Russia vs Japan - again

Now, we are very good at saying that Japan would NOT invade Russia in 1941.

We have all the stat's to prove that it would be a bad move and that Japan had to go South insofar as the Northern Resource Area would take decades to develop and Japan was seriously running out of time.

Well and good.

However, Stalin kept massive forces in Siberia and clearly feared a Japanese attack, to the point of not even taking Sorge serious.

What did he know that we don't? Stalin was surely not stupid and must have looked at the same facts as us.

So?

Ivan
 
There's a very good timeline that has been started recently concerning a war between Russia and Japan after the Kalkhin-Ghol incident. Highly recommend it for a realistic look at the outcome of such a war.
 
I imagine the forces in Siberia were there for political reasons too.

The Soviets also kept armies on the Turkish border too, used them in the moment of crisis in the summer and fall of 42, then moved them back in 1943. I doubt if Russia seriously considered Turkey would invade in 1943, but the threat of such armies would help Turkey ensure she takes a proper neutrality, puts pressure on Turkey to reduce trade with the Axis etc...

Stationing a bunch of armies in Siberia would help ensure Japan does not think about interfering with all the lend lease that comes in via the Trans Siberian railway for example.

Plus if you don't have enough supply capability to keep every one near the front line and you have to have a strategic reserve someplace why not keep them in places where they might exert some leverage.
 

Cook

Banned
However, Stalin kept massive forces in Siberia and clearly feared a Japanese attack, to the point of not even taking Sorge serious.
And rightly so, there were powerful elements in the Japanese Army that pressed for an attack on the Soviets following Barbarossa, Germans were putting as much diplomatic pressure as they could for Japan to do so and the Japanese kept a huge army in Manchuria throughout the Pacific War.

Just because in hindsight something can be seen as a reckless move does not mean that it looked that way at the time.
 
It's Steven Colbert's dam, isn't it?

Japanese invasion of Siberia is a river prone to flooding. The Soviets built a dam by stationing troops in the far east; the flood was diverted. But if you take the dam away, the river doesn't just stay where you put it. The Soviets stationed troops in the area in order to ensure themselves against a Japanese attack. What Stalin knew is that if he left his border unprotected they might well attack, which is not exactly a secret.
 
So, Stalin took them serious. I can see the threat and trying to intimidate Japan with keeping troops in Siberia. The 1939 incident must also have encouraged Stalin to keep troops there. That I can see.

Ok, Of course Moscow was a close encounter and the Siberian divisions arrived in time. But when did the majority of Siberian forces arrive? I think I read somewhere that it was in 1942/3 that the presence could be felt? Am I wrong there?

1942/3 was after Japan had committed, so how big an influence did Japan's move have on Stalin's readiness in Siberia?

Who in Japan pushed for a Northern Strategy? Was it only the army? Yamamoto was obviously into a Southern strategy, insofar as that meant the navy, but was it that simple?

I am not too clued up on this early stuff on Japan.

Ivan
 
The forces that were used around Moscow in the winter of '41 came from central parts of the USSR. The army in the far east was kept permanently up to strength as a very large training camp, receiving fresh drafts and sending trained men to the armies in the west. So the Siberian army was always there and one can't point to a single point at which its troops went elsewhere. It was a process not an event.
 
I would suspect that Stalin simply had large numbers of troops stationed there as a precaution against any possible Japanese invasion. The Soviet Union was a pariah state for most of its early existence, and the Far East was occupied by the Japanese during the Russian Civil War.

Whilst I seriously doubt that he was under the impression that Japan would genuinely attack them, he was clearly worried about any possible reprisals of the expansionist Japan spreading North. Especially after Japan had defeated Russia so soundly in the Russo-Japanese War.
 
The main factor is what would Japan gain by going north? The answer nothing. If fact they'd burn through their limited oil stocks much quicker than OTL get chopped by the Soviets forces in the far east. Then their Japan's economy would implode.

Japan's army was a light infantry army, this would not stand up to the Red Army's tanks, firepower & better logistics.

There were very good reasons Japan make the choice to go after the oil wells in the Duch East Indies.
 
The Siberian forces at Moscow had nothing to do with the forces stationed in the Far East. The Soviets had a system worked out by August 1941 whereby new armies were formed in Siberia and Central Asia and then transferred to the West, with a smaller permanent army of units left behind in the East. This left a constant reserve of men totaling over 700,000 in the East at all times, but they could easily be sent West without weakening the total forces positioned against Japan because new armies and tank brigades were always being formed.
 
The main issue is that there's not much for Japan in eastern Siberia. By invading indochina and the East Indies they delayed their resource crisis by a while, but by invading Russia they'd lose what little they had even faster. The Kwantung army would be no match for the Soviet forces in the area;
 
That's my point. We know it wold be a bad move. Stalin must have as well, but even so, kept large formations in the East.
 

Cook

Banned
That's my point. We know it wold be a bad move. Stalin must have as well, but even so, kept large formations in the East.
Well firstly, it was a bad move because there was a large Soviet Army there and secondly, he’d just been attacked by the Germans, something he’d judged to also be a bad move.
 
More than the invasion itself it gives Japan a chance to shut down one of the three key points of entry for Lend-Lease goods into the USSR. Ships can not make Vladivostok and aircraft would be shot down, meaning only Persia and Archangelsk would be left open. Together the other two comprised 50% of lend-lease entry goods into Russia. Removing the *vital* supply lines in 1941 will not see the Imperial Army win the war by force but rather by attrition. Without the supplies for aircraft, clothes, parts, etc. the USSR is going to be hurting badly for supplies and will not be able to move much beyond the Eastern Ukraine. If this is enough to allow Silver Fox or Platinum Fox to succeed kiss the USSR good bye with Germany taking everything east of the Urals, Japan getting everything east of Baikal or the Ob, and the rest becoming a rump White Russian state that is a good dumping ground for political prisoners. This frees up German troops to head south through the Caucasus to take down Persia, India, the Middle East, and in general wreck havoc on the rest of Asia.
 
Um, L-L only became a major factor in 1943 after Stalingrad. Eveything the Soviets got up until that point didnt count for much. So the Axis is screwed anyway.

Also it should be pointed out the IJA wont get near Vladivostok. They'd be lucky not lose terriory, to Soviet counter-attacks...
 
The campaign will not just be one continuous Khalkin Gol after another. The Japanese will try to adjust their tactics and strategy, and they do have a better logistical situation. Think they could get air superiority too. Won't be as one-sided as it's been made out to be.
 
Well firstly, it was a bad move because there was a large Soviet Army there and secondly, he’d just been attacked by the Germans, something he’d judged to also be a bad move.

Stalin was terrified of a German invasion and knew that the Red Army was unprepared for war. That's why he tried to appease it as much as possible until the Red Army was a viable fighting force. He wrote off a German invasion in June of 1941 because 1. An invasion had been predicted for May, and when that didn't appear he became even more doubtful of further reports 2. He believed an invasion would be preceded by an ultimatum and a series of demands rather than essentially an attempted surprise attack with no warning 3. The British confused the situation by also giving Stalin information, making him think that Germany wasn't going to attack him and it was all just a British attempt to provoke war between the Soviet Union and Germany.
 
The Kwantung army was more or less a a law unto itself, fair enough.

It rasises the question: What was the strategic objecive behind Khalkin Gol?

WI Japan had been more successful in 1938 and 1939 for that matter? Could the Kwantung army have set the agenda by continued incursions and tactical successes?

What about logistics? it is not the like criss-crssed with roads and railways there.

Could the Kwantung army even have left China a bit to itself and changed the thrust toward Russia (and Mongolia)?

Would the Kwantung army have gained anything by such a move, not saying it would have benefitted Japan Empire in any way?

Ivan
 
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