Russian Republic signs peace with CP 1917.

What would've happened if the Russian Republic, the successor of the Russian Empire signed peace with the Central Powers during WW1. Would the Bolsheviks rise up still? Would the Civil war still happen? Would Russia be stronger or weaker than the Soviet Union? Would the Entente win WW1 still? Would Russia still win WW2 and would WW2 still happen?
 
What would've happened if the Russian Republic, the successor of the Russian Empire signed peace with the Central Powers during WW1. Would the Bolsheviks rise up still? Would the Civil war still happen? Would Russia be stronger or weaker than the Soviet Union? Would the Entente win WW1 still? Would Russia still win WW2 and would WW2 still happen?

1. The Bolsheviks probably wouldn't rise up so long as the Russian Republic was barely competent, a lot of their appeal was that they were pushing for peace.

2. ...No, there wouldn't be a civil war without a strong Bolshevik presence.

3. It would probably be weaker in the sense that it would be a liberal democracy, and it might be vulnerable to White coups, but I think it would certainly have the potential to exceed the Soviet Union in the very long term.

4. Yeah, the Entente would probably win WWI, given that Russia bowed out anyway OTL for the Civil War, but the Entente won after America joined in.

5. Would there be a WWII? Probably not. The rise of Communism was one of the main drivers behind the rise of Fascism. While it might be possible, I really can't see it happening, and if it did, Russia might well just not be part of it.
 
It depends on when exactly the peace is signed. There is a world of difference between a peace in March 1917 and one in October 1917. In the former case it becomes slightly possible that the Entente could be defeated, I don't put it much above 5% or so, but it could happen, and the Bolshevik Coup and civil war are almost certainly avoided. In the latter case not much different than OTL. In between there is of course a lot of possibilities
 
Nitpick: Technically speaking, Russia was not declared a republic until September. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_Republic (This may seem trivial but is symptomatic of the Provisional Government's slowness.)

More important: The PG should have avoided the July Offensive, but leaving the war at that point was almost out of the question. Everyone assumed that it would lead to a German victory (the Yanks weren't coming for many months) and a victorious Germany, it was thought, would proceed to dismember Russia and destroy everything won by the Revolution. If Kerensky had attempted a Brest-Litovsk in the summer of 1917, the Bolsheviks would be the first to cry "Treason!" and "sell-out to German imperialism!" (Of course they were in favor of peace, they would explain, but one with the German workers and soldiers, not with the Kaiser; and if reminded that the German workers and soldiers were not in power, the Bolsheviks would reply that if Russia would just get a *real* socialist government, a German revolution would be sure to follow...)

To see the political impossibility of Kerensky making peace, one just has to look at the moderate socialist parties on which he depended for his support. I'll recycle something I wrote some time ago about the extraordinary tenacity of Russia'a moderate socialists on the war:

In December 1917 the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries held its Fourth Congress. The extreme left of the party had already defected to form the Left SR Party but there were still people of quite left-wing views at the Congress. One of them, Kogan-Bernstein, proposed that the forthcoming Constituent Assembly summon the Allies to begin peace talks without delay, and in the event of their refusal or failure to reply within a specified time limit, Russia would have a free hand. The resolution did not say how this freedom would be used, but it did at least imply separate action if not a separate peace. The resolution was voted down 72-52 with 32 abstentions. (Oliver Radkey, *The Sickle under the Hammer: the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries in the Early Months of Soviet Rule*, p. 192.) And this was after not only the disastrous summer offensive but the October insurrection! Yet *even then*, only one-third of the mainstream SRs were willing to demand tangible progress toward peace, even at the cost of breaking with the Allies. So how likely were they (or their similarly-minded Menshevik comrades) to do so several months earlier?

If there was anyone who just might have filled this role, it could have been Victor Chernov, leader of the left-center of the SRs, a man who had resigned from the PG protesting its dilatoriness on the issues of peace and land reform, and a man who was very popular in the Russian village. If only Chernov's faction of the SRs had either gained control of the party or formed their own party; if the Constituent Assembly elections had been held months earlier; if Chernov's backers had won; and if the Assembly had made Chernov Prime Minister of Russia, the country would at least have had a leader of greater legitimacy than Kerensky and perhaps more willing to confront the Allies. Chernov later claimed that while he had opposed a separate peace in 1917 he would have been willing to consider one as a last resort if the struggle for a general settlement had meant the immolation of Russia on the altar of the Allied cause. Unfortunately, Chernov's actual conduct during 1917--including during the Fourth Congress--was marked by constant compromising with the pro-war right-center of his party, and as Radkey remarks "if he could not see signs of immolation in the situation of December, 1917, then he would never see them." (p. 190)
 
It depends on when exactly the peace is signed. There is a world of difference between a peace in March 1917 and one in October 1917. In the former case it becomes slightly possible that the Entente could be defeated, I don't put it much above 5% or so, but it could happen, and the Bolshevik Coup and civil war are almost certainly avoided. In the latter case not much different than OTL. In between there is of course a lot of possibilities

March 1917 was absolutely impossible. Sukhanov, a left-wing "Zimmerwaldist" Menshevik wrote with regret that "During the first weeks the soldiers of Petrograd not only would not listen, but would not permit any talk of peace. They were ready to lift up on their bayonets any uncautious 'traitor' or exponent of 'opening the front to the enemy.'" (Quoted in Adam Ulam, *The Bolsheviks* [New York: Macmillan 1965], p. 325. https://books.google.com/books?id=TdCK1WkconkC&pg=PA325 (See https://books.google.com/books?id=6-D_AwAAQBAJ&pg=PA202 for a slightly different translation.)

As for the Bolsheviks before Lenin's arrival, read Stalin's *Pravda* article of March 28: "The mere slogan 'Down with the war' is absolutely impractical. As long as the German Army obeys the orders of the Kaiser, the Russian soldier most stand firmly at his post, answering bullet with bullet and shell with shell. ... Our slogan is pressure on the Provisional Government with the aim of compelling it to ... attempt to induce all the warring countries to open immediate negotiations ... Until then every man remains at his fighting post." https://books.google.com/books?id=vUYwDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT118&lpg=PT118
 
March 1917 was absolutely impossible. Sukhanov, a left-wing "Zimmerwaldist" Menshevik wrote with regret that "During the first weeks the soldiers of Petrograd not only would not listen, but would not permit any talk of peace. They were ready to lift up on their bayonets any uncautious 'traitor' or exponent of 'opening the front to the enemy.'" (Quoted in Adam Ulam, *The Bolsheviks* [New York: Macmillan 1965], p. 325. https://books.google.com/books?id=TdCK1WkconkC&pg=PA325 (See https://books.google.com/books?id=6-D_AwAAQBAJ&pg=PA202 for a slightly different translation.)

As for the Bolsheviks before Lenin's arrival, read Stalin's *Pravda* article of March 28: "The mere slogan 'Down with the war' is absolutely impractical. As long as the German Army obeys the orders of the Kaiser, the Russian soldier most stand firmly at his post, answering bullet with bullet and shell with shell. ... Our slogan is pressure on the Provisional Government with the aim of compelling it to ... attempt to induce all the warring countries to open immediate negotiations ... Until then every man remains at his fighting post." https://books.google.com/books?id=vUYwDwAAQBAJ&pg=PT118&lpg=PT118
With OTL attitudes certainly, but the OP provided no information about the scenario in which that peace occurs, only that it involves the Russian Republic. Given that they did not sign a peace OTL, getting them to sign peace requires changing something, either an internal political factor, which as you say is just about impossible in March 1917, or an external one, like the military situation involving the Germans at the gates of Petrograd due to some minor deployment changes in '14. Presumably you could have a peace earlier than March 1917 if you moved the revolution up
 
March 1917 was absolutely impossible. Sukhanov, a left-wing "Zimmerwaldist" Menshevik wrote with regret that "During the first weeks the soldiers of Petrograd not only would not listen, but would not permit any talk of peace. They were ready to lift up on their bayonets any uncautious 'traitor' or exponent of 'opening the front to the enemy.'" (Quoted in Adam Ulam, *The Bolsheviks* [New York: Macmillan 1965], p. 325. https://books.google.com/books?id=TdCK1WkconkC&pg=PA325 (See https://books.google.com/books?id=6-D_AwAAQBAJ&pg=PA202 for a slightly different translation.)


I note that he specifies "The soldiers of Petrograd". Can we take it that those at the front felt the same way?
 
What effect would there have been had Germany offered reasonable terms to the Czar having rejected those and keeping Russia at war so that the Provisional Government can get to the table for peace that is not a complete humiliation? That likely presumes a different leadership at OHL, perhaps having Falkenhayn never getting ousted by Hindenberg, or the later never achieves his cult of personality to supplant the normal leadership. That might mean a very different war overall but for argument sake Falkenhayn appears more reasonable and less influenced by calls to annex yet more minorities. I assume that Poland, the Baltics and Finland are on the way to independence, maybe Ukraine, so if we allow a more earnest independence movement then the PG is not quite permitting a dismemberment. Is that enough? I am open to this being as early as 1916 with the war going even worse for Russia. I am biased in thinking the Czar is doomed but a Bolshevik revolt is not inevitable?

As for longer term I think a surviving Republic shapes out like Weimar Germany, dominated by left-leaning parties with a retrenched right hoping for a restoration. Without a Versailles style vindictive peace and Germany not opposed, I think the monarchy stands a decent chance for a come back. if we keep Germany to a white peace then it likely focuses East and builds trade links with Russia again. Germany likely revises its demands once time heals the wounds and you could see an even more potent socialist Germany allied to a more liberal Russia. That is my utopian spin.
 
I note that he specifies "The soldiers of Petrograd". Can we take it that those at the front felt the same way?
I've read that the soldiers at the front were extremely war-weary (Russia's Failed Revolutions by Adam B Ulam), but unfortunately he doesn't cite any statistics.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
What effect would there have been had Germany offered reasonable terms to the Czar having rejected those and keeping Russia at war so that the Provisional Government can get to the table for peace that is not a complete humiliation? That likely presumes a different leadership at OHL, perhaps having Falkenhayn never getting ousted by Hindenberg, or the later never achieves his cult of personality to supplant the normal leadership. That might mean a very different war overall but for argument sake Falkenhayn appears more reasonable and less influenced by calls to annex yet more minorities. I assume that Poland, the Baltics and Finland are on the way to independence, maybe Ukraine, so if we allow a more earnest independence movement then the PG is not quite permitting a dismemberment. Is that enough? I am open to this being as early as 1916 with the war going even worse for Russia. I am biased in thinking the Czar is doomed but a Bolshevik revolt is not inevitable?

As for longer term I think a surviving Republic shapes out like Weimar Germany, dominated by left-leaning parties with a retrenched right hoping for a restoration. Without a Versailles style vindictive peace and Germany not opposed, I think the monarchy stands a decent chance for a come back. if we keep Germany to a white peace then it likely focuses East and builds trade links with Russia again. Germany likely revises its demands once time heals the wounds and you could see an even more potent socialist Germany allied to a more liberal Russia. That is my utopian spin.

They did offer reasonable terms. Basically Russia lose the Congress of Poland, and bit of the Baltic area.
 

BlondieBC

Banned
What would've happened if the Russian Republic, the successor of the Russian Empire signed peace with the Central Powers during WW1. Would the Bolsheviks rise up still? Would the Civil war still happen? Would Russia be stronger or weaker than the Soviet Union? Would the Entente win WW1 still? Would Russia still win WW2 and would WW2 still happen?
  • A lot depends on which month you want the peace treaty signed, the earlier it is signed, the more likely the CP pull out at least a draw. Also, if signed before the planting season, there is profound impact on Russian and perhaps German food production.
  • The Bolsheviks were a very low probability event. Almost any major POD in this time frame butterflies them away.
  • You could easily end up with a civil war, just a lot different than OTL.
  • Russia is stronger.
  • WW2 would not happen. You can easily get a second war, but it will look a lot different.
 
They did offer reasonable terms. Basically Russia lose the Congress of Poland, and bit of the Baltic area.

Would this offer be before Nicholas? I see him refusing as mere delusion, but could the forces that oust him take it up? Or was that too late?

Poland might have been better industrialized but the Poles were unruly enough to be shown the door. And to give it the Austrians to try to swallow is its own revenge. The Baltics are a worse loss since it leaves St Petersburg vulnerable but again no great loss. With some better foresight the Russians can secure their Western border and cement a peace with Germany that lets them refocus East, the Far East and Siberia offer more than enough pace to consume generations in conquering it, and the Russians still need to deal with Japan who is a British ally. Here the Russians gained nothing backing France and her perfidious partner. Is that enough to put Russia and Germany back in bed?
 
I note that he specifies "The soldiers of Petrograd". Can we take it that those at the front felt the same way?

Probably. I was surprised to learn that as late as the Constituent Assembly elections--i.e., *after* not only the disastrous summer offensive and the Kornilov affair but the October insurrection as well--the soldiers at the front were not unanimous in their preference for the Bolsheviks, even though they were the only party offering any real hope for peace. Rather, it depended on the front:

"The voting at the front and in the navy seems to have been determined by one circumstance alone — the extent to which Bolshevik agitation had been carried on among the rank and file. If the district were remote from the metropolitan centers, and specifically from the influence of the Petrograd Soviet and the Bolshevik party organization, the SR's carried the day, and the farther removed the district was, the greater their degree of success; but on the Northern and Western Fronts the old-line agrarian appeal of the PSR had been overbalanced by intensive propaganda in favor of immediate peace and immediate seizure of the estates, so that here the SR's sustained a crushing defeat and Lenin's party won a great victory.35 The contrast is seen in the accompanying tabulation.
Western Front Roumanian Front

SR 180,582 679,471
Bolshevik 653,430 167,000
Constitutional Democrat 16,750 21,438
Menshevik 8,000 33,858
Ukrainian Socialist Bloc 85,062 180,576
Residue 32,176 46,257
Total 976,000 1,128,600

The observer can only wonder whether the Roumanian Front would have differed from the Western had it not been more insulated against the Bolshevik contagion. Certainly the facts point in that direction. Between the two fronts lay the Southwestern, and here the SR's were already stronger than their rivals, though only by a ratio of 4:3. On the other hand, the Caucasian Front was even more remote than the Roumanian, and it was precisely here that the SR's displayed their greatest strength, electing five deputies against one for the Bolsheviks on the basis of incomplete returns. The explanation of their success is simple: the SR leadership of the soldiers' soviets, strongly in favor of national defense, had used its authority to throttle Bolshevik agitation on the front, even denying to that party representation on electoral information committees, and had gotten away with its one-sided policy because of remoteness from the hearth of revolution. Thus the strength of Bolshevism steadily wanes as the influence of the metropolitan centers recedes. Not only the SR's but also the Mensheviks were helped by distance: thus on the Western Front Menshevism was already virtually extinct by the time of the election, whereas on the Roumanian Front it still retained a following, albeit a modest one. The figures presented above show that Constitutional Democracy had no appeal for the rank and file of the troops--few besides the officers could have chosen its list. On the other hand, the figures reveal that the Ukrainian movement had achieved a not inconsiderable following at the front, where leaders like Simon Petliura, deputy from the Roumanian Front, bore the standard ostensibly of Ukrainian socialism, but actually of Ukrainian nationalism." Oliver H. Radkey, *Russia Goes to the Polls: The Election to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, 1917,* pp.38-39

If as late as November 1917 ''defensist" parties could still get majorities on the Southwestern, Romanian, and Caucasian fronts, one has to assume they had overwhelming support there in March. The Northern and Western Fronts are therefore the key, but it is unlikely that they would turn against the war until the garrisons and soviets in places like Petrograd became radicalized and centers of anti-war and pro-Bolshevik agitation which were then transmitted to the fronts.
 
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If as late as November 1917 ''defensist" parties could still get majorities on the Southwestern, Romanian, and Caucasian fronts, one has to assume they had overwhelming support there in March. The Northern and Western Fronts are therefore the key, but it is unlikely that they would turn against the war until the garrisons and soviets in places like Petrograd became radicalized and centers of anti-war and pro-Bolshevik agitation which were then transmitted to the fronts.
So, all in all, to get an earlier withdrawal from the war, you need an earlier revolution - maybe a "Kerensky" one in Oct 1916 followed by a Bolshevik one in March.



What effect would there have been had Germany offered reasonable terms to the Czar having rejected those and keeping Russia at war so that the Provisional Government can get to the table for peace that is not a complete humiliation? That likely presumes a different leadership at OHL, perhaps having Falkenhayn never getting ousted by Hindenberg, or the later never achieves his cult of personality to supplant the normal leadership. That might mean a very different war overall but for argument sake Falkenhayn appears more reasonable and less influenced by calls to annex yet more minorities. I assume that Poland, the Baltics and Finland are on the way to independence, maybe Ukraine, so if we allow a more earnest independence movement then the PG is not quite permitting a dismemberment. Is that enough? I am open to this being as early as 1916 with the war going even worse for Russia. I am biased in thinking the Czar is doomed but a Bolshevik revolt is not inevitable?

Big problem, I suppose, is that once peace is concluded the Russian soldiers will go home. It would be pretty hard to make them stay at the front when they have been told that the war is over. And once they go, there is little to stop the Germans finding some pretext or other to make additional demands.
 

raharris1973

Gone Fishin'
Donor
Monthly Donor
The reduced strength of Bolshevism in the Caucasus theater makes me wonder if a summer offensive in *that* theater but not the west could have been a non-disaster, and maybe a success.
 
Big problem, I suppose, is that once peace is concluded the Russian soldiers will go home. It would be pretty hard to make them stay at the front when they have been told that the war is over. And once they go, there is little to stop the Germans finding some pretext or other to make additional demands.

After the invasion of Belgian and the repudiation of its Treaty obligation there I would think German veracity is open to doubt. Indeed I think that was one of the worst blunders, it made the war all or nothing, its end founded upon clear cut victory for Germany. Add to that the formality of declaring war on Russia when it was not needed, a rather odd sop to honor and legality. However,, I am not convinced it is fatal.

Here I think the Russians can keep sufficient forces mobilized and on guard to prevent any treachery and I think the Germans are more concerned with winning in the West than grabbing more land to the East. This is especially so if another figure rules from OHL and the civilian leadership is not fully sidelined. Hindenberg was the villain, he usurped authority and created a dictatorship, in this mold he created the problem that would become the Nazis and Hitler's coup. He willingly threw the Monarchy to the wolves and set up the democratic government to take all the blame for a war the Army fully lost. Take that away and I think Germany is far less fanatical and much more rational. In fact I think the war has a better chance ending after 1916 and somewhere in 1917 here. That should allow for the very slimiest chance the monarchy survives in Russia or in the alternative the revolution is far less radical. I cannot say that the fire once started does not burn into the Bolshevik revolution as Russia implodes but I would not call it inevitable. I refer in my notes to the "Age of Empire" as this essentially nothing obvious changes outcome.

The wildcard is if the war ends in the East does the OHL commit to winning in the West. That would be a good bet but again one must ponder how a different leadership views yet another year of war. All this pivots on how one has altered things to get us to the OP's scenario. Is the USA not intervening? Has Germany done better at holding to a restricted submarine blockade? Is it getting more neutral shipping and trade? Has the war gone better or worse to the West? It is not a criticism but a cautionary reminder that without a detailed outline of events the speculation is rather open ended.
 
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