Robert E. Lee stays home

That was more than just a failure of judgement. AS Johnston did not fail as commander of the Army of Mississippi; he failed to be the commander of the Army of Mississippi.

And not just at Shiloh.

He acted essentially as a district commander in late 1861, for example.

Getting caught up in stuff around Bowling Green and neglecting what his subordinates weren't doing elsewhere is a bad combination - and beyond mere inexperience.

Peter Principle in action.
 
And I should note that Davis didn't like Johnston much because Johnston sent him a passionate but ill-judged letter complaining about being ranked behind Cooper, Sidney Johnston and Lee...

And Davis sent a nastygram back, ensuring that Johnston wouldn't like him. Lincoln would have ignored Johnston's letter.

...was reluctant to share his plans or intentions with Davis after one of Davis's cabinet members leaked information previously to his wife and all of Richmond's society circles...

Understandably.

Fact is, Davis and Joe Johnston had enough trouble getting along with each other in OTL even without Lee's influence, so removing Lee completely wouldn't change that at all.

AFAIK, Lee had nothing against Johnston, and probably did his best to smooth over differences between them at this time.
 
They also had numerous incapable generals - Polk, Floyd, Pillow, etc.

Polk gets a lot of negative ratings, but I don't think it's fair to compare him to two completely useless gits.

He was a division and corps commander for three years, and his superiors and colleagues seemed to think he was acceptable. Nor do I see any occasion when he seriously screwed the pooch.


Hmm. The Union got rid of a fair number of division, corps, and independent army commanders. In the AotP, Porter, Keyes, Franklin, Heintzelman, Couch, Sykes, Warren, and Sigel were all sacked. The CSA doesn't seem to have replaced so many.
 
He was a division and corps commander for three years, and his superiors and colleagues seemed to think he was acceptable. Nor do I see any occasion when he seriously screwed the pooch.

Davis and Sidney Johnston might have thought he was acceptable, Bragg - who had to deal with his insubordination and troublemaking (so did Sidney, but Sidney seems to have been clueless) - sure didn't.

As for seriously screwing the pooch: The Kentucky campaign, by not keeping Bragg informed of either what he was doing or what he thought the enemy was.

Didn't do well at all at Stones' River or Chickamauga.
 

RousseauX

Donor
I would argue that foreign intervention was one of two ways the South could have won. The second was by maintaining their resistance and inflicting such pain upon the North than political will to continue the war breaks down and pro-peace Democrats gain control in the 1864 elections.
The problem with this is that the south did really badly in the west, even if you get the equivalent of Lee minus Pickett's charge and Malvern Hill it still doesn't fundamentally change the equation or make the south that much far ahead.

I mean, let's get rid of Lee's 3 great follies: Antietam, Gettysburg and Malvern hill: in total this gives the south an additional 42,000 men and the North an additional 32,000. The south doesn't actually come out that far ahead even so. In the mean time the south is still losing badly in the west as the union steadily grinds it way past Kentucky and Tennessee and into Georgia while cutting the Confederacy in half on the Mississippi. Tossing another 30-40k men on each side in the east does nothing to change this. The Confederacy will collapse in the west while maintaining a strategic stalemate in Virginia just as OTL. Even with slightly greater northern casualties (it's not going to be much more than another 10-20k prob) isn't going to be decisive in shaping northern public opinion.
 
The problem with this is that the south did really badly in the west, even if you get the equivalent of Lee minus Pickett's charge and Malvern Hill it still doesn't fundamentally change the equation or make the south that much far ahead.

I mean, let's get rid of Lee's 3 great follies: Antietam, Gettysburg and Malvern hill: in total this gives the south an additional 42,000 men and the North an additional 32,000. The south doesn't actually come out that far ahead even so. In the mean time the south is still losing badly in the west as the union steadily grinds it way past Kentucky and Tennessee and into Georgia while cutting the Confederacy in half on the Mississippi. Tossing another 30-40k men on each side in the east does nothing to change this. The Confederacy will collapse in the west while maintaining a strategic stalemate in Virginia just as OTL. Even with slightly greater northern casualties (it's not going to be much more than another 10-20k prob) isn't going to be decisive in shaping northern public opinion.

I think you are right to win the CSA needs to hold it's own in the west and keep control of the Mississippi to have a chance of winning.
 
True, but it also requires Confederate armies to maintain the ability to prolong their resistance, which means that need to avoid such engagements as Malvern Hill, Sharpsburg, and Gettysburg.

The requirement is maintaining resistance *and* inflicting repeated, serious pain. The two objectives are hard to accomplish at the same time. I don't see any likely replacements for Lee pulling off both.
 
The problem with this is that the south did really badly in the west, even if you get the equivalent of Lee minus Pickett's charge and Malvern Hill it still doesn't fundamentally change the equation or make the south that much far ahead.

I mean, let's get rid of Lee's 3 great follies: Antietam, Gettysburg and Malvern hill: in total this gives the south an additional 42,000 men and the North an additional 32,000. The south doesn't actually come out that far ahead even so. In the mean time the south is still losing badly in the west as the union steadily grinds it way past Kentucky and Tennessee and into Georgia while cutting the Confederacy in half on the Mississippi. Tossing another 30-40k men on each side in the east does nothing to change this. The Confederacy will collapse in the west while maintaining a strategic stalemate in Virginia just as OTL. Even with slightly greater northern casualties (it's not going to be much more than another 10-20k prob) isn't going to be decisive in shaping northern public opinion.

These men have to be fed and supplied too, and the Confederate logistics was always pretty strained even OTL.
 
Davis and Sidney Johnston might have thought [Polk] was acceptable, Bragg - who had to deal with his insubordination and troublemaking (so did Sidney, but Sidney seems to have been clueless) - sure didn't.

Did he ever demand that Polk be removed? He didn't get on with Polk, but rather than force the issue he left Polk in command of a third of his army.

As for seriously screwing the pooch: The Kentucky campaign, by not keeping Bragg informed of either what he was doing or what he thought the enemy was.

So he should have sent a few more dispatches?

Didn't do well at all at Stones' River or Chickamauga.

Were his troops broken and driven off the field, like Van Dorn at Pea Ridge?

Did he march a division into an ambush, like Sumner did at Antietam?

Did he ignore threats to his flank, like Burnside at Antietam, or Howard at Chancellorsville?

Did he go off and leave his men without command, like Pickett at Five Forks?

I'm not saying Polk was a particularly good commander. But I don't see where he did particularly badly, even once, much less throughout his service.
 
Did he ever demand that Polk be removed? He didn't get on with Polk, but rather than force the issue he left Polk in command of a third of his army.

He definitely tried after Chickamauga, I believe after Stones' River.

Davis didn't do diddly squat to support Bragg in this regard, however, so what was Bragg to do?

Kinda hard for any Confederate general to remove officers when Davis is standing by the officers in question.

Edit:

On March 30, 1863, Polk continued his behind the scenes manipulation to have Bragg relieved of command. Polk wrote to Davis recommending that Bragg would be of greater value in some other field. He recommended Bragg for Inspector General. On March 30, 1863, Davis decided to visit the army himself and found the army in a high state of efficiency. In the mean time, the army had also gained 9,414 men. According to Parks, Bragg blamed Polk for the disaster at Perryville. On April 13, Bragg sent to all wing and division commanders, except Polk, a letter citing Polk’s note from Bardstown and a section of his report of the Battle of Perryville. Bragg wanted to prove Polk’s disobedience to his officers. Hardee sent his letter to Polk, fearing that Bragg was planning a court martial.49 According to historian Nathaniel Hughes, Bragg accused Hardee of “sustaining Polk in his disobedience” at Bardstown and Perryville. Hardee refused to answer.50 Cozzens says that Davis merely deferred to Johnston’s judgment and by mid April 1863, the matter was closed.
http://www.bryansbush.com/hub.php?page=articles&layer=a0409

Bragg being Bragg, I doubt proving Polk's disobedience would have been merely a point in an abstract game.

So he should have sent a few more dispatches?
And y'know, obeyed orders. This is not something to trivialize.

It was a great barrier to the AoT's chances of success that the senior subordinate to Bragg acted as - to put it charitably - an independent commander.
Were his troops broken and driven off the field, like Van Dorn at Pea Ridge?

Did he march a division into an ambush, like Sumner did at Antietam?

Did he ignore threats to his flank, like Burnside at Antietam, or Howard at Chancellorsville?

Did he go off and leave his men without command, like Pickett at Five Forks?

I'm not saying Polk was a particularly good commander. But I don't see where he did particularly badly, even once, much less throughout his service.
Apparently "being just short of open mutiny" doesn't count, but he behaved short of "no worse than average" in those battles - and there are no examples of him doing particularly well as a counter (unlike Burnside or Howard, who have a few successes to their name).

Not having his men routed is not the same as being able to deploy them effectively or organize assaults effectively or even proficiently.

So I strongly suggest reading Thomas Connelly's books on the Army of Tennessee to see Polk's consistently shitty behavior - even if he was a tactical genius his malicious insubordination should have seen him shot.

And throwing away good opportunities to attack by being insubordinate is arguably as bad for the Confederacy as throwing them away by any other form of unfitness.
 
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AFAIK, Lee had nothing against Johnston, and probably did his best to smooth over differences between them at this time.

There were issues with Lee coming into the picture.

First was the fact that Lee did not believe it necessary to withdraw from Manassas/Centerville to the Rappahannock line in early 1862 and upon arriving in Richmond and learning of the movement he voiced his dissapointment to Davis. Davis, in turn, sent a rebuke to Johnston for conducting this operation without informing him despite the fact that it had been Davis who had ordered the movement in the first place.

Then there is the issue of Lee intercepting Johnston mail and keeping him ignorant of events in Northern Virginia while Johnston was opposing McClellan, and doing this despite Johnston specifically writing to him and telling him that he was relying on Lee to keep him informed of events elsewhere in Virginia. Not to mention Lee and the Richmond Authorities constantly countermanding Johnston's orders to Benjamin Huger.

Minor things you might argue but certainly not anything that would help improve the relationship of Johnston and the Richmond authorities.

Lee, for his part, probably wasn't acting with malicious intent - he did, afterall, count Johnston as a friend, offer to serve under him in some capacity prior to Seven Pines/Fair Oaks and gave him his backing during the Atlanta Campaign and again once restoring him to command in the Carolina's - but malicious or not his actions in early 1862 were not helpful to maintaining the working relationship between the government and one of its top generals.
 
I should note that Davis didn't like J Johnston very much because he saw him as too timid. If Lee isn't by Davis advising a more aggressive stance then Johnston may have less political pressure in waging war. That could butterfly away the injury (and/or lose Richmond earlier on).

Johnston had the pressure he did because Davis wanted him to fight, not because of Lee's advice.

Johnston was under no pressure to fight from Davis during the Peninsula Campaign in OTL. He had conducted the Campaign well within the boundaries of the expectations of the Richmond Authorities.

In the April conferance between Davis, Lee, Johnston, Longstreet, G.W. Smith and (Secretary of War) George Randolph, it was decided that the Confederates would merely delay on the James Peninsula so as to buy time for more troops to be trained and brought to the capital and more weapons and ammunition to be made or purchased and distributed, and would fall back towards Richmond where the decisive battle would take place only once that army had been reinforced.

Thus Johnston had followed the strategy laid out by the Confederate High Command and had in no way done anything to make Davis think he wouldn't fight.

The main change here, if Lee is planting corn in Arlington instead of working for the Confederacy, is that Johnston might get his way in the April High Command conferance and Yorktown and the Peninsula will be abandoned much earlier in favor of concentration around the capital.
 
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