Rommel's SigInt not captured at 1st Alamein

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Deleted member 1487

http://www.armchairgeneral.com/radio-kills-rommels-621st-radio-intercept-company.htm
A German platoon detached at Tobruk achieved success in May when a decoded message told of the breakout routes that an Allied unit was going to use. That unit suffered heavy losses when it tried to do so.
The intercept platoon rejoined in late June. Seebohm positioned both intercept platoons barely a half mile behind the front line at a place called Tel el Eisa. The site was on high ground, great for intercepting and for communicating with the evaluation center and the liaison team with Rommel.
The British took notice of the unit, with air reconnaissance flying over its position. They also intercepted and decrypted the Enigma traffic between the unit and the evaluation center. The British became aware of the company’s mission and planned a raid.
Australian troops led the raid on the night of July 10th. Italian troops co-located with the intercept platoons fled. Seebohm happened to be visiting the platoons at the time. Both he and his unit fought as best as they could, but rifles and machine guns were no match for tanks.
Seebohm was wounded and died soon after. Seventy-three men of the intercept platoons were captured, along with their equipment and a treasure trove of documents detailing what the unit had done.
So why didn’t they flee? Seebohm had been dressed down by a colonel when the unit had previously pulled out of a position. The colonel did not know the unit’s mission, but Seebohm vowed that it would not happen again. Any really safe position would not have been as effective an intercept position, either. Rommel was furious that the unit had been wiped out.
The loss decimated the 621st. The equipment and men were replaced, but they simply were not as experienced as the original intercept crews. Equally important, the British were completely aware of their vulnerabilities and made further radio security changes. They started with a week’s radio silence.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Battle_of_El_Alamein#Tel_el_Eisa
Possibly the most important feature of the battle, however, was that the Australians had captured Signals Intercept Company 621. This unit had provided Rommel with priceless intelligence, gleaned from intercepting British radio communications. That source of intelligence was now lost to Rommel.[69][70]

A major source of Rommel's success in the Desert Campaign was intelligence both from SigInt and the breaking of US diplomatic codes; both sources were lost during 1942, the former with Radio Intercept Compnay 621 being captured on July 10th after failing to pull out when their Italian co-located defenders retreated. What if they had pulled out and not been captured? Would they have made any difference in the coming battles?
 
This was the same general period the Brits identified the leak via the US Army Black Code from the US military attache to the Italians, and when the Brits were tightening their signals procedures considerablly. Given the latter action the usefulness of the German unit would decrease, but still better than seeing it severely damaged by the attack.
 
This was the same general period the Brits identified the leak via the US Army Black Code from the US military attache to the Italians, and when the Brits were tightening their signals procedures considerablly. Given the latter action the usefulness of the German unit would decrease, but still better than seeing it severely damaged by the attack.

Pretty much to have a even intelligence playing field after the loss of 'the good source' you would have to have the Panzer Army Africa come upon ULTRA which almost happened more then once in the course of the campaign.
 
Given the incredible stupidity of the German officers involved its loss seems inevitable.

A high traffic message centre within raiding distance of the front line with no protection.

More significant is the black code and location of the armies.
 
Given the incredible stupidity of the German officers involved its loss seems inevitable.

A high traffic message centre within raiding distance of the front line with no protection.

More significant is the black code and location of the armies.

One of the senior German officers accused the chap in command of the Signals unit of cowardice as he was setting up well behind the lines (quite sensibly so IMO).

So vexed by the implication that he was a coward he setup his near the front lines...and got 'Aussied' for his troubles.

Still the British Army was going through a major change in Opsec at the time (changing in a very short period of time from very poor opsec to the worlds best) and it would no longer be as simple as for example listening in on two Brigade commanders at Gazalla discussing 'in quite some detail' the undefended gap between their 'box's' and deciding to do nothing about it and simply hope the Germans dont realise and take advantage........which of course the Germans did.
 

Deleted member 1487

Still the British Army was going through a major change in Opsec at the time (changing in a very short period of time from very poor opsec to the worlds best) and it would no longer be as simple as for example listening in on two Brigade commanders at Gazalla discussing 'in quite some detail' the undefended gap between their 'box's' and deciding to do nothing about it and simply hope the Germans dont realise and take advantage........which of course the Germans did.
Part of that OpSec was the capture of the German SigInt unit exposing exactly what needed to change; while I agree that the usefulness of the unit was going through a major downgrade due to improved OpSec and the ending of the 'Gute Quelle', however its not going to crush it like their being overrun did. There would still be a lot of utility to 621, but perhaps not enough to change the course of the campaign from July 1942 on.
 
The reinforcements to Tunisia did include signals intel personnel & equipment. I have no idea how large or capable this group was. There are hints in the literature both Fredendals I Corps & Andersons 1st Army were good sources for the new sigint unit. A lot less likely they got anything of real value out of the 8th Army when it arrived in January.
 

Deleted member 1487

The reinforcements to Tunisia did include signals intel personnel & equipment. I have no idea how large or capable this group was. There are hints in the literature both Fredendals I Corps & Andersons 1st Army were good sources for the new sigint unit. A lot less likely they got anything of real value out of the 8th Army when it arrived in January.
I was given the impression that the replacements weren't really that good, certainly not as good as the original 621.
 
May not have been, they certainly did not have as much time to learn the nuances of operating in Africa vs the Brits or US Army. Still, neither the US nor the 1st Army were at the top of their OpSec game either.
 

Deleted member 1487

May not have been, they certainly did not have as much time to learn the nuances of operating in Africa vs the Brits or US Army. Still, neither the US nor the 1st Army were at the top of their OpSec game either.
Might that then have yielded valuable info that could have changed the conduct of the Tunisian Campaign? Perhaps Rommel's desire to put more weight behind that thrust can go ahead with greater info about the US disposition?
 
Kesselring had good info on the US dispositions. The argument centered on how much weight to place against the 1st Army, which was regarded as more dangerous than the French or US Corps.

Be interesting to find some detailed info on the German views of Allied signal security during the campaign. The small fragments in the books indicate there were problems. The descriptions of Fredenhalls sloppy practice from Blumenson or Atkinson are the best known.
 
Kesselring had good info on the US dispositions. The argument centered on how much weight to place against the 1st Army, which was regarded as more dangerous than the French or US Corps.

Be interesting to find some detailed info on the German views of Allied signal security during the campaign. The small fragments in the books indicate there were problems. The descriptions of Fredenhalls sloppy practice from Blumenson or Atkinson are the best known.

Did Fredenhall practice anything that wasn't sloppy?
 
Did Fredenhall practice anything that wasn't sloppy?

He had a solid reputation training soldiers, and a track record for planning and organizing. He was not promoted and placed in successive commands based on his good looks or impeccable tailoring. Leaving aside Marshals judgement, Chaffee placed Fredendal in the leading leadership positions when forming the Armored Corps, and the 1st Armored Division. I'm guessing the pressure of three years of full throttle command of critical parts of the mobilization, and then combat in African brought out personality defects. In my service I watched several capable and promising officers abruptly fall apart. In retrospect it is easy to criticize them, but the susposed warning signs are in fact applicable to about anyone else.
 

Deleted member 1487

He had a solid reputation training soldiers, and a track record for planning and organizing. He was not promoted and placed in successive commands based on his good looks or impeccable tailoring. Leaving aside Marshals judgement, Chaffee placed Fredendal in the leading leadership positions when forming the Armored Corps, and the 1st Armored Division. I'm guessing the pressure of three years of full throttle command of critical parts of the mobilization, and then combat in African brought out personality defects. In my service I watched several capable and promising officers abruptly fall apart. In retrospect it is easy to criticize them, but the susposed warning signs are in fact applicable to about anyone else.
So he was the McClellan of WW2 officers?
 
Really it's just delaying the inevitable, the Allies simply have more troops and equipment to throw in, and eventually it's going to tell. Might delay a campaign in Italy mind, but given the screw-up that turned out to be, that's maybe not such a bad thing anyway.
 
Ya, given the numbers in the latter half on 1942. Particularly in the poor supply rates for the Axis. The final battles @ Alamein in late 1942 were in no way a close run thing for the Commonwealth. Their losses could have been increased substantially & they still would have won & shooed the Axis back to Tripoli.
 
Actually, a German win at Second Alamein might actually help the allies out, as it would reduce the number of forces Rommel can split off the grab Tunisia without fatally weakening his front line.
 
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