Russian victory at Tannenberg/Masurian Lakes

I have read from other historians that the claim was made up, forget where though. R and S were no different than the other stunningly incompetent Russians generals of WW1, so their failure to do their jobs right is just par for the course and didn't require anything other than incompetence.

So you do not have any sources claiming that there was no feud between the two?

In this case I think I continue to believe the story that there was a feud. Because in the meantime I have been reading about the politics of the Russian army (trying to find an non-hoffmanian source for the feud), and while I could not find other sources for this I did find others describing the disputes albeit not due to a personal feud but in the context of the politics of the Russian army. Rennenkampf was a friend of grand duke Nikolas while Samsonov was a protégé of the war minister Sukhomlinov. The latter tried to modernise the army, and the former tried to sabotage and undermine him at every turn. For instance the duke got the Tsar to cancel war games that were planed by the War minister. Nikolas and Sukhomlinov both had their loyalists which were feuding.

This would be disastrous during when war broke out as both fractions had to be given equal representation, e.g. the two armies in east Prussia got Rennnenkampf (as a partisan of the Duke) and Samsonov (as a supporter of the war minister).

So even if the incident described by Hoffman did not happen there are other reports of a feud between Rennenkampf and Samsonov.
 
So in order to get the two armies to work together the Russians have first and foremost to not assign to feuding commanders.

That's actually fairly easy.

Having a competent high command (for instance Brusilov) would also help.

Was Brusilov eligible at this time? Or what about the commander on the Caucasus front, who beat the Turks like a bongo drum?

As for the consequences: With the loss of the eastern armies the Russians could easily conquer East Prussia including Königsberg.

Konigsberg was fortified and probably holds out. But every thing else from Danzig east could be lost. This is a huge blow to German morale.

Then much depends on the reaction of the German leadership. If they panic and recall troops from the west it is possible that the western front collapses after the battle of the Marne allowing France to regain significant ground. This in turn might lead to an early end of the war as the Germans realise they cannot win - for extra irony have them sue for peace before Christmas.

The Germans will probably rally and hold for a while... But Turkey will not join the Central Powers, even Goeben present. Also, with German reserves all being sucked east, the "Race to the Sea" bends north and east of OTL, so the Germans probably don't hold any of the Channel coast and may not even take Antwerp. That's a huge boost to Belgium and the Allies.

When one adds in the Serbian defeat of Austrian invasion, and the Austrian debacle in Galicia - I think the German war party looks very discredited and there is a government reshuffle, followed by attempts to sue for peace. Austria may head for the door first, especially if it looks like Italy is joining the Allies, and maybe even Romania.

The question is whether the Germans are ready to accept what the Allies are ready to offer. One wild card - if the Allies recapture a large part of Belgium, they will have utterly irrefutable evidence of German massacres in their hands, and this will be "fresh news". It could be very hard for the Allies to make a peace that does not include war crimes trials for some German commanders, and about as hard for Germany to submit to that condition.
 
Was Brusilov eligible at this time? Or what about the commander on the Caucasus front, who beat the Turks like a bongo drum?
Well Busilov was the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Military District under Skalon but he moved to the Kiev Military District in 1913 remarking that "Well! What’s done is done, and I am glad, that I have escaped cesspool of Skalon’s court atmosphere." Deckhand in his Rouleau Compresseur timeline used a point of divergence of one of the Polish nationalist groups assassinating Skalon, apparently there were a number of attempts over the years, with Brusilov taking over and using the intervening year to kick things into somewhat better shape. I don't know whether he would be considered senior enough to take over the Commander-in-Chief position but his successfully handling the situation following the assassination of Skalon couldn't but help.


Konigsberg was fortified and probably holds out. But every thing else from Danzig east could be lost. This is a huge blow to German morale.
Depends on what its food situation is like, whilst it might not be as bad as a modern city and run out in less than a week if deliveries to wholesalers and supermarkets are interrupted unless they've specially laid in supplies its still not going to be great. Replenishment by sea might be considered but that likely results in the Russians simply heavily mining the approaches to the city and sitting their submarines, and likely the British theirs, out there as well to help disrupt any attempts at minesweeping operations.
 
IIRC that myth came from Max Hoffmann who claimed to have seen that when an observer during the Russo-Japanese war. AFAIK there was no such event and Rennenkampf and Samsonov had no ill-will; the problem was just the realities of logistics and Russian over-hasty action causing a breakdown in CiC.

Hoffmann's wording was much more careful ("Der Krieg der versäumten Gelegenheiten", chapter "Die Schlacht bei Tannenberg"):
'Every advance by Rennenkampf would have avoided the disaster of Tannenberg. I'd thus like to mention the rumour, which cannot totally be dismissed, that Rennenkampf did not want to help Samsonov because of personal animosity. Of course, one must assume that he didn't realise all the consequences and the extent of the defeat. That personal enmity existed between both men, I know; it dates back to the battle of Liauyang, where Samsonov with the Siberian Cossak Division defended the Yentai coal mine, but had - despite excellent bravery of his cossaks - to evacuate the site, because Rennenkampf - on the left wing - remained inactive despite repeated orders. - Witnesses spoke of a sharp encounter between both leaders at the Mukden railway station after the battle.'

Hoffmann was military observer on the Japanese side. Thus, he couldn't claim more than hearsay. But he mentions to have told Ludendorff about this conflict between the enemy leaders.
 

Don Quijote

Banned
What if after the first clash at Gumbinnen the Germans had followed Prittwitz's advice and retreated behind the Vistula, so as to avoid transferring reinforcements from the west? Would the the Russians have pursued, or turned soouth and attacked Austria-Hungary, a much weaker opponent?
 
When it comes to East Prussia, remember that the first Soviet attempt in October 1944 (Gumbinnen Operation) failed, and that the Germans held the Soviets off for almost 6 months before the front collapsed in late January 1945 and Köningsberg fell in April 1945.

The old late 19th century fortifications around Königsberg did suprisingly well against the Soviets.

East Prussia was defensible and did have good fortifications.
 

Deleted member 1487

What if after the first clash at Gumbinnen the Germans had followed Prittwitz's advice and retreated behind the Vistula, so as to avoid transferring reinforcements from the west? Would the the Russians have pursued, or turned soouth and attacked Austria-Hungary, a much weaker opponent?
He changed his mind rapidly IOTL, if he tried he'd be removed from command even faster by his subordinates and higher command.
 

Don Quijote

Banned
He changed his mind rapidly IOTL, if he tried he'd be removed from command even faster by his subordinates and higher command.

You can't be certain about that. German strategy was to deal with France first and stay on the defensive in the east. If that meant falling back before a strong an co-ordinated Russian advance, which was possible, then they would hve done it, albeit reluctantly.
 

Deleted member 1487

You can't be certain about that. German strategy was to deal with France first and stay on the defensive in the east. If that meant falling back before a strong an co-ordinated Russian advance, which was possible, then they would hve done it, albeit reluctantly.
It was not to abandon East Prussia though, which is why Prittwitz was replaced after he said he was going to abandon it. Again coordinated Russian advance in the first 6 weeks of the war in East Prussia is an oxymoron; the russians didn't have radio and their land lines weren't great up to the border and non-existent over it.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Tannenberg#Prelude:_17.E2.80.9322_August
After the battle at Gumbinnen Rennenkampf decided to keep his First Army in position to resupply and to be in good positions if the Germans attacked again. Both Russian Armies were having serious supply problems; everything had to be carted up from the railheads because they could not use the East Prussian railway track, and many units were hampered by lack of field bakeries, ammunition carts, and the like. The Second Army also was hampered by incompetent staff work and poor communications. Poor staff work not only exacerbated supply problems but, more importantly, caused Samsonov during the fighting to lose operational control over all but the two corps in his immediate vicinity (XIII & XV Corps).[20]
 

Don Quijote

Banned
In the OP I didn't say the battle had to be early on. I'm fine for this to take place 2-3 weeks later than OTL. Or would that free up those two German corps to stay in the west?
 

Deleted member 1487

In the OP I didn't say the battle had to be early on. I'm fine for this to take place 2-3 weeks later than OTL. Or would that free up those two German corps to stay in the west?
Even that would be too early. That would push things back into September by which time the French campaign would have been decided with the two extra corps that went to East Prussia IOTL, while 8th army has time to fortify the Konigsberg line better and maneuver against 2nd army as IOTL. The core issue is that the Russians lacked communications on German soil, while the Germans had their highly efficient rail and telegraph systems in place, so they could coordinate in a way the Russians couldn't. As the link states Samsonov couldn't control anything more than the adjacent two corps and communications broke down at all levels. Rennenkampf would still be stopped at the Konigsberg fortification line (partially thanks to rail gauge change over at the border) and Samsonov would have to fight on his own as per OTL.

Even if the Russians were able to do more later by then the Germans could move out of East Prussia and use the follow on corps freed up after the victory at the Marne (thanks to two extra corps) preventing a major German retreat, while the newly reinforced 8th army goes on the offensive and rips up the Russians, especially as 1st and 2nd army would be locked in a siege of Konigsberg (which could be supplied by sea thanks to the German Baltic fleet dominating the area) and the Russians lacked the large caliber fortress busting guns of the 300mm caliber. Later they were able to dismount naval guns in coastal forts and fashion makeshift carriages for them, but that wasn't until October IIRC that they were available. Part of the reason Przemysl held out for so long was the lack of large Russian siege guns.
 
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That would push things back into September by which time the French campaign would have been decided with the two extra corps that went to East Prussia IOTL

Those two corps can't make a difference in the west, there isn't any road space for them. Germany's going to lose the Marne regardless.
 

Deleted member 1487

Those two corps can't make a difference in the west, there isn't any road space for them. Germany's going to lose the Marne regardless.
In fact there was, they were behind the rest and were able to march up later, especially as the gap had its roads wide open and they would have fit there.
 
In fact there was, they were behind the rest and were able to march up later, especially as the gap had its roads wide open and they would have fit there.

No, there was not. All available roadspace were already jammed with the troops and supply trains of all the other forces involved. Even Schlieffen before the war had come to recognize the problem of getting the additional two corps to the frontline during his retirement, which he spent endlessly reviewing the drafts he had submitted, and the impossibility of getting the additional two corps his plan required drove him to despair over it's chances. In his last retirement revision of the plan, scribbled in the margins, is the line "we are too weak".

Schlieffen foresaw the failure of his own plan years before it already took place.
 
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Deleted member 1487

No, there was not. All available roadspace were already jammed with the troops and supply trains of all the other forces involved. Even Schlieffen before the war had come to recognize this during his retirement, which he spent endlessly reviewing the drafts he had submitted, and the impossibility of getting the additional two corps his plan required drove him to despair over it's chances. In his last retirement revision of the plan, scribbled in the margins, is the line "we are too weak".

Schlieffen foresaw the failure of his own plan years before it already took place.
Source on this? Based on the German studies that were published post war analyzing the Marne I am not seeing any comment of roads being clogged too much to allow for the extra corps, instead there is only lamentation that the corps weren't there to plug the gap. That is also backed up by english language historiography of the battle, including Sewell Tyng's "Battle of the Marne" (he actually fought in the battle).
 
Source on this?

John Keegan's The First World War, chapter 2. I believe Martin Van Crewald also deals with the issue in Supplying War, in the chapter "the Wheel that Broke", although I'd have to re-read the chapter to be sure. Best thing Moltke can do with two additional corps is to have them digging a fallback line a ways back if things go south.
 

Deleted member 1487

John Keegan's The First World War, chapter 2. I believe Martin Van Crewald also deals with the issue in Supplying War, in the chapter "the Wheel that Broke", although I'd have to re-read the chapter to be sure. Best thing Moltke can do with two additional corps is to have them digging a fallback line a ways back if things go south.
Keegan is not the best source on WW1, he's much more a Steven Ambrose style historian. I'd like to see the Creveld info if you have it.
 
Keegan is not the best source on WW1, he's much more a Steven Ambrose style historian.

Hardly. Just because he wrote one book discussing things from the soldiers perspective doesn't mean he's pushing a nationalist agenda like Ambrose does. Most of his other books are in much more traditional military-history style, even if he does generalize rather frequently. He does have ideas I take issue with, particularly when he tries to connect warfare with it's political dimension which is when he really tends to fall down, but most of the time I find he's on the ball.

I'd like to see the Creveld info if you have it.
I have the book, but it's at home and my Tuesday's are mostly spent at school now. Have to wait until tomorrow before I have a chance to review it.
 

Don Quijote

Banned
In OTL the two corps didn't reach the east in time for Tannenberg. If they had had to fight even further west into France, it would have taken even longer to get them to East Prussia. This is all assuming Schlieffen works, which is also not guaranteed.

Therefore the Germans push slightly further west than OTL with the two extra corps, but don't neccesarily take Paris. Meanwhile the Russians have more time to fully mobilise and organise, before a successful attack into East Prussia and (hopefully) a victory at Tannenberg or somewhere nearby.
 
Meanwhile the Russians have more time to fully mobilise and organise, before a successful attack into East Prussia and (hopefully) a victory at Tannenberg or somewhere nearby.

I don't really buy a successful Russian attack into East Prussia in 1914 unless you overhauled the entire Russian command and control system prior to the war. The extra month of mobilization and reorganization would be handy, sure, but that would probably more reduce the scale of the disaster then avert it.
 
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