Romans win at Teutoburg Forest

I am not sure, that I got your point. Did you say, that the romans never used a 2nd line of defense, like they need to establish, if moving into Germania partially?

I was talking about two organised lines on a border, rather than troops on hinterland : you won't end with both a hugely militarized Rhine while there's a limes, with fewed defensible positions, to guard.
You may end with hinterland garrisons (probably mostly auxiliaries and peace keeping, I'd suppose) : as in you couldn't have both the same militarisation of the Rhine than IOTL, and an eastern limes (Agri Decumates get supported by the Rhine defense, mostly because it was continuous and integrated)

Regarding your sidenote about civil wars: if the romans don't solve that issue with massive structural reforms in almost all departments, they got no chance at all anyways.
I agree : I was simply pointing that Civil Wars may get harsher when they'll happen ITTL, with a stronger Rhineland legions faction (that barely played much role IOTL, safe with Vitellius and Posthumus; compared with Danubian legions)
 
Suppose Germanicus can beat Arimitus at Teutoburg and the latter dies during the battle, not a shattering victory but enough to win the region for Rome. How long could Rome hold the region and what are the effects on the Empire in the long run?

Germanicus didn't lose their. He did launch a wildly successful campaign in Germania to retrieve Caesars Eagle and avenge Rome's defeat in Teutobirg Forest though.
 
I was talking about two organised lines on a border, rather than troops on hinterland : you won't end with both a hugely militarized Rhine while there's a limes, with fewed defensible positions, to guard.

Of course you can end with exactly this!

"Limes" is a very flexible roman concept. It does not mean a wall necessarily. It even does not need a chain of forts. And looking to Germania east of the Rhine, the romans need a very intelligent and flexible interpretation of the term "limes". I see no problem to keep about half of the legions at the Rhine. I see even a strong strategic need to do so. I also did not say, that all the tribes I mentioned above should be disarmed (Bructeri, Frisii, Usipetri, Tencteri, Mattiaci). Varus tried it, and got the response. No military leader with a brain, should do the same mistake twice. I am afraid, the romans need a more creative approach to conquer Germania again.
 
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My previous post does not mean that I think conquering and holding the Elbe frontier was impossible.

It was possible but would have been very costly and unprofitable for maybe 2 centuries.

And It would have been highly unprobable that Rome would not have faced at least one Teutoburg-esque defeat. Just consider what happened with other conquests/provinces.

Rome faced many setbacks and defeats, several of which were far more costly than Teutobourg

To add to this, the real decisive factor in the Romans withdrawing from Germania when they did was the Great Illyrian Revolt. It sapped manpower down to nothing, so when Varrus got walloped, Augustus panicked because his manpower was completely exhausted by that point.
 
Germanicus didn't lose their. He did launch a wildly successful campaign in Germania to retrieve Caesars Eagle and avenge Rome's defeat in Teutobirg Forest though.

Of course he failed, if you look to the analysis of modern historians of the 21st century. His brutal strategy was very detrimental. The romans finally lost every support of the pro-roman factions in the german tribes. Actually these factions ceased to exist after Germanicus' campaigns. Germanicus destroyed everything Drusus, Tiberius and others tried to establish. The pro-roman faction would have been very useful after Arminus death. Furthermore, he perhaps wasted more ressources than Varus and reached nothing but a few eagles. A lot of very good reasons for Tiberius, the very experienced general, to call him back to Rome.
 
"Limes" is a very flexible roman concept. It does not mean a wall necessarily. It even does not need a chain of forts.
I know that : my point was that, contrary to the IOTL Agri limes that was in the direct continuity of Rheinish border, the Weser/Main/Bohemia would be isolated structurally. Unless you make everything between Rhine, Danube and the new limes (that HERE would certainly be more fortified than the IOTL border, would it because there would be less clear natural obstacles), Rhine would have a far less military focus.

I don't write off a deep line of defense, of course (but as said, mostly auxiliaries IMO), but having two full lines of defenses, one similar to OTL plus one (that would ask for more ressources) on TTL is really unlikely to me.

I see even a strong strategic need to do so.
Me too : but giving it wasn't really done entierly by Romans (forts in hinterland aren't the same thing than an actual defensive line, as vague and porous it may be), it would ask for some change on Roman strategic tought. (Meaning not just pulling auxiliaries in back as they did in Africa, but accepting the huge ressource drain that would be letting not part of a legion but several of these on Rhine).

I am afraid, the romans need a more creative approach to conquer Germania again.
Eventually, yes, a more gradual approach may be needed, as with some confusion between clients, allies and eventually "Inner" Germans people. Not something really unperceptible, but smooth enough to allow transitions (which, as we agreed, would require a flexible approach on fortifications and limes between Weiser and Main)
 
I know that : my point was that, contrary to the IOTL Agri limes that was in the direct continuity of Rheinish border, the Weser/Main/Bohemia would be isolated structurally. Unless you make everything between Rhine, Danube and the new limes (that HERE would certainly be more fortified than the IOTL border, would it because there would be less clear natural obstacles), Rhine would have a far less military focus.

I did not recommend to go as far as the Weser in a first step. I said Ems, Lippe, Sieg and Lahn. Perhaps up to the Elder and Fulda (which is of course the southwestern headstream of the Weser), in order to control the Chatti. These region along the Rhine tributaries belong rather to the Rhine than to the Weser, which is behind some mountains like the Teutoburg Forest.

I also did not say, that 2 fully qualified border lines are needed. I don't see many auxilia at the Rhine. Just a few enhanced double-legions acting like a regional field army from the hinterland. Remember, you got 11 legions plus up to 100 auxilia to deploy in 41 AD.
 
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Me too : but giving it wasn't really done entierly by Romans (forts in hinterland aren't the same thing than an actual defensive line, as vague and porous it may be), it would ask for some change on Roman strategic tought. (Meaning not just pulling auxiliaries in back as they did in Africa, but accepting the huge ressource drain that would be letting not part of a legion but several of these on Rhine).
It's not like the Romans were adverse to this when necessary. The late Roman empire did adopt a defense in depth strategy, and IIRC, this was also the case with Roman Dacia.
 
It's not like the Romans were adverse to this when necessary. The late Roman empire did adopt a defense in depth strategy, and IIRC, this was also the case with Roman Dacia.
Are you referring to Luttwak's thesis?

It's a bit unconvincing with what we know from Late Imperial army, to be honest : forts are still mostly present on borders (except public order), and the "sanctuarisation" of provinces isn't well argued : romans expeditions in Barbaricum were more driven by geopolitical matters (as protecting client or convenient human shields as well than defeating Barbarians before they entered Romania) than social (provinces'opinion being largely ignored).

Philippe Contamine said:
Focus on protecting borders lead to the building and maintain of strategic roads, dikes, fortifications and castella. A document from the early Vth number 89 castella along Danube, 57 on eastern limes, from Black Sea to Red Sea, 46 in Africa, from Tripolitain to Tingitana, 23 in Britain, 24 in Gaul.
Experts saw these efforts as unsufficient : "Border's safety will be better reached with a continued line of castella established every [1500km] with strong walls and powerful towers"

I could expand, but it would be only variations on a same theme.

It's interesting to see that "inner" troops were almost always quartered (and eventually garrisoned de facto) into cities, being less a defense-in-depth than a militarisation of police and public order.

Zosime then oppose Diocletian, that furnished with strong cities and fortification Imperial borders, and that put there the entiere army; and Constantine that "pull away from border the greater part of the soldiers, to put them in cities that had no need to be protected". And then, ruin of cities, under the burden of military occupation, softened troops.
[Contamine mention both Zosime's hostility to Constantine, then that Gallian did the same in the IIIrd]
Nevertheless, far from immediate dangers, comitatenses risked to loose their combativity : moreso, they transformed easily into inner garrisons, loose mobility and focused on police matters

It depends a bit which part of Dacia we're talking about : if you're referring to Ad Moesia and the tentative to use Sarmatians (Roxolani, IIRC) as human shields, it's doable with population resettlement in Western Germania, IMO. But it wouldn't be defence-in-depth, rather a "defence-in-advance" if you allow me this expression (I don't know the english equivalent).

Romans seems to be adverse of this, even when it came to necessity, and didn't handled it very well. Hence my earlier post where the appearance of a defence-in-depth in order to allow the maintain of a Rhine position would require a lot of work to make it possible. Eventually a "defence-in-advance" witht he help of clientelized tribes could seems easier and work better for Romans, while it would backfire as it did on Danube IOTL.
 
Oh great, another TL where the Huns pour through the Fulda Gap.

Right now, we are talking about the 1st century AD. No Huns! And this is just a first and smaller stage of expansion, in order to avoid the full demilitarization of the Rhine region, which might hamper romanization.
 
We should not think about Luttwak's outdated theory, if somebody talks about an in-depth-strategy. Actually I like the term "Defense-in-Advance" mentioned above.

In my proposal, you got e.g. 2 field-armies (e.g. 2 double-legions plus auxilia) at Vetera and Mogontiacum. The other legions and auxilia are guarding the newly subjugated tribes on the right banks of the Rhine. They must not neccessarily establish a line of forts along the new border. They could guard just the regions from some well fortified strongholds at strategic positions.

This approach is pretty similar to Varus strategy. Parts of his army were still encamped at the Rhine border, while others were in camps in Germania Magna. With the negative experiences the romans had after the Varus desaster, they should organize it better this time. The area to control, I propose, is much smaller and closer to the Rhine in the first stage. Because the romans don't go as far as the Weser. The tribes along the Weser should become client kings for the time being. Thats risky and troublesome enough. Varus Germania Magna was simply too big. He had to fail sooner or later.

You may call this an in-depth-strategy. But it is far away from Luttwak. Because this approach is an offensive in-depth-strategy and not a defensive one. And the combat zone is the newly conquested area and not the roman provinces.

However, something like an in-depth-strategy was not fully unknown to the romans of the principate, and not an invention of the late empire.
 
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Suppose Germanicus can beat Arimitus at Teutoburg and the latter dies during the battle, not a shattering victory but enough to win the region for Rome. How long could Rome hold the region and what are the effects on the Empire in the long run?


About as long as they held Caledonia after their victory at Mons Graupius?
 
We should not think about Luttwak's outdated theory, if somebody talks about an in-depth-strategy. Actually I like the term "Defense-in-Advance" mentioned above.
You first heard it there folks :D

You may call this an in-depth-strategy. But it is far away from Luttwak. Because this approach is an offensive in-depth-strategy and not a defensive one. And the combat zone is the newly conquested area and not the roman provinces.
I agree that it would be the first move, but Romans would probably quickly absorb these clients.

Clientelisation went a bit out of fashion in the Ist century, with Rome began either tightening its grasp or outright absorbing its clients (as Nero or Trajan did, for example), and I'd see these client tribal states being absorbed as they were in Roman Britain eventually.
But while western Britain had pretty obvious borders and no real potential destabilizing threat outside Picts, it would be more generalized along transrhenan Roman Gaul, forcing a more tight control of these clients until their full provincialisation (trough sheer control or after a revolt), which would be in line with the aformentioned general trend.

Eventually, it would mean for Romans to advance their direct military presence further.

However, something like an in-depth-strategy was not fully unknown to the romans of the principate, and not an invention of the late empire.
Not fully unknown but not really implemented, and mostly trough urban garrisons which may be a problem with a less romanised Rhineland, even without considering that these urban garrisons eventually turned more as auxiliaries of old, as in policed forces.

My point isn't that it couldn't be develloped, but as I said earlier that it would require some out-of-the-box thinking when roman geostrategy had different trends (and especially without the Barbarian pressure that forced partial, but not really that deep, geostrategical chances in the III/IVth centuries).

Again, not impossible, but it wouldn't be an obvious logical outcome of a transrhenan Roman presence to me.

About as long as they held Caledonia after their victory at Mons Graupius?

For once, I'd favour the contrary approach : Caledonia was but a remote and far point for Romans, without any benefit conquering it than local geopolitical purposes (that IOTL pointed as not being essential). Eventually, as political matters in Rome made Agricola coming back, it wasn't seen as a big loss (and actually making a "diplomatic" point to Picts)

Western and Southern Germania, on the other hand offered more prospects, geopolitically or ressource-wise. The main problem being the defensibility of these regions compared to Rhine, hence a more important military and clientelisation effort IMO.
 
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