RNAS NOT included in the RAF in 1918

To avoid derailing this thread Six More Ark Royals.
WI When the RAF is founded in 1918 the Admiralty fights hard to keep the RNAS under its control. The sticking point would be the heavy bombers. Would these be transferred to the RAF or would the Admiralty keep these at least until the end of the war and then the bombers become part of the RAF? Ship board planes would be the obvious remit for the surviving RNAS and as @Astrodragon mentioned in the other thread possibly what would later become Coastal Command. Any other thoughts on the matter.
My sixpennorth is that there wouldn't actually be much difference until the 1930s and rearmament.
 
There was a report drafted in 1919 on the WW1 strategic bombing campaign- what had worked and what hadn't, what to do next time and so forth- and the RAF took good care to lose it and never speak of it again, because it proved that Trenchard and the rest of the morale- bombers and strategic zealots were talking out of their arse. It eventually turned up in the mid seventies, and reads like the Butt Report twenty- two years early.

Seriously; the entire post-war justification for the RAF was somewhere between wilful self delusion, empire building and outright fraud, as suggested by their hiding the evidence that their ideas had not worked, had failed expensively and would be vastly more expensive if pushed hard enough to succeed.

Honest librarianship should have prevented the formation of the RAF, and if they are subsequently caught attempting to burn their report card, metaphorically speaking, should tend back towards that happy outcome.

RNAS bomber units, and ex- RNAS units in the Independent Air Force, seem to have been rather better at it than the RFC, actually- doing more damage for less loss, partly due to crew training, partly due to being less maniacal (the RFC's approach passed through gung- ho into Banzai! far too readily), partly raid planning- more realistic appreciation of the difficulties, more care for the weather, and more careful selection of targets that could be reliably found and attacked from the air.

A naval heavy bomber arm would probably be more effective; in 1939 we could have been where we actually were in autumn 1942.
 
My sixpennorth is that there wouldn't actually be much difference until the 1930s and rearmament.
Originally I was going to agree with that, but now I think there wouldn't be much difference after rearmament began either.

Now I think the changes would be mental rather than material. That is because the massive sums required to service the National Debt, the pacifist sentiment of the British public after World War One and then the Depression means there would not be any more money for aircraft carriers and naval aviation ITTL.

The mental improvements would be the result of naval aviators being properly integrated into the RN's officer corps so that by 1940 people like Arthur Longmore and Frederick Bowhill would be admirals in the RN rather than air marshals in the RAF.

Though (AFAIK) the IJN and USN still had their own battleship v aircraft controversies in spite of those services controlling their naval aviation between 1918 and 1939. Therefore I think that if the Admiralty had kept control of sea based (and shore based) naval aviation between 1918 and 1939 the Royal Navy's naval aviation problems between 1939 and 1945 would not have automatically been avoided.
 
Does anybody have its name or even better a copy on-line?
There's a lot of post war and interwar reports and manuals that are amazingly good that were buried and amazingly bad and were kept around.

The armour manual in the mid 30s was my favourite.

That said I would second the request for the name or a copy.
 
There would be much to argue for the transfer of the RFC to the RNAS. The only downside I can see is RFC other ranks losing the sheets from their beds and having to make do with just blankets.
 
There were multiple versions of AP 1225, the official Air Publication on the effect of British bombing; the third version, with evidence rewritten to suit the conclusion, was the one eventually released- the original survey, filed and forgotten, was actually joint Anglo- American, filed by a Major G.R. Paul, USAAC, 26 February 1919, and based on a combination of site surveys, interviews and German incident reports including insurance claims for damage caused by bombing.

George K. Williams has a book on this, the survey (which he based much of it on) was PRO AIR 1/1998/204/273/262, letter FI 1Ia/a, HQ RAF in the field to Air Ministry.

Ever since I found out about it, I have had a slight obsession with it- it seems to be the hinge of fate for British air power; so much wasted effort, time, materiel and people could have been avoided if it had been taken seriously.
 
The bombing survey and the published history of the Independent Air Force, which I will have to dig out the author of when my local library opens on Monday morning; basically the results show that the RNAS was less inclined to press on regardless, more inclined to schedule based on the weather, and the loss rates to accident, the target plots and the replacement rate all suggest that the RNAS was much better at keeping crews alive long enough to learn their trade and become genuinely effective. The RFC was far too willing to sacrifice, and far too willing to use (largely non-existent) morale effects to justify sacrifice, and keep doing it.

A realistic appraisal- which the 1919 survey was- could and should have had the same effect as the Butt Report, meaning a British (and American?) bomber arm, built on a sound footing in peacetime, of the same order of effectiveness as Bomber Command after the effects of the Butt Report had been digested. The Navy had a more realistic approach to begin with and were more likely to take the recommendations on board.
 
I wouldnt expect to see much change in equipment in the FAA until the early 30's.
The 20's was a decade of experimentation, and the land planes used were perfectly acceptable for this.
I would expect a closer eye kept on what the American's were up to, and probably earlier experiments with dive bombing.

Without the RAF deciding over the sea navigation, I would expect this to be addressed early, so the decision on single/double crew fighters could be a lot closer.

A big impact would be if the RN kept control of Coastal Command. We might see some of the issues ignored by the AM (like AS bombs) actually looked at.

What the change would also give the FAA is a much better base to ask for equipment in the late 30's. Naval rearmament was to some extent limited by facilities. However aircraft is a different matter. Still limited, but not quite as much. It would take some clever political footwork though, as the RAF will still demand every available facility. Given a decade or so of the RN orderingaircraft, one possibility is them building up a good relationship with the manufacturers not on the RAF's pals list.

Having more ex-fliers in senior posts would be a big help.
 
Considering the logic of forming the RAF in the first place, they should, there's little point to the whole exercise without it results in rationalization of supply, uniformity of command and unanimity of effort. Land based aircraft attacking land targets are a difficult task for the Navy to retain, really.

How- and with whom- the RAF subsequently develops, and whether it keeps exclusive claim to them, is the interesting bit, because a good few of the men who subsequently came down with Trencharditis were ex RN; and before his own salary became dependent on strategic air power, Trenchard himself was an exceedingly vocal supporter of tactical aviation to serve the army in the field. Wouldn't have got the top job if he hadn't been.

Another dimension in Service politics, someone to remind the RAF of their hostages to fortune, may have considerable effect- possibly the effect the RAF was founded to avoid, admittedly.
 
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