Rommel withdraws to Halfaya Pass after 1st Alamein

[Deleted member 1487]

What if after being stopped at El Alamein in July 1942 he withdraws to Halfaya Pass to shorten his supply lines while sitting on the defensive? It was a better position than digging in at El Alamein and waiting for the British, especially due to the shortened supply lines, plus if retreat was needed they were closer to Benghazi while the British were building up further from their supply centers. Assuming he did this how long could they hold out at the pass and what impact would it later have on Torch if they could delay the British at the border for longer and not sacrifice as many men?

 

[Cryhavoc101]

What if after being stopped at El Alamein in July 1942 he withdraws to Halfaya Pass to shorten his supply lines while sitting on the defensive? It was a better position than digging in at El Alamein and waiting for the British, especially due to the shortened supply lines, plus if retreat was needed they were closer to Benghazi while the British were building up further from their supply centers. Assuming he did this how long could they hold out at the pass and what impact would it later have on Torch if they could delay the British at the border for longer and not sacrifice as many men?

Is Hitler still in charge?

If so then this scenario cannot happen

Rommel gets a massive slap from Hitler for retreating when 'victory is so close'
He is ordered to advance again and / or replaced by another General who will follow orders from Berlin.

Assuming the latter then the 2nd battle for El Alemain happens pretty much as OTL but unless the New General is willing to disobey direct orders from Hitler (like Rommel did OTL) then a greater Portion of the Axis army goes into the bag.

However lets ditch all that for a moment and assume that Rommel/Kesselring have managed to sell the idea of a strategic withdrawl to Hitler.

The British had to defeat Rommel at El Alamain because of the threat the German/Axis army posed to the Suez Canal.

If they are at Halfaya pass then they no longer pose a threat and the British Commonwealth army can efectively besieg him while they grow stronger and attack on or about November 1942 as the Torch landing goes in......

 

[Deleted member 1487]

If they are at Halfaya pass then they no longer pose a threat and the British Commonwealth army can efectively besieg him while they grow stronger and attack on or about November 1942 as the Torch landing goes in......

So OTL then, just a harder slog at Halfaya. After 1st El Alamein there was nothing going on until Rommel attacked in August to stop the British build up, but failed and then things settled down until October.

 

[Catspoke]

You can still out flank Halfaya with a deep hook run through the desert (correct?)

It seems the ratio of tanks British/German by October 1942 would be enough that a pitched tank battle in the open desert wouldn't go well for the Germans even with all their tactical advantages.

While at Aliamein you have at least an outflankable position and you can rely on your mines and antitank guns to help and utilize your static Italians better.

Plus the German thought they would get better use of the railway the British built and at the time even the local German leadership thought there was no reason they couldn't hold at Ailiamen even in October 1942 (didn't realize how bad the odds were).

There is a fun thread on the railway here:

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=99035

 

[Cryhavoc101]

So OTL then, just a harder slog at Halfaya. After 1st El Alamein there was nothing going on until Rommel attacked in August to stop the British build up, but failed and then things settled down until October.

The Battle in November would be fought to prevent the Bulk of the Africa Korps from withdrawing to the West to oppose the US/British Landings

Any Battles fought at Halfaya before this time would be positional only and be of little consequence.

 

[mattep74]

What if after being stopped at El Alamein in July 1942 he withdraws to Halfaya Pass to shorten his supply lines while sitting on the defensive? It was a better position than digging in at El Alamein and waiting for the British, especially due to the shortened supply lines, plus if retreat was needed they were closer to Benghazi while the British were building up further from their supply centers. Assuming he did this how long could they hold out at the pass and what impact would it later have on Torch if they could delay the British at the border for longer and not sacrifice as many men?

Is the Brittish not just going for Crusader 2.0? If you look at the first Crusader offensive that relived Tobruk you will see that they were at Halafa Pass

A much smaller 8th army managed to get around those defensive fields

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Is the Brittish not just going for Crusader 2.0? If you look at the first Crusader offensive that relived Tobruk you will see that they were at Halafa Pass

A much smaller 8th army managed to get around those defensive fields

Putting forces south and at the pass should be able to hold.

 

[Aber]

Putting forces south and at the pass should be able to hold.

Only if you have enough fuel to allow the mobile forces to manoeuvre.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Only if you have enough fuel to allow the mobile forces to manoeuvre.

Seeing as how their supply lines would be closer in Libya near Halfaya than in Egypt near El Alamein, there should be more than IOTL.

 

[hasdrubal barca]

Seeing as how their supply lines would be closer in Libya near Halfaya than in Egypt near El Alamein, there should be more than IOTL.

What about the Fuka Line?

The Rommel Papers after 2nd Battle of El Alamein:

"After the battle, with all the experience it had brought us, I had an idea for a plan which might have enabled us to put up a more successful defence of Western Egypt. We had tied up too much of our material in the construction of the Alamein Line.

It would first have been necessary to establish the non motorised infantry in the Fuka Line, using the maximum number of mines and positions constructed similarly to those at El Alamein. The line at Fuka, like that at El Alamein, rested in the south on the Qattara depression and thus could not be turned. It had the additional advantage that steep declivities rendered some twelve miles of it impassable to tanks and vehicles.

The El Alamein line would have been held by mortorised formations and reconnaissance units, while the mortorised forces located between Alamein and Fuka would have been grouped for a mobile defence."

Would this plan have been more successful?

 

[MattII]

Getting all those mines up would have compromised other supplies. To hold a remote position in the desert you need a port capable of supplying a garrison large enough to keep the enemy out. Between Alexandria and Tobruk, the only port to be worthy of the name was at Mersa Matruh, and even that probably wouldn't have been big enough to keep a decent garrison going in the face of what the Allies could throw around by that point.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Getting all those mines up would have compromised other supplies.

Considering the numbers of mines used at 2nd Alamein how would it have been different?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Battle_of_El_Alamein

Rommel, furthermore, had plenty of time to prepare his defensive positions and lay extensive minefields (approximately 500,000 mines)[12]

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/63/WesternDesertBattle_Area1941_en.svg

Let's say this option was used and is more effective leading to a British defeat during their offensive. What then? Tunisia is opened up to the fighting between the Panzerarmee Afrika and the US, while the need to supply to widely diverging fronts is too much for the Axis especially with Malta becoming increasingly effective. I would assume that the Axis pull back in steps, hounded by the British, but without the major losses in men and material of OTL. Monty's reputation is hurt somewhat as a result. They pull back to Halfaya to shorten supply lines and probably start shipping some forces back to Sicily to lessen supply burdens and then continually fall back on Benghazi and sabotage as they go. How much longer than can Tunisia/North Africa hold out and will more men get evacuated in the end to Sicily?

 

[MattII]

Trying to secure a ~70 km front vs a ~40 km one. Almost twice as many mines are needed, plus little in the way of a mobile reserve (they're all up at El Alamein), which is a bad thing, since you've given yourself a much larger area to try to guard with lesser forces.

Against a strong enemy, no defensive position between Halfaya Pass and El Alamein is going to work, at least for long.

 

[hasdrubal barca]

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/63/WesternDesertBattle_Area1941_en.svg

Let's say this option was used and is more effective leading to a British defeat during their offensive. What then? Tunisia is opened up to the fighting between the Panzerarmee Afrika and the US, while the need to supply to widely diverging fronts is too much for the Axis especially with Malta becoming increasingly effective. I would assume that the Axis pull back in steps, hounded by the British, but without the major losses in men and material of OTL. Monty's reputation is hurt somewhat as a result. They pull back to Halfaya to shorten supply lines and probably start shipping some forces back to Sicily to lessen supply burdens and then continually fall back on Benghazi and sabotage as they go. How much longer than can Tunisia/North Africa hold out and will more men get evacuated in the end to Sicily?

I think it would depend on how much influence Rommel has over the events. Maybe without the defeat at 2nd Alamein he has more clout.If Rommel was unquestionably put in charge of all operations in North Africa I think they could do alot better.

For instance Kasserine Pass could have been more decisive:

Rommel decided to attack through the Kasserine Pass into the main force of the U.S. II Corps at Tébessa to capture U.S. supplied on the Algerian side of the western arm of the mountains, eliminate the Allied ability to attack the coastal corridor linking Mareth and Tunis and threaten the southern flank of the First Army. On February 18, Rommel submitted his proposals to Albert Kesselring, who forwarded them with his blessing to the Comando Supremo (Italian High Command) in Rome.[18]

At 13:30 on February 19, Rommel received the Comando Supremo's agreement to a revised plan. He was to have 10th and 21st Panzer Divisions transferred from von Arnim’s 5th Panzer Army to his command and attack through the Kasserine and Sbiba passes toward Thala and Le Kef to the north, clearing the Western Dorsale and threatening the 1st Army's flank.[19][nb 2] Rommel was appalled, the plan dispersed Axis forces and through the passes, would expose their flanks. A concentrated attack on Tébessa, while entailing some risk, could yield badly needed supplies, destroy Allied potential for operations into central Tunisia and capture the airfield at Youks-les-Bains, west of Tébessa

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kasserine_Pass

Also i've read that Rommel had a completely different plan for Operation Capri that involved a pincer attack. The Italians however having seniority blew him off and attempted their own useless plan.

 

[hasdrubal barca]

Trying to secure a ~70 km front vs a ~40 km one. Almost twice as many mines are needed, plus little in the way of a mobile reserve (they're all up at El Alamein), which is a bad thing, since you've given yourself a much larger area to try to guard with lesser forces.

Against a strong enemy, no defensive position between Halfaya Pass and El Alamein is going to work, at least for long.

It will drag out the battle a bit. The British will have to launch a major assault at El Alamein to defeat the mobile forces. Then the British will have to bring up their artillery to the Fuka line, which will take time, and by this point German mobile forces will have reformed behind the Fuka line.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Trying to secure a ~70 km front vs a ~40 km one. Almost twice as many mines are needed, plus little in the way of a mobile reserve (they're all up at El Alamein), which is a bad thing, since you've given yourself a much larger area to try to guard with lesser forces.

Against a strong enemy, no defensive position between Halfaya Pass and El Alamein is going to work, at least for long.

Part of the Fuka plan's point was that the front had a steep incline, so no vehicles could climb it, restricting the front heavily AND having it closer to supply hubs. In the meantime the mobile forces of the Axis could fight a mobile defense to the West of the Fuka Line and fall back on it as needed.

 

[Cymraeg]

Sorry, but both Hitler and Benny the Moose thought that Alexandria was in Rommel's reach even after First Alamein. If Rommel mentions withdrawal Eastwards then he'll be told to stop and dig in.

 

[hasdrubal barca]

Sorry, but both Hitler and Benny the Moose thought that Alexandria was in Rommel's reach even after First Alamein. If Rommel mentions withdrawal Eastwards then he'll be told to stop and dig in.

Rommel ignore them during the retreat from El Alamein after repeatedly being told to make a stand in Libya. So Rommel just has to go renegade. Hes at the front they aren't.

 

[Shaby]

Rommel ignore them during the retreat from El Alamein after repeatedly being told to make a stand in Libya. So Rommel just has to go renegade. Hes at the front they aren't.

It is one thing to do it with an army shattered to pieces, with enemy landing in its rear threatening to cut off the only supply line and quite another with an army still capable of giving fight. Besides, Rommel also believed he would be able to continue his advance eventually.

 

[MattII]

It will drag out the battle a bit. The British will have to launch a major assault at El Alamein to defeat the mobile forces. Then the British will have to bring up their artillery to the Fuka line, which will take time, and by this point German mobile forces will have reformed behind the Fuka line.

Only if the mobile forces can get out. Anyway, the British are now faced with two lines, each individually weaker than the one line they had to face at Second Alamein.

Part of the Fuka plan's point was that the front had a steep incline, so no vehicles could climb it, restricting the front heavily AND having it closer to supply hubs. In the meantime the mobile forces of the Axis could fight a mobile defense to the West of the Fuka Line and fall back on it as needed.

Which still gives the British an easier time at El Alamein, and will leave the Fuka line weaker than what the Alamein one was.