Russia launches its own 'Barbarossa' strike on Nazi Germany

WI: following carving up of Poland, Stalin no longer trusts Hitler and launches preemptive strike (Under Rokovossky, don't know if spelt right...)

Taking into account Soviet military purges but their superiority in numbers, discuss....
 
The german counter-offensive will be stunning, given the crushing operative superiority of the Wehrmacht.
 

Deleted member 1487

WI: following carving up of Poland, Stalin no longer trusts Hitler and launches preemptive strike (Under Rokovossky, don't know if spelt right...)

Taking into account Soviet military purges but their superiority in numbers, discuss....
Its been discussed repeatedly and the consensus is that the Soviets would be in an even worse position than having sat on the defensive.
 
Not even with seemingly endless supplies from Siberia.

Plus the OKW were utterly against Op Barbarossa, maybe a Soviet assault may even stir up more trouble
 
Zhukov did a wargamming for the German side and won and Stalin gave him a new military post..

But the Soviet Union Armed Forces were in transition to modernize from 1939 to 1942 and their ability to maintain their logistical tail was poor...
 
WI: following carving up of Poland, Stalin no longer trusts Hitler and launches preemptive strike (Under Rokovossky, don't know if spelt right...)

Taking into account Soviet military purges but their superiority in numbers, discuss....

When is 'following'?

The day after the last Polish unit surrendered?
Middle of the Phony War?
During Weserubung ?
Start of Sickel Cut?
The day Paris fell?
During the Battle of Britain?
Winter of '40-'41?
A day before Barbarossa?

The answer to this matters a lot in analyzing potential outcomes.
 

Deleted member 1487

Ah I missed the ambiguity of the OP. When does the attack come? If in 1939 or 1940 they really cannot due to other conflicts (in 1939 the conflict with Japan, the invasion of Poland, and the war with Finland, in 1940 the invasion of the Baltics, the recovery from the Winter War, and the occupation of Bessarabia and parts of Bukowina). The logistics of East Poland were a mess and Russia had IOTL made no effort to upgrade them, AFAIK as a defensive measure in case of a German invasion. So a Soviet offensive in 1939 is not possible. In 1940 it is more doable, but only after the occupation of the Baltics, which is after the German defeat of France. The USSR then cannot spend time dismantling the Stalin Line, nor can it change its doctrine/organization of units, it must forego modernization to get existing equipment up to snuff (so no KVs or T-34s or modern aircraft), and cannot expand; Stalin must spend all his resources getting the army recovered from the Winter War, annex his promised territories (Baltics, Bessarabia), integrate newly seized lands and pacify them, and upgrade infrastructure at the border to allow for an invasion.

At the earliest we are looking at very late Summer/Autumn 1940. At that point the only thing that makes sense to do is invade Romania hard to capture the major foreign source of German oil and then to clear the East Bank of the Vistula and threaten East Prussia to tie down the Germans. If the Soviets do that then the Germans are in real trouble. There is a famine in Europe, the blockade prevents importing in significant quantities, and the Soviets now have shut off a major source of Axis oil, while also denying them Soviet resources that were historically traded. The Soviet military is a joke but they have the advantage of Germany being low on resources and now cannot really materially prepare for Barbarossa thanks to no Romanian oil or Soviet trade resources. They've used up a bunch of resources in the Battle of France and Britain and Europe is in famine. The German military is tough as nails and the best military on the planet at the time, but they need resources and supplies to be able to fight. The Soviets in this scenario have cut them off of what they need to be able to fight, so their military weakness relative to the Germans is dramatically aided by the German lack of supplies. The Germans will hit back very hard with their allies, but will be hobbled by their lack fo supplies from achieving nearly anything substantial beyond perhaps grabbing back Romania...but likely only with wrecked oil fields.

The problem with that scenario is that it requires the Soviets having perfect knowledge of the German material shortages, perfect forethought in terms of what would make them most effective, and knowing that the Germans are going to attack next year. They'd need to start preparing in 1939 to make this happen, which is just not really possible given Stalin's strategic thoughts and the neutering of any opinions outside of what Stalin would tolerate. So while it is all possible in terms of hindsight, at the time it was just not a viable plan due to imperfect understanding of what was going on and what would happen. Stalin thought he could watch the Germans and Brits wear each other down and take time to build up a world beating military and conquer Europe on the cheap, which made total sense without hindsight in 1939 and even in 1940. Doing the above attack plan really is a bad idea relative to Stalin's OTL plan...assuming the Germans don't defeat France or don't invade the USSR in 1941.
 
Ha, ha. Stalin wasn't that stupid. He knew he needed to rebuild his army - its performance during the Winter War showed that.
While he may very well have planned on invading Germany in '42 or '43, he most assuredly wasn't going to do it before Barbarossa happened.
 
There are many reasons a Russian first strike against Nazi Germany would be a disaster:

1. Equipment and training: The main tanks of the Red Army in 1939/1940 are the BT series and the T-26, both of which were increasingly outdated. Soviet planes were about as advanced as German planes, but Soviet pilots only got about 5% as much training as their German counterparts.

2. Logistical problems: the Red Army's supply system was godawful, meaning that the fuel, food, and other supplies needed for an invasion wouldn't necessarily make it to the units. Spare parts were also in short supply, meaning that once something breaks it pretty much had to be abandoned.

3. Leadership: the Purges killed 3 of 5 Marshals, 13 of 15 army commanders, 50 of 57 corp commanders, 154 out of 186 division commanders, and 41 out of 48 commissionars. Those who survived or replaced them tended to be there for political reasons rather than military competence, and in any case were too terrified of Stalin to do much independently.
 
In mid-41? The Soviets suffer the biggest military defeat of all time. Worst case is it's bad enough to cost them the war right in 1941. Best case is the Germans run out of steam at the D'niepr line, leaving the Soviets with enough resources to rebuild a even stronger Red Army in 1942. That means come mid-42, both the Germans and Soviets are a whole lot stronger then they were OTL mid-42. That generally favors the Soviets in the longer-run, but in the short-run it means a titanic clash in '42. The middle-case, and most probable, outcome leave the German seizing roughly as much territory as they did OTL but avoiding the massive overextend and casualties they suffered in the winter of '41-'42... meaning come the campaign season of '42, the Soviets are weaker and the Germans are a whole lot stronger. That is a recipe for a potential Soviet collapse in '42. As you can tell, 2 of 3 of these scenarios ends with the USSR collapsing and thus leaves the war to be won or lost entirely by the Americans. Not a pleasant prospect for anyone except the Nazis and their supporters...

In mid-40? The Soviets blunder forward a bit, possibly as far as the Vistula, at tremendous cost, before the German counter-attack tosses them straight back across the border. The Germans can probably push deep into Belarus and Western Ukraine, but lack the time or resources to get into the USSR's vital resource regions. That effectively dooms Germany to defeat at the hands of a more quickly rebuilt Red Army in the longer run, but as Wiking notes this is all hindsight talking and would not be remotely apparent right there in mid-1940...

Late-'39 is kinda similar to mid-'40. Except with the extra aspects of butterflying away the Fall of France (the WAllies would be quite delighted to see the Germans and Soviets kill each other by the millions) as well as obviating the Soviets from ever embarking on the Winter War or occupation of the Baltic States.
 
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In mid-41? The Soviets suffer the biggest military defeat of all time. Worst case is it's bad enough to cost them the war right in 1941.

would this be a result of everything going wrong? or a particular risk of being on offensive?

(just trying to understand what else could go worse than OTL invasion? the loss of so many aircraft on ground, etc)
 
would this be a result of everything going wrong? or a particular risk of being on offensive?

(just trying to understand what else could go worse than OTL invasion? the loss of so many aircraft on ground, etc)

A particular risk of being on the offensive, specifically in relation to the deployment of Soviet forces. Historically, the Soviet forces defending European Russia were arraigned in two strategic echelons: a first echelon along the frontier and a second echelon back along the D'niepr river line. What happen OTL is the Germans annihilated the first echelon in the north and center and routed it in the south, only to stumble up on the second. After the time-consuming and costly battles, they managed to finally wipe this second echelon out in the subsequent battles around Smolensk and Kiev, only to have to once again fight through the another round of freshly mobilized forces during Operation Typhoon. And then after they managed to fight through and destroy those in the Vyazma-Bryansk encirclements, the Soviets deployed yet another round of forces, a mix of newly mobilized formations, pre-war cadres that had were thrown into battle, and pre-war regulars transferred in from the East, that finally halted the Germans in October-November and then went over to the offensive in December.

What taking the offensive does is take the entire Soviet military organization, and shift the whole thing westward. They'll be using both the first and second echelon since they believed in striking with the maximum available force. These would be wiped out together forward of the 1941 border. The freshly mobilized forces that the Germans destroyed during Typhoon would be wiped out iITTLs Smolensk and Kiev engagements. And then the forces that IOTL halted the Germans at Moscow and launched the winter counter-offensive are wiped out in ITTLs Typhoon. The question then is, who is left to defend Moscow?

The answer, of course, is whatever new forces the Soviets can put together after that. But the Soviets need a certain amount of quality to stop the Germans and each fresh deployment of forces suffered from a degradation of quality as they were rushed through training. So would the qualitative degradation in the final round of new reservists be the straw which breaks the camels back for the Soviets? Or would it be enough to still stop the exhausted Germans? That is the big unknown which makes the difference between the worse case and middle case scenario. But if the answer is that they are not qualitatively good enough, then the Germans can take Moscow and hold it through the winter. That's a potentially mortal blow.
 
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I agree that an attack in 41 would be folly - the Red Army wont be raising the Red Banner over the Reichstag in 41/42

And an earlier attack is unlikely to defeat the German Army

However as far as it being worse than OTL - do recall that the biggest disadvantage for the Red army in 1941 was Stalin hamstringing his own army before the German Invasion in an effort to look as harmless as possible and then giving it a series of batshitcrazy orders that often resulted in entire formation of units being destroyed.

Had he given the orders to attack before the German Invasion - then as the attacking force it would - certainly initially - enjoy a number of advantages that the same OTL army trying to scramble to defend against the German Army's attack did not enjoy

The advantages (and differences to the OTL Red Army) would be as follows

The Red army is ready to fight - sub units and parent units etc would be formed up and not scattered across the region in their 'peacetime' barracks - sometimes hundreds of KMs apart and be at or near their ToE

The Logistics are in place for the attack - while Russian Logistics early war are nothing to write home about - actually having what Logistics you have ready to do its best is much better than it being strung out and the fighting arms not having ammunition food, spares and POL to hand because it's still in supply depots.

And possibly most importantly the Army and Air Force etc knows it's about to fight, when it's going to fight and where giving it an advantage over the Germans (again only initially) - the air units that OTL were surprised on the ground on day one losing several 1000 aircraft in the first 3 days is instead going to be ready (well certainly better prepared than it was) for Battle and the Luftwaffe is not going to enjoy the same very favorable exchange rate as OTL

Also while the Red Armies losses are going to be heavy - the German Army is going to lose a lot of men and equipment as well - possibly more than they lost in the early weeks and months of Barbarossa
 
However as far as it being worse than OTL - do recall that the biggest disadvantage for the Red army in 1941 was Stalin hamstringing his own army before the German Invasion in an effort to look as harmless as possible and then giving it a series of batshitcrazy orders that often resulted in entire formation of units being destroyed.

Had he given the orders to attack before the German Invasion - then as the attacking force it would - certainly initially - enjoy a number of advantages that the same OTL army trying to scramble to defend against the German Army's attack did not enjoy

The advantages (and differences to the OTL Red Army) would be as follows

The Red army is ready to fight - sub units and parent units etc would be formed up and not scattered across the region in their 'peacetime' barracks - sometimes hundreds of KMs apart and be at or near their ToE

The Logistics are in place for the attack - while Russian Logistics early war are nothing to write home about - actually having what Logistics you have ready to do its best is much better than it being strung out and the fighting arms not having ammunition food, spares and POL to hand because it's still in supply depots.

And possibly most importantly the Army and Air Force etc knows it's about to fight, when it's going to fight and where giving it an advantage over the Germans (again only initially) - the air units that OTL were surprised on the ground on day one losing several 1000 aircraft in the first 3 days is instead going to be ready (well certainly better prepared than it was) for Battle and the Luftwaffe is not going to enjoy the same very favorable exchange rate as OTL

All of what you say would certainly be of great benefit if the Red Army was preparing to defend, but attacking is much harder then defending and in 1941 an attack by the Red Army will still be a staggeringly inept affair. Worse, an attack into the Reich also gives the Germans the added benefit of interior lines, while it stretches the Red Army's logistic tail out over that same shitty road and rail network the Germans had so much trouble with when they invaded (these kinds of things work both ways). It's just an all around nightmare scenario for the Russians... which would is why they never contemplated it OTL.

With that said, how much of additional delay and damage would be imposed upon the Germans by a Soviet pre-emptive strike is the other big unknown that makes a difference between my listed middle case and best case (for the Soviets) outcomes.
 
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Minty_Fresh

Banned
An attack in 1941 for the Soviets would be catastrophic, as they would be shuffling basically a static army led by crappy commanders westwards without any sort of morale boosting or strategic depth to rely on. Across the whole front, they would get thrashed and suffer likely over a million losses in the first month alone, with the Germans encircling and pocketing entire Armies in the counterattack. The lack of depth, combined with the inability for retreat for an unmotorized force over the logistical hell that is Eastern Poland and Belarus, could possibly lose them the war.

The Germans took a week or so to get to Minsk and about two months to take Smolensk and fight off the counter attacks. In this scenario, I think they could get to Smolensk within three weeks of the start of the inevitable counter attack and be in position to drive on Moscow, and the Russians in the South would not pose such a threat to their flank seeing as they would be annihilated in their attacks against the Germans and allies in the south.

This could very well lose them the war. The reserve armies from the Far East would still be in play around Moscow, but the Germans would be in a far better position than OTL, and possibly not quite as exhausted. The Russians might have ended up losing Leningrad.
 

Deleted member 1487

If the Soviets attacked in 1941 to preempt Barbarossa the big problem the Soviets would have is logistics and being disorganized, so attacking is the best way to make your forces combat ineffective in that situation. Effectively they'd be bearing their throat, belly, and balls to attack as their attacking forces would be strung out and even less able to defend against a riposte than sitting still on their own turf. They'd be smashed up on the attack by the Luftwaffe and when at their weakest ripped to ribbons. It would be like 2nd Kharkov, but 10 times worse.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Battle_of_Kharkov
 
would this be a result of everything going wrong? or a particular risk of being on offensive?

A particular risk of being on the offensive, specifically in relation to the deployment of Soviet forces. Historically, the Soviet forces defending European Russia were arraigned in two strategic echelons: a first echelon along the frontier and a second echelon back along the D'niepr river line.

What taking the offensive does is take the entire Soviet military organization, and shift the whole thing westward. They'll be using both the first and second echelon since they believed in striking with the maximum available force. These would be wiped out together forward of the 1941 border.

thanks

wonder the Soviet reaction to air campaign? could they be forced on offensive? or is that too transparent a trap?
 
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