Rommel stops at Benghazi

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Deleted member 1487

I checked on the search function, but couldn't find thread about this.
Having finally started reading van Creveld's book on logistics, I've gotten to the Rommel chapter and am struck by the ridiculousness of the Egypt invasion. Obviously Benghazi was too far to be logistically supported for a long period of time and Tobruk was insane. Invading Egypt, logistically speaking was pure fantasy, yet Rommel tried anyway.
What if he finally got the picture after taking back Benghazi and decided that falling back on Tripoli to shorten his supply lines and allow the Axis to launch operation Herkules to take Malta?

Obviously there would be a gap between the 1941 liberation of Benghazi and Rommel's retreat and the mid-1942 invasion of Malta, but wouldn't it have been far more logical and beneficial for Rommel to force the British to fight him close to his supply base, while the British were at the end of their supply lines?

Would the African campaign then have lasted longer, costing less, and give Rommel a much better chance of getting his forces out in 1943?
 
Eventually British are going to get overwhelming forces to Africa and beat Rommel back. Lacking strategic depth, he might lose sooner than OTL. Rommel forces were better suited for offensive than defensive operations.
 

Deleted member 1487

Eventually British are going to get overwhelming forces to Africa and beat Rommel back. Lacking strategic depth, he might lose sooner than OTL. Rommel forces were better suited for offensive than defensive operations.

I was thinking of the Germans keeping a mobile defense that would involve going on the offensive to forestal the British when necessary. Basically the Axis wouldn't advance beyond Benghazi for supply reasons when they did attack though.
 
I was thinking of the Germans keeping a mobile defense that would involve going on the offensive to forestal the British when necessary. Basically the Axis wouldn't advance beyond Benghazi for supply reasons when they did attack though.

It doesn't matter. The Allied forces were growing in power rapidly and it's only a matter of time before the U.S. Army arrives and the Afrika Korps has to fight an impossible two front war with the Allies in control of the air and the sea around Libya.

Rommel's only and I mean only way to avoid the Afrika Korps being destroyed by 1943 is driving the UK from Egypt into the Middle East and then turning the Sini into a fortified DMZ that the 8th Army can't break through so he could use most of his forces to fight the U.S. Army advancing from the West.

Rommel makes clear in his papers that he was well aware of the overall strategic picture that the US and UK were massively outproducing Germany in terms of tanks, ships, oil, weapons, etc. He knew every month that went by Allied forces in Africa would grow stronger then the Axis forces were growing stronger and he would soon be fighting a two front war unless he managed to kick the 8th Army out of Africa.
 
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Deleted member 1487

It doesn't matter. The Allied forces were growing in power rapidly and it's only a matter of time before the U.S. Army arrives and the Afrika Korps has to fight an impossible two front war with the Allies in control of the air and the sea around Libya.

Rommel's only and I mean only way to avoid the Afrika Korps being destroyed by 1943 is driving the UK from Egypt into the Middle East and then turning the Sini into a fortified DMZ that the 8th Army can't break through so he could use most of his forces to fight the U.S. Army advancing from the West.

Rommel makes clear in his papers that he was well aware of the overall strategic picture that the US and UK were massively outproducing Germany in terms of tanks, ships, oil, weapons, etc. He knew every month that went by Allied forces in Africa would grow stronger then the Axis forces were growing stronger and he would soon be fighting a two front war unless he managed to kick the 8th Army out of Africa.

I'm not looking for the Axis to win; that is impossible. I'm looking for how long Germany can hold out and use minimal resources to hold out. As it was Rommel's offensives cost tremendous materials and supplies, not to mention attritioned the Italian navy in the effort to keep Rommel's units supplied in Egypt. If the Axis could have held out just as if not more effectively for far less resources, it could aid Axis efforts on other Fronts and change the course of the war. That is what I'm trying to figure out.
 
You mean it was impossible then.

If Rommel was given more tanks and troops in early 1941 and along with the help of some Allied military blunders it would be hard, but not impossible for the British commanders out of fear out a route to withdraw the 8th Army to the Middle East. In that case American forces have to slowly fight Axis forces across North Africa all the way to Egypt so by 1944 the map might look something like this.

map.png


If the Axis could have held out just as if not more effectively for far less resources, it could aid Axis efforts on other Fronts and change the course of the war. That is what I'm trying to figure out.

The vital period where the forces used in Africa could have altered the course of the war in the USSR somewhat was the summer of 1941. The extra troops, tanks and transport trucks could have been used to take Leningrand in the summer of 1941 when it was pretty much undefended. But, the only way that scenerio could play out is if the the Afrika Korps weren't sent there in the first place.
 
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Comrade Wiking,

This idea would work out worse than OTL

3 major problems with such a plan

1. Standing on the defensive in the desert is generally poor strategy theres nowhere to dig in; plus you are vulnerable to flanking attacks from the south and encriclements... gazalla was the perfect example of this not being a viable strategy

2. The British being able to stage that far forward will allow them to ferry fighter aircraft and supplies directly to malta to supplement ship delivery; plus fighters can fly top cover to convoys going to malta (which probably would offset the gain in supply security Rommel gains by not staging so far forward himself

3. The British being based that far forward allows them to bomb tripoli more frequently and with fighter cover which again costs Rommel supplies that he was saving by not basing forward

net loser strategically and tactically in my book
 

Cook

Banned
I wouldn't it have been far more logical and beneficial for Rommel to force the British to fight him close to his supply base, while the British were at the end of their supply lines?
You mean; what if Rommel had followed orders and stayed in Tripolitania?
:D

Yes, it would have.
 
I was thinking of the Germans keeping a mobile defense that would involve going on the offensive to forestal the British when necessary. Basically the Axis wouldn't advance beyond Benghazi for supply reasons when they did attack though.

Rommel uses his tanks to make huge circles in the desert sand for a couple of years. Very pretty from the air I'm sure.
 
Comrade Wiking,

This idea would work out worse than OTL

3 major problems with such a plan

1. Standing on the defensive in the desert is generally poor strategy theres nowhere to dig in; plus you are vulnerable to flanking attacks from the south and encriclements... gazalla was the perfect example of this not being a viable strategy

net loser strategically and tactically in my book


Gazala failed because the line was poorly designed. No mutual support between boxes and no defense against outflanking.
 
Congratualtions Wiking, best book you`ll read about war.

The battle of Beda Fomm shows what happens to those who sit in Benghazi. IIRC there are only a handful of defensive positions in Libya, where the escarpment is climbable for the coast plain. Halfaya Pass is one example of these positions. You have to hold them or nothing, if you can`t hold Halfaya then you have to fall waaay back to the next defensible position, there is no middle ground.
 
Von Thoma's opinion...

was that to have some sort of a win in Africa the Axis had to go for quality over quantity, since logistical realities prevented resuplying large forces. He claymed that the only way to do that would be to remove all the italian forces and go for a smaller, but all german Panzerarmme Africa that would have the quality/size ratio to beat the 8th army and still be logistically viable. Since that would be politically unacceptable for the italians, who were doing most of the logist transport anyway, it would never happen.

There are other PODs that can have an Axis Med, but would require, for example, France to fully change sides in 1940 and a combined German/Italian/French effort to drive the RN away and push all the way to the Iran/USSR border. Looks easier the smaller the map is, of course. IMO, that is one of the most plausible "Axis Wins" ways to rewrite WW2, but a quick 180º degrees turn by Petain's France will probably be voted into the mildly ASB category
 

Deleted member 1487

Congratualtions Wiking, best book you`ll read about war.

The battle of Beda Fomm shows what happens to those who sit in Benghazi. IIRC there are only a handful of defensive positions in Libya, where the escarpment is climbable for the coast plain. Halfaya Pass is one example of these positions. You have to hold them or nothing, if you can`t hold Halfaya then you have to fall waaay back to the next defensible position, there is no middle ground.

I'm a bit disappointed that there was a bit more 'meat' to the book. By that I mean too much analysis and not enough numbers and charts.
Still its critical to understand logistics especially in WW1 to understand why things happened they way they did, which is critical to alternate history!

I'm not suggesting that Rommel sits at Benghazi, but rather sabotages the hell out of it and pulls back. That leaves the British to come to the Germans while having to supply their forces without forward ports to sustain them. Once the British are in a vulnerable spot, say El Agheila, the Axis goes on the offensive once again and lops the head off of the extended British forces. Of course this can only work so many times, but fighting a mobile campaign in the desert, perhaps going so far as Tobruk if there is an opportunity to hurt the British, but always falling back instead of trying to take Egypt so as to ease the logistic situation and keep Libya a going concern for as long as possible, until the Americans show up. Then pull out instead of sending in the Panzer Armee and hold in Sicily.

Logistically there is no way Egypt can ever be taken or held. So it makes little sense to waste so many resources to try. Instead why not keep close to the critical ports and don't worry about having to fall back after a big success to keep the Axis forces fresh and ready for the next British offensive.
 
Gazala failed because the line was poorly designed. No mutual support between boxes and no defense against outflanking.


In 98 percent of the Libyan desert there is no defense against outflanking from the south; which is why standing on the defensive is poor strategy, your line can always be turned
 
You mean; what if Rommel had followed orders and stayed in Tripolitania?
Given the hilarious hijinks in the German high command about following orders, ignoring orders, point blank lying to get the right orders issued, etc, what are the consequences of that?

Say Rommel does follow orders (probably ASB, but lets say he does) and tries to fight a mostly defensive campaign, which goes badly wrong as he keep being flanked, what are the butterflies? Do more generals start ignoring orders?
 
In 98 percent of the Libyan desert there is no defense against outflanking from the south; which is why standing on the defensive is poor strategy, your line can always be turned

How about somewhat of an L-shape to it with a mobile reserve to deal with any attempt to turn it?
 
Anything big enough to reasonably prevent outflanking is going to be about as effective as tissue paper at stopping a direct assault.
 
I'm a bit disappointed that there was a bit more 'meat' to the book. By that I mean too much analysis and not enough numbers and charts.
Still its critical to understand logistics especially in WW1 to understand why things happened they way they did, which is critical to alternate history!

He does come to some good conclusions, I wrote off the desert war for the Axis after reading that book.

If you want numbers read Hitler's Strategy 1940-1941: the Balkan Clue. It lays out exactly which divisions in the Greek campaign were allocated to Barbarossa, and why Barbarossa was actually late.
 
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