Russia doesn't enter World War 1

shiftygiant

Gone Fishin'
French didn't care for Serbia in 1914.

Of course they didn't care about Serbia, but they'll care about the implication of what Russia is doing. Again, the message that France will get is that if Russia is willing to abandon Serbia, a nation of which they had deep ties and bonds with, to the wolves, then what'll stop them doing it again?
 
Of course they didn't care about Serbia, but they'll care about the implication of what Russia is doing. Again, the message that France will get is that if Russia is willing to abandon Serbia, a nation of which they had deep ties and bonds with, to the wolves, then what'll stop them doing it again?

You mean the country that gave us the phrase 'treason is a matter of dates?' The French will recognize that such alliances come down to mutual self-interest and carry on as before, its not like they exactly trusted to Russians anyway...
 
France would not risk its existence over Serbia.
They told Serbs to suck it up, until Russia decided to support it, and they knew they had a chance against Germany, together. then they changed a tune, seeing Russia was willing to fight Germany.

Even if Russia would have dropped Serbia, France would not have to worry about the same being done to them in case of German aggression, since they and Russians needed each other to defend against Germany.
 
Besides the Russians had a ready made excuse. A Serb assassinated the arch duke of Austria-Hungry. They could easily say their alliances don't include supporting regicide.
 
French didn't care for Serbia in 1914.
Of course they did. Insofar as they knew that it would likely give them the hoped for two/three front scenario against Germany and had supported Serbia and Russia accordingly.
Obviously, Russia was the key for France. If Russia bows out, Serbia has failed as a pawn and France's involvement there is over, too.
 
Richard Pipes in *The Russian Revolution*, asking why Russia went to war when the risks (especially after the war with Japan) were so obvious, argues (p. 195-6) that

"Socialist writers attribute tsarism's involvement to the pressures of Western democracies whom Russia owed vast amounts of money. For Russian conservatives, Russia acted out of a selfless devotion to the alliance... [which] earned her no gratitude...

"Such explanations are unconvincing. Imperial Russia entered into defensive alliances and honored her commitments neither in response to Allied pressures nor from altruistic motives, but from soundly perceived self-interest. Long before 1914 Russian statesmen had a good notion of the designs Germany had on her. These called for the dismemberment of the Empire and German economic mastery over Russia and her borderlands. Post-World War II archival research has confirmed that German political, military, and business circles regarded the breakup of Russia and control over her resources as essential to Germany's global aspirations. Berlin assigned high priority to neutralizing the Russian military threat and the related prospect of a two-front war as well as to gaining access to Russia's human and material wealth with which to match that of France and Britain.

"Given Germany's *Russlandpolitik* after the dismissal of Bismarck, the choice before the rulers of Russia was not whether to withdraw into isolation or to join in great-power politics, with all the risks that this entailed: this had been decided for her by Germany. Her choice lay between facing Germany alone or acting in partnership with France and possibly England. Posed in this manner, the question answered itself. Unless Russia was prepared to give up her empire, shrink to the territory of seventeenth-century Muscovy, and acquiesce to the status of a German colony, she had to coordinate her military plans with the Western democracies. The alternative was to stand by while Germany smashed France, as she was certain ro do if her eastern flank was secure, and then transferred her armies east to dispose of Russia'..."

Unfortunately, the only sources Pipes gives for his characterization of Germany's pre-1914 designs on Russia are Fritz Fischer's *War of Illusions* and *Germany's Aims in the First World War*, and I am a little bit rusty about the "Fischer controversy" http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fritz_Fischer and specifically about what evidence Fischer gives for Germany's pre-1914 intentions vis-à-vis Russia...
 

BooNZ

Banned
Unfortunately, the only sources Pipes gives for his characterization of Germany's pre-1914 designs on Russia are Fritz Fischer's *War of Illusions* and *Germany's Aims in the First World War*, and I am a little bit rusty about the "Fischer controversy" http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fritz_Fischer and specifically about what evidence Fischer gives for Germany's pre-1914 intentions vis-à-vis Russia...

That would because there were no firm German war aims in Europe prior to WW1 - unlike France, Russia and Serbia. Germany had been at peace for over 40 years. In many ways Germany sought to appease Russia (e.g. route of Bagdad railway) and arguably stood by Russia when it was most vulnerable (circa 1905-1906).

I do have a copy of Fischer's book and found the progressive territorial claims as the war progressed interesting, but those had the appearance of a collection of ideas rather than policies that anyone significant was aware of or took seriously before the war. A bit like citing US v UK war games as evidence one nation was actually planning to invade the other.
 
Well the september program to which Pipes might be referencing was never made official policy. But even today its actual influence on the german leadership is still controversial.
 
So Russia had no obligation other than domestic pressure to support Serbia.

Domestic pressure is only one part of the story.

The Russian government risked losing far more than just a single ally. It was well aware what kind of impression abandoning Serbia would have on all the other governments in the Balkans; if Russia stood by while the Habsburgs crushed Serbia, Russia would be seen as fundamentally weak and unwilling to aid her allies. Her friendly overtures would be viewed as useless and her threats would lose edge as well. In the words of the Foreign Minister Sazonov, "...Russian prestige in the Balkans would collapse utterly" and she risked seeing pretty much the whole Balkans regress into the Austro-German sphere of influence if she did not show herself willing to defend her friends.
 

BooNZ

Banned
Great War is averted, at least for now.
If it happens, Entente wins faster, since in 1914 Russia was in the middle of reorganizing their Army, and building railroads to better supply troops in event of war. If they were finished before war starts, they would have won. And France and Russia are allied, so Germany can't just attack one and ignore other.

...but on the other hand the longer it's delayed nations like Russia have a lot of time to reform their industry and military to a point where they'd be nigh unstoppable.

Russia was sinking huge amounts of treasure into bolstering its army from around 1908 onward, but increasing and significant portions of its budget was being dedicated to naval expenditure from 1912. Further increases in Russian army manpower were projected to be matched by German increases. By 1912 the Germans had effectively lost the naval race with Britain and were increasingly focused on their army. The A-H military budget remained a relative pittance, but it was scheduled to modernise its artillery in 1915 onward (a significant force multiplier).

Further to the above, in 1914 Anglo German relations were on the improve and Anglo Russian relations were likely to come under stress. Given time and the absence of a certain Belgium detour, GB might have sat out the next continental war. With the benefit of hindsight, 1914 was the optimal time for Russia and France to go to war with the CP.
 
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