Rise of China in a continued cold war

Say hardliners maintain control of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw pact and the cold war continues into the present.

What would be the impact on the Rise of China in a continued cold war

Would China maintain it's alliance with the United States or Switch to the Soviet Union

Could China end up as a third faction in the cold war opposing the United States in the pacific and the Soviet Union in Siberia and Central Asia ?
 
The PRC would probably be slower in modernizing its forces in terms of acquiring force projection (read: naval) capabilities, while the army would be a balancing act between keeping a decent (read: large) size and modernization (depends on if there was a Gulf War at all).

Depending on how the USSR stumbles on in the 21st century (i.e. how badly their economy is doing and how behind* they are on the electronic revolution) the PRC might actually economically aid the USSR so as to have a good geo-political distraction.

I doubt the PRC would actively pursue a 3rd way, but would certainly play the two superpowers against each other.


*here we go again...
Conway's all the World's Fighting Ships 1947-1995 said:
Industrial productivity has never been altogether satisfactory, particularly in such new fields as electronics. By the early 1980s many new warships were going to sea without key electronic systems, and sometimes even without portions of their armament. The Soviets did continue to develop innovative prototypes, and sometimes they were able to acquire electronic components from the West. Overall, however, it seems unlikely that the system could compete with the Western powers in the ongoing electronic revolution. Unfortunately, the Soviets had no Khrushchev who could envisage some radical military reaction comparable to the 'revolution in military affairs'. The post-Khrushchev settlement, in which all segments of the Soviet system were allowed to develop much as they liked, precluded that. In effect, the costs of maintaining standing forces and building the sort of forces already in production, could not be sustained.
 
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I suspect the rise of China is bad news for the Soviets, since due to sheer size, even if China only matches the per capita productivity achieved by the Soviets by 1980, that's still enough to make them the largest economy in the world by some measures. I'd expect their economy to grow larger than the Soviet economy at some point between 2004 and 2010 (depending on how well these hardliners are running the Soviet Union). That will make China an attractive example/leader/system for other Communist states, including the USSR. The Soviets could survive long enough to see China become the leader of world Communism.

If the hardliners in Moscow are smart, they'll implement the border demarcations that happened under Gorbachev in OTL (though Gorbachev can't take full credit for resolving the border, since the commission to work out the disputed border had been working for some years before he gained power, as I recall) and work for positive relations with China. They can potentially benefit from Western wooing of China by importing technology from China and expand trade with their growing neighbour. Of course, the price of this would be Soviets exporting their technology to China as well. Potentially this could be as great as Russian and Ukrainian technological exports have been in OTL or it might be a little less.

The West may be much more energetic about wooing China in this situation, exporting even more technology, investing even more money, working even harder to make room for China in the liberal capitalist world order. Or they may not. But I don't expect that the West would be less energetic than OTL - investing in China is still as advantageous as it was in OTL and the geostrategic dimensions push even more to try to keep China on side so that the US can maintain nice little goodies like their CIA listening post in Sinkiang.

So I expect China is likely to rise even faster than OTL on balance and to have a foot in both camps. Or at least until one side or the other grows so unnerved by China's growing power that they blink and try to pull back much as the US is attempting right now.

I suspect that the Soviets would not be the first ones to blink, since blinking would cost them much more than the much more distant USA. In a situation where the Soviets continue, there's little hope of a real easing of tensions with the USA as Gorbachev attempted. And since the Soviets aren't strong enough to face off against China AND the West, I suspect that absent any diplomatic disasters (such as the downing of the South Korean airliner) the Soviets will work hard to keep China friendly so they can focus more resources in Europe and the Middle East. Also, China would by the 90s become a potentially valuable trade partner, since the rapidly industrializing China would have a demand for goods the USSR was good at producing, would be a potential source of hard currency and would be a potential partner in R&D joint ventures and in time a potential exporter of high tech goods to the USSR.

It's hard to see how the Soviets can avoid great China's embrace.

If the Soviets can resist the urge to implement "China style" reforms until they understand how to transfer the lessons of China to the very different Soviet context, within the Soviet borders the relationship with China could be all positive. Alternatively, if, as OTL, the Soviets implement reforms based on the Chinese experience without translating them to the Soviet context, the Soviets could have some self inflicted turbulence (possibly turbulence bad enough to shake the whole system apart as in OTL), even as they had a great trade relationship with China.

However, externally, even in the most optimistic case, the Soviets will be hold a shrinking slice of the world GDP pie, and thus be declining in relevance.

So how long does it take China to take over the leadership of world Communism? Potentially quite a while, if the Soviets are able to maintain second place in the world military rankings. Even today, China is a long, long way from the military power held by the Soviets in the 80s. So while China would become the "rich successful brother" in the 21st Century, the Soviets could maintain their standing as the "strong brother that can protect countries from the American bully" which could give them enough influence in the world to hold together their sphere of influence (which itself would be continuing to develop through this period).

Of course, the Soviets could be unsuccessful in maintaining sufficient military strength, they may find China outclassing them by such a margin that leadership of the Communist world basically passes to China as soon as it shows any interest in it. I suspect that is very bad for the Soviet Union - history shows that empires often collapse when their mythology is undermined, and not being "best at Communism" could torpedo the Soviets.

There's also the chance that the hardliners in Moscow fail to have good relations with China and the Soviet Union is slowly declining during this period, only this time they are more stretched due to having to garrison Siberia against China AND they are struggling to deal with a hostile China. I don't think this scenario is too pretty for the Soviets. Not at all.

fasquardon
 
China and the USSR likely start getting close again in the 2010s or 2020s due to the US being overbearing, if not as ridiculous as OTL.
 
I don't think this scenario is too pretty for the Soviets. Not at all.
I agree. No matter what else, the Soviet Army is always going to be a lot closer to the Chinese heartland than the American heartland. Meaning the PRC is in a rather worse position to play the superpowers against each other, than the US is to use the PRC to distract the USSR. Sheer geography gives the one more options than the other.

That said I agree the West will woo the PRC. Cooperating with them is something that fullfills just too much of several interest wishlists:
- The Left gets to have their "constructive engagement" with a communist power.
- The Right gets to make money from trading with China and developing it can be sold to anti-communists as teaching the population of the Warsaw Pact an object lession in how pro-market reforms can improve living standards.

The potential for friction exists mainly insofar as the NATO countries will take a much harsher line against PRC technology theft, since the PRC could trade it to the USSR.
 
IIRC post-Tianamen the PRC was cozying up with the USSR over the US, and in 1991 they were (unofficially) supportive of the August Coup. Considering the development of Sino-Russian ties IOTL, I think you’d see the USSR and China banding together against the US in a similar fashion.
 
IIRC post-Tianamen the PRC was cozying up with the USSR over the US, and in 1991 they were (unofficially) supportive of the August Coup. Considering the development of Sino-Russian ties IOTL, I think you’d see the USSR and China banding together against the US in a similar fashion.

The question is though are the Soviet hardliners going to be willing (or domestically able) to play gas can and second fiddle to their peasent protogee? Unlike our Russia, who had the chance to at least shuffle (if only partially reform) her economy to get the credit for recovery compared to the Yeltsin\Mafia years and escape blame for shortcomings, a continued USSR is going to have to prop up the decrepit local industries to maintain legitimacy and will be obliged to maintain the Red Army rather than the current Russian policy of exploiting it's massive inheritance as much as it can before the structure rots away entirely. Opening up to cheap Chinese exports would be suicidal to the former, and if siding with the Ruskies slows the PRC's integration into the global investment and export market their rise is going to be slower and weaker than IOTL.
 
So how long does it take China to take over the leadership of world Communism? Potentially quite a while, if the Soviets are able to maintain second place in the world military rankings. Even today, China is a long, long way from the military power held by the Soviets in the 80s. So while China would become the "rich successful brother" in the 21st Century, the Soviets could maintain their standing as the "strong brother that can protect countries from the American bully" which could give them enough influence in the world to hold together their sphere of influence (which itself would be continuing to develop through this period).

Of course, the Soviets could be unsuccessful in maintaining sufficient military strength, they may find China outclassing them by such a margin that leadership of the Communist world basically passes to China as soon as it shows any interest in it. I suspect that is very bad for the Soviet Union - history shows that empires often collapse when their mythology is undermined, and not being "best at Communism" could torpedo the Soviets.

There's also the chance that the hardliners in Moscow fail to have good relations with China and the Soviet Union is slowly declining during this period, only this time they are more stretched due to having to garrison Siberia against China AND they are struggling to deal with a hostile China. I don't think this scenario is too pretty for the Soviets. Not at all.

fasquardon

Communism would be a name only of both PRC and USSR undergos market oriented reform, more so for USSR.
 
The question is though are the Soviet hardliners going to be willing (or domestically able) to play gas can and second fiddle to their peasent protogee? Unlike our Russia, who had the chance to at least shuffle (if only partially reform) her economy to get the credit for recovery compared to the Yeltsin\Mafia years and escape blame for shortcomings, a continued USSR is going to have to prop up the decrepit local industries to maintain legitimacy and will be obliged to maintain the Red Army rather than the current Russian policy of exploiting it's massive inheritance as much as it can before the structure rots away entirely. Opening up to cheap Chinese exports would be suicidal to the former, and if siding with the Ruskies slows the PRC's integration into the global investment and export market their rise is going to be slower and weaker than IOTL.

I suspect they'd be as willing as the British were to play second fiddle to the US. That is to say, not at all, but they'll have a choice between keeping the empire or making big sacrifices for uncertain gain.

The Soviets gain enormously from a friendly China and lose big from an unfriendly China.

Of course, China also loses from an unfriendly Soviet neighbour, and gains in Communist cred (stabilizing the internal system a little) by the home of the revolution not confusing them for capitalists, China can gain from trade with the Soviets, but I suspect due to geographic, technology flow, and quality factors, China would be a more important trade partner for the USSR than the USSR would be for China.

Of course, unlike the British, the Soviets have weaker institutions holding the homeland together, so if the mother party of Communism is outperformed by her Chinese "daughter", that will leach away confidence within the Soviet Union in the system, much as the apparent success of the debt-fueled growth in Eastern Europe in the 60s weakened the system. And I am not confident that the Soviets could "turn Chinese" under a later "Gorbachev" type figure (where Gorbachev was trying to "turn Czechoslovakian") and not bring everything tumbling down.

TL;DR: Eventually I think the Soviets will find themselves forced to play second fiddle and they may implode as a result.

As far as reforms go... The hardliners won't survive at all if they reform nothing. Even if they go no further than the reforms under Brezhnev... Well, under Brezhnev the Soviets were making a number of changes - of course, many of those changes were wrong or half-assed - the system was still evolving. And I'm not sure that the reforms of the 90s were anywhere close to as positive as you portray - the collapse of the system was a catastrophe - people suffered serious malnutrition, died for lack of medicine, died for lack of shelter, the health system suffered severe damage, cultural output plummeted, education was gutted, Soviet science, once a juggernaut, almost completely died away and it's hard to see how it will ever recover during our lifetimes. Also, not only sick and non-competitive industries were allowed to die, but also productive industries - gutted for the enrichment of a tiny minority. The collapse didn't just clear out dead wood - it also killed off the successor states ability to regenerate.

It was a huge disaster. Though one with a few silver linings.

As far as spending on the military, I'm not sure that's so bad either. For the price of maintaining the red army, the Soviets got a seat near the head of the table in most diplomatic forums. And that has significant economic and geopolitical benefits, though ones that are very hard to price. But for a power that was in every other respect barely stronger than Britain and France, that price was probably worthwhile. And after Stalin the Soviet system actually did a pretty good job of plumping for a fairly efficient level of military spending - enough to be a credible threat, but never succumbing to temptation to over-invest to build a war winning military (because the only way to win WW3 is not to play).

There's definite downsides to the large military - the arms race (though I think the US has its own motivations to not want that race to go too hot) and the very real risk that a careless remark on television can cause the annihilation of all civilization. But since the end of the cold war only solved the first issue not the far more serious second issue, on balance I suspect that the USSR benefited from its military spending in the cold war and would continue to do so as China rose.

Communism would be a name only of both PRC and USSR undergos market oriented reform, more so for USSR.

Not really. It's very fashionable to say that the Chinese aren't Communist anymore, but I think the crack-down on capitalists in the Party shows that there are still true believers in the Chinese Party and that aim is not simply power for the in-group, but rather to harness elements of capitalism for the furtherance of Socialism within China and China within the world.

Heck, in truth China and the Soviet Union never stopped being capitalist - all they did is replace private capital with state capital and said that this was a necessary thing for developing Socialism tomorrow.

One of the reasons why Khrushchev was chucked out of office is because he went and told the Soviet people that they'd achieved Socialism. The head ideologue of the Party at the time (Suslov) took issue with this blatant poppycock and joined Brezhnev in chucking Khrushchev into retirement. The Soviet Union was a one party state capitalist regime working towards the implementation of utopia in the future.

China, by that same token is a one party mixed capitalist regime working towards the implementation of utopia in the future. For me at least, it's the first and last part "one party" and "implementation of utopia in the future" that defines Communism. What kind of capitalism they choose is not particularly important in working out what kind of animal the regime is.

fasquardon
 
Would the one belt one road or a more limited version still be attempted

Well, China will still profit from better infrastructure in Asia (as will the USSR, so they could end up joining in). Whether Chinese banks have such a hunger for finding people to loan to is much more contingent. And whether Chinese investments are given some sort of grant name or just are separate projects following an a single strategy is highly contingent.

The timing is also something liable to be rather variable.

So your guess is as good as mine.

fasquardon
 
It depends on who’s in power in the USSR. If Reformists like Gorbachev implements his reforms. The new Russian market Economy will be controlled by China for natural resources and China becomes stronger than the USSR. Essentially China becomes a world superpower and get’s Russia as a puppet government.

If the USSR is controlled by hardliners than the story is very different. A Hardline USSR would see China as a threat first and foremost to Soviet control over Siberia and Central Asia. However they would also see trade opportunity with China. First thing in order to ensure China doesn’t get any ideas about trying to take back Outer Manchuria the USSR enacts Virgin Land Campaigns of settlement in Siberia and parts of Central Asia near the Chinese boarder. With GMO crops there able to grow some agriculture out there. With this dealt with the USSR would start to fund infrastructure in order to Connect these areas more directly with Moscow and to allow Russian Resources exports with China. China would need this to fuel there industrial growth as in OTL. But the condition of this trade would be very different. There would be no Chinese Infrastructure projects in Central Asia, just Russian ones. There would be no Chinese companies extracting resources in Siberia. Just state owned Russian ones. A hardline USSR would see China as capitalist, they would deal with China like they dealt with the west in the 30’s. First a security threat, and second a potential economic opportunity. Eventually America would go all tariff on China. This would present new opportunities for the Soviets. As the world would have three Superpowers. The USSR, America, and China. And the new Cold War would be between America and China. The USSR would trade with both, but on there own terms. And even with trade, the USSR would never be friendly to either.
 
The new Russian market Economy will be controlled by China for natural resources and China becomes stronger than the USSR. Essentially China becomes a world superpower and get’s Russia as a puppet government.

Yeah, that's never gonna happen.

1) Russia/the Soviet Union is not actually that rich in resources - not per square km - so the payoff for dominating Russia isn't that large compared to the payoff of dominating other regions.
2) The Soviets were running short of raw materials - the reason why the FSU is such a large raw materials exporter is because industry collapsed in the region, meaning the shrinking resource base was made available to foreign buyers. If the Soviets don't collapse, those raw materials will soon enough become so tight as to be entirely eaten up by a Soviet industrial base that isn't collapsing but is instead either slowly growing or slowly shrinking (which depends entirely on how well the Soviets do in securing imports and improving the quality of their industrial output).
3) Those resources are in some pretty dang inconvenient places. Especially in relation to China. It's cheaper to import coal from Pennsylvania to China than it is to import coal from Siberia, because coal from Siberia has to travel much more by expensive railway. The same is true of most raw materials the Soviets can provide.

Yes, the Soviets would export some raw materials to China, but geography dictates against those exports ever becoming a major component of the trade of either state. Gas is an exception to this because gas can be transported very efficiently through pipes and gas is also 6 times more expensive in Asia than it is in Europe.

If the USSR is controlled by hardliners than the story is very different. A Hardline USSR would see China as a threat first and foremost to Soviet control over Siberia and Central Asia. However they would also see trade opportunity with China. First thing in order to ensure China doesn’t get any ideas about trying to take back Outer Manchuria the USSR enacts Virgin Land Campaigns of settlement in Siberia and parts of Central Asia near the Chinese boarder. With GMO crops there able to grow some agriculture out there. With this dealt with the USSR would start to fund infrastructure in order to Connect these areas more directly with Moscow and to allow Russian Resources exports with China. China would need this to fuel there industrial growth as in OTL. But the condition of this trade would be very different. There would be no Chinese Infrastructure projects in Central Asia, just Russian ones. There would be no Chinese companies extracting resources in Siberia. Just state owned Russian ones. A hardline USSR would see China as capitalist, they would deal with China like they dealt with the west in the 30’s. First a security threat, and second a potential economic opportunity. Eventually America would go all tariff on China. This would present new opportunities for the Soviets. As the world would have three Superpowers. The USSR, America, and China. And the new Cold War would be between America and China. The USSR would trade with both, but on there own terms. And even with trade, the USSR would never be friendly to either.

I don't think the Soviets had any hardliners like this. They sound pretty nutty, if you ask me.

A new virgin land campaign would be enormously expensive and disruptive.

And why would they focus on ideological differences with China when their geopolitical position is so fragile and they can instead focus on their similarities (which even now are far greater than the ideological common ground China shares with the US).

As for Chinese enterprises not operating in the Soviet Union - I wouldn't be so sure - in OTL, North Korea pretty much had free reign to log in Siberia. The Soviet system wasn't as closed as people usually assume. For sure, the Soviets will want to minimize Chinese enterprises operating on their turf, but there may be cases where the benefits are too tempting and so you end up with a few enterprises getting access to the Soviet Union.

As for connecting infrastructure between Soviet Asia and China... You may be right. But this is a region that is difficult to develop for the Soviets. To have pipelines and international trade flowing across the land borders would help a Soviet Union in a difficult position.

fasquardon
 
I don't think the Soviets had any hardliners like this. They sound pretty nutty, if you ask me.

A new virgin land campaign would be enormously expensive and disruptive.

And why would they focus on ideological differences with China when their geopolitical position is so fragile and they can instead focus on their similarities (which even now are far greater than the ideological common ground China shares with the US).
Because that's kinda the definition of an ideological hardliner?
You seem to imagine the USSR being ruled by some sort of Schrödingers Communists, who are both hardline cold-warriors willing to use ever more repressive measures to keep the Soviets Empire intact, while at the same time rational-pragmatic enough to make nice with the PRC, who's been seen as a rival from way before either country went communist.

Expecting them to "focus on their similarities" and accept being relegated to 2nd fiddle in the communist world, is like expecting Shia fanatics and Sunni fanatics join together in harmony to band together against the West. Sure it would be the smart thing to do, sounds perfectly rationale and sensible, expect that for ideological hardliners hating heretics is more important than rational self-interest any day of the week.
 
Because that's kinda the definition of an ideological hardliner?

Here's the problem about talking about "hardliners" as if they're a political faction: they didn't exist in the USSR.

The USSR was organized on the basis of patronage networks. So on an individual basis, a Party member might be more "hardline" or more "reformist", but what about those on whose coat tails they rode or who were riding on their coat tails? And just because a Politburo member was "hardline" on one issue didn't make him "hardline" on another issue. As such, there was no "hardline" political tribe and when people post something saying "what-if hardliners this", well, I can either lecture them on how that isn't a meaningful question or I can get into the spirit of the thing and interpret "hardliner" the way it really worked for Westerners during the cold war - which is to say the people advocating less Western-approved policies.

If you define "hardliner" by "ideological conviction", Gorbachev and his bunch were the hardliners. That's why Gorbachev scared the West so much when he succeeded Chernenko. This was the heir of Suslov and Andropov who was pushing aside the Brezhnevite old men and coming with policies shaped by their strong Communist convictions.

You seem to imagine the USSR being ruled by some sort of Schrödingers Communists, who are both hardline cold-warriors willing to use ever more repressive measures to keep the Soviets Empire intact, while at the same time rational-pragmatic enough to make nice with the PRC, who's been seen as a rival from way before either country went communist.

I don't see why the "hardliners" need ever more repressive measures to keep the empire intact - all they need to do it continue the previous policies of the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras.

As for Soviet attitudes towards China, the Soviets were rational-pragmatic enough to see that conflict with China was bad news as soon as the relationship crashed. The low point in Sino-Soviet relations was caused by three things: the momentum of Soviet sins towards the Chinese during the 40s and 50s, Khrushchev betraying Stalin, and Chinese refusal to accept rapprochement. The Soviets were trying to repair the breach pretty much as soon as it formed, sometimes clumsily or plain weakly, but the recognition of the only viable "win" state was there from day one so far as I've read.

The groundwork for the Sino-Soviet rapprochement under Gorbachev had already been laid under his predecessors. Gorbachev energized something that was already in motion and something that was desired by most of the power brokers in Beijing and Moscow. So under the leadership of these "hardliners", I expect it would go in that same direction. Likely slower. But it would go.

Expecting them to "focus on their similarities" and accept being relegated to 2nd fiddle in the communist world

The problem is, the Soviets are sailing right for an iceberg, but they're surrounded by even more forbidding icebergs. Making nice with China risks sinking the ship, ya, but it risks the ship sinking less than, say, making nice with the USA or making nice with neither.

is like expecting Shia fanatics and Sunni fanatics join together in harmony to band together against the West. Sure it would be the smart thing to do, sounds perfectly rationale and sensible, expect that for ideological hardliners hating heretics is more important than rational self-interest any day of the week.

Well, what rational self-interest do Sunnis and Shias have to work against the West?

Honestly, I can't think of any. Especially not if you look at it from their own ideological perspective. Most fanatics are either pretty nationalist, as well as adding a dash of Sunni/Shia flavoring, and focused on regional goals, or are out to get all infidels and consider each-other to be among those purged.

In contrast, what rational self-interest do the Soviets and China have to get along and avoid fighting each other? I could fill a page with all the reasons from avoiding nuclear war to giving their economies that extra little kick.

fasquardon
 
It depends on who’s in power in the USSR. If Reformists like Gorbachev implements his reforms. The new Russian market Economy will be controlled by China for natural resources and China becomes stronger than the USSR. Essentially China becomes a world superpower and get’s Russia as a puppet government.
Given the far weaker otl Russia is not a chinese puppet. I doubt that the far larger and stronger USSR would end up as a Chinese puppet
 
The USSR was organized on the basis of patronage networks. So on an individual basis, a Party member might be more "hardline" or more "reformist", but what about those on whose coat tails they rode or who were riding on their coat tails? And just because a Politburo member was "hardline" on one issue didn't make him "hardline" on another issue. As such, there was no "hardline" political tribe and when people post something saying "what-if hardliners this", well, I can either lecture them on how that isn't a meaningful question or I can get into the spirit of the thing and interpret "hardliner" the way it really worked for Westerners during the cold war - which is to say the people advocating less Western-approved policies.

If you define "hardliner" by "ideological conviction", Gorbachev and his bunch were the hardliners. That's why Gorbachev scared the West so much when he succeeded Chernenko. This was the heir of Suslov and Andropov who was pushing aside the Brezhnevite old men and coming with policies shaped by their strong Communist convictions.

The problem is, the Soviets are sailing right for an iceberg, but they're surrounded by even more forbidding icebergs. Making nice with China risks sinking the ship, ya, but it risks the ship sinking less than, say, making nice with the USA or making nice with neither.
You make a valid point. But I would note that if people pretend to believe stuff, because everyone else seems to that can sometimes take on a life of it's own with people locked into a worldview that most disagree with, yet no one wanting to be the first one to say the Emperor has no clothes.
That said, I am willing to concede that a Sino-USSR reconciliation is by no means impossible, perhaps even more likely than not. But hardly guaranteed to be successful either.

I don't see why the "hardliners" need ever more repressive measures to keep the empire intact - all they need to do it continue the previous policies of the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras.
Because the people in the Warsaw Pact countries wanted out. Any surviving USSR would either have to let them go or adapt ever more heavy-handed repression to keep them in line. Now I think letting the Pact countries go, while keeping the USSR itself intact and continuing would have been possible, but that IMHO doesn't fulfill the criteria of "continued cold war".
 
But hardly guaranteed to be successful either.

Yeah, I agree with that.

Maybe I devoted too little time to that in my previous posts, but I'm not sure much interesting happens if the USSR and China fail to improve their relations.

Then again... Hm... What does happen in the Soviets manage rapprochement with neither the US or China? My bet the most likely is that the leadership do something desperate and the system is likely to break up under them.

Because the people in the Warsaw Pact countries wanted out. Any surviving USSR would either have to let them go or adapt ever more heavy-handed repression to keep them in line. Now I think letting the Pact countries go, while keeping the USSR itself intact and continuing would have been possible, but that IMHO doesn't fulfill the criteria of "continued cold war".

But that's not what was happening in OTL - yes the satellites wanted out. But the necessary repression was declining. What was happening in the late 40s and the 50s in the satellite states is... Well, lets just say there's plenty of reasons to hate Russians in that part of history.

And I'm not sure the USSR could afford to let the pact countries go... At least, they couldn't afford the pact going capitalist since that is a direct indictment of their system and their ideology of being the progressive side. But if the Soviets pull back, can they do anything to strengthen communism in the former WarPac? It's a difficult one.

But yeah, the whole WarPac going becoming independent Communist regimes would have been OK.

fasquardon
 
Yeah, I agree with that.

Maybe I devoted too little time to that in my previous posts, but I'm not sure much interesting happens if the USSR and China fail to improve their relations.

Then again... Hm... What does happen in the Soviets manage rapprochement with neither the US or China? My bet the most likely is that the leadership do something desperate and the system is likely to break up under them.
Well I think from a "best for peace and stability in the world" perspective, them somewhat repairing their relations, but not to the level of allies agin would be the best case. Have three Superpowers, all more or less resigned to living with each other but no two ones closely aligned either. That way none of them could get too overbearing, lest they drive the other two closely together.
 
Yeah, that's never gonna happen.

1) Russia/the Soviet Union is not actually that rich in resources - not per square km - so the payoff for dominating Russia isn't that large compared to the payoff of dominating other regions.
2) The Soviets were running short of raw materials - the reason why the FSU is such a large raw materials exporter is because industry collapsed in the region, meaning the shrinking resource base was made available to foreign buyers. If the Soviets don't collapse, those raw materials will soon enough become so tight as to be entirely eaten up by a Soviet industrial base that isn't collapsing but is instead either slowly growing or slowly shrinking (which depends entirely on how well the Soviets do in securing imports and improving the quality of their industrial output).
While this is partially true, one of the biggest reasons Russia is such a a resource exporter is because of the thawing of Siberian Tundra, and new technology allowing for the profitable excavation of deeper deposits. A surviving USSR would be stronger than OTL Russia. And because of this they would have more technology required for the excavation of deeper mineral reserves than what OTL Russia can do.


A new virgin land campaign would be enormously expensive and disruptive.
Not really, while the Virgin Land Campaign required a lot of resources, it was still profitable, because it increased the USSRs agricultural output, and also helped developed poorer parts of the Union. And with GMO crops it becomes easier for a Virgin Lands Campaign to become more profitable.
 
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