Perhaps you were correct, but that does not change the fact that we are discussing Manchuria here, not Yangtze Valley.
Perhaps you were correct, but that does not change the fact that we are discussing Manchuria here, not Yangtze Valley.
Southern China was long divided between the British and French zone of interest by this time around.
What portion of Manchuria’s people are Han at that point?
For a POD to make sense, it has to be based on the RTL setup conditions.
If those conditions do not exist anymore, because a new player has negated the premise (Spanish American War 1898) which means the South China Sea no longer is a viable French or British operations area because a new colonial power emphatically controls those sea lanes, then it is to be expected that an adjustment has to be made as to the assumptions for any PoD.
It is not an accident that the peace broker between Japan and Russia was the United States.
Just to be sure, my original post with the link to the article on the First China Consortium was an answer to the question "Why couldn't Japan rip off Manchuria during the Xinhai revolution in OTL? Or Russia and Japan rip it off and split it?".
South China remained French and British area of interests for more than 30 years after the Spanish-American War, that is why could supply various Chinese warlords during the 1920s and that is why they could assert so much influence over China's trade, including custom administration. Having sea lane is one thing, actual power projection capability and commercial interests are another. As discussed by the article I linked, "With rare exception, the U.S. government had shown itself disinclined to become involved in Chinese affairs, unwilling to give American businessmen support comparable to that which their European and Japanese competitors might reasonably expect from their own governments. As a result, little U.S. capital could be found in China in 1909, when William Howard Taft became president of the United States."
Three reasons:
The Americans tolerated them. The reason the European exploiters and colonial imperialist interlopers were able to operate so freely in the Chinese interior was the Yangtze Patrol.
First of all, you are delving into the points that are not relevant to the discussion. I've contributed enough thread derailing myself and if you want further answer from me, it might be better to start a new thread.
"Why couldn't Japan rip off Manchuria during the Xinhai revolution in OTL? Or Russia and Japan rip it off and split it?".
If you by 'economically unable' meant 'economically unable to fund the operation', that'd be wrong, because Japan was continuing its military expansion during this time around. Kongo-class and Fuso-class battleships were authorized and constructed in this period. This by no means suggests that Japan was not already overspending on military, but they certainly were capable to squeeze their finance and send out expedition if they were willing. And within the Army there were more than enough will to "Protect South Manchuria, attack Beijing, and occupy Fujian and Zhejiang", as stated in "the Operational plan against the Qing State" spearheaded by none other than Yamagata Aritomo. Such ambitions were in part possible thanks to the infrastructure that supported Japanese power projections in South Manchuria, readily available in the form of the South Manchuria Railway Company, controlled by the Japanese government since the Russo-Japanese War.
As the revolution in China progressed, in January 1912, Yamagata was demanding the cabinet to authorize sending out a two-division sized expeditionary force to South Manchuria and engineer an international intervention with the Russians whose influence covered North Manchuria with its Chinese Eastern Railway Company, unlike the factually incorrect map you brought here. This effort was shot down, as the cabinet could not risk isolating the Japanese position in China any further, and opted to follow London instead of confronting the Western interests supporting Yuan Shikai. As usual for Meiji Japan, international isolation was something to be feared and avoided, not something that should be and can be overcome. Lack of economics, infrastructure, and online maps took no part within Japan's internal debate during the Xinhai Revolution.
British boats were patrolling the Yangtze since the Opium War, and reading through this article, I think it would be safe to say that American presence in the Yangtze Valley, was not sizable, and was not important part of the Western power projection in China. Yates Stirling Jr. stated in his memoir, which is freely available in online by the way, that "The command of the Yangtze Patrol was more of a diplomatic position than a naval one. The admiral of that force, in a way, is an important part of the diplomatic setup on the river. His naval force is small and weak, merely a police force against banditry. The principal duty is in dealing with the Chinese officials and persuading them to help in maintaining friendly relations between China and our country."
You asked the question.
I did not. Improve your reading comprehension.
I even quoted the question you asked. Howso did you not ask?
Go back to the page 1 and search for that exact 'question'. I'm not sure why you are playing troll, but posting a new thread and stopping the derailment could help if you want an actual discussion.
Admiral Fischer said: ↑
Just to be sure, my original post with the link to the article on the First China Consortium was an answer to the question "Why couldn't Japan rip off Manchuria during the Xinhai revolution in OTL? Or Russia and Japan rip it off and split it?".
Admiral Fischer said: ↑
First of all, you are delving into the points that are not relevant to the discussion. I've contributed enough thread derailing myself and if you want further answer from me, it might be better to start a new thread.
Hunh? (^^^)
Why couldn't Japan rip off Manchuria during the Xinhai revolution in OTL? Or Russia and Japan rip it off and split it?
Competing interests. Russia wasn't the only one Japan had to worry about.
This is not deflection but a simple statement of fact and rejection of your attempt at further derailment of the thread.I wrote that I quoted your question. You are practicing "deflection". Not going to go down that red herring. Please stick to the topic.
Sea-power investment has nothing to do with land based infrastructure improvement; except within the sea-power context which; are ports, docks, slips and weighs. The Imperial Japanese Government spent 40% of its taxable intake domestically on this investment and its navy and virtually nothing outside Japan on such basic land route communications improvements on railroads, roads, or airports or cross country TRUCKS.
What improvements made in China was a result of "private investment" and was as much Chinese Warlord and Kuoming government as anything the Zaibatsus did. The expeditionary armies did not even have enough all terrain animals (mules) to operate as peasant infantry in the Chinese environment.
1. The map is correct.
2. WTH are you talking about? You have no idea about Japanese internal politics? Yamagata was a genrō at the time (to be factual, only 1 of 7 and while his influence was considerable, he was not the dictator, nor could his ideas be taken seriously at the time for reasons not as you claimed.) Saionji Kinmochi, who was one of his mortal enemies, and the Russians (Guess who led the Japanese against Kuropatkin?) had no intention of cooperating with the old bastard on anything as even if they could, the idea was financially IMPOSSIBLE under the budgetary constraints Kinmochi faced. Whatever you claim (a route army? 30,000 men? Ridiculous.) is wisp o' the willow.
3. London was not much use or help in stopping the Korean annexation. So there again, the claim about the British is somewhat bogus.
2. Tolley, Kemp (2000). Yangtze Patrol: The U.S. Navy in China. Annapolis, MD: Bluejacket Books, Naval Institute Press. Better source and MORE ACCURATE.
3. Stirling was a lying old racist bastard of dubious judgment and adherence to the truth. The Hawaiians "loved" him. (INTENSE SARCASM)
I don't believe you failed notice this flow of the discussion:
So again, the question was not mine, and you're playing troll.
This is not deflection but a simple statement of fact and rejection of your attempt at further derailment of the thread.
But if this really is what you want:
Take a look in the actual Army-Navy budget comparison (table 3) and point me where is this supposed '40%' investment to the Navy are coming from when the Army was consistently outspending the Navy.
Ono Military Spending and Finance at the End of the Meiji Era
Page 41
Military Spending and Finance at the End of the Meiji Era: A Study of Wartime and Postwar Finance and Shift Effects
Yuji Kono
Summary: As observed in the Uk as well as Japan in the Meiji period, after the end of a major war, (dislocation effect).
However, the contents are different in Japanese and English, and also in Japan It is different after the Sino-Japanese War and after the Russo-Japanese War.
The military expansion after the Russo-Japanese War was special accounts for financial expenses and temporary military expenses (general accounts) after the war, but was relatively calm due to the powerful control of the bureau.
As a result, the shift effect was also suppressed, but the trend of deficits in the trade balance was inevitable, and the outflow of positive yen also affected monetary policy.
At first Japan's finances from the Sino-Japanese War to the end of World War II had the feature that "there has never been a year when spending on the war and its processing did not appear on fiscal statistics." It was no exception from the Russo-Japanese War, which concluded in September 1905, to World War I. This paper analyzes the post-war effects of the Russo-Japanese War, which became a major economic burden for Japan during the Meiji period, on the fiscal and financial aspects. The methodof prior research in this area can be divided into two categories: a micro perspective centered on military spending and a macro perspective that has expanded the scope to gross domestic product (GDP). First of all, in the study of Yoshikazu Ono (1922), which is the former, it begins by considering the expenditure items of military expenditure individually.
A study on the impact of wartime finance on post-war finances based on this consideration
the financial base of the military expansion during and after the War between Japan and Russia. the process of moving from accounting to post-war finance (general accounting). Yoshimasa Muroyama (1986) also describes the transition of the ship's plan under financial constraints and its military historical significance from the viewpoint of political and economic history.
Because these see military spending as part of fiscal policy, 1 Showa Fiscal History Editorial Office, Ministry of Finance, "Showa Fiscal History IV Temporary Military Expenditure" (Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1965), pp. 3. 2 Ono, Giichi, War and Armament Expenditures of Japan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1922). Yoshikazu Ono has left detailed financial data from the relationship he worked for the Ministry of Finance, and this book has a high historical value. 3 Yoshimasa Muroyama, "Finance and Naval Expansion Policy after the War between Japan and Russia: The Financial Course of the Eight-Eight" Fleet Initiative, edited by Akira Hara, "Economics and Politics of Modern Japan" (Yamakawa Publishing Co., Ltd., 1986) pp. 37-62. The Navy's arms expansion plan, which is discussed here, includes the Third Expansion Plan (October 1902), the Naval Maintenance Council (September 1906), the Imperial Defense Policy (April 1907), and the "Naval Arms Enhancement Council" (Meiji 43. May 1910), "Emergency Enhancement of Naval Armament" (1911) has a policy history aspect. On the other hand, Shima Yoshihiko (1943) considers the sophistication of military technology as explanatory variables in discussing the aging of army spending ledger account that means the transition of army costs Rather than pursuing it separately, we conduct an analysis based on changes in the nature of the expenditure content (the ratio of equipment procurement and repair-related expenditures to the overall army costs). In response to such micro considerations, Koichi Emi and Keiichi Shionotani (1966) discuss the impact of war on finance from a macro perspective5. Emi and Shionoya's consideration is a technique of Alan T. Peacock and Jack Wiseman, which introduced and analyzed the concept of "dislocation effect" in Britain after World War II at the end of the 19th century. It is applied to the financial analysis of Japan from the Meiji to the middle of the Showa era.
But these analyses focus on long-term economic fluctuations, the impact of the wartime finances of individual wars on the fiscal policy of peacetime. In addition, the
In other words, the purpose is to analyze fiscal policy as a whole, and because we see military finance as part of that, It remains to get a holistic view of the relationship between military spending and fiscal policy.
In addition, these financial impact has been little noted. During and after the war [on] military finance . The overall macro impact is direct, but on the other hand, as an indirect [factor]. The impact on the surface cannot be ignored. The inflow of internal and foreign bonds issued in large quantities during the Russo-Japanese War inevitably causes changes in the structure of monetary policy7.
In this paper, the previous research was the subject of research alone, and the fiscal and financial effects; the direct and indirect financial effects of the Russo-Japanese era and clarify their characteristics. Specifically, we will first look at the relationship between wartime and peacetime, which can be a fiscal policy from the Sino-Japanese War to the outbreak of World War I, while paying attention to the dislocation effect in accordance with the methods of Peacock-Wiseman and Emi and Shionoya.
After the Russo-Japanese War, both land and sea, we will consider the military expansion plan and the items of expenditure for the land and navy in terms of finance.
Then wartime finance and war during the Russo-Japanese War as an indirect macro-indirect effect of later military spending, the impact on the financial structure after the war. to mention: the fiscal expansion after the war between Japan and Russia due to the transition effect led to a deterioration in the trade balance and the outflow of positive cash flow. They jeopardize the existence of the gold-oriented financial system.
In fact, the existence of the gold-oriented system is more dangerous than during the Russo-Japanese War. May), "Council for Implementation of Emergency Development Plan for Naval Armament" (November 1912), and "Council for Implementation of Naval Arms Replenishment Plan" (November 1913). 4 Shima Yoshihiko, "Fiscal Policy Theory" (Kawade Shobo, 1943), Part 2. 5 Koichi Emi and Keiichi Shionotani, "Long-term Economic Statistics 7 Fiscal Expenditure" (Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 1966).
6 Peacock, Alan T. and Jack Wiseman, The Growth of Public Expend iture in the United Kingdom (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961). 7 In the previous research on this, Ito: "Japan's Gold Policy and Central Bank Policy after the Russo-Japanese War," by Koji Fujioka and Akihiko Yoshioka, "International Gold-Oriented and Central Bank Policy" (Nagoya University Press, 1987), And Toru Katayama, "After the Russo-Japanese War, Fiscal and Financial Structure - Focusing on the Japan-Russia War Procurement Organization,"Economic Theory, Vol. 138, No. 5 and 6 (November and December 1986), Pp. 96-114, Kiyoshi Noji,"Kiyoshi, Post-War Management and Foreign Finance after the War of Japan and Japan, 1896-1913 -- Focusing on Foreign Government Funds---"History of Land System Science, No.92 (July 1981) is typical.
page 42.
It was rather after the war.
In this regard, we will discuss the change in the credit multiplier not mentioned in the previous study. 1 Military and Economy of Major Countries in the Early 20th Century
In the event of a major war, the cost of war sometimes exceeds the economic power of the country. And the wartime finances that are built to cover this war cost will continue to affect fiscal policy for a long time even after the war. This section provides an overview of the analysis of Peacock-Wiseman, a representative prior study on this field in the UK since 1890, and the discussion between Koichi Emi and Keiichi Shionotani, who used the method to analyze Japan's fiscal policy. These previous studies examine the long period from the 19th century to the middle of the 20th century, but this paper analyzes before and after the Russo-Japanese War.
In addition to the general study of the preceding research, this section provides an overview of the military and economic power of eight power strains, including Japan, from 1900 to 1913, the year before the outbreak of World War I. (1) Economic and military power of major countries First of all, the economic power and the military power of Japan before and after the Russo-Japanese War are compared with the Western powers. In the first half of this period, Britain (Second Bohr War), Japan and Russia (The Russo-Japanese War) have experienced a major war. In the second half, military build-up is taking place in European countries where the situation in the Balkans has become unstable.
In this situation, the scale of the change in economic power and military spending of Japan, which was small but achieved high economic growth, is grasped in comparison with the great powers. Table 1 shows the military and economic indicators of the eight Great Powers at that time in 1900, Meiji 43 (1910), and 1913. First of all, it is gross national product (GNP), but the value of Japan is small among eight countries at any point in time. However, Japan's growth rate is high among these countries. Japan's GNP has grown 2.1 times during the Meiji 33-Taisho 2 (1900-13). Europe and the United States are comparable to that of the United States, and Russia is 1.7 times higher, Germany and Italy 1.5 times, Austria-Hungary 1.4 times, the United Kingdom 1.3 times, and France 1.2 times, both of which are well below Japanese values. In addition, the For this reason, with the exception of the United States, Japan's relative economic power has improved significantly over the past 13 years.
In 1900, Japan's GNP was 42 percent in Italy, 24 percent of Austria-Hungary, and 20 in France. 8 Peacock and Wiseman, The Growth of Public Expend iture in the United Kingdom, Emi Shiono Tani , Long-Term Economic Statistics 7
etc. etc. etc.
.South Manchuria Railway is, literally, just there. Japan even had an army formation dedicated to protect this state-controlled railway, widely known as the Kwantung Army
As I have pointed out, the map is incorrect to assign the whole Manchuria under the Japanese influence. North Manchuria remained in the Russian orbit, outside of Tokyo's reach. All four Russo-Japanese conventions since 1907 agreed on this division.
Broken link.
And this is relevant to what part of your own claim?
Irrelevant to the discussion concerning the Yangtze.
Considering who (You) moved off topic with a question and error statement about who controlled what and who would do what in Manchuria, that is not valid.
Still Red HERRING. AND IT IS ALL YOURS.
If both of you don't start playing the ball and stop the snide remarks I'm going to toss both of you. I see no innocents in this particular slap fight. I suggest you Both:
1. Start debating like adults
OR
2. Walk away.
Either will work. Your call, but if one of the Mods gets dragged back into this thread we'll get our money's worth.
Might have helped if you translated the document which says exactly what I told you.
Built before the Russo Japanese War by guess who?
South Manchuria Railway Company (南満州鉄道株式会社, kyujitai: 南滿洲鐵道株式會社 Minamimanshū Tetsudō Kabushikigaisha), TAKEN OVER FROM THE RUSSIANS.
Bogus claim you made
Since it is based on which Chinese were loyal to whom and the map says so, your claim is BOGUS.
All sources actually SUPPORT what I wrote about your claims which were spurious. You might try to read the sources you cite? I assume your Japanese is MUCH better than mine?
Nonsense. Why did the Japanese have to remove the Korean government?
Not a claim when it is the historical fact by a reputable source.
If you cite a known liar, incompetent, and racist as a source for anything, you will be called on it.