Roman rump states?

I assume that by Maghreb, you meant North Africa (Maghrib/Mauretania in the medieval sense stops at, roughly, Algers and everything between this point and Cyrenaica is Africa/Ifriqiya)

I don't think so : the exarchate of Ravenna seems to have been increasinly tied up in the VIIth and VIIIth centuries with other Roman holdings in Italy outside its jurisdiction (Sicily, notably), and you'd probably end up with something similar in Carthage, altough we don't know much about what happened in the exarchate due to the lack of sources and possibly interest outside major revolts in the VIIth.
You could argue that Gennadius-like rulership could make the exarchate sort of double-tributary state between Constantinople and Damas, but, at this point, there's nothing really preventing Arabs to take Carthage in the VIIth century : Constantinople would need to dedicate a good part of its ressources without a real guarantee : on the other hand, if Arab power declines earlier and importantly in the region, Romans would have less issues asserting their power in what remains of the exarchate.
If I say North Africa, it kinda mixes with the modern meaning of it so I used Maghreb(that IMO has a more useful definition in its modern form IMO).


Does a Islamic pressure on the Anatolia front imply that they should be able to overrun North Africa as well, isn´t it possible to have regional problems in Egypt with earlier Coptic revolts that puts North Africa in a safe spot while the Byzantines are still getting pressured in Anatolia by the Arabs, in the Balkasn by the Avars/Bulgars and Slavs and in Italy by the Lombards.

Wouldn´t a North Africa grow independent or could the more inland Berbers become hostile as well?
 
If I say North Africa, it kinda mixes with the modern meaning of it so I used Maghreb(that IMO has a more useful definition in its modern form IMO).
The main issue with mixing-up Maghrib and Africa is that they were in several aspect as distinct as Africa was to Egypt, in addition to the traditional tripartie division of coast, highlands and plateau : personally, at least up to the XIVth century, I prefer to distinguish them.

Does a Islamic pressure on the Anatolia front imply that they should be able to overrun North Africa as well
Not necessarily, but the relatively decentralized nature of Arab expansion (especially in Africa, which never really was under a direct calpihal control) makes it hard to really stop it except when it met with strong and maintained opposition, with a Roman Empire undergoing one of its worst historical crisis.

Note that the exarchate was essentially a matter of coastal control furthermore, and while its cores were surrounded by petty-kingdoms that had a dynamic complex relationship with them, the effective control was a matter of suppliement and garrisons of the coastal cities and immediate countryside. There, taking over wasn't exactly an issue, but rather how much Constantinople could afford to give away to their defense, as the Roman-Berber coalition was, for all it complexity, not actively working out.

isn´t it possible to have regional problems in Egypt with earlier Coptic revolts
It's possible, but I don't reallt think it's likely : at this point, the native population seems to have remained passive as Arabs weren't as much seen as much radically different politically and religiously wise than Romans, and Arabs doesn't seem to have been really resolute on pressuring fiscally the population as much it went in the VIIIth and IXth centuries.
I would rather think of a shakier succession conflict preventing or shortening Umayyad dynastical takeover.

Wouldn´t a North Africa grow independent or could the more inland Berbers become hostile as well?
Berber petty-kingdoms and chiefdoms apparently went into a period of contraction more marked in Mauretania than in Africa.

Not to say Berbers didn't played a major role in the defense of Roman Africa, especially as Romans seems to have greatly disengaged themselves in the second half of the VIIth century, but while the petty-kingdoms of the plateaux stand their ground, you didn't have much structural defense against raids from Cyrenaica and Fezzan with a Byzantine navy unable to really harass the coast.

Eventually, I think that a surviving exarchate would be essentially stuck to the bare bones of what it was initially (and even then it was a reduction over Vandal Africa), and far too weak to really withstand Roman or Arab pressure, even with a distanted relation with Berbers.
 
There does seem to be a bit of a mix of terms in us in the OP here, but I kind of like that, it gives more freedom.

But regarding the depressingly recurrent argument of when is something Roman. If we agree that over time Roman-ness is analogous to nationhood, then I'd use these rules

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_identity

TL;DR - if you think you're Roman, the group considered Roman thinks you're Roman, and most outside that group considers you Roman. You're effing-Roman.

----

Regarding Rump States/Provinces/Nations, we've got an interesting mix.

I'm pretty sure @LSCatilina would agree with me that France, Britain, Spain, and Italy (and perhaps others), could be described as being populated by 'Nations based partially on Roman Culture'. (Heck, Turkey would fit this too).

If we're looking at Provinces that 'break off' from the rest of the institution (for lack of a better phrase), then the Exarchate of Carthage, or (depressingly) Ceuta (before its conquest by the Ummyads) would fit this criteria - making it as simple as a combination of central neglect leading to the ties 'breaking' due to that neglect, or defecting. (I mean, it would be hard to say that Sextus Pompey was less Roman than Octavian, or the Gallic Roman Empire as less Roman than the rest of the Roman Empires).

In which case it would be as simple as IOTL - stop reporting to central authority, but still be part of the Roman nation. Bingo. Job done. I'd include any option from Coel Hen through Trebizond. This is different from France/Spain/Turkey where the Roman Nation is arguably subsumed into the dominant nation (Franks/Visigoths/Turks respectively).

In contrast, there are those that could be described as moving past their Roman roots. i.e. Venice. My understanding is that it was founded by Roman refugees, but then identified more as Venetian over time, to the point that they didn't consider themselves Romans. At which point I would say it is fair to say they aren't Roman any more. No conquest, not subsumed, just... drifted away. (I simplify this of course as there is a strong argument that the rise of Medieval Italian cultures is a combination of Roman, Langobard, Gothic, Greek, Arabic, and each sampled in different measures). (If I'm wrong and Venetian culture takes great pride in its Roman-ness, this is news to me and I've love to be corrected).

So not only is it possible, it was done. A lot. A personal favourite of mine is the idea of a Romano-Berber North Africa under Heraclius in a no-Phocas TL, or the aforementioned Coel Hen. (I did a post of a rough PoD here ) - I also think a Trebizond that dominates Georgia (somehow), and then the rest of the Caucauses, despite its complicated cultural circumstances would also be fundamentally a Roman Rump state as the OP described.
 
I'm pretty sure @LSCatilina would agree with me that France, Britain, Spain, and Italy (and perhaps others), could be described as being populated by 'Nations based partially on Roman Culture'. (Heck, Turkey would fit this too).
Describing Late Antiquity/Early Medieval identities in post-imperial western Romania as "national" strikes me as an anchronism : what existed in early medieval period was more of the continuation of the civic-political identity of late Romania, set along the line of distinctivness of Barbarian identity (as mentioned above, and that evolved in something equivalent to "A Barbarian is someone following a Barbarian king or kinglet") and the replacement of the collapsing Imperial state, with its militias and structures, by the Barbarian state.

You had less and less post-imperial population defining itself as Roman, not because they renounced their cultural identity, but because they identified themselves as part of the new, if continuous, society. It's not a systematical change, of course : southern Gallic population continued to self-identify as Roman, as in several regions in Italy, but it mostly comes down to the capacity of the Barbarian state to maintain a roughly (if relatively weak) unified dominance.

A national identity, however, stress the common kinship not only in matters of relation to the state (or sometimes, without, in the case of stateless nations), but in culture, language, law, as a shared history. Most importantly, a national identity is generally exclusive : a XIXth European can be German or French, but not both, not really.
A noble of VIIth Aquitaine can be issued from Austrasian (which is essentially a geopolitical concept) nobility, refer to itself as Roman and part of the Frankish vassality, without much second tought.

You really have to wait the Xth century to see the first proto-national identities really emerging (altough it structurate quicker in England with the conception of gens Anglorum and an earlier vernacularisation of institutions compared to the continent) slowly gaining up on society.

Eventually, it should be remembered that what happened in Gaul, Spain, Italy was not a cultural build-up coming "partially" from Roman culture, but a direct continuation of Late Romania as it existed culturally and institutionally since the IIIrd century (meaning that provinces were, while essentially Roman, still undergoing a Barbarian influence). It evolved from there, obviously, but not as much radically it did in Eastern Romania at the notable exception of the maintain of imperial structures there. Carolingia represented (rather than caused IMO) a first radical departure (rather than the swan song of Late Antiaquity) echohed in the Xth century.

It's hard to say if the Gothic, Frankish, Lombard identities could have led to proto-national identities without the changes happening since the VIIth century (Romano-Persian wars, Arab conquests, collapse of Carolingia, etc.), altough I think it could have emerged as an equivalent (I'm not convinced it would have led to XIXth-style nationalism, as if it was something universal), but it wasn't such between the Vth and VIIIth centuries to me (interestingly, if the Roman state would have survived in western Europe, the distinction between Roman citizenship and "Barbarian citizenship" may have hastened the progress).

I don't know as much as I would want on eastern Romania regional identities, but AFAIK, the main alliegence of provinces was set by the existence and acceptence of the imperial state, and (but not equally) by the religious identity : it became a cliché on this board that non-Chalcedonian believers considered themselves apart of "melkite" society, but that's not what can be seen before the Arab conquests.

Vincent Deroche said:
Monophysit's geography was quickly stabilized : Coptic-speaking Egypt is almost exclusively monophysit exception made of a wealthy, hellenic, essentially urban minority which support Chalcedon; Palestine is chalcedonian following the establishment of Jerusalem as a Patriarchate, not without violent conflicts in the Vth century; Syriac-speaking provinces, eastern Syria and Mesopotamia are mainly monophysits, but without a same crushing majority as in Egypt, with there as well a contrast between an urban, wealthy and chalcedonian elite; and a rural, Aramean-speaking, monophyisit population. In a first time, the Monophisit resilience is coming from a theological tradition, and resentments of the patriarchates of Antioch and Alexandria due to the rise of the patriarchate of Constantinople; Cyril is a Greek, pure and simple, Severus of Antioch only writes in Greek as the majority of Monophysit writers. All think of themselves, before anything else, as "Romans", subjects of the Christian Empire, and obviously hope to bring back the Empire to the faith they consider to be the only true one. The birth of the Monohpysite movement can't be interpreted as a simplist religious transposition of a resistence whom true nature would be political or social.

On the other hand, it doesn't mean that religious identity played no part in the institutional (social or political identity) : not only it only grew as a part of popular and nobiliar self-identity, but it could be an obstacle to assert the civic-political unity, as it happened with the (concious) maintain of Homeism in Spain and Italy, and as it happened in Egypt and Syria.

Vincent Deroche said:
But the religious opposition between denominations coincide so well in facts with the ones between Greek-speaking and Aramean or Coptic speaking populations, and with the opposition between Constantinople and its provinces, that little by little emerges the beggining of a proto-national sense and the identification of an ethnic group trough its religious denomination [...]The complete discossiation isn't yet made, but it is latent and the Arab invasions suscited them effortlessly

Simply said, the weakness of the late imperial or post-imperial power can lead, in situations where loyalties were already weakened or conditional, to a sense of proto-national identity : it's more of a relatively passive change, than an assessment of identitarian secession, altough you can see them appearing later, with the State of the Paulicians for exemple.


If we're looking at Provinces that 'break off' from the rest of the institution (for lack of a better phrase), then the Exarchate of Carthage, or (depressingly) Ceuta (before its conquest by the Ummyads) would fit this criteria
I'll make a quick return to the first quote, the "partially based on Roman culture".
For all we can see, most post-imperial states were essentially based on late Roman culture, society and institutions. On which other bases Barbarian states could have been set, when Barbarians were romanized groups, integrated since centuries to the Roman world and political horizons? Not to say that you didn't have any Barbarian influence, but it existed since the IIIrd century at least, due to dedicatii settlements and pluri-centennial relationship on the limes, making Barbarian entities as much Roman culturally and institutionally than the provinces they slowly replaced Roman state in?

Of course, that was not systematical : the case of peripherical regions such as Britain and Illyricum which were institutionally essentialy tied to their role of quasi-military marches, without a same structural development than the rest of western Romania is interesting there. But the tribal restructuration of post-imperial Britain (would it be on historical lines, or an allo-historical Britto-Barbarian ensemble of high-kingships), or its absence in Illyricum (the failure of a Pannonian ensemble may be due to the presence of two relatively strong primary states sattelizing the region rather than structuring it) isn't representative of post-imperial Romania.

The reality of emergence of post-imperial states in the early Middle-Ages isn't as much a break-off of institutions, than the replacement, due to the weakness and/or disappearence of the imperial state, of who rules on these institutions and how they evolve. The notion of previous integration on these institutions, and legitimacy to take them over might be important there : it's why the aformentioned Roman "tyrants" as Bundellarius or Syagrius ultimatly failed, and why Barbarians succeeded.

How the Exarchate of Carthage evolved (when it comes to Ceuta, we know so little, than I wouldn't be as assertive as you are about its nature, personally) is to be set in the aformentioned context of decline of direct imperial authority on western regions in the VIth (altough, by no means continuous) than a growing autonomisation that could have looked similarily to the eastern non-chalcedonian provinces of the Empire, except with military autonomy to back the opposition to monothelic policies of Constantinople.


In which case it would be as simple as IOTL - stop reporting to central authority, but still be part of the Roman nation. Bingo. Job done. I'd include any option from Coel Hen through Trebizond. This is different from France/Spain/Turkey where the Roman Nation is arguably subsumed into the dominant nation (Franks/Visigoths/Turks respectively).
That's a really obsolete viewpoint of identities in Late Antiquity there : I won't repeat what I tried to point above, but summarizing it shortly : you didn't have a set Frankish or Gothic identity in the Vth, but a Barbarian civic-political identity that replaced and went mixed on Roman institutions, as the disappearance of the Roman state and its replacement by a Barbarian state meant the end of the clear distinction between an integrated but technically secondary Barbarian statute, and a Roman citizenship backed by a Roman state.

Again, what consecrated the legitimacy of Barbarian kingdoms were that they succeeded the Roman state by taking over institutions on which they were already integrated politically and culturally, rather than asserting a non-existent national rule.

A personal favourite of mine is the idea of a Romano-Berber North Africa under Heraclius in a no-Phocas TL
The opportunity for such a state already went away with the Justinian conquest : by not only preventing Berber takeover of Vandalic Africa, and by ignoring the realities of Roman Africa, as with a really porous limes when it came to Berber communities and entities, the best they ended with was with a rump Roman Africa, and an ensemble of petty Berber kingdoms that could be seen as a military recruitement pool, but with a distanded relationship with Carthage, something more akin to their relations with Slavic peoples in the same period and later.

or the aforementioned Coel Hen. (I did a post of a rough PoD here )
I won't dispute (I wouldn't have brang the possibility in first place otherwise) the possibility of an romanized (as in creolized) ensemble of high-kingship in post-imperial Britain (especially because you didn't have, safe for the Saxon Shore, the permanence of the roman state within Barbarian settlements as in Gaul or Spain), it won't be a roman state, due to the lack of strong Roman institutions in the Vth century. It's why Anglo-Saxons settlements took the form of chiefdoms and complex chiefdoms instead of post-imperial states as what happened to Franks, Vandals or even Heruli.
There's no realistic way to end up with an unified Britain, even if things go well for Brittons : at best, two or three high-kingship with blur borders with Gaels, Picts, Saxons (especially in the south) and whoever rules in Gaul. Anything more than this is can't really happen.
 
Weeeeeee, wall of text. You don't disappoint LSCatilina!

Describing Late Antiquity/Early Medieval identities in post-imperial western Romania as "national" strikes me as an anchronism : what existed in early medieval period was more of the continuation of the civic-political identity of late Romania, set along the line of distinctivness of Barbarian identity (as mentioned above, and that evolved in something equivalent to "A Barbarian is someone following a Barbarian king or kinglet") and the replacement of the collapsing Imperial state, with its militias and structures, by the Barbarian state.

Which is why I used the terms for the modern nation-states. (Although, I admit, I did use the idea of a Roman nation anachronistically), but short of getting into the minute differneces between the nation and the perspective of Romans to distance their in-group with the out-groups of barbarians and Persians (yay, more anachronisms).

You had less and less post-imperial population defining itself as Roman, not because they renounced their cultural identity, but because they identified themselves as part of the new, if continuous, society. It's not a systematical change, of course : southern Gallic population continued to self-identify as Roman, as in several regions in Italy, but it mostly comes down to the capacity of the Barbarian state to maintain a roughly (if relatively weak) unified dominance.

Which is what I roughly meant when I talked about a nation being 'subsumed' by the other. But in more precise terms.

A national identity, however, stress the common kinship not only in matters of relation to the state (or sometimes, without, in the case of stateless nations), but in culture, language, law, as a shared history. Most importantly, a national identity is generally exclusive : a XIXth European can be German or French, but not both, not really.
A noble of VIIth Aquitaine can be issued from Austrasian (which is essentially a geopolitical concept) nobility, refer to itself as Roman and part of the Frankish vassality, without much second tought.

You really have to wait the Xth century to see the first proto-national identities really emerging (altough it structurate quicker in England with the conception of gens Anglorum and an earlier vernacularisation of institutions compared to the continent) slowly gaining up on society.

+1

Eventually, it should be remembered that what happened in Gaul, Spain, Italy was not a cultural build-up coming "partially" from Roman culture, but a direct continuation of Late Romania as it existed culturally and institutionally since the IIIrd century (meaning that provinces were, while essentially Roman, still undergoing a Barbarian influence). It evolved from there, obviously, but not as much radically it did in Eastern Romania at the notable exception of the maintain of imperial structures there. Carolingia represented (rather than caused IMO) a first radical departure (rather than the swan song of Late Antiaquity) echohed in the Xth century.

It's hard to say if the Gothic, Frankish, Lombard identities could have led to proto-national identities without the changes happening since the VIIth century (Romano-Persian wars, Arab conquests, collapse of Carolingia, etc.), altough I think it could have emerged as an equivalent (I'm not convinced it would have led to XIXth-style nationalism, as if it was something universal), but it wasn't such between the Vth and VIIIth centuries to me (interestingly, if the Roman state would have survived in western Europe, the distinction between Roman citizenship and "Barbarian citizenship" may have hastened the progress).

I don't know as much as I would want on eastern Romania regional identities, but AFAIK, the main alliegence of provinces was set by the existence and acceptence of the imperial state, and (but not equally) by the religious identity : it became a cliché on this board that non-Chalcedonian believers considered themselves apart of "melkite" society, but that's not what can be seen before the Arab conquests.

On the other hand, it doesn't mean that religious identity played no part in the institutional (social or political identity) : not only it only grew as a part of popular and nobiliar self-identity, but it could be an obstacle to assert the civic-political unity, as it happened with the (concious) maintain of Homeism in Spain and Italy, and as it happened in Egypt and Syria.

I recognise the point here, but the roughest outline of all of this is that idea of the honeypot, but only of two parts. However you want to split the influences of the maturing joint cultures of the various post-Roman kingdoms, it isn't unfair to say that both initially distinct groups both had a part to play, it is fair to say they both had influence (whilst much less precise than your terms) as such, partial.

I'll make a quick return to the first quote, the "partially based on Roman culture".
For all we can see, most post-imperial states were essentially based on late Roman culture, society and institutions. On which other bases Barbarian states could have been set, when Barbarians were romanized groups, integrated since centuries to the Roman world and political horizons? Not to say that you didn't have any Barbarian influence, but it existed since the IIIrd century at least, due to dedicatii settlements and pluri-centennial relationship on the limes, making Barbarian entities as much Roman culturally and institutionally than the provinces they slowly replaced Roman state in?

The key point here is that whilst the differences (from our perspective) may be slight - at the time my understanding is that there were still clear in and out groups between the Romanized Barbarians and 'Romans Proper'. As such, until that distinction isn't made by Roman and Romanized sources, then I don't think it is fair to not recognise the distinction that the sources seem to.

Of course, that was not systematical : the case of peripherical regions such as Britain and Illyricum which were institutionally essentialy tied to their role of quasi-military marches, without a same structural development than the rest of western Romania is interesting there. But the tribal restructuration of post-imperial Britain (would it be on historical lines, or an allo-historical Britto-Barbarian ensemble of high-kingships), or its absence in Illyricum (the failure of a Pannonian ensemble may be due to the presence of two relatively strong primary states sattelizing the region rather than structuring it) isn't representative of post-imperial Romania.

The reality of emergence of post-imperial states in the early Middle-Ages isn't as much a break-off of institutions, than the replacement, due to the weakness and/or disappearence of the imperial state, of who rules on these institutions and how they evolve. The notion of previous integration on these institutions, and legitimacy to take them over might be important there : it's why the aformentioned Roman "tyrants" as Bundellarius or Syagrius ultimatly failed, and why Barbarians succeeded.

I'm not sure I see the distinction between break-off of an institution (at least in part) and changing those who rule on them. From my perspective even if the institutions operate fundamentally identically, they belong to different 'establishmetns' or heirarchies and as such seize to be the same institution as one another - one simply being previously part of the other. The latter predicates the former - or at least did in this circumstance. Co-Rule sort of muddies the waters there.

How the Exarchate of Carthage evolved (when it comes to Ceuta, we know so little, than I wouldn't be as assertive as you are about its nature, personally) is to be set in the aformentioned context of decline of direct imperial authority on western regions in the VIth (altough, by no means continuous) than a growing autonomisation that could have looked similarily to the eastern non-chalcedonian provinces of the Empire, except with military autonomy to back the opposition to monothelic policies of Constantinople.

I'm nothing if not brash.

That's a really obsolete viewpoint of identities in Late Antiquity there : I won't repeat what I tried to point above, but summarizing it shortly : you didn't have a set Frankish or Gothic identity in the Vth, but a Barbarian civic-political identity that replaced and went mixed on Roman institutions, as the disappearance of the Roman state and its replacement by a Barbarian state meant the end of the clear distinction between an integrated but technically secondary Barbarian statute, and a Roman citizenship backed by a Roman state.

Again, what consecrated the legitimacy of Barbarian kingdoms were that they succeeded the Roman state by taking over institutions on which they were already integrated politically and culturally, rather than asserting a non-existent national rule.

I'm not disputing that you're describing it all much more accurately than I have (being more formally trained and knowledgeable). My terms may be clumsy, but I don't think we're in any great disagreement here. However, I use the term 'dominant' because they took over institutions, like armies, or introduced ones loyal to their in-group rather than the Romans. You even use the term 'took over'.

The opportunity for such a state already went away with the Justinian conquest : by not only preventing Berber takeover of Vandalic Africa, and by ignoring the realities of Roman Africa, as with a really porous limes when it came to Berber communities and entities, the best they ended with was with a rump Roman Africa, and an ensemble of petty Berber kingdoms that could be seen as a military recruitement pool, but with a distanded relationship with Carthage, something more akin to their relations with Slavic peoples in the same period and later.

I'm not sure I agree with you here (the way that such a state could form is innumerable, if each are unlikely/never happened), but I think that comes to a point of philosophical differences when it comes to alt-history.

I won't dispute (I wouldn't have brang the possibility in first place otherwise) the possibility of an romanized (as in creolized) ensemble of high-kingship in post-imperial Britain (especially because you didn't have, safe for the Saxon Shore, the permanence of the roman state within Barbarian settlements as in Gaul or Spain), it won't be a roman state, due to the lack of strong Roman institutions in the Vth century. It's why Anglo-Saxons settlements took the form of chiefdoms and complex chiefdoms instead of post-imperial states as what happened to Franks, Vandals or even Heruli.
There's no realistic way to end up with an unified Britain, even if things go well for Brittons : at best, two or three high-kingship with blur borders with Gaels, Picts, Saxons (especially in the south) and whoever rules in Gaul. Anything more than this is can't really happen.

Define a strong institution. I don't say that frivolously here - but is this an institution that is in control? Is it an institution that is paper-only? Because I'm not sure I agree that you need an institution of a significant strength to say if something can be a 'Roman State', as long as those who are fundamentally in charge, consider themselves Roman. It may be a minority of a minority (which is unlikely), but if it comes from (as posited), a Coel Hen, whose Coeling heirs keep the title of Dux Brittanniarum, and identify (and are identified) as Romans in some way, then (by a toe-hold), it is a Roman-state.

My understanding that the Saxons mainly ignored the Roman institutions that existed as soon as they became inconvenient, in contrast to your description of the Franks et al.

As to the realism - I don't know. Another timeline would likely consider the Mongol Empire, or rise of the Caliphate as unrealistic, or heck - the British Empire. I'd agree to implausible, but (at least for me), the fun is finding out how to do so, and accepting the consequences. That, and well - define the timescales you're using there, I could certainly see a united Britain with a measure of good luck and half a dozen hundred years. ;)
 
it isn't unfair to say that both initially distinct groups both had a part to play, it is fair to say they both had influence (whilst much less precise than your terms) as such, partial.
Thing is, Barbarians were distinct more from a political point of view than cultural, even at the beggining (at least how they appeared as coherent peoples). The distinction grew out of it, especially in the late IVth and Vth century when Barbarian formed cohesive political entities within Romania, rather that the relatively scattered settlements of dedicatii.
You had, IMO, something dialectical at play there, with Barbarians not being really distinguishable from the provincial population they were influenced by much more they influenced them (setting the base for a stronger integration of second-wave settlements and takeovers); then a growing political distinction in the IVth/Vth centuries (while culturally, romanization continued to fully operate), and then a lesser political distinction as Barbarian took over the post-imperial institutions.

But again, the very real Barbarian influence was a romanized influence on a Roman population. The properly non-Roman influence does exist, but is really limited to fringes in most of western Romania, and took a certain time to really last.

The key point here is that whilst the differences (from our perspective) may be slight - at the time my understanding is that there were still clear in and out groups between the Romanized Barbarians and 'Romans Proper'.
Thing is, because the distinction is essentially political, you had several Romans, or long established dedicatii that joined up with Barbarians since the IIIrd century (or, arguably, as soon as they formed coherent peoples along the limes). In terms of material culture, the difference between settled Barbarians and Romans is not slight, it is virtually inexistent.

As such, until that distinction isn't made by Roman and Romanized sources, then I don't think it is fair to not recognise the distinction that the sources seem to.
Most of distinct features appeared after Barbarians settled in Romania and weren't a remnant of non-Roman influence.

For what matter Franks, for exemple, a lot of what supposedly distinguished them from Romans are a later creations : fransciscae doesn't exist before the VIth century, the Salic Law is essentially a rebranded Roman law on Barbarians, the mythified history of Franks as written in the VIth/VIIth centuries is a mash-up of Aeneid and Exodus, the supposedly frankish tradition of shared kingship is absent in earlier centuries but essentially mirror Roman shared-imperium, "typical" Frankish clothing doesn't appear before the VIth...

To quote Bruno Dumézil, from the VIth onwards, with a provincial population more and more identifying itself as Frankish (for political, fiscal and prestige purposes), the differenciation is so impossible to do, that Gallo-Romans are playing Barbarians as some kids would be playing cowboys, fantasizing about their Barbarian identity from half-remembered stories, Tacitus and other latin writers, and inspiring themselves from populations that still existed within the Barbaricum, mixed with little romanized Barbarian features that survived the fall of the western Roman state.

And we're talking of a people that is considered having kept most (romanized) Barbarian features : it's even funnier with Goths. A slight analogy could be made (altough certainly not similar) with Hiberno-Americans rewriting their history (the stress on indentured servants, etc.), celtizing themselves in a manner that no XIXth Irishmen would have done, etc.

I'm not sure I see the distinction between break-off of an institution (at least in part) and changing those who rule on them.
Breaking-off the institutions would imply that these would at least cut themselves from each other, or from the institutional poles from which the new rulers wouldn't have control.
While we see a growing estrangement due to the collapse of the roman state, and the decline of structures that depended directly from it (altough it's far less obvious for Africa and Italy before Roman reconquest), you still had enough political and institutional continuity and exchanges between Barbarian kingdoms, Exarchates and the eastern Roman state, which wouldn't have happened if these polities really broke off, at least as it seems to be commonly defined.

From my perspective even if the institutions operate fundamentally identically, they belong to different 'establishmetns' or heirarchies and as such seize to be the same institution as one another - one simply being previously part of the other.
It's a bit moot for what matter the Late Empire : Barbarian takeover didn't happened overnight, but was a slow take of control on key institutions (such as the military, which did included due to the times a territorial control over civil militia). With the fall of the western Roman state, it was less Barbarians taking advantage of the vaacum (altough they certainly did took advantage of the weakness of the roman state in the Vth century), than the logical consequences of the greater part Barbarians played in Roman state since the IVth (just look at the long list of Frankish-Romans generals in the west, possibly related to Merovingians).

However, I use the term 'dominant' because they took over institutions, like armies, or introduced ones loyal to their in-group rather than the Romans. You even use the term 'took over'.
But they didn't took over as a "dominant nation", but as a what remained of the western Roman state during and after its collapse. I wouldn't say replaced, because it wasn't made smoothly, but it's not the take over of an anachronical nation, or of a political faction whom networking would be somehow distinct from Roman institutions.

I'm not sure I agree with you here (the way that such a state could form is innumerable, if each are unlikely/never happened), but I think that comes to a point of philosophical differences when it comes to alt-history.
I could be convinced otherwise, but I don't see a reasonable way for the early VIIth century exarchate to evolve as a Romano-Berber roughly unified state. It's not philosophical, tough, than trying to understand the historical situation, from what I could find as secondary sources.
If the forms it could take are innumerable, I'd be sincerely interested to know which practical forms you're thinking about.

Define a strong institution.
Roughly, a relatively imprevious organisation, that while evolving, can either self-sustain itself, or can be guaranteed its stable sustain.
For exemple, the democratic institution in America or France is relatively strong, while democratic institution in Belarus or Gabon is not. Or, for what matter Britain, the militia institution wasn't strong as it greatly declined if not collapsed as soon the Roman state disappeared from Britain while it survived elsewhere, if weakened.

Because I'm not sure I agree that you need an institution of a significant strength to say if something can be a 'Roman State', as long as those who are fundamentally in charge, consider themselves Roman.
Don't forget that what defined a roman state wasn't just the self-perception (otherwise, we would be forced to consider the merovingian duchies of Aquitaine as "Roman states" which, obviously, makes little sense), but a political identity and relationship to roman institutions.
A Britton high-kingship, while including several roman or romanized features, would be a departure from roman institutions that were dependent on imperial sustain (notably trough military presence). Assuming that Brittons would define themselves as Romans as for their primary identity (which would already be a debatable assumption, as it seems they stuck to tribal/civitate identities, with the territory undergoing important break-ups of break-ups), while building-up on what remained of these.

The point is less to depict sub-Roman Britain as "unRoman", but to point that for all the cultural and sociel creolization that resulted from centuries of Roman rule, the imperial institutions simply didn't fared well without the military and administrative imperial presence : it's no wonder if the first Anglo-Saxon ensemble to emerge from the tribal mix-up of the VIth century were kingdoms in relation with Frankish courts and trade trough Gaul (Kent, East-Anglia, Wessex, mostly).

Eventually, it's not about needing institutions of significant strength to be considered as a "Roman state" : it's about the survival of these institutions (even if weakened) on the long run to allow a Roman identity to be maintained.

My understanding that the Saxons mainly ignored the Roman institutions that existed as soon as they became inconvenient, in contrast to your description of the Franks et al.
It's rather complicated : the late Roman structures in Britain were certainly less present to begin with, compared to other western provinces and regions (exceptions made of places as the aformentioned Illyricum, altough northern Spain could easily count with the caveat it wasn't as much of a military region) with the attested survival of pre-Roman tribal identities at its rough periphery (Votodinii, Dumonii, Silures, etc.) that even with the best will in the world, I can't spot in Gaul or Spain.
Does that means that sub-Roman Britain wasn't romanized? No, but it was rather more of a creolization that what happened in the aformentioned region, with relatively less develloped structures that suffered from the gradual but quick withdrawal of the Roman army that ammounted to a collapse of Roman state for the island.

That alone wouldn't have been as destructuring, if the roman state didn't collapsed in the mainland as well : its destructuring effects were felt up to Scandinavia, which fragmented into smaller, impoverished and warlike entities which eventually pushed more North Sea peoples South and West, making it even destructuring for Britain.
The Saxon takeover took place in a situation where roman institutions and structures of a really divided Britain were either collapsing or significantly more weakened than in the mainland, so Saxons didn't as much ignored the current structures (as their kingdoms generally mirrored what existed before) that probably didn't encountered much of these (safe for Saxons from the southern shores, which were settled since the IIIrd centuries, and that might have joined up with local Brittons, such as for the emergence of Wessex).

I don't think it means Britto-Romans were doomed politically, but post-imperial structures were simply too weak and too unequally present IMO to support an unified state in the Vth century, while I could likely see the establishment of Britto-Roman (supported, rather than weakened with a good enough PoD, by Barbarians) decentralized ensembles. With time, it could evolve from something out of the chiefdom/complex chiefdom/state formation that, among other exemples, Anglo-Saxons kingdoms went trough and possibly earlier, eventually ending as one or two coherent polities. But I don't see it happening in the VIth or VIIth century myself.

As to the realism
I don't claim to be vested with perfect knowledge of the period, far from it, and I least try (do I really suceed is up to anyone but me point of view ;) ) to accept being wrong : but with all due respect, I find the "History is ASB so everything can happen" argument to be somehwat lazy and eventually preventing any discussion (as you said, the fun is trying how to manage to pull a TL within the constraints of realism).
Now it's my conception of non-ASB AH, so maybe we'll have to agree to disagree there.

I could certainly see a united Britain with a measure of good luck and half a dozen hundred years.
With such time length it could admittedlt goes in many different directions (my argumentation is mostly about forseeable and "predictable", or rather deductible, outcomes of some PoD(s). That said, with such time length, I don't think it would be considered as Roman, as we don't consider UK as an Anglo-Norman kingdom, so I must admit I'm not sure about this point.
 
Thing is, Barbarians were distinct more from a political point of view than cultural, even at the beggining (at least how they appeared as coherent peoples). The distinction grew out of it, especially in the late IVth and Vth century when Barbarian formed cohesive political entities within Romania, rather that the relatively scattered settlements of dedicatii.
You had, IMO, something dialectical at play there, with Barbarians not being really distinguishable from the provincial population they were influenced by much more they influenced them (setting the base for a stronger integration of second-wave settlements and takeovers); then a growing political distinction in the IVth/Vth centuries (while culturally, romanization continued to fully operate), and then a lesser political distinction as Barbarian took over the post-imperial institutions.

But again, the very real Barbarian influence was a romanized influence on a Roman population. The properly non-Roman influence does exist, but is really limited to fringes in most of western Romania, and took a certain time to really last.


Thing is, because the distinction is essentially political, you had several Romans, or long established dedicatii that joined up with Barbarians since the IIIrd century (or, arguably, as soon as they formed coherent peoples along the limes). In terms of material culture, the difference between settled Barbarians and Romans is not slight, it is virtually inexistent.


Most of distinct features appeared after Barbarians settled in Romania and weren't a remnant of non-Roman influence.

For what matter Franks, for exemple, a lot of what supposedly distinguished them from Romans are a later creations : fransciscae doesn't exist before the VIth century, the Salic Law is essentially a rebranded Roman law on Barbarians, the mythified history of Franks as written in the VIth/VIIth centuries is a mash-up of Aeneid and Exodus, the supposedly frankish tradition of shared kingship is absent in earlier centuries but essentially mirror Roman shared-imperium, "typical" Frankish clothing doesn't appear before the VIth...

To quote Bruno Dumézil, from the VIth onwards, with a provincial population more and more identifying itself as Frankish (for political, fiscal and prestige purposes), the differenciation is so impossible to do, that Gallo-Romans are playing Barbarians as some kids would be playing cowboys, fantasizing about their Barbarian identity from half-remembered stories, Tacitus and other latin writers, and inspiring themselves from populations that still existed within the Barbaricum, mixed with little romanized Barbarian features that survived the fall of the western Roman state.

And we're talking of a people that is considered having kept most (romanized) Barbarian features : it's even funnier with Goths. A slight analogy could be made (altough certainly not similar) with Hiberno-Americans rewriting their history (the stress on indentured servants, etc.), celtizing themselves in a manner that no XIXth Irishmen would have done, etc.

Fair enough. I'm not sure I have anything further to contribute on those points :)

Breaking-off the institutions would imply that these would at least cut themselves from each other, or from the institutional poles from which the new rulers wouldn't have control.
While we see a growing estrangement due to the collapse of the roman state, and the decline of structures that depended directly from it (altough it's far less obvious for Africa and Italy before Roman reconquest), you still had enough political and institutional continuity and exchanges between Barbarian kingdoms, Exarchates and the eastern Roman state, which wouldn't have happened if these polities really broke off, at least as it seems to be commonly defined.

I think I see where we differ on perspective. I do think that not only can an institution break off on its own accord, but be broken off (and slowly in both cases). I guess I'm using definition 2!

Thing is, Barbarians were distinct more from a political point of view than cultural, even at the beggining (at least how they appeared as coherent peoples). The distinction grew out of it, especially in the late IVth and Vth century when Barbarian formed cohesive political entities within Romania, rather that the relatively scattered settlements of dedicatii.
You had, IMO, something dialectical at play there, with Barbarians not being really distinguishable from the provincial population they were influenced by much more they influenced them (setting the base for a stronger integration of second-wave settlements and takeovers); then a growing political distinction in the IVth/Vth centuries (while culturally, romanization continued to fully operate), and then a lesser political distinction as Barbarian took over the post-imperial institutions.

But again, the very real Barbarian influence was a romanized influence on a Roman population. The properly non-Roman influence does exist, but is really limited to fringes in most of western Romania, and took a certain time to really last.

Thing is, because the distinction is essentially political, you had several Romans, or long established dedicatii that joined up with Barbarians since the IIIrd century (or, arguably, as soon as they formed coherent peoples along the limes). In terms of material culture, the difference between settled Barbarians and Romans is not slight, it is virtually inexistent.


Most of distinct features appeared after Barbarians settled in Romania and weren't a remnant of non-Roman influence.

For what matter Franks, for exemple, a lot of what supposedly distinguished them from Romans are a later creations : fransciscae doesn't exist before the VIth century, the Salic Law is essentially a rebranded Roman law on Barbarians, the mythified history of Franks as written in the VIth/VIIth centuries is a mash-up of Aeneid and Exodus, the supposedly frankish tradition of shared kingship is absent in earlier centuries but essentially mirror Roman shared-imperium, "typical" Frankish clothing doesn't appear before the VIth...

To quote Bruno Dumézil, from the VIth onwards, with a provincial population more and more identifying itself as Frankish (for political, fiscal and prestige purposes), the differenciation is so impossible to do, that Gallo-Romans are playing Barbarians as some kids would be playing cowboys, fantasizing about their Barbarian identity from half-remembered stories, Tacitus and other latin writers, and inspiring themselves from populations that still existed within the Barbaricum, mixed with little romanized Barbarian features that survived the fall of the western Roman state.

And we're talking of a people that is considered having kept most (romanized) Barbarian features : it's even funnier with Goths. A slight analogy could be made (altough certainly not similar) with Hiberno-Americans rewriting their history (the stress on indentured servants, etc.), celtizing themselves in a manner that no XIXth Irishmen would have done, etc.

It's a bit moot for what matter the Late Empire : Barbarian takeover didn't happened overnight, but was a slow take of control on key institutions (such as the military, which did included due to the times a territorial control over civil militia). With the fall of the western Roman state, it was less Barbarians taking advantage of the vaacum (altough they certainly did took advantage of the weakness of the roman state in the Vth century), than the logical consequences of the greater part Barbarians played in Roman state since the IVth (just look at the long list of Frankish-Romans generals in the west, possibly related to Merovingians).

But they didn't took over as a "dominant nation", but as a what remained of the western Roman state during and after its collapse. I wouldn't say replaced, because it wasn't made smoothly, but it's not the take over of an anachronical nation, or of a political faction whom networking would be somehow distinct from Roman institutions.

Fair enough. I'm not sure I have anything further to contribute on those points :)

I could be convinced otherwise, but I don't see a reasonable way for the early VIIth century exarchate to evolve as a Romano-Berber roughly unified state. It's not philosophical, tough, than trying to understand the historical situation, from what I could find as secondary sources.
If the forms it could take are innumerable, I'd be sincerely interested to know which practical forms you're thinking about.

I'll say no more than this on this thread - but beyond evolving from a network of alliances, my first instinct isn't much more than that. It'd probably need the equivalent of a Bismark/Lawrence of Arabia figure. (And significantly more research).

Roughly, a relatively imprevious organisation, that while evolving, can either self-sustain itself, or can be guaranteed its stable sustain.
For exemple, the democratic institution in America or France is relatively strong, while democratic institution in Belarus or Gabon is not. Or, for what matter Britain, the militia institution wasn't strong as it greatly declined if not collapsed as soon the Roman state disappeared from Britain while it survived elsewhere, if weakened.

Fair enough on the first part - I'm always cautious of describing something as strong vs weak based on the fact it broke down - as it suggests that before that point it wasn't - when on the group it certainly could have been for the day-to-day bloke on the street, however, a strong enough force came to break it, but I can respect the definition.

Don't forget that what defined a roman state wasn't just the self-perception (otherwise, we would be forced to consider the merovingian duchies of Aquitaine as "Roman states" which, obviously, makes little sense), but a political identity and relationship to roman institutions.
A Britton high-kingship, while including several roman or romanized features, would be a departure from roman institutions that were dependent on imperial sustain (notably trough military presence). Assuming that Brittons would define themselves as Romans as for their primary identity (which would already be a debatable assumption, as it seems they stuck to tribal/civitate identities, with the territory undergoing important break-ups of break-ups), while building-up on what remained of these.

The point is less to depict sub-Roman Britain as "unRoman", but to point that for all the cultural and sociel creolization that resulted from centuries of Roman rule, the imperial institutions simply didn't fared well without the military and administrative imperial presence : it's no wonder if the first Anglo-Saxon ensemble to emerge from the tribal mix-up of the VIth century were kingdoms in relation with Frankish courts and trade trough Gaul (Kent, East-Anglia, Wessex, mostly).

Eventually, it's not about needing institutions of significant strength to be considered as a "Roman state" : it's about the survival of these institutions (even if weakened) on the long run to allow a Roman identity to be maintained.
I was careless and should have included perceived by others, legal basis and continuity. All of which I think a Coeling Dux could well maintain.

It's rather complicated : the late Roman structures in Britain were certainly less present to begin with, compared to other western provinces and regions (exceptions made of places as the aformentioned Illyricum, altough northern Spain could easily count with the caveat it wasn't as much of a military region) with the attested survival of pre-Roman tribal identities at its rough periphery (Votodinii, Dumonii, Silures, etc.) that even with the best will in the world, I can't spot in Gaul or Spain.
Does that means that sub-Roman Britain wasn't romanized? No, but it was rather more of a creolization that what happened in the aformentioned region, with relatively less develloped structures that suffered from the gradual but quick withdrawal of the Roman army that ammounted to a collapse of Roman state for the island.

That alone wouldn't have been as destructuring, if the roman state didn't collapsed in the mainland as well : its destructuring effects were felt up to Scandinavia, which fragmented into smaller, impoverished and warlike entities which eventually pushed more North Sea peoples South and West, making it even destructuring for Britain.
The Saxon takeover took place in a situation where roman institutions and structures of a really divided Britain were either collapsing or significantly more weakened than in the mainland, so Saxons didn't as much ignored the current structures (as their kingdoms generally mirrored what existed before) that probably didn't encountered much of these (safe for Saxons from the southern shores, which were settled since the IIIrd centuries, and that might have joined up with local Brittons, such as for the emergence of Wessex).

I don't think it means Britto-Romans were doomed politically, but post-imperial structures were simply too weak and too unequally present IMO to support an unified state in the Vth century, while I could likely see the establishment of Britto-Roman (supported, rather than weakened with a good enough PoD, by Barbarians) decentralized ensembles. With time, it could evolve from something out of the chiefdom/complex chiefdom/state formation that, among other exemples, Anglo-Saxons kingdoms went trough and possibly earlier, eventually ending as one or two coherent polities. But I don't see it happening in the VIth or VIIth century myself.

Fair play :)

I don't claim to be vested with perfect knowledge of the period, far from it, and I least try (do I really suceed is up to anyone but me point of view ;) ) to accept being wrong : but with all due respect, I find the "History is ASB so everything can happen" argument to be somehwat lazy and eventually preventing any discussion (as you said, the fun is trying how to manage to pull a TL within the constraints of realism).
Now it's my conception of non-ASB AH, so maybe we'll have to agree to disagree there.

You find it prevents discussion? Bizarre. I find the opposite. I mainly use the argument to take the position that the nutty is worth discussing, rather than "let the nutty happen". Lazy madness is lazy and bad.

With such time length it could admittedlt goes in many different directions (my argumentation is mostly about forseeable and "predictable", or rather deductible, outcomes of some PoD(s). That said, with such time length, I don't think it would be considered as Roman, as we don't consider UK as an Anglo-Norman kingdom, so I must admit I'm not sure about this point.

I dunno, by and large the monarchy as an institution has persisted from that point, with those families. I think the House of Windsor may well make that argument. Then again, I could also state it isn't that saying that post-civil war it was an institution created/restored by Parliament.
 
I think I see where we differ on perspective. I do think that not only can an institution break off on its own accord, but be broken off (and slowly in both cases). I guess I'm using definition 2!
I don't know, a break-off that takes centuries to unfolds seems a bit off to me, but you know what I mean.

I'll say no more than this on this thread - but beyond evolving from a network of alliances, my first instinct isn't much more than that. It'd probably need the equivalent of a Bismark/Lawrence of Arabia figure. (And significantly more research).
Apart from the aformentioned study on Berber-Roman relations in Late Antiquity (freely avaible there), Abdallah Laroui is interesting enough, and of course the freely avaible UNESCO History of Africa (II and III), or this other study focusing on petty-kingdoms of Mauretania.

The main problem remains the aformentioned contraction and splintering of political power among the kingdoms : while it does have a rotative confederative aspect, it's essentially a matter of defense before a threat that might unify the various rulers, as Carthage (and a fortiori Constantinople) is unable to really have this role from the VIIth onwards, especially as the petty-kingdoms, themselves deprived from the possibility to advance and take the coast in the VIth century, formed themselves on the monopolization of regional power along the roman lines.
Now, it's true that some of the most important kings are considered as possible master of the aformentioned rotative confederation that could have included Algerian and Tunisian plateaux, announcing the later Berber dynasties : it's a fair point, but we must then pull the comparison completly, with how Berber entities never really managed to form a roughly unified state before Almoravids (and even there, it was still partly confederal for what matter Berbers), and how (for exemple) the Berber Revolt failed short to take Ifriqiya and collapsed into several small dynasties and tribes.

The irony is that without taking Africa, including the coast, Berbers probably won't be able to form a maintained confederacy and state, and that they needed to form a maintained confederacy to take Africa from either Arabs or Romans. Not that, with time, the aformentioned passage from cyclical chiefdoms to formative state wouldn't happen, or that opportunities wouldn't arise but by the VIIth, you can't have a strong Caliphate, or a stronger Byzantium (that would arise from a weakened Caliphate as you described) and a Berber takeover : the window of opportunity to have somethin akin to what happened in western Romania was aborted by Justinian reconquest, and we had a situation akin to Slavic entities within the eastern Roman periphery.

Outer Berbers eventually joined up relatively easily with Arabs, Inner Berbers were more interdependent with each others and on their relations to Romans but both didn't formed much more than largely independent but subordinated allies; as Slavic peoples either went with whoever managed to form strong imperial confederations, either with Romans.

Fair enough on the first part - I'm always cautious of describing something as strong vs weak based on the fact it broke down - as it suggests that before that point it wasn't - when on the group it certainly could have been for the day-to-day bloke on the street, however, a strong enough force came to break it, but I can respect the definition.
No, no : I agree with you there. Structures and institutions are evolving and almost always strong or weak relatively to something (if not both in the same time, in a dialectical relationship), and what appears as strong in a first perception due to clear success can appear as actually weak, as it was the case with Carolingian Empire. Not to say that the fact it broke down isn't a good indication, of course, but it generally indicates that (as in the same exemple) there was something wrong before it broke.
 
As we discussed the possibility of exarchates to became independent vicariates (for exemple, in a no-Islam TL), the possibility, if convoluted, of an Exarchate of Gaul should be mentioned : not something out Justinian reconquest for obvious geostrategical and logistical reasons, but out of the Maurician's policy in the western Mediterranean basin.

Constantinople seems to have favoured (trough financial support, essentially) Gondovald's revolt in 580's, locally supported by part of Roman nobility of the south of the Frankish kingdom-s whom they obtained the main part of military function (essentially nobles from Syagrii and Desiderii-Salvii families and clientship) and that turned against Chilperic (while largely ignoring, if not allied with, Childebert and Brunhilde from one hand, Gontran on the other). Tiberius and Mauricius went with it because it strengthened a policy of supporting Chalcedonian claimants in Spain, namely Ermenengild from one hand, and to put an end to a chaotic situation Gaul (mostly the threat of Merovingian extinction).

Long story short,
what happen next is a series of plot twists that would put the Twilight Zone to shame. The very same threat of extinction that legitimized Gundovald's claims led Chipleric to make Childebert his heir (which neutralize any threat). Then Chipleric sires a son, reversing alliances. Then Chilperic is murdered, reversing alliances. Then Gontran set himself against Childebert, reversing alliances more or less to the initial point, with an Austrasian-Gundovald alliance against Neustria. But Gondovald's success in Aquitaine threatens Childebert's own rule, distancing allies, and then Gontran declares Childebert his heir, reversing you know what.

While Gundovald's revolt failed, the southern Franko-Roman nobility prooved their capacity of revolt and political resilience (not that the revolt was a war between Franks and Romans, a good part of the army that defeated Gundovald was led by other Franko-Romans), and most of the important leaders escape an immediate retribution, or any retribution at all.
As Gontran wanted to make a political point in Constantinople, by sending Syagrius of Gap as an envoyee to the emperor (showing that revoltees were submitted), but it almost backfired.
Indeed, Mauricius titled Syagrius as patrician, and seems (at least to Jean Penent) to have tought about a more direct approach, possibly establishing something akin to an exarchate or at least a semi-exarchate within Frankish realm under the form of a super-patriciate.

If it's the case, it was barely an after-tought, giving that Gontran was right to assert his victory, being the main king in Gaul. But it wouldn't take much more than an untimely death (let's say that Gontran is murdered by Fredegund five years earlier than the historical, failed, attempt) to reverse the situation, and make Childebert a main ruler who may maintain his alliance with Romans and need their support against Clothar II (or rather, his mother and her clientele). While the royal faida may end quicker ITTL, you might end up with a semi-exarchate in southern Gaul (whom limits would be hard to define, but could include Syagrii-Desiderii-Salvii enlarged family and allies meaning possibly Provence up to Lyon, Aquitaine south of Dordogne river, and parts of Auvergne. Of course, not forming a whole bloc but interwebed with Childebert's fiscus) whom main benefit for Childebert would be to prevent Clothar II and Fredegund to take too much of Gontran's fiscus; and for Romans to prevent Goths to maintain a too hostile mediterranean policy.

With another PoD allowing a quicker end to Romano-Persian wars in the late VIIth century, and with no or significantly weaker Islam, we could see the patriciate in Gaul being more or less maintained as a Franko-Roman condominium for some time. It's a bit complex (understanding VIIth century Gaul requires some dedication) and depends on a multi-PoD timeline, but it would be an interesting and certainly overlooked allohistorical situation.
 
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