Roman Empire split in three, instead of two?

It's going to end in bloodshed if all 3 of them are on equal footing. Every time. So the answer is then, as someone said, one senior Augustus, and 2 junior Caesar's. To provide an example of what I am talking about, let me use Diocletian's tetrarchy system:

Diocletian retires as per OTL. Rather than have Maximian retire with him, he stipulates Maximian is now the senior Augustus, and is to retire in 10 years. Galerius is raised to junior Augustus. All 3 emperors + Diocletian agree on Galerius's successor as junior Caesar. When Maximian retires, Galerius moves his base to Italy and becomes the senior Augustus, with Constantius Chlorus being appointed junior Augustus, moving his base to Nicomedia. Galerius's successor becomes senior Caesar and moves to Gaul (to replace Constantius), and everyone agrees on a successor to Constantius as junior Caesar.

So it works like this: Every 10 years, the emperors alternate power bases. So the junior most Caesar starts in the Balkans. In 10 years, he becomes the senior Caesar, and moves to Gaul. 10 years from then, he comes the junior Augustus and moves to the east, and 10 years from then, he comes the senior Augustus and moves to Italy.

This, I feel, is the best way to do it. You can of course customize it for a 3 way split, but the basic principles apply. The idea is to always have a senior Augustus who's been Augustus for awhile to always be in place-not having 2 Augustus's retire at the same time and thus opening up a power vacuum like Diocletian did. This allows for there to be a clear top dog. The alternating of bases every 10 years as well, helps to prevent any one person from developing a strong power base and base of support.

This isn't perfect by any means. But if you can keep it in place for, say, 2 generations at least before a civil war, then I think it can be institutionalized to the point where it becomes the de facto state.

This is again a well thought model. I also see 4 emperors not 3, because you got 4 major fronts (Germania, Pannonia, Moesia, Syria) and some minor ones (Britannia, Africa, Egypt, ...). The minor commands could be perhaps a training ground for candidates.

I also agree, that it was a big mistake, that Diocletian enforced Maximian to retire with him. However, it is a miracle, that the tetrarchy worked at all. Perhaps because Maximian and Diocletian have been friends, or at least good guys or rational guys, like Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Verus. Imagine Septimus Severus introduces this model with Caracalla and Geta behind him. You know how this story ended.

And I see some more issues:

1. a roman officer in the 2nd/3rd century was usually 30 years old, when he became an officer of equestrian rank (prefect, tribune, ...). Regardless, if he started as centurio ex equite romano (about 10 years to become primipulus) or if he started as prefect after a civil career (duumvir). Afterwards you need at least about another 10 years to call this guy an experienced officer able to lead an army. Well, 45 to 50 years old would be even better, if it comes to experience.

That means, if the junior Caesar is choosen from the most experienced commanders, he is at least 40 years old. I am not mentioning guys from senatorial rank, because they had near to null military experience, when they became a commander as legatus legionis; also about the age of 30. Finally, we should not forget officers ex caliga, which are usually even 15 years older.

So your junior Caesar is about 40 years old and needs another 40 years (4 x 10) until he goes to retirement at the age of 80. That means, most emperors will die during their career, which of course accelerates the career of all. But it would perhaps better to change positions all 5 years. If not some guys might become dangerously impatient, if one Augustus really gets that old.

2. What happens, if the senior Augustus does not want to go to retirement? You know, he commands the central field army, which should be the strongest.

3, What happens if one emperor shows incompetence? Some guys are not as good as they looked like, when they have been appointed. Others change after illness, or suffering from dementia or other diseases, which reduces their performance. Or they become that greedy and corrupt, that they have to be replaced. But how to replace or accuse somebody, who commands a regional field army?

3. What happens, if some emperor starts a conspiration to murder a higher one, in order to progress faster? As long as this does not become obvious, it is no problem. But if. Or if just enough rumours are spread.

4. What happens, if an Augustus wants his son as junior Caesar and the 2 others disagree? If the name of this guy is Constantine, I see trouble ahead.

5. How do you avoid, that a rather unexperienced son becomes junior Caesar? If he fails, he usually gets murdered by the legions and the legions appoint someone by themselves.

6. Looking to the travelling times in the roman world, do you really believe, that the 3 emperors can meet in time, whenever a new junior Caesar has to be appointed?

My questions don't mean, that I disagree to your model. Actually a rotation model, where the high military commanders become always promoted automatically, until they reach the top with a high age sounds pretty good. This model sounds more stable than any other.

That was exactly one major problem of the republic. You first became consul, and then military commander. And afterwards just senator again. Waiting another 10 years to get a chance to become consul again. That was exactly the wrong order. At least for guys like Julius Caesar and others.
 
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I agree, there's a lot of kinks that need to be worked out and you brought up some legitimate points. I've flirted with the idea of perhaps Diocletian coming to the realization that emperors with children are just bad trouble. Perhaps Maximian dies early and his son is briefly declared emperor before Diocletian deals with it (before the tetrarchy preferably). Diocletian adjusts his plans to make sure none of those chosen have sons (or, preferably, won't have sons in the future either). If this can, by sheer luck perhaps, last for another round of Caesar's and Augusti, then at least the framework "2 Caesar's, 2 Augusti", should be entrenched enough to become the de facto state (even after civil wars).
 
I agree, there's a lot of kinks that need to be worked out and you brought up some legitimate points. I've flirted with the idea of perhaps Diocletian coming to the realization that emperors with children are just bad trouble. Perhaps Maximian dies early and his son is briefly declared emperor before Diocletian deals with it (before the tetrarchy preferably). Diocletian adjusts his plans to make sure none of those chosen have sons (or, preferably, won't have sons in the future either). If this can, by sheer luck perhaps, last for another round of Caesar's and Augusti, then at least the framework "2 Caesar's, 2 Augusti", should be entrenched enough to become the de facto state (even after civil wars).

Well, in the long run, you can't avoid that high commanders have sons or exclude good commanders with sons from the rotation. That would just be another reason for usurpation.

But I agree, that it would help to establish this model in the roman mindset and especially in the mindset of the roman soldiers. If just Nerva would have had this idea! There was a lucky century afterwards with childless emperors. Hadrian did something similar, when he not just appointed Antoninus as succesor but also Lucius Verus as the next succesor. It is still a miracle that Antoninus managed to promote Marcus Aurelius afterwards without a civil war.

Sons should have a chance, but just if they showed their performance in a rather normal military career. And they have to compete with others. Unfortunatly in the roman world sons usually became heavily promoted. They advanced way too fast (e.g. Germanicus). And the roman soldiers favour the dynastic model. This is a core of the roman mindset coming from the old patron-client relationship.

I also like to mention, that a military reform helps. You need a career model which leads to experienced and capable commanders at the age of 40. Especially for the senatorial career that was not given. Unfortunately senators and their sons hated to dedicate their life to a military career, except the few vires militaris like Agricola and others.

I also like to mention, that a good military career alone is the wrong way. These pure militarians like Diocletian were often lousy civil administrators. Especially if they ignored their civil advisers. Diocletian tried to organize the empire like a legion. And that was more than one nail into the coffin of the empire. Even if some of his measures were great and badly needed in order to stop the crisis. So the combined military and civil career and education of the principate is an asset to keep. And all this has to be done in a career not longer than 20-30 years, in order to "breed" capable emperors. If you start with such a more intense career model in the 1st or 2nd century, you would get a lot of resistance from the aristocrats.
 
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How can we rationalize Diocletian enacting such reforms? What would have to get him to change his mindset, similar to how a minor incident with Maximian and his son could convince him to revise his criteria for choosing his co-emperors?
 
Diocletian is way too late, if your goal is, to rescue the roman empire, falling 200 years later. I am a believer of structures and processes, and some of them are longterm and led to the Fall of Rome. Beside the shock, Peter Heather described. But I disagree with Heather, that it was only the shock initated by the Huns, and nothing else. Diocletian did his very best. But he was a child of the crisis, thinking in urgent military needs based on the experiences of his precedessors. Perhaps mainly Gallienus and Aurelianus. And Diocletian did exeptionally good. He stopped the crisis!

I am conviced, that you have to start to rescue the empire before the crisis, while all these romans were sleeping and dreaming the dream of an enternal empire. Even if it was pretty obvious from our modern point of view, that this Titanic was approaching the iceberg. The problem for every author of a plausible alternate history starting in these times is: why the hell, the romans or an emperor should get the idea to adopt the right measures and change processes massively? By accident is a good approach. But you need damn plausible accidents, and a lot of them.

So every reasonable TL has to start anywhere between Augustus and Severus, imho. The earlier the better. Well one of my ideas is to start with the provincialisation of Sicilia after the first Punic War, because I see, that here one major longterm detrimental process started: the roman way of province administration without any division or restriction of powers :)

Worst case for a follower of the "Structure-Theory", if it comes to the Fall of Rome, is of course, if you blame the roman mindset alone for the Fall of Rome. Actually the roman mindset is a major reason for the Fall of Rome. But in this case you have to avoid that Romulus kills Remus. Which is rather nuts, is'nt it?
 
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