No, no and no.
From Istvan Deak's The Lawful Revolution; Louis Kossuth and thr Hungarians:
"Most Hungarian historians have condemned Lamberg's appointment as unconstitutional and counterrevolutionary. They see it as another base trick played by Vienna reactionaries. It was perhaps unconstitutional, but the appointment was also in the interest of peace and the autonomy of Hungary. When the manifestos were published on September 25, Jelačić was still moving leisurely towards Buda-Pest: it was expected that he woule take the city in a day or two. Why then the appointment of a new supreme commander with authority over both Hungarian and Croatian armies, and with the specific task of enforcing an immediate armistice? This could have stopped Jelačić. And if the aim was entirely anti-Hungarian, then why appoint a moderate Hungarian? Lamberg had participated in the Reform Diet of 1847-48 as a member of the Upper House; and as commander of the Pressburg army corps he had shown himself as patriotic as his uniform allowed him to be. His Ungarns politisches Zukunft, published anonymously in 1842, proved him a conservative reformer; Batthyány himself respected the general. The king's move represented a last effort to save the Monarchy in its old decentralised form. But Lamberg's appointment was totally misunderstood in Hungary."
Deak also points out that his appointment was pretty much decided by Archduke Stefan, Palatine of Hungary, who definitely sympathised with the Reformists and his serious attempt at protecting both the Monarchy and the gains of the Revolution threw him in exile.
I was half-wrong with my accusations, however, now that I'm re-reading. Kossuth called for Lamberg to be treated as a traitor and rebel and made sure to post the date of the General's arrival. It's the radical press in Buda-Pest that called for his head. While not directly responsible, he definitely played a role here.
Finally, you are giving way too much credit to the Court in Vienna. Vienna was heavily divided at this point. The remnants of Metternich's faction pushed for a continuation and even reformation of the Monarchy's decentralised system (as Metternich himself wanted; little known fact), while Bach's faction wanted the centralise the Empire. Of course, there were the Reactionary Neo-Absolutists that wanted to destroy the new constitution and the April Laws as well as the Liberals and Moderates sympathetic to tge Hungarian cause from the very beginning who lost their voice with Lamberg's murder. Bach and his faction won out in the end, but the bickering within the Camarilla is not to be underestimated and Bach's victory in the post-Metternich crisis was not assured at all.
I wont dispute that you have more knowledge than me in this matter. However I draw very different conclusions from the same facts:
1. Vienna didnt need to appoint Lamberg to order Jellacic to stop. If this was their goal this step was unnecessery. However we should ask what would have accomplished if the liberal hungarian government went along with this. It would have placed all the armed forces under the hungarians governments control under the control of someone who was loyal to Vienna and not to them. This Lamberg demonstrated before when he refused to place his troops under the control of the hungarian military ministry. This would have placed the new hungarian government completly at the mercy of Vienna.
2. You probably know much better than me how divided the loyalties of the 'hungarian' officer corps was. They were basically the former imperial officers who have already sworn an oath to the emperor/king. I dont think it unlikely that the military would accept Lamberg even with his unconstitutional appointment. That again would mean that the hungarian government remains without an armed force - while Jellacic is marching toward them.
3. Because of this I cant fault the hungarian leadership for not accepting this unconstitutional step, that would take away their military power and place it in the hands of their political enemy who has already demonstrated that his loyalties lie with the Emperor. In exchange of this he might order Jellasic to stop who might comply with this order...
4. Taking unconstitutional steps just after the liberals made revolution for a constitution is bound to be a bad idea.
5. Regarding Lambergs death I think it was the best solution for the hungarian liberal government. For the reasons above it was unthinkable that they would let him accomplish his mission. To stop him they could have arrested him, executed him or driven him away. However it was extremly important that the military remains under their control and for this they needed the military to still see them as the lawful government of Hungary and not rebels against the emperor. If they inprisoned or executed Lamberg they would need a legal reason and all in all it wouldnt go over too well. If they let him get away he could have gone directly to the army and tried to size control. Getting him killed by a mob and claiming no responsibility for it seems to me one of the most effective and ruthless solutions.
6. Dont forget the base fact that it was Jellasic who attacked Hungary. He either acted with Viennas consent which means Vienna was viewing Hungary as rebbeling or was a rebel himself. By neither declaring Jellasic a rebel nor ordering to stop his attack I think Vienna made his decision. The only thing they did during the whole mess was to try to take back control of the armies under the constitutional hungarian government by an unconstitutional step.
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