Lucky. I just read up on the Crimean War the past two days.
How well can the Russians do? In effect, pretty poorly. In terms of battle on the open field, the Turks were already thrashing the Russian armies in the Danube region, forcing the invading Russians into a series of protracted sieges and retreats in the difficult and swampy terrain of the Danube delta (disease, specifically cholera, not to mention starvation, was rampant in the Russian army there). Even before the Russians had to retreat out of the Danubian Principalities, the Allied army had landed in Varna, ready to push the Russians back (and they would've, too; pretty handily).
I think people don't understand how drastic the disparity is between the armies. Just to give the most glaring example, the French (and British) were using the Minié Rifle. It had an effective and accurate range of 1,200m. By comparison, the Russians were using muskets with an effective range of barely 300m. Indeed, the Minié actually outranged Russian field pieces (as was demonstrated in Alma; in fact, during the Alma, the French Zouaves, upon realizing this, ended up doing a polka in plain view of the Russian artillery)!
Honestly, I could much more easily see how the war could've ended in favor of a heavier Allied victory over a Russian victory. The war was the Allies to lose, and by all that is holy, Raglan and others did their best to lose it.
For example, Sevastapol could've fallen without barely any resistance if Raglan had shown some decisiveness and gone for Sevastapol after crushing the Russians at the Alma (as was the original plan). Eventually, they all decided that the up to 500 men who may be casualties as a result of it was an unacceptably high number (highly ironic considering how the rest of the Crimean campaign played out), and instead of attacking the incredibly weak northern fortifications, they moved down to attack the southern half of the city (ironically the best fortified), and gave the defenders a crucial 18 days to fortify.
Then there's the whole Simiferopol debacle. Since Simiferopol was the main supply depot for the Russians in the area, they were absolutely dreading an Allied offensive to seize it (which would've succeeded very easily). However, such an offensive never materialized, to their confusion. Raglan ended up disobeying orders from both London and Paris regarding this during the second year of the campaign. The French General Canrobert even offered to put his troops and command under Raglans, if
only he would go ahead with the plan (naturally, he didn't).
You know what would be really funny at that point?
Austria comes into the war.
On Russia's side. Because hell, why not. Britain's too busy, France stuck neck out for ally too far, Sardinia can't defend interests in Italy without pulling out of conflict. Austria wins in Italy, the Balkans, or both. Russia gets some concessions and maybe to keep its navy. Or get the Turks to pay for a new one.
...why would the Austrians want that? None of that would actually warrant Austrian intervention. I mean, it should be noted that Sardinia didn't join the war until its second year during the Crimean campaign, and ended up getting a guarantee of non-interference in Italy until after the war was over (...which is what happened).
The Russian War goals during the Crimean war, declared and undeclared, ran counter to Austrian interests, by a wide margin. First, there's the Russian blockage of the Danube delta for navigation (when they acquired the Danube islands from the Ottomans) in an effort to safeguard their growing dependence on grain exports (with the decline of the timber trade). Second, the Russian occupation of the Danubian principalities of Moldova and Wallachia was
extremely alarming to the Austrians;every day, it looked more and more like an annexation. So alarming, in fact, that they found it necessary to send in an army just to push the Russians out of the principalities (and effectively broke the siege of Silistra).
And most importantly, Czar Nicholas I painted the war in religious and pan-Slavic terms. The war was an Orthodox crusade to liberate the oppressed Slavic peoples of the Balkans; the Serbs, and the Bulgarians, while also seeking to restore Constantinople to Orthodoxy. This Pan-slavic crusade (and effort to make the Balkans a Russian dependency) is pretty much antithetical to Austria's own interests, and even integrity (during the Crimean War, the Austrians ended up moving significant forces south to monitor the Empire's own Slavic populations).
Indeed, the Austrians were hardpressed not to join the French and the British. By the second year of the war, they had already signed a military alliance with the two (same with Sweden and, reluctantly, Prussia) to force a peace settlement out of Russia, and. During the entire war, Czar Nicolas I was in mortal fear of Austrian intervention in the war. In fact, it was the Austrians who
really ended up forcing the new Czar Alexander II to the table (who was fiercely patriotic and wanted to continue the war), by breaking off relations with Russia and continuing to amass men on the border after they attempted to wriggle their way out of ceding control of the Danube/Danube delta in Bessarabia to the principalities/Romania.
I don't know. The French navy will still rule the Black sea, their army is pretty good, the Ottomans do have the numbers south of the Danube...
But if Austria plays coy and lets Russia bring down her army from the Austrian border, yeah, the allies might be on their way to losing on land despite winning on sea. Or the Russians could be incompetent despite the numerical advantage. All things are possible.
That assumes Austria would allow it, when its explicitly counter to their interests to see a Russian dominated Balkans (the continuation of Turkish rule is preferable to seeing that, and Pan-slavism in full force).
Easier said than done, and I don't think anyone wants LOTS of land. Russia wants protectorate over Christians, and access through the straits. After Sevastopol, also reparations. Everything else is gravy.
And of course if the Balkan Revolts happen at the same time Austria's and Russia's plans might be thrown into interesting confusion, to the point where they might have to go into damage control.
Anyway, don't want to steer conversation towards this timeline too far, it was just an idea.
You should actually see the Czar's original proposal to Britain/the rest of Europe. It was the complete dismantlement and partition of the Ottoman Empire. And by complete, I do mean booting the Turks out of Europe and the Balkans entirely. Before the start of hostilities, it was likely that they'd have settled for acknowledgement of Russian supremacy in Ottoman affairs (as a trojan horse to effectively secure the Balkans and make the Ottomans a protectorate), but that would never have gone down well; the infringement of Ottoman sovereignty, against growing religious and nationalist sentiments against such meddling was too great. To quote
The Crimean War (Orlando Figgs):
Menshikov's mission was to demand from the Sultan the nullification of the November Ruling in favor of the Catholics, the restoration of Greek privileges in the Holy Sepulchre, and reparation in the form of a formal convention or sened that would guarantee the treaty rights of Russia (supposedly dating back to the 1744 Treaty of Kuchuk Kainarji0 to represent the Orthodox not just in the Holy Lands but throughout the Ottoman Empire. If the French resisted Greek control of the Holy Sepulchre, Menshikov was to propose a secret defensive alliance in which Russia would put a fleet and 400,000 Russian troops at the Sultan's disposal, should he ever need them against a Western power, on condition that he exercised his sovereignty in favor of the Orthodox. According to his diary, Menshikov was given the command of the army and the fleet 'and the post of envoy plenipotentiary of peace or war'. His instructions were to combine persuasion with military threats. The Tsar had already approved a plan to occupy the Danubian principalities and grant them independence if the Turks rejected Menshikov's demands. He also ordered the advance of 140,000 soldiers to the frontiers of the principalities, and was prepared to use these troops with the Black Sea Fleet to seize Constantinople if that should be needed to force the Sultan into submission...
Menshikov's demands stood little chance of being met in their original form. The fact that the Tzar had even thought they might succeed suggests how far removed he was from political reality. The draft of the sened prepared by Nesselrode went well beyond the dispute in the Holy Lands. In effect, Russia was demanding a new treaty that would reassert its rights of protection of the reek Church throughout the Ottoman Empire and (in so far as the Orthodox patriarchs were to be appointed for life) without any control by the Porte. European Turkey would become a Russian protectorate, and the Ottoman Empire would in practical terms become a dependency of Russia, always threatened by her military might.
(The Crimean War, 108-109)
Reading through it all, I'm actually stunned by the ineptitude of Czar Nicholas I's foreign policy leading up to the crisis. I understand it was based on the premise that Great Britain was favorable towards Russia, and Austria was indebted to Russia (a fantasy, given Lord Aberdeen was a pariah in his own cabinet on the issue of Russia, and the British press/public was viciously Russophobic, and Austria would always look out for her own national interests, as would all other states), but the blunders leading up to the Crimean War boggle the mind. For example, sending a hardened military man like Menshikov instead of an actual diplomat, when Menshikov's first act upon meeting the court was to appear in full military dress instead of civilian clothing, and demanding the replacement of the Ottoman Foreign Minister for caving to the French. And broke all decorum by refusing to speak to said minister in the first place! The Ottomans were cowed enough to agree to it, but Menshikov's bullying made the Turkish ministers inclined to resist the pressures by turning to the British and French as a question of national sovereignty.
The Crimean War is unlikely to end in a Russian victory for three reasons: 1) Russia had an obsolete military equipment and logistical system of the 1810s fighting the first armies to be able to use rifles in large-scale battlefield deployment. The Allies were able to fire more and more accurately than their Russian counterparts. 2) It was a localized war, where Russian overall strength was at a greater disadvantage than the more concentrated strength of Russia's enemies. 3) Russia's military leadership was of uneven quality at best, with a great many of Russia's troops tied down elsewhere than in the war with France and the UK.
That's an understatement.
At their worst, you have generals that were never sober, and ordered Russian troops to fire on other Russian troops while waving a bottle of wine. Even Raglan's incompetence won't match that.
