Russian Army 1905-1914 sanity options

Fairly straight forward question inline with the other sanity option threads.

Given the issues had with its leadership, its supplies, and virtually everything else, how much can we improve Russia's Army and prepare it for WWI during the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War up until WWI?
 
The reforms required would have had much in common with the reforms carried out in the contemporary British Army under the leadership of the Secretary of State for War R.B. Haldane. That is, they would have to have been changes that dealt with pedestrian matters (particularly the machinery of mobilization and supply) as well as the sorts of things, like new weapons, that appealed to readers of illustrated magazines.

Unfortunately for the Russian Army, the situation in the decade that followed its defeat in Manchuria was different from that of its British counterpart. For one thing, any given reform would have had to have taken place on a much larger scale. For another, there was so much more to do.

A simple example of the problems faced by the Russian Army concerns the standard field gun, the 3-inch (76.2mm) Putilov piece adopted in 1902. In many respects, this was a fine piece, comparable to the weapons of its type adopted at this time by other powers. However, because of the state of the Russian steel industry, it was built with substandard metal. As a result, the barrel wore out more quickly than the barrels of its French, German, and British counterparts.

With these difficulties in mind, I think the best thing that the Russian leadership could have done in the years after 1905 was to have reduced the size of the army and used the money saved to invest in the sort of reforms that would have a high payoff in the longer run. These would include such things as investments in industrial infrastructure as well as measures that made a military career more attractive to potential non-commissioned officers.
 
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Driftless

Donor
(snip)
With these difficulties in mind, I think the best thing that the Russian leadership could have done in the years after 1905 was to have reduced the size of the army and used the money saved to invest in the sort of reforms that would have a high payoff in the longer run. These would include such things as investments in industrial infrastructure as well as measures that made a military career more attractive to potential non-commissioned officers.

One of the cliches' I've heard for the Russian Army of that period, was the preponderance of under-educated and non-technical experienced farm boys forming the majority of the lower-ranks. If that cliche were essentially true, that left the army terribly unprepared to fight modern war with machinery that demands routine skilled maintenance: machine guns, artillery, motorized transport, even bolt action rifles. Spend more of the budget on recruiting, training, and retaining soldiers and non-com's that have those skills. Develop that concept where it's seen as means of advancement, both within the Army and by Russian society. A modest societal reform, perhaps.
 

Deleted member 94680

With these difficulties in mind, I think the best thing that the Russian leadership could have done in the years after 1905 was to have reduced the size of the army and used the money saved to invest in the sort of reforms that would have a high payoff in the longer run. These would include such things as investments in industrial infrastructure as well as measures that made a military career more attractive to potential non-commissioned officers.

The Russian army was already reduced in size to cut cost. Reducing it further would've rendered it even less effective than it was OTL 1914. Proposing to cut the size to spend more is counterintuitive as they could barely afford to spend what they did.

The real problem bedevilling the Russian Army was the internal conflicts within its own high command. Come down decisively on one side or the other, sack those supporting the losing side and move forward.

Inviting a British Military Mission in to help overhaul Stavka would be beneficial as well. Emphasise that the artillery is there to support the infantry as opposed to sitting safe in outdated fortresses and withdrawing early to protect its guns would help too.
 

Insider

Banned
One of the cliches' I've heard for the Russian Army of that period, was the preponderance of under-educated and non-technical experienced farm boys forming the majority of the lower-ranks. If that cliche were essentially true, that left the army terribly unprepared to fight modern war with machinery that demands routine skilled maintenance: machine guns, artillery, motorized transport, even bolt action rifles. Spend more of the budget on recruiting, training, and retaining soldiers and non-com's that have those skills. Develop that concept where it's seen as means of advancement, both within the Army and by Russian society. A modest societal reform, perhaps.
Thats not as much as cliche as sad reality. The lack of education of rank and file was one the reasons behind Red Army's abysmal performance in Winter War and Barbarossa. Thats after twenty years of government that made fighting with illiteracy its major goal. I see little chance for doing it faster and more effectively.
 

Deleted member 94680

Thats not as much as cliche as sad reality. The lack of education of rank and file was one the reasons behind Red Army's abysmal performance in Winter War and Barbarossa. Thats after twenty years of government that made fighting with illiteracy its major goal. I see little chance for doing it faster and more effectively.

This isn't about the Red Army, this is about the Imperial Russian Army pre-WWI.
 
This isn't about the Red Army, this is about the Imperial Russian Army pre-WWI.
The Red Army and the pre-WW1 Imperial Russian Army drew their manpower from roughly the same population pool, though, albeit 20 years apart. If that population pool had certain persistent characteristics at the time of the Red Army, those characteristics may well have been in place at the time you're interested in.
 

Deleted member 94680

The Red Army and the pre-WW1 Imperial Russian Army drew their manpower from roughly the same population pool, though, albeit 20 years apart. If that population pool had certain persistent characteristics at the time of the Red Army, those characteristics may well have been in place at the time you're interested in.

Maybe, but it's a fairly tenuous link. The changes in Russia itself were extreme in the 25 years between the OP's latest date and the start of WWII. The Soviets changed almost everything from education to the class structure in their time ruling the country. Warfare became fairly more technical in the period between WWI and WWII as well, requiring more soldiers of a higher educational level in more posts than the top-down organisation of most WWI armies.

Norman Stone in his The Eastern Front 1914-1917 has stated (in the preface to the latest edition at least) that he was originally far too harsh on the qualities of the Russian peasant. His verdict had been far harder on the leadership of the Army, which IMHO is the root cause of the Army's failings.
 

Coulsdon Eagle

Monthly Donor
Railways. Millions spent on French loans to upgrade or build strategic railways in western Russia and into Poland. Yet IIRC the railway commissariat was a tiny office and lacking any authority.

So troops, munitions, fodder and food are often in the wrong place in too small quantities and too late. The numbers of locomotives and wagons available dropped consistently during the war, and often were parked doing nothing in one district when other areas were short of desperately needed rolling stock.

Fix this and it would reduce some problems. It could also butterfly away the first revolution as I understand food was available in the country but the transport to the cities was screwed up by railway management. No food riots?
 
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