There is nothing odd in that.
I never said it was odd, my point was to say that the "byzantinisation" of coins in the West wasn't a proof of cultural or political domination.
It was a current use by Romano-German kingdoms to melt byzantine monetary to coin their own, critically since the end of VIth century while it was used as such before.
It could be interesting to make a comparison with the Romano-Persian Wars happening in the same time, critically when some local coinage (Essentialy provencal) actually use byzantine features that disappeared from contemporary byzantine coins (but present in Italian coins of the previous century).
Not that you have a disengagement of byzantine coinage in western Europe, but they happen to be found mostly on peripherical aeras or outside Romano-German kingdoms (Rhine, Frisia, England for gold coins; while cooper coins are more easily found along trade roads : Septimania/Aquitaine, Rhone-Seine/Loire)
Rather than a brutal collapse of Byzantine monetary presence, you probably have a more smooth evolution, adapting to a wake of "nationalisation" of romano-germanic or germanic entities (Interestingly happening in the same time the fuse of population was important enough for that the ethnic name became the name for all elites) that if still respectful of byzantine models in a first time, introduce an affirmation of local models (rather than regnal features, more or less absent).
You pointed out the "byzantine-looking" aspect of Gallic (but that can be said as well for Italian or Hispanic coinage) was "telling" as for Byzantine domination.
The fact that they were increasingly different, while Byzantine coinage still was used along trade roads points out a different genre of domination more economical than cultural (even if, of couse, it wasn't absent) as Arabo-Islamic coinage was used in Carolingian Europe (use of silver coins to coins denarii, presence of Arabo-Islamic coins along trade roads).
While true, this has little bearing on the assertion that 602 - 751 was the critical transition period for the Empire. Still, trade routes continued to follow Late Roman patterns for some time due to inertia, however there was a marked decline in the amount of trade going on.
To give you an idea, the Lombards still minted gold coins, but the Carolingian's prized currency was silver. The Carolingian Empire had disconnected from the reduced, but still partially cash-based economy of Constantinople. There was a lot more bartering going on.
I think there might be a confusion there.
Carolingians did established a standardization of denerii, but silver-based coinage was established in Francia around 675, gold coins not disappearing (Carolingians still minting solidii).
Not that it prevented Late Merovingians, Peppinids or Carolingians to coin
gold money, of course.
Italy is different on this but not radically : Lombards kings did issued a silver coinage (siliquae).I'll give you that it was a bi-mettalism that, at the contrary of Meorvingian gold coins (that had only a small metal ratio), maintained a strong solidus.
But that's, as I mentioned above, a point towards the maintain of Late Roman trade roads in Italy, and the absence of a radical rupture between Italy and Constantinople even as the Exarchate was disappearing.
There's again, you have a more gradual change rather than a radical rupture : silver currency existed earlier in Francia, but rather than local, it was issued from AS and critically Frisian coinage (sceattas).
As for barter, I would disagree with you : the decline of Merovingian mintage up to later VIIth century most probably provoked that, but the monetary influx of Arabo-Islamic coinage re-used into denarii highlight a renew of trade exchanges in a silver-based economy (both with Arabo-Muslims, but as well towards North Europe).
If something, we see the stregthening of a monetary trade in Carolingia.
In fact, it's difficult to see exactly what it is we are disagreeing on here.
I think we misunderstood each other there : my point is that while they did were part of Post-Classical Roman culture (would it be only because they ruled over hugely romanized aeras), you had an important resistance towards Eastern Roman influence that didn't get really resolved before the Byzantine abandon of Spania (It's quite telling that Arianism, a strong identity marker among Germans, to distinguish themselves from Roman elites, even if it was doomed to disappear sooner or later, was maintained for more long than in any other romano-germanic kingdom).
What I'm positing is a bit more nuanced. When Constantine refounded Byzantium as his capital, he was ending a process that had begun in 212 by Caracalla, who pronounced all free peoples in the empire to be citizens. Rome had become a nation, not a city. The "Byzantine" Empire was, ironically, the reverse process, the Empire slowly becoming a city.
On that, I think we both agree.
Rather, it means that as regions were, one-by-one, cast off from central authority or conquered by others, they were slowly withdrawn from the influence of that central (and still evolving) Roman culture.
But that's where we may disagree (if I didn't misunderstood) : that the imperial roman culture survived in ERE, is a thing.
But while Constantinople was the main center of romanity, it was far from being the only one : "romanisation" of Romano-Germanic kingdoms owes as much if not more, to a provincial romanity issued from the same legacy than imperial one.
More Gallo-Roman, Hispano-Roman, etc. elites took an important role on these and up to the fusion of populations (that wasn't one-sided, I'll give you that : while Franks designated as well Franks and Gallo-Romans since the late VIth century; Aquitains still called themselves Romans including Vascon or Germanic elements. Not that it prevented multual influence)
Using the Aquitain exemple (I know I keep using sources that are probably not translated, you'll excuse me for that, as there's the ones I've a more easy access), Michel Rouche pointed out that the division of the region among Frankish sub-kingdoms came from a necessity to each Frankish ruler to have access not only to ressources of a rich province, but as well as a "fish tank" for managers.
Not that these romans elites didn't had relations with Byzantines (as for the half-assed Mauricius' probable tentative to set up an "exarchate-like" presence in Southern Gaul with the support of Syagrii and Desiderii-Salvi) but even before 602 and a political disengagement, they tended to be more prone to cooperate if not merge with German elite, forming an original romanity (that, I agree, as for its multipolar nature, was distinct enough from Imperial ERE culture. Interestingly, it would make Western Post-Classical Romanity closer to the Late Classical model you described)
602-751 was the process by which that centralized culture had changed so much that the cast-off regions, if you will, were no longer similar enough to be thought of as the same.
I understand your point, but I wouldn't agree. For my point-of-view, it's rather the beggining of a process that would definitely end only two centuries later.
It's not a that important deal or even disagreement, so I suggest we agree to disagree there.
By the time the Pope crowned Charlemagne, it was too late. Too much of Rome had gone and, in any event, the differences between East and West were too great.
But even Charlemagne didn't considered himself as a "Roman Emperor". Not only that Romans, for Early Carolingians had a different meaning (Either Aquitains, Italians or Byzantines), but about the relativly bad reputation Romans had (it's roughly at this time you see appear the prototype of Frankish origin tales, in a attraction/repulsion mode to Roman uses, using them to create a distinct and opposite Frankish historiography).
The titulature he used was "Emperor reigning over the Roman Empire", a bit strange denomination, but understable regarding his goals : being an Emperor at the likeness of Byzantine Empire (whom he claimed the translation), claiming the overlordship over an imperial entity but not claiming being roman himself (In Carolingian solidii, by exemple, even after the coronation, Charlemagne is still depicted as "Kings of Franks and Lombards" rather than emperor*)
*It could be an interesting lecture about Theodoric choices : maybe as much than a respect for romans uses and conceptions, his power came from his "national" kingship over Goths. Rejecting it for the purple would have made him loosing a fair deal of legitimacy for a title that wouldn't have owed him much support from Italo-Roman or Hispano-Roman elite (and could have actually pissed them).
On this regard, the distinction isn't fudamentally distinct than Charlemagne's.
Louis I's situation is really distinct, on the other hand : raised among Romans (Aquitains) depsite actual orders from Charlemagne explicitly asking that his son doesn't become akin to the people he ruled over, and among a clergy full of hopes regarding a restauration of the empire, he was certainly more prone to consider himself as a Roman Emperor (and the Byzantine or pseudo-Byzantine influence at this point became more important).
The Visigoths were already subsumed into Hispano-Roman culture by the time the Arabs completed the process. Rather more of them survives, in a number of Spanish personal and place names, but they were eliminated as well.
I disagree there, about Francia being the only exemple : I'd point out the presence of a gothic nobility in southern France up to the XIth century (where it became undistinguishable from Medieval Occitan) including in the territories taken over by Franks in the VIth century (Wulfarius of Albi, in early IXth century by exemple).
Gothia itself is an exemple, in the former visigothic province of Gaul, of a fusion of population quite achieved (and, admittedly, distinct from Hispanic one, as highlighted by the regular sub-kingdoms, when not outright tentatives of secession).
Even in Hispania, we have clear traces of such fusion that not only remained in place in North-Western Visigothic successor states, but as well present in the VIth century.
In the succeeding Asturian (718–910) and Leonese (910–1037) king-
doms in the north, there is only one context in which the word Romanus appears. In a number of documents of manumission from these centuries, the freed slave is invested with Roman citizenship, thus allowing him to own property, marry freely, and give legal
testimony. In part this was antiquarian.
There are other similarfeatures, such as anachronistic references to the Lex Aquila, in the
notarial practices of this time, but it is also testimony to the fact that “Roman-ness” was seen, as under the empire, as a form of legal status and not as an ethnic determinant.
These texts also closely follow the text of documents of manumission of the Visigothic
period. No practical examples of the latter survive, but a number of model forms are preserved in a collection of notarial formulae put together in the Asturian kingdom from a range of Visigothicexamples, some at least of which came from Córdoba.
These again would seem to imply that “Roman citizenship” was regarded in the late Visigothic kingdom as a category of status, rather than as a form of ethnicity.
Visigothic kings were said to rule over one people and one motherland, called "Patria Gothorum" (7th Council of Toledo), highlighting a similar process than in Francia, delayed partially because of Byzantine presence in Spain.
No, not really. The Rashidun Caliphate was most friendly toward the Empire, in so far as Arabs could be said to be friendly.
I think we disagree there : being friendly to Roman legacy is distinct from being friendly towards the Roman Empire, as this one didn't had the monopole of Roman culture (would it be only because Arabs took over province with their own conception and variant of Post-Classical Romanity).
The roman legacy over Umayyads and their wali (critically in Africa and West, where they enjoyed much autonomy) lasted a good time, in matter of institutional (military, palatial, and cultural (architecture) legacy.
Granted, it's further than Rashidun Caliphate, for the good reason these had no imperial tradition to speak of : they simply used
If authority in Italy had been maintained, it is likely more popes would have found themselves languishing in the Crimea. Sure, it wasn't likely to extend much temporal authority over Frankish kings, but the cultural influence would have continued, at least.
But the imperial authority in Italy wasn't exactly to be maintained : it was to be restored. The popes and the roman dukes began quite quickly to issue their own coingage (issued from Byzantine, but without mention of the emperor, something you didn't had even in Provence).
Constantinople can try to hold with monothelism as much they want, and put popes in Crimea, it wouldn't change that they wouldn't have been able to impose it because nobody really wanted it apart the emperors.
At best, you'll end with another East-West divide caused by monothelism instead of filioque.
At worst, you'll end with an even more humiliating abandon of monothelism by the emperors.
Typical politics for the Empire.
It's my point : the dominance of the emperors over their peripherical provinces, and under papacy is far from being a crushing one.
It would have been interesting to know what would have happened if the Arabs hadn't shown up. It is likely you would have seen a Southern and Western Empire, eventually, replacing the Exarchates.
I'm not sure : Exarch revolts were usually made by claimant of the imperial title rather than "independentist" tentatives. It could be more akin to the "Gallic" Empire, a Roman Empire without "Rome"-Constantinople and eventually crushed on (either by Byzantines or neighbours).
The Ottonian Dynasty was fascinating. It teases the historian with the possibility that, perhaps, East-West reapproachment was possible. It ultimately failed, but if a century or so could have been shaved off from the period of low communication between East and West... well this is an Alternate History forum. Someone ought to write that scenario out.
I think it was definitely too late. Long story short, Ottonian reforms were ultimatly rejected as not only being foreign-inspired (look at what Theophano had to fight, or about how she was pictured), but threatening to change german-imperial kingship, favouring the intervention of german nobility, to an imperial authority that nobody really wanted to begin with.
At this point, East and West are too much estrangered.
Now, it did vanish in the West. Keep in mind, steam technology was known to the Greeks, and it vanished too.
That's another cliché on this regard : the perception of technology and immediate applications is a modern one. Greeks themselves tought them less as applications than demonstration of their theories.
When even contemporaries saw it more as a toy than a possible practical application, it wasn't likely that someone would by just looking at it, have a stroke of genius.
As you say, nobody used it, and if it was copied by monks preserving earlier works, it was not utilized. It was entirely theoretical.
And then can't be seriously considered as lost : there was knowledge of such, there were application of such in medieval Italy. That the know-how was lost, with a lack of transmission is another thing.
You see, a technology is more than a formula (and even that was lost, only the general gist of thing was preserved), it is engineering and practical application.
I agree, but it would necessit for using a technology that
1) There was a need for this (And the construction of monumental buildings wasn't exactly on the agenda)
2) There's the ressources for this. The fact pozzolane is a volcanic ressource, something that is more easily found in Italy than other former western Roman regions, didn't helped much.
As long you had a centralized administration to deal with opus caementicium ressources and cost, it wasn't really a challenge (while the massive part of such constructions were still found in Italy). With its disappearance, it joined up with roman brick in disuse (while the latter was re-used after the VIIth century, mostly because ressources were directly avaible).
Would ERE maintained its grasp on Italy and other sources, it would may had an impact on it.
That's Gibbon's view, and I think it's missing something important.
You misunderstood me : I didn't said Christianity caused the decline, but that it provided a new context for the Imperial Romanity.
In a state of almost permanant crisis for the ERE, it eventually provided a way for Roman elites and authority to translate itself in a declining city where building new urban monuments was irrelevant.[/QUOTE]
Even so, I suspect it could have weathered it, much like China had its ups and downs, if it hadn't been for the bad timing of the Arabs. The Arabs broke the unified meta-culture of the Mediterranean and shattered the possibility of a Roman resurgence.
This meta-culture and economical contiuum was already shattering, partially due to the consequences of Roman-Persian wars from a hand, and the constitution of relativly strong entities in the West from another.
At this point, the development of West/North trade roads, and the growing importance of Romano-Germanic kingdoms (once fusion of population achieved) was more or less a given, Arabic Conquests quickening it. (In fact, without AI presence and subsequent crisis, Viking raids may be lowered if not butterflied, giving Western realms a better chance)
A roman resurgence is possible in TTL (Clientelisation of Lombards being very much probable, while costly), but would still be, due to both its size and ambitions, prone to several crisis (Arabs to begin with : even without Islam, they would have represented an important threat; Steppe peoples, Slavs, without mentioning inner crisis) and, IMHO, unable to fully impose itself as it did during the V/VIth centuries, at least in a "forseeable" TL (I won't bet on anything past the first or two centuries past such an enormous PoD, would it be only because it butterfly several events)