ROCN Submarine WI

[La Rouge Beret]

Prior to the Japanese successfully lobbying to end Sino - German cooperation there was talk of providing several submarines to the Nationalist Chinese Navy. Now my thoughts are on the face of it, that when the Sino Japanese War commences a small number of probably coastal submarines will not have a massive impact and maintaining their serviceability will be a tremendously difficult.

However my question stems from if the Chinese are able to engage several IJN ships or Japanese flagged shipping and has a similar 'success' rate as the Kreigsmarine at the commencement of WW 2. Will this lead to the KM changing or modifying their torpedoes earlier, and would there be sufficient data for this assessment to be made?

Alternatively, if the submarine arm is successful would this lead the IJN to introduce convoys prior to the Pacific campaign?

 

[Daewonsu]

Alternatively, if the submarine arm is successful would this lead the IJN to introduce convoys prior to the Pacific campaign?

With what? The docks were already running at full capacity building regular warships. There would be no room for working on something related to such insignificant (to the Japanese military) issues such as logistics. If anything this would only make Japan realize it wouldn't be able to fight the US on any terms and not go through the Pacific War.

 

[GarethC]

It might cause the IJA to introduce convoys, anyway.

 

[Sharunaku]

IJA would take all Chinese ports earlier than OTL, which they had done by late 1938. Same principle as in the previous war with Qing - your navy is done when your ports are taken.

 

[thaddeus]

think the problems with operating u-boats have been outlined once war had started however ...

Germany did equip China with one plane that reportedly attacked Japanese ships with some success HS-123 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Henschel_Hs_123

what if their cooperation had continued, a plane likely to be sold to them DID carry torpedoes FI-167 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fieseler_Fi_167

(have it in mind that S-boats were also ordered but not delivered? and of course they carried torpedoes as well)

so very plausible torpedo issues could be sorted out prior to war in Europe.

 

[Tallil2long]

My guesstimate is that serviceability rates would be poor, sorties infrequent, and likelihood of high scores negligible due to lack of training and subs being a new phenomenon for the Chinese navy (thorough maintenance and training didn't seem to be a strong suit in the Chinese navy of the period). It's probable that too little damage is inflicted to force the IJN to reevaluate its take on convoy and ASW.

Now, if the Chinese could score one or two really impressive, lucky high-profile kills, the IJN might start taking the first steps toward upgrading their ASW. But the Chinese effort can't be of any great scope or duration, so I doubt we'd see the IJN making any profound changes.

 

[Dathi THorfinnsson]

My guesstimate is that serviceability rates would be poor, sorties infrequent, and likelihood of high scores negligible due to lack of training and subs being a new phenomenon for the Chinese navy (thorough maintenance and training didn't seem to be a strong suit in the Chinese navy of the period). It's probable that too little damage is inflicted to force the IJN to reevaluate its take on convoy and ASW.

Now, if the Chinese could score one or two really impressive, lucky high-profile kills, the IJN might start taking the first steps toward upgrading their ASW. But the Chinese effort can't be of any great scope or duration, so I doubt we'd see the IJN making any profound changes.

Ya. The probable ineffectiveness of the Chinese subs might make the Japanese MORE complacent about sub threats.

 

[La Rouge Beret]

My guesstimate is that serviceability rates would be poor, sorties infrequent, and likelihood of high scores negligible due to lack of training and subs being a new phenomenon for the Chinese navy (thorough maintenance and training didn't seem to be a strong suit in the Chinese navy of the period). It's probable that too little damage is inflicted to force the IJN to reevaluate its take on convoy and ASW.

Now, if the Chinese could score one or two really impressive, lucky high-profile kills, the IJN might start taking the first steps toward upgrading their ASW. But the Chinese effort can't be of any great scope or duration, so I doubt we'd see the IJN making any profound changes.

This dovetails into my thoughts about the difficulty faced by Nationalist China and one of the only ways that I could see the ROCN submarines being effective would be for at least one boat to be crewed by international volunteers. This is before we even consider the logistical chain inclusive of training that is required to support the nascent submarine flotilla.

Hypothetically we could always see an order for Type II submarines in 1933 / 1934, but the problem would also be could China afford it and what would prompt it?

 

[La Rouge Beret]

Ya. The probable ineffectiveness of the Chinese subs might make the Japanese MORE complacent about sub threats.

Good point you never know how this could conceivably play out.

 

[Tallil2long]

This dovetails into my thoughts about the difficulty faced by Nationalist China and one of the only ways that I could see the ROCN submarines being effective would be for at least one boat to be crewed by international volunteers. This is before we even consider the logistical chain inclusive of training that is required to support the nascent submarine flotilla.

Hypothetically we could always see an order for Type II submarines in 1933 / 1934, but the problem would also be could China afford it and what would prompt it?

Some highly-motivated and well-trained crews could make a difference. Yet they'd still have to cope with not-so-efficient Chinese logistical support, so I suspect their sortie rate would still be low. Unless we went all the way to creating a sort of undersea Flying Tigers; it seems harder to do that with subs than with airplanes, though. And I'm not sure how large a pool of experienced, unemployed submariners existed, versus pilots. Still, volunteer and "volunteer" formations were used in both China and in the Spanish Civil War, so it might be plausible. Particularly if the U.S. or some other nation decided to unofficially sponsor and support them, in pursuance of that nation's policy with regard to China.

Edit: as Sharunaku pointed out, though, the duration of the effort will likely be limited by the Japanese seizing their usable ports once the nuisance reaches suitable proportions.

 

[Richard V]

American submarines actually did as much damage laying mines as actively hunting ships with torpedoes. Submarines would wait for mine clearing operations to finish and lay them again where the enemy thought is now safe. Mine laying was also far easier and safer to do. If you have a not so well trained submarine force this would be the way to go to war.

 

[La Rouge Beret]

That's a very good point and that might prove the point of distinction, until the Chinese crews are trained up they concentrate on mine laying. As opposed to the 'Western' crews who concentrate on merchant shipping.

As for the 'Western' crew my thoughts were they could remain German or perhaps Dutch.

 

[Tallil2long]

How about this?

The U.S. (or somebody else, if another plausible candidate exists) decides it doesn't want the Japanese to dominate China. This nation helps the Chinese buy a few good subs, then encourages some of its own former submariners to form a volunteer group to crew them. It also provides, through semi-deniable channels, much of the logistical and maintenance support.

This volunteer group exploits the well-known IJN laxity towards ASW to score some high-profile successes; perhaps they sink a cruiser, put a torp into a carrier, and cause a short-term logistical crisis by really brutalizing a couple of convoys.

The Japanese respond by launching an effort to capture the usable ports, which fairly swiftly drives the volunteers out of business. In the meantime, though, they've realized that they have to take ASW more seriously. They shift some construction capacity to making cheap escorts (they'll have to give something else up in order to do this) and commence a crash course of improving their ASW weapons and updating their techniques.

Not sure how plausible it would be for another nation to commit so much to creating and supporting a volunteer sub squadron, particularly as it can only damage their relations with Japan.

Perhaps some knowledgeable people can weigh in on this aspect?

 

[Tallil2long]

That's a very good point and that might prove the point of distinction, until the Chinese crews are trained up they concentrate on mine laying. As opposed to the 'Western' crews who concentrate on merchant shipping.

As for the 'Western' crew my thoughts were they could remain German or perhaps Dutch.

I'd think the Dutch would try to prevent any of their citizens getting involved in such a thing, lest it create Japanese ire towards them (which they could ill afford, given how vulnerable the NEI is).

Perhaps German crews, unofficially supported by the U.S. government? The nationality of the crews helps conceal the true extent of U.S. involvement.

 

[Richard V]

Well it can't be anyone with interests in Asia the Japanese could threaten. So the British, French, Dutch are out. The Americans and Soviets are the most likely candidates, possibly Italians, though I can't see what would be in it for them.

 

[Tallil2long]

Maybe I'm over-complicating this.

If sufficient high-profile successes could plausibly be caused in just a handful of sorties, then the advisors sent to train the Chinese crews might achieve them. Lots of instances OTL of military advisors flying missions themselves.

That would require far less commitment than would the provision of an entire volunteer sub force. And if the successes are dramatic enough, could convince the Japanese to rethink their ASW while not requiring all that many sorties, which avoids the logistical sustainability and serviceability problem.

 

[La Rouge Beret]

Well it can't be anyone with interests in Asia the Japanese could threaten. So the British, French, Dutch are out. The Americans and Soviets are the most likely candidates, possibly Italians, though I can't see what would be in it for them.

The Italians in OTL did export military equipment (predominantly aircraft) to China and it would not be unreasonable for submarines to be included.

Maybe I'm over-complicating this.

If sufficient high-profile successes could plausibly be caused in just a handful of sorties, then the advisors sent to train the Chinese crews might achieve them. Lots of instances OTL of military advisors flying missions themselves.

That would require far less commitment than would the provision of an entire volunteer sub force. And if the successes are dramatic enough, could convince the Japanese to rethink their ASW while not requiring all that many sorties, which avoids the logistical sustainability and serviceability problem.

This could be a reasonable idea / suggestion, and could work for a niche platform. However, considering the complexity of a submarine and the logistical tail... we might see 1 - 3 submarines supported in this manner. Alternatively, if the US wanted to rival the AVG perhaps they could source ethnic Chinese within the US for submarine service?