Romania refuses: Bessarabia not given back

Deleted member 1487

https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/Romania/three.pdf
The Evacuation of Romanian Military Units from Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina
The Situation of Romanian Military Forces in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, June 1940

From September 1939, the majority of Romanian military forces were deployed between the eastern Carpathians and the Dniester River. Deployed here was the Army Group I (which had subordinated the Third and Fourth Armies), the Mountain Corps with the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Cavalry Divisions, and eight fortification regiments. In fact, 65 percent of Romanian military forces—1,200,000 troops—were deployed on the Eastern front. According to Operational Order no. 18 of June 15, 1940, the 3rd Army was to wage war on the Ceremuş and Upper Prut rivers. The fallback position was along the Rodna Mountains–Little Siret–Sihna–Jijia line of defense, with a “red line” defense in the Zupania–Prislop–Cârlibaba region. In Bessarabia, the 4th Army was to defend the Corneşti–Lower Răutul–Dniester line. The defense of Northern of Bukovina and Bessarabia was the responsibility of the same armies, which were augmented with specially constituted army units.19 The growing tension on Romania’s eastern border made army commanders ask for details on their missions in the event of Soviet aggression and the adoption of preliminary measures to evacuate selected property and staff from Bessarabia. For example, on June 12, 1940, the 4th Army proposed that the families of officers, non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and civil servants as well as the property of cultural institutions, churches, factories and warehouses be sent to Romania. The government did not approve these demands for political reasons. At the same time, the Army High Command drew up a series of evacuation plans for the territories between the Dniester and the Prut. The Tudor Plan was based on the railway timetable during peacetime. It also called for the movement on foot of convoys and evacuation caravans.
 
It could have meant a total collapse of the German economy and ww2 taking a completely different turn. There would have been no invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941.

what is the German reaction going to be? likely try to rush and annex entirety of Transylvania to Hungary so as to position themselves in the Carpathian Mtns.? (as a last resort if they are unable to negotiate with their putative partners the Soviets)

during the war they stalled on synthetic fuel plant development only to resume (1942?) frantic efforts, managed to reach 36m barrels per anum vs. 71m barrels consumption, but that was with ongoing operations in USSR, the pre-war consumption was 44m barrels (have no idea the portion of the increase resulting from Eastern Front vs. occupied territories?)

they also failed to switch vehicles to producer gas (the hot water sized tanks mounted or towed) until 1942 which saved them millions of barrels for fuel. the Austrian oilfields tripled in production over course of the war to 12m barrels.

one can imagine if the Soviets had captured or damaged the Romanian oilfields, Germany would have been forced to institute all the above measures?

is the consensus they could not carry out Barbarossa? but how soon could the Soviets carry out Bagration?
 
what is the German reaction going to be? likely try to rush and annex entirety of Transylvania to Hungary so as to position themselves in the Carpathian Mtns.? (as a last resort if they are unable to negotiate with their putative partners the Soviets)

during the war they stalled on synthetic fuel plant development only to resume (1942?) frantic efforts, managed to reach 36m barrels per anum vs. 71m barrels consumption, but that was with ongoing operations in USSR, the pre-war consumption was 44m barrels (have no idea the portion of the increase resulting from Eastern Front vs. occupied territories?)

they also failed to switch vehicles to producer gas (the hot water sized tanks mounted or towed) until 1942 which saved them millions of barrels for fuel. the Austrian oilfields tripled in production over course of the war to 12m barrels.

one can imagine if the Soviets had captured or damaged the Romanian oilfields, Germany would have been forced to institute all the above measures?

is the consensus they could not carry out Barbarossa? but how soon could the Soviets carry out Bagration?

I think it would motivate the nazis the same way as the Japanese were when they declared war the USA.
 
what is the German reaction going to be? likely try to rush and annex entirety of Transylvania to Hungary so as to position themselves in the Carpathian Mtns.? (as a last resort if they are unable to negotiate with their putative partners the Soviets)

during the war they stalled on synthetic fuel plant development only to resume (1942?) frantic efforts, managed to reach 36m barrels per anum vs. 71m barrels consumption, but that was with ongoing operations in USSR, the pre-war consumption was 44m barrels (have no idea the portion of the increase resulting from Eastern Front vs. occupied territories?)

they also failed to switch vehicles to producer gas (the hot water sized tanks mounted or towed) until 1942 which saved them millions of barrels for fuel. the Austrian oilfields tripled in production over course of the war to 12m barrels.

one can imagine if the Soviets had captured or damaged the Romanian oilfields, Germany would have been forced to institute all the above measures?

is the consensus they could not carry out Barbarossa? but how soon could the Soviets carry out Bagration?

What consensus?

Hitlers own words are that Germany would be helpless, all your questions are answered with Hitlers own words. In addition to that any action by the Germans against the Soviet Union in 1940 will mean that the Soviets stop their supplies, and Germany really needs the Soviet Grain, without the Soviet grain the Germans would then have two major problem.

About a Soviet attack, there would be no needs since Germany would collapse or the scenario that Stalin hoped for would happen, where the western Allies fight the Axis and inflict serious damage upon each other and then the Soviet Union marches in and installs communism when both sides are too weak to do anything.

I think it would motivate the nazis the same way as the Japanese were when they declared war the USA.

No, Hitler himself said they could do nothing until spring 1941, and without the Romanian oil they can not attack it is not possible, the country would also by then already be suffering massive economic and industrial disruption. It would be a complete win for the USSR.
 
No, Hitler himself said they could do nothing until spring 1941, and without the Romanian oil they can not attack it is not possible, the country would also by then already be suffering massive economic and industrial disruption. It would be a complete win for the USSR.
So would that instead mean all the limited resources be focused on subduing Britiain in Operation Sea Lion?
 
what is the German reaction going to be? likely try to rush and annex entirety of Transylvania to Hungary so as to position themselves in the Carpathian Mtns.? (as a last resort if they are unable to negotiate with their putative partners the Soviets)

during the war they stalled on synthetic fuel plant development only to resume (1942?) frantic efforts, managed to reach 36m barrels per anum vs. 71m barrels consumption, but that was with ongoing operations in USSR, the pre-war consumption was 44m barrels (have no idea the portion of the increase resulting from Eastern Front vs. occupied territories?)

they also failed to switch vehicles to producer gas (the hot water sized tanks mounted or towed) until 1942 which saved them millions of barrels for fuel. the Austrian oilfields tripled in production over course of the war to 12m barrels.

one can imagine if the Soviets had captured or damaged the Romanian oilfields, Germany would have been forced to institute all the above measures?

is the consensus they could not carry out Barbarossa? but how soon could the Soviets carry out Bagration?

What consensus?

Hitlers own words are that Germany would be helpless, all your questions are answered with Hitlers own words. In addition to that any action by the Germans against the Soviet Union in 1940 will mean that the Soviets stop their supplies, and Germany really needs the Soviet Grain, without the Soviet grain the Germans would then have two major problem.

About a Soviet attack, there would be no needs since Germany would collapse or the scenario that Stalin hoped for would happen, where the western Allies fight the Axis and inflict serious damage upon each other and then the Soviet Union marches in and installs communism when both sides are too weak to do anything.

No, Hitler himself said they could do nothing until spring 1941, and without the Romanian oil they can not attack it is not possible, the country would also by then already be suffering massive economic and industrial disruption. It would be a complete win for the USSR.

firstly, Hitler was trying to rewrite history a bit to justify his invasion to Mannerheim, who was dragged along for the ride.

secondly, the occupation of Transylvania could be seen as aiding (any) conflict the Soviets were having with Romania (second front)

finally my question was what the consensus of the board was as to Hitler's course, not to parrot his speech. he expressed similar doomsday views of Kursk and still went ahead with that.

my own view would be they attempt a crash program to complete their synthetic plants, also forced to consider a more limited version of Barbarossa that recaptures their pre-war projected oil sources of Poland, Romania, and Estonia (oil shale)
 

Deleted member 1487

No, Hitler himself said they could do nothing until spring 1941, and without the Romanian oil they can not attack it is not possible, the country would also by then already be suffering massive economic and industrial disruption. It would be a complete win for the USSR.
Nothing? There is quite a bit that Hitler could have done to aid Romania if the Soviets overextend their agreed upon territorial changes; the OTL North Bukovina move was minor enough not to provoke a reaction, but if Stalin opted to try and take the entire country if the Romanians resisted, then it would draw in Italy at very least and more than likely Hitler as well due to how important Romanian oil was to the German economy.

That said it is incredibly unlikely that Stalin would get that aggressive at this point, he still wanted to try and avoid pissing off Hitler too much because he wanted German help modernizing the Soviet economy (the 5 Year Plans weren't going as well as hoped), to avoid uniting Europe against him (at very least the Axis powers, who had just signed the Tripartite Pact), and because the Soviet military was not ready for a major engagement. While the Soviets would be able to take Bessarabia and Bukovina, they'd likely exhaust themselves in the process given that they were committed to occupying the Baltics and just spent a lot more of their ready resources in Finland than anticipated, so wouldn't likely be able to take the rest of the country quickly and present Hitler with a Fait Accompli before he could inject forces into Romania and stiffen their spines.

Plus if he truly tried to conquer the entire country the Balkan states would panic and side with Hitler, remember in 1940 Stalin was still courting Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to set up their own alliance system, so was mindful of the impact naked aggression in the region would have. Stalin wasn't quite Hitler when it came to gunboat diplomacy given his more realistic (if not pessimistic) view of his forces capabilities. Plus at this point the world was shocked by how quickly the Germans won and Stalin was in panic mode about how unready and weak the USSR was versus Hitler (even if May 1940 gave everyone, Hitler included, an overinflated view of the capabilities of the Wehrmacht), so at least in part the move to annex territories on the border wasn't simply about territorial aggrandizement to reunite the old Russian Empire, it was to get a better buffer zone against invasion by the Axis.
 
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While the Soviets would be able to take Bessarabia and Bukovina, they'd likely exhaust themselves in the process given that they were committed to occupying the Baltics and just spent a lot more of their ready resources in Finland than anticipated, so wouldn't likely be able to take the rest of the country quickly and present Hitler with a Fait Accompli before he could inject forces into Romania and stiffen their spines; plus if he truly tried to conquer the entire country the Balkan states would panic and side with Hitler; remember in 1940 Stalin was still courting Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to set up their own alliance system, so was mindful of the impact naked aggression in the region would have. Stalin wasn't quite Hitler when it came to gunboat diplomacy given his more realistic (if not pessimistic) view of his forces capabilities. Plus at this point the world was shocked by how quickly the Germans won and Stalin was in panic mode about how unready and weak the USSR was versus Hitler, so at least in part the move to annex territories on the border wasn't simply about territorial aggrandizement to reunite the old Russian Empire, it was to get a better buffer zone against invasion by the Axis.

My thoughts exactly at this point, since the Winter War was a wake up call on how badly Stalin butchered the military force. So it's likely the Soviets would do even worse than OTL.
 

Deleted member 1487

My thoughts exactly at this point, since the Winter War was a wake up call on how badly Stalin butchered the military force. So it's likely the Soviets would do even worse than OTL.
To be fair so would the Germans. Not getting Soviet help from August 1940 on would really hurt, same with having to keep mobilized/remobilize divisions that IOTL were stood down to work in industry and with the harvest to deal with the labor shortages (slave/forced labor was already starting and sabotage was already causing some issues), while Europe was in famine in 1940 due to issues with flooding and the disruption caused by the fighting as well as the RN blockade. Of course it is unlikely that Stalin understood the vulnerabilities of the European Axis at the time, as he apparently didn't realize how much he was antagonizing Hitler in 1940 with the relatively minor things he did during the Soviet Axis entry talks and his demands for his entry into the alliance.
 
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