Royal Marine Division - 1943-??

Dave Shoup

Banned
Historically, the Royal Marines were, to be blunt, used questionably by the British high command in WW 2. In a war that was defined, in large part, by amphibious warfare, the RM spent most of the war years in their traditional shipboard roles of gunners/etc. (a capital ship generally had 100 to 200 RMs aboard), security/garrison needs in the UK and other established naval bases, or their interwar-developed role of a combined arms defense force for overseas naval bases (the "Mobile Naval Base Defense Organization," or MNBDO), which were - essentially - brigade-sized mixes of infantry, coast artillery, AA artillery, etc. who were "mobile" the sense they could be deployed to build-up a functioning naval base in an otherwise austere location, but were "static" once they arrived.

In WW 2, the RM increased from some 13,000 officers and men (regulars and reserves) in 1938 to 82,000 in 1943, and along with providing detachments for the larger ships of the RN, security and garrison duties, and the manpower sufficient for two MNBDOs, designated (creatively) MNBDO I (established prewar, and designated as such in 1939) and MNBDO II (established in 1941). Through a complex series of deployments and detachments, much of MNBDO I ended up serving in the Indian Ocean and much of MNBDO II in the Med, although elements of I also served in the Med and elements of II also served in northwest Europe. These two formations gave rise to the 1st, 2nd, and 5th RM AA brigades, of which the 5th was (basically) a conglomeration of the 1st and 2nd for service in NW Europe in 1944.

By the end of 1943, RM manpower broke (roughly) down as follows:

14,000 - landing craft crew;
11,000 - headquarters and depots;
8,000 - Fleet duties (shipboard detachments);
7,000 - Special service (commandos);
42,000 - RN base duties, FAA, training units, RM engineers, Allied/joint/combined staffs, etc.)

It is worth noting that in a conflict defined by amphibious assaults, only about 7,000 RM were assigned to what amounted to light infantry units trained and equipped for amphibious assaults...

It is also worth noting that the majority of those 7,000 RMs were late arrivals to the "commando" role; before 1943, only two commandos (basically, an understrength infantry battalion) had been made up of RM personnel; most of the commandos were made up of soldiers before 1943. The first RM unit was originally formed as "The RM Commando" in February, 1942, and then redesignated as 40 RM Commando; the second was formed in October, 1942, as 41 RM Commando, largely by redesignating the existing 8th RM Battalion (infantry).

In mid-1943, the majority of the RM's land warfare capabilities were found in an understrength light infantry division designated as "The Royal Marine Division," formed as such in August, 1940. On paper, its organization was (more or less) as follows:

RM Division headquarters - CG: MG Sir Robert Grice Sturges
Division Troops: 15 RM Battalion (MG); 18 RM Battalion (Mobile); RM Division Engineers; RM Division Signals; etc.
Formation headquarters
101 RM Brigade (hq); 102 RM Brigade (hq); RM Division Artillery
Infantry:
1st RM Battalion; 2nd RM Battalion; 3rd RM Battalion; 5th RM Battalion; 10th RM Battalion;
Artillery:
RM Field Artillery Regiment
RM Anti-tank Regiment
Amphibious Engineers:
RM 1st Beach Group
RM 2nd Beach Group

Two more RM infantry battalions existed; the 7th was in the Med as an independent battalion, and had absorbed the 9th RM Battalion in May, 1942, while the 11th RM Battalion was in the Indian Ocean.

Now, historically, the division sketched above was converted in 1943 to either a) commando units (the historical 42-48 RM Commandos), or b) landing craft crews (the 14,000 men mentioned above). The division headquarters was converted from an operational hq to an administrative one, becoming headquarters of the Special Service Group in the UK in August, 1943, while the brigade headquarters provided personnel for elements of what became the four Special Service/Commando brigades of 1944-45. In 1945, two more brigade headquarters - 116 and 117 RM Brigades - were formed, using a mixed group of personnel, to provide additional light infantry for NW Europe.

There were a fair number of reasons - doctrine, the British conscript manpower crisis of 1944-45, inter-service rivalries, etc. - as to why all of the above occurred, but it certainly raises the issue of whether the mass conversion of seven RM infantry battalions to seven RM commando battalions, and the provision of 14,000 landing craft crew, was really the best use of trained light infantry like the RMs.

So, here's the POD: in the summer of 1943, rather than the conversions and re-assignments outlined above, WSC, Bourne and Hunton (the the senior RM generals), the RN, and the Army agree the Navy can find landing craft crew from the fleet, and the two extant RM battalions and the Army's commando battalions (1-4th, 6th, and 12th in the UK, 9th in the Med, and 5th in the Indian Ocean, as well as various Allied, "local," or special units) can handle the commando role as is necessary.

For example, decommissioning the four remaining Revenge class battleships would yield 4,000 RN officers and men, and the 14 remaining WW I-era light cruisers (two Emerald, two Frobisher, six Danae class, four Caledon+ cruisers) another 7,000, roughly; the last 3,000 presumably could have been made up by transferring the seven remaining Banff-class sloops back to the USCG (1400 men total), as well as many of the remaining ex-USN "four piper" destroyers the British chose to decommission (~150 men each), so 11 of the 41 that historically survived until the end of the war.

Those post-POD decisions yield a light infantry division drawing from a pool of (at least) 19,000 men (14,000 landing craft crews plus at least 5,000 light infantry NOT converted to commandos), organized (presumably) as follows:

RM Division headquarters
Division Troops: 15 RM Battalion (MG); 18 RM Battalion (Mobile); RM Division Engineers; RM Division Signals; etc.
Formation headquarters
101 RM Brigade (hq); 102 RM Brigade (hq); RM Division Artillery
Infantry:
1st RM Battalion; 2nd RM Battalion; 3rd RM Battalion; 5th RM Battalion; 10th RM Battalion; add 7th or 11th as appropriate, given a decision on deployment)
Artillery:
RM Field Artillery Regiment
RM Anti-tank Regiment
Amphibious Engineers:
RM 1st Beach Group
RM 2nd Beach Group

That's roughly two brigade groups, with 7-8 maneuver battalions between them, and artillery and engineers to match. Seems like a useful formation for the Med or Indian Ocean, in 1943 and afterwards...

So, if the above all occurs, and both the point to point and the amphibious assault shipping is available in 1943-44, where do you send it?

Scotland or Iceland, to provide something tangible to back up FORTITUDE NORTH? The Med, to provide a British force sized for BRASSARD or something similar? The Indian Ocean, to give Mountbatten an amphibious division - presumably beefed up with the Army's 29th Independent Brigade) a year early?

Or how about all the way to the Southwest Pacific, to reinforce the theater in anticipation of the withdrawal of the (US) 1st and 3rd Marine divisions for the Central Pacific in 1944?

Thoughts?

Sources:

The Royal Marines and the War at Sea, 1939-45, by Watts, Martin

and

The Watery Maze: The Story of Combined Ops, by Fergusson, Bernard
 
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Whutz 'Strine foah Gyrine, mate"?

Dave Shoup

Banned
More than 100 views and nobody wants to weigh in on the prospect of a Royal Marine division in the Pacific War?
 
So, if the above all occurs, and both the point to point and the amphibious assault shipping is available in 1943-44, where do you send it?

shipping is the big thing. Extra shipping?
Scratch Op Shingle, and do Dragoon in June: or to really dick with the Germans, do it in May, and suck away forces from Normandy.

Or do a better job of Shingle with the added RM.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
shipping is the big thing. Extra shipping?
Scratch Op Shingle, and do Dragoon in June: or to really dick with the Germans, do it in May, and suck away forces from Normandy. Or do a better job of Shingle with the added RM.

If the division deploys to the Med, shipping wouldn't be an issue, although presumably the RMD's two brigades would replace a divisional headquarters and two brigades that deployed historically to the Med from the UK, and after HUSKY - the obvious candidate in 1943-44 would be to send the RMD in place of the the Canadian 5th Armoured Division.

The thing is, I don't see a light infantry division of two brigades making much of a difference for landings on the Continent, in Italy or France. To provide a 1-1 replacement of the British and Canadian army divisions that were used in the theater historically for amphibious assaults in 1943-45 after HUSKY, the RMD would have to be beefed up considerably to three brigade groups, which would require a "spare" army brigade. The 234th from Malta would be an obvious candidate.

Seizing an isolated island - Elba, for example, as in BRASSARD - would have been doable for a light division; it's basically what the Allies used with the French 9th Colonial, historically.
 
The British decide after Dieppe, that any opposed landing will require at least one specialized beach assault Division. In step, the Marines, the first of two divisions is formed as an integrated three Brigade Division with its own specialized equipment (developed alongside and in conjunction with Hobarts Funnies of the 9th Division) including LTV's. On D-Day The Marine Divisions lead the assault on the beach to the east of the Orne river and the Merville Battery with specific task of opening a route to seize Caen on D-Day. The rest is Alt-History!
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
The British decide after Dieppe, that any opposed landing will require at least one specialized beach assault Division. In step, the Marines, the first of two divisions is formed as an integrated three Brigade Division with its own specialized equipment (developed alongside and in conjunction with Hobarts Funnies of the 9th Division) including LTV's. On D-Day The Marine Divisions lead the assault on the beach to the east of the Orne river and the Merville Battery with specific task of opening a route to seize Caen on D-Day. The rest is Alt-History!

Well, that certainly is. :)

Absent the I (Royal) MEF, what do you think could be done with the RMD as a two brigade group strong light division from the autumn of 1943 onwards?
 
More than 100 views and nobody wants to weigh in on the prospect of a Royal Marine division in the Pacific War?

Unlikely until 1945 ("Germany First") but if the atomic bombs fail, then the campaign to liberate Malaya and the Dutch East Indies would use them to the full.
 
I have to ask why?

The large USMC is an accident of history, politics, and the armed forces inability to play nicely together

The Royal Navy has always had a small elite force it could shoot like a cannon towards the land. It is called the Army.

As the European theatre in WW2 showed army units were quite capable of amphibious operations.
 
As others have pointed out, why?

A specialized amphibious assault division is useful in a situation where there will be a series of landings with no significant inland advance and which are spaced far enough apart for the unit to be ready for the next operation, i.e. the Pacific. Elsewhere the assault from the sea was a small part of a larger campaign, so either the division continues as a conventional unit or it's withdrawn and not used until the next landing. Given UK manpower & shipping shortages the latter is not really an option. The constraints on UK amphibious operations generally wasn't assault troops, it was shipping. Also, the marines will need to be replaced on board ships, so presumably there will have to be reductions either in the number of ships in the RN or in the number of divisions in the army to create the RM division.
 
IIRC there were some (3?) amphibious ships capable of each landing a battalion of troops sent to the Med in 1941 (early at any rate) with an idea to land them ahead of an armoured offensive in the desert. If this had been done I can imagine calls for a specialist amphibious force to be expanded for this sort of thing and used in the Med until 1944.
 
I understand what the OP is getting at but apart from those 5-6 years (and arguably not even then) the very well trained regular army was able to absorb any ampibious mission beyond that requiring a 'Squadron' Naval landing force (Royal marines and Naval Landing parties).

More important to any UK Amphibious operation is all of the technical and tribal knowledge (beyond climbing down a net to a landing craft and charging ashore once the ramp goes down) - such as Landing craft operations, beach head logistics, combined arms communication (mainly ship to shore and vice versa).

There were a number of Amphibious landings during the war many of them multi - Division in strength and using the RM as a single Division sized entity means that they can only be used in one place at any given time

The reason for Marines to be on ships had not 'gone away' during the war and that particular function could not be replaced by Soldiers or realistically by armed sailors.

Amphibious infantry on the other hand can be replicated by Army units (especially if they have been 'idle' in the UK for 12-36 months).

Like today if a large scale UK Ampib op was required then 3rd Brigade would form the core of said force and provide the specialized knowledge with the majority of the troops provided by the Army

Take the Falklands for example:-

3 Commando Battalions

5 Army Battalions + 1 Light Tank Squadron

Had the force required needed to be stronger then they army would have furnished them.

The lets look at the Pacific campaign

In total there was 6 US Marine divisions stood up during the war

There was 22 Army Divisions serving during the same period

So while the Marines may have been largely responsible for the initial landing etc (and not always then) the burden of the actual fighting fell on the US army in an almost 4:1 ratio
 
As Jellico points out, the US Marines are something of an aberration. In WWII there were only 6 divisions of them in the Pacific as opposed to almost 30 US Army divisions. In the course of the war the army made far more amphibious landings than the marines and proved that they could do them just as well.
 
As the European theatre in WW2 showed army units were quite capable of amphibious operations.
Capable isn't the same as 'Good at it'

USMC was better than Army for simply have done ops before the War, not counting all the specific things they were different, like FACs and such
 
Capable isn't the same as 'Good at it'

USMC was better than Army for simply have done ops before the War, not counting all the specific things they were different, like FACs and such
How do you define 'better'? Both made landing against no opposition, both made landings against very heavy opposition. Neither ever had an invasion fail. The army, OTOH, made invasions and follow-up landings on a scale the marines could never match. All the landings in Europe and most of the landings in the Pacific were done by the army. How did the marines do it 'better'?
 
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As that was a last minute decision to take that Island, not much time for planning or logistical considerations
The English army has been going ashore for 500 years and still gave us Gallipoli. I think it is fair to say that amphibious operations continually have to be relearned as we keep fighting the last war. There are stuff ups by all players. I don't think that there is anything controversial about that.
 
A Royal Marine Division could have been built up for Normandy. The Royal Marines could have been equipped with LVTs and modeled after a USMC Division. After Normandy the Division could have returned to England like the 6th Airborne Division and fought in the campaign to open up Antwerp.
After the war the RM Division becomes Britain’s go to expeditionary Force. The Division deploys to Korea in 1950 and the Sinai in 1956.
 
Unlikely until 1945 ("Germany First") but if the atomic bombs fail, then the campaign to liberate Malaya and the Dutch East Indies would use them to the full.

If the atomic bombs fail, then it would be chemical warfare against the Japanese Home Islands.
 

Dave Shoup

Banned
Unlikely until 1945 ("Germany First") but if the atomic bombs fail, then the campaign to liberate Malaya and the Dutch East Indies would use them to the full.

That's certainly an option; given the deployment of the RN X Force to the Pacific in 1944 (six LSIs, meaning the British equivalents of USN APAs, - HMS Empire Mace, Empire Spearhead, Glenearn, Empire Battleaxe, Clan Lamont, and Empire Arquebus - the headquarters ship HMS Lothian, and the CM Ariadne, acting as an APD) under Rear Admiral Arthur G. Talbot it would suggest the British envisioned something more than shore-to-shore landings.

Historically, VII 'Phib used Talbot's ships for training duties in Australian waters, but if a British landing force - the RMD, for example - had been included, presumably they could have seen active service in the NEI or Malaya. The six RN LSIs were all rated at having a capacity of 800 troops, so that's 4,800 total, plus whoever could be accommodated on the other two ships. Add the three RAN LSIs and some RN LSTs, and a mixed RN/RAN/RNZN covering force, and presumably they could have moved and landed a reinforced RM brigade or two, as sketched above, for an opposed landing in the SEAC/SoWesPac areas.

The other thought I've had for 1943-44 is the Med, where a "separate" British light infantry division could have been very useful in the 1944 Adriatic campaign and/or the 1944 Aegean operations.
 
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