the Germans having to aid the Russians and Italians, is valid, but limited by the German know-how and several other factors. The first big factor is the need to actually occupy the defeated countries so that the Anglo-Americans can't just walk in and fortify so that they can't be gotten out. This is going to eat a lot of manpower, and while it might be better for the Russians to expend their lower-quality troops doing this than the Germans, the Germans (even if they do trust the Russian leadership) aren't going to take kindly to massive concentrations of Russian troops on both the eastern and western borders of Germany. At the very least, Germany's going to be occupying northern France.

The second big factor is based on the assumption that Scandinavia isn't a walkover, and that the Anglo-Americans are able to hold significant territories in Norway even against Russo-German attack. It's very difficult to reduce someone entrenched in Norway, particularly since land-based supply lines are hardly faster than sea-based supply lines at moving goods, and since land-based supply lines are easier to interdict by air. I doubt very much that air superiority over Scandinavia would be attained quickly by either side, keeping that theater open for much longer than it was IOTL.

The third big factor is that the German Expeditionary Forces are essentially going to have to rely on Russian and Italian supply lines. It's not like the Germans can maintain their own convoys in the theaters in which they'll be operating. Roads are few and bad, and if they try to clog them they'll be sunk. This effectively means that German troops operating with the Italians and Russians are going to have to rely on inferior (even with help from the Germans on logistics since WWI, I doubt that the other Axis powers will be quite up to snuff) Italian and Russian logistics. The fact that Italian and Russian convoys will have to supply German troops with German supplies and their own troops with their own supplies further complicates things, and slows down the pace of campaigns in which GEFs are involved. The Axis might have standardized their supplies, but I doubt it, if not for reasons of national pride then because of the expense of retooling the factories.

The fourth big factor has to do with the invasion of Britain, which is where know-how comes in. To my knowledge, none of the Axis nations has ever attempted (much less succeeded in) an amphibious invasion against a defended coast. The situation is made worse by the fact that neither air nor naval superiority is guaranteed; indeed, it is distinctly unlikely. Basically, this means that the Germans are going to have to evolve an amphibious doctrine essentially from scratch, as well as whatever scraps the Japanese might or might not send their way. Not only will they have to evolve doctrine, they will have to develop the technology to transport men and material safely, and they will have to mass-produce it. This, and the training of the assault troops, is going to take time, a number of years in fact. During that time, it would be distinctly counter-productive to send the troops for the invasion halfway around the world where they would a) not learn the necessary skills, b) be committed and thus hard to withdraw, as well as understrength. These considerations will tie down a considerable amount of German manpower close to home, though the invasion troops could participate in the reduction of Norway.

Also about Sealion: I was always persuaded that combined German-Russian industrial and manpower pool was the only way to make it feasible (with 1940s technology; in WWI the Russo-Germans should most likely sitck with creating a super-fleet and an airtight blockade), but I wonder how much preparation it would take, and whether USA air and naval power could make the island unassailable against Russo-German onslaught, or not.
This is correct, as far as it goes, but you have to take into account Russian and German starting fleet strength (guaranteed to be much lower than the Anglo-American even if the pre-Axis won WWI). This means that the Russo-Germans are going to have to devote much of their resources to a shipbuilding program, not only of warships to protect the invasion, but of landing ships themselves, of which neither Russia nor Germany possesses one. As for an airtight blockade, that's probably unnecessary; all you need to do is keep Anglo-American heavy unity out of the Channel and north of The Wash, and your invasion will have a reasonably good degree of protection. American air power might very well be decisive here, depending on how much they commit, its integration with the UK Commands, and the degree of development of machines and doctrine.

Essentially, it's going to take massive amounts of preparation, which might very well take so long and give the Entente so much time to prepare that the invasion will be very closely fought, and with no surety of victory at all.

Also, Southern France ? Isn't it just too much close to European heartland ? Could the Anglo-Americans ever land enough men and equipment not to be eaten alieve by massive Axis counterattack (again, fully assuming the Axis coordinates its forces and resources at least as efficiently as the Allies did in OTL WWII) ??? I agree that Scandinavia, Spain-Portugal, and the Balkans are peripheral enough to stage a major landing with a decent chance of success, but IMO France or Italy are kinda suicidal if Americans don't have nukes to blow the way open. German-Russian industrial potential is close enough to Anglo-American one, that the Allies can forget having anything close to the massive air superiority they had in OTL Sicily/Salerno/Normandy. Naval, perhaps, but air, never.
I was assuming that the Axis failed to establish effective control over Algeria (a successful Entente defense there is possible, particulalry if the French fleet is evacuated in time, and if American troops make it to Morocco). This, plus Gibraltar, would be at first a thorn in the side of the Axis, and later a staging ground for an invasion of somewhere. The south of France seemed reasonable to me because it's fair invasion country, because it's likely to be less well-protected than northern France, because the Axis has no real way of threatening the invasion force since it can only really be attacked from Italy and the Anglo-Americans can probably assemble a fleet to beat the Italo-Russian, particularly if they've managed to hold Suez, and because the Entente needs to strike somewhere decisive. Italy's out due to mountainous terrain and the narrow front, the Benelux and Germany's out due to the difficulty of landing and the concentration of the enemy, northern France is out because of the German naval presence, and there's no way an invasion force is getting close to Russia. If the Entente doesn't strike somewhere, they're bound to lose simply because they can't force their enemies to submit. The south of France seems to me to be the Entente's only chance to strike anywhere near the vitals of the Axis.

The interesting thing about this situation is that neither side can really threaten the vital centers of the other, at least not without humungous risk to itself (Germany invading Britain, Entente invading France).
 
The point is debatable, and requires to decide whether Britain, France, and Italy could still muster the will and resources to kick back the Communists from Central Europe when they take power in Germany, or they just build a sanitayr cordon on the Rhine and the Alps.
They could have starved the Germans into submission. No help could come from the russia, who in 1919 had its own problems with the farmers refusing to give their produce to the cities. On top of that, German heavy weaponry (artillery, guns, kriegsmarine) had been taken by the allies. There's no way Germany could have won a war. And Russia was up to no war either, one the bolschevics' main promises having been to end the war just two years before.
 

General Zod

Banned
The first big factor is the need to actually occupy the defeated countries so that the Anglo-Americans can't just walk in and fortify so that they can't be gotten out. This is going to eat a lot of manpower, and while it might be better for the Russians to expend their lower-quality troops doing this than the Germans, the Germans (even if they do trust the Russian leadership) aren't going to take kindly to massive concentrations of Russian troops on both the eastern and western borders of Germany. At the very least, Germany's going to be occupying northern France.

Yep, this is true, but the Russians can provide a significant help for garrison duty and coastal defense of southern France, Italy, the Balkans.

Moreover, again precisely because it makes good sense for the Axis (and the Anglo-Americans) to cover most major operations and theaters with mixed troops (any single nation's manpower and resource pool is taxed less, allied troops get experience), I would expect that a significant amount of Russians would take part into preparations for Sealion (just like a significant amount of Germans would fight in Middle East and India and another significant amount of Germand and Russians in North Africa). Some of them could train in the Baltic (and help with Scandinavia), but others would have to train in northern and central Atlantic France, alongside German troops.

The second big factor is based on the assumption that Scandinavia isn't a walkover, and that the Anglo-Americans are able to hold significant territories in Norway even against Russo-German attack. It's very difficult to reduce someone entrenched in Norway, particularly since land-based supply lines are hardly faster than sea-based supply lines at moving goods, and since land-based supply lines are easier to interdict by air. I doubt very much that air superiority over Scandinavia would be attained quickly by either side, keeping that theater open for much longer than it was IOTL.

This is very true. And to a lesser degree this is also true for the Balkans. Bad logistics there (even if not the terrible climate of northern Scandinavia) can help the A-A entrench. To an even lesser degree, this may be also true for Iberia, which is far from the Axis heartland and with only slightly better logistics. Mediterranean isles (Sardinia, Corsica, Crete, Cyprus; Sicily is much more dubious, too close to mainland), too, if the A-A can achieve and hold naval superiority.

France (northern or southern) or mainland Italy, IMO is an almost impossible dream for the A-A short of nukes. They are far too close to the Axis heartland and their logistics are just too good: Italy, while mountainous, in the 1940s had rather good railways and roads that link it to Austria and France (cfr. the swiftness Nazi Germany took control of it in 1943). France had even better. Large numbers of Russo-German troops could be quickly rerouted to any landing site in either country, besides Italy would be the mainland of third Axis power and rather unlikely to suffer the OTL 1943 crisis of confidence, given its rather more powerful alliance ITTL. And while the A-A can achieve naval superiority, air superiority is much, much more doubtful.

A-A landings may be reasonably successful in Scandinavia, Balkans, Iberia, Corsica/Sardinia/Crete/Cyprus, maybe even Sicily too, but France or mainland Italy promise to be even more difficult than Sealion and as bloody as Downfall. That is, without using nukes to blow enemy concentration of troops away.

This is even assuming that the A-A manage to secure North Africa and clear it of Axis troops, which is far from a given. Massive concentration of American troops landing in Morocco can do it, but since it shall take a while to get them there, it is going to be a logistic race for the Axis to swamp North Africa with troops and secure it and for the overtaxed British and French remnants to hold out after the fall of France till the Yankee arrive to save the day (if at all).

Not to mention the fact that ITTL the Axis can and shall secure Turkey with a pincer maneuver, then overrun the Middle East to secure oil sources and attack India. Therefore even if the A-A secure North Africa with landings in Morocco, they are not quite safe from a clockwise Axis maneuver hitting from Palestine and Egypt. The logistics are overstretched, and already taxed to support the assault to India, but if the alternative is leaving southern Europe vulnerable to amphibious assult, it is worth the effort. It might require the Axis to withdraw from India and fortify in Persia to shorten the logistics chain, however.

The third big factor is that the German Expeditionary Forces are essentially going to have to rely on Russian and Italian supply lines. It's not like the Germans can maintain their own convoys in the theaters in which they'll be operating. Roads are few and bad, and if they try to clog them they'll be sunk. This effectively means that German troops operating with the Italians and Russians are going to have to rely on inferior (even with help from the Germans on logistics since WWI, I doubt that the other Axis powers will be quite up to snuff) Italian and Russian logistics. The fact that Italian and Russian convoys will have to supply German troops with German supplies and their own troops with their own supplies further complicates things, and slows down the pace of campaigns in which GEFs are involved. The Axis might have standardized their supplies, but I doubt it, if not for reasons of national pride then because of the expense of retooling the factories.

This is quite true. I would only point out that, since in 3 of 4 PoDs the Axis powers have been making extensive economic and military cooperation since the 1920s, or even the 1880s, it is quite likely that some of this standardization may have informally happened anyway. Heck, in all likelihood not a few of Russian and Italian factories were raised with German investments.

The fourth big factor has to do with the invasion of Britain, which is where know-how comes in. To my knowledge, none of the Axis nations has ever attempted (much less succeeded in) an amphibious invasion against a defended coast. The situation is made worse by the fact that neither air nor naval superiority is guaranteed; indeed, it is distinctly unlikely. Basically, this means that the Germans are going to have to evolve an amphibious doctrine essentially from scratch, as well as whatever scraps the Japanese might or might not send their way. Not only will they have to evolve doctrine, they will have to develop the technology to transport men and material safely, and they will have to mass-produce it. This, and the training of the assault troops, is going to take time, a number of years in fact. During that time, it would be distinctly counter-productive to send the troops for the invasion halfway around the world where they would a) not learn the necessary skills, b) be committed and thus hard to withdraw, as well as understrength. These considerations will tie down a considerable amount of German manpower close to home, though the invasion troops could participate in the reduction of Norway.

This is all very true, although as I said above I expect a substantial Russian contingent, too, to take part in Sealion. Having said that, I concede that Sealion shall be an very hard battle, even if nowhere so difficult as a successful Salerno or Normandy ITTL. Naval superiority shall be quite hard (but only because the USA are in the war), while air superiority shall be harshly fought over, and much dependent on how good the technological development of the two sides shall unfold.

About the Japanese, there are two options ITTL: first, they may be Entente allies (either they are old Entente revanchist members or when WWII erupts, the A-A lift the embargo and close both eyes to the plight of China to limit their enemies) so they are busy fighting the Russians in Eastern Siberia (quite annoying to the Axis but ultimately harmless, the war shall be over before they manage to reach anything vital to Russia). This option opens the interesting option of Japanese troops helping defend India.

It also opens another interesting political-strategic variant if the Russo-Germans decide to send Chiang large amounts of supplies and trainers over their long land border, which may be just what GMD needs to make a successful stand to the Japanese. I dunno whether the Russo-Germans would have the men to spare to send a signifiicant amount of their own ground troops to Chiang, although this would cause even more serious problems to Entente Japan (combined Russo-German mechanized expeditionary corps would eat the lightweight IJA infantry alive, see Manchuria 1945).

Alternatively, they decided to backstab the Entente and invade South East Asia in a parallel war. It's not too likely that the Russo-German Axis would be much interested in seeking an alliance with Russophobe Japan, but it may happen; or more likely, the JP on their own may deem more profitable and less ardous to backstab the overtaxed British in South East Asia than fighting in Siberia. The various PoDs may cause wide butterly fluctuations here, however.

Anyway, I ruled out an Axis Japan in the PoD for various reasons not the least avoiding to make the Axis too strong. But let's consider the case of a Japan which fights a parallel war of its own against the A-A in the Pacific, without any real alliance to the Axis. This is rather bad news for the A-A. Now American power has to be committed to fortify Britain, defend India, repel the Japanese, and secure North Africa. A rather daunting list, even for the US.

If anything slips, something has to give, and the by far most likely candidate for failure is North Africa, and if the Axis secures that, there goes any hope of avoiding conventional defeat (if Sealion succeeds) or a stalemate (if it fails) in the European theater, although a victory against Japan in the Pacific is almost a given and a victory in India with a stalemate in the Middle East or a stalemate in India is quite possible.

This is correct, as far as it goes, but you have to take into account Russian and German starting fleet strength (guaranteed to be much lower than the Anglo-American even if the pre-Axis won WWI). This means that the Russo-Germans are going to have to devote much of their resources to a shipbuilding program, not only of warships to protect the invasion, but of landing ships themselves, of which neither Russia nor Germany possesses one. As for an airtight blockade, that's probably unnecessary; all you need to do is keep Anglo-American heavy unity out of the Channel and north of The Wash, and your invasion will have a reasonably good degree of protection. American air power might very well be decisive here, depending on how much they commit, its integration with the UK Commands, and the degree of development of machines and doctrine.

This is a rather accurate assessment of the issues involved. Especially the bit whether the effectiveness of American air power may end up the casting factor in the success or failure of Sealion.

Which is by the way, another reason why I deem landings in France or Italy are doomed to fail: with German-Russian-Italian-occupied French warmaking potential close to Anglo-American one (Kennedy's 1937 calculations give a total of 35.1% for this Axis vs. 51.9% for the A-A, this fails to account for the Axis contributions of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Benelux, and the various Axis satellies in Central and Eastern Europe), I fail to see how the Entente could achieve decisive air superiority in those theaters.

Essentially, it's going to take massive amounts of preparation, which might very well take so long and give the Entente so much time to prepare that the invasion will be very closely fought, and with no surety of victory at all.

Yes, this is a rather accurate assessment of the issue.

I was assuming that the Axis failed to establish effective control over Algeria (a successful Entente defense there is possible, particulalry if the French fleet is evacuated in time, and if American troops make it to Morocco).

About this, it is going to be a rather close race between the Axis overcoming logistical difficutlies and Entente naval power to concentrate enough forces to secure North Africa (which makes their European core unassailable) by clearing Anglo-French remnants out before the Americans land in force, and the Anglo-Americans mustering enough troops and resources to make those landings successful before the Axis entrenches among all their other more pressing committments (defending the British Isles, India, and depending on the side of Japan, Australia and the Hawai as well). Not to mention defending North Africa from the inevitable Axis counterattack from Palestine.

This, plus Gibraltar, would be at first a thorn in the side of the Axis, and later a staging ground for an invasion of somewhere.

Hmm, about Gibraltar, there are several butterflies at work here: leaving aside the proto-Axis PoD, which would dismantle the French colonial empire (they only get to keep Algeria and/or French West Africa if they are very very lucky and the CP very very merciful) and kick the British out of any Mediterranean stronghold of theirs even in the most merciful peace treaty, in the other PoDs it is most likely, since we are assuming an efficient Axis strategic coordination as a given, that the Axis secures Malta quite early.

As for Gibraltar, the position of Spain needs to be defined. Whatever side of the SCW this super-Axis sponsors would win it hands down, unless possibly a revanchist France stages a massive direct intervention in the Triple Alliance PoD, or the Entente makes a massive intervention to secure their backs in the All-Communist PoD. And even if Spain is pro-Entente, would they still stand up when Axis troops enter Paris, and stick to the Anglo-Americans, or change sides ?

If Spain goes Axis, conquering Gibraltar is a walk in the park for the Axis. On the other hand, this opens a whole new wide stretch of land with long coasts, bad logistics, and far from their heartland, they have to defend. If Spain goes Entente, the Axis can probably secure it against weak Spanish resistance (they would be exausted by the SCW) and British intervention, it would most likely be ATL equivalent of Greece. Only if Americans manage to send enough troops to stabilize the theater in time (doubtful) it can turn into another ferstering sore for the Axis like Norwegia. The ultimate value of Gibraltar is whether it allows the Axis to secure North Africa. If it does, the sacrifice of defending Spain is worthwhile, if not, it's much less valuable.

The south of France seemed reasonable to me because it's fair invasion country,

Also fair counterattack country (good logistics, really close to Axis heartland), if the Axis has plenty of spare troops. This Axis does.

because it's likely to be less well-protected than northern France,

Rather questionable.

because the Axis has no real way of threatening the invasion force since it can only really be attacked from Italy and the Anglo-Americans can probably assemble a fleet to beat the Italo-Russian, particularly if they've managed to hold Suez,

This is simply an unfounded assumption. The Axis does not absolutely need local naval parity to repel a landing, they just need local land and air superiority. Southern France can be easily reached from northern France, southern Germany, northern Italy.

and because the Entente needs to strike somewhere decisive. Italy's out due to mountainous terrain and the narrow front, the Benelux and Germany's out due to the difficulty of landing and the concentration of the enemy, northern France is out because of the German naval presence, and there's no way an invasion force is getting close to Russia. If the Entente doesn't strike somewhere, they're bound to lose simply because they can't force their enemies to submit. The south of France seems to me to be the Entente's only chance to strike anywhere near the vitals of the Axis.

Ahh, we are getting close to the crux of the issue, or really grand strategy ;).

Let's take a cursory glance to conventional victory conditions for this WWII (Nukes later):

Complete Axis victory: successful Sealion. Enuff said. If Britain is conquered, the USA may only secure India at the very best, but the main geopolitical war aim of the Axis (control of Western Eurasia) is established. The Yankees shall be forced to concede Europe, Africa, and the Middle East and go in a Cold War (there shall be one, the Axis does not have the realistic means to invade the USA without a generation of preparation and mustering all Euro-Russian resources to the fullest), even if they can reap a consolation prize by annexing the british Dominions and building an empire in Asia.

Partial Axis victory: defense of continental Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East, optimally at the Persian-Afghan border, if not at the Turkish-Iraqi border. They have failed to take out the British stronghold, which is going to give them pains in the Cold War to come but they have held out everything they really need. The Anglo-Americans shall eventually exaust themselves with fruitless peripheral theaters in South Asia, Eastern Siberia, or subsaharian Africa, and be forced to bargain for a compromise peace.

Complete Entente victory: they need to conquer any of the vital areas of the Axis (Germany, European Russia), sever the just as vital connection between them (Central Europe), or conquer all of the almost as vital areas (France, Benelux, Italy). Those latter areas are almost as vital both for their substantial, albeit not vital, manpower and industrial contribution to the Axis, and because they allow to make a deadly threat to the vital areas. They can't successfully continue the war without them against Anglo-American power, and if they try, they shall be steamrolled.

Compromise Entente victory: they need to secure an entrenched foothold in continental Europe which poses a good strategic threat to the vital or next-to-vital Axis areas. This may be represented by conquest of Scandinavia, or alternatively North Africa and the Middle East plus any of Iberia or the Balkans. Failing to take out those breaches into Fortress Europe, or worse a threat of their expansion towards their heartland shall force the Axis to bargain for a compromise peace.

Stalemate: the Axis keeps the core of continental Europe, the Entente keeps North Africa and the Middle East, maybe with limited footholds in Scandinavia, Iberia, or the Balkans that show no significant potential for expansion.

As it concerns the nukes, of course they are endgame, but the conditions for their devleopment shall vary significantly according to the PoD. Roughly, IMO:

Triple Alliance PoD: the Axis develops nukes 2-3 years in advance, complete victory for the Axis. The Entente has none of the ex-Axis emigrated scientists, the Axis has just as good economic and rather better scientific potential.

Nazi-Soviet PoD: the Entente develops nukes 2-3 years in advance, complete victory for the Entente. The Entente has all of the ex-Axis emigrated scientists, the Axis has crippled its economic and scientific potential with purges, racial persecutions, nutty pseudoscience theories, questionable economic policies.

All-Fascist PoD: the Axis develops nukes first, but the Entente catches up within an year or so, compromise Axis victory or stalemate. The Entente has few or none of the ex-Axis emigrated scientists, their economic and scientific potential is just as good as their enemies, but they have a better starting point.

All-Communist PoD: the Entente develops nukes first, but the Axis catches up within an year or so, compromise Entente victory. The Entente has some of the of the ex-Axis emigrated scientists, they have somewhat compromised their economic and scientific potential with questionable practices.

The interesting thing about this situation is that neither side can really threaten the vital centers of the other, at least not without humungous risk to itself (Germany invading Britain, Entente invading France).

Yep, this is why all in all the most likely outcome from a conventional point of view seems a compromise victory for either side, or a stalemate, which ushers in a multigenerational Cold War propped up by MAD. Of course, this somewhat favors the Axis, since their stalemate or compromise victory conditions are easier to accomplish. This is the result of making an efficient geopolitical pooling of European resources (this is what Hitler was really trying to do, but done the sane, efficient way). The Axis wins by securing and enlarging the perimeter of their continental fortress, the Entente by making critical breaches in those walls. The latter is the somewhat more uphill battle, even if American power makes it a winnable struggle.

Of course, then there are nukes, which equalize the field, and make decisive victories, and Entente victory, rather easier.
 
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