Rhodesia-related plausibility- RhAR augmented by nonwhite volunteers

OK, during the Rhodesian bush wars of the 1960s thru to 1981, their armed forces were augmented by a substantial proportion of foreign volunteers (esp Saffas & Brits, plus Americans & Aussies who'd served in Vietnam) in their key elite units such as the RLI, Selous Scouts & Rhodesian SAS. However, is there any way that there could've been more nonwhite volunteers willing to fight for Rhodesia ? Is there any way that Rhodesia, despite apartheid, could be seen as a place where blacks as well as whites could get a square deal- such that say large nos. of African-American Vietnam War vets (btw there actually was a secret CIA plan to that effect in the mid-70s to help anti-Communist forces in Angola & Mozambique against Communist guerillas) could've volunteered to fight as members of the Rhodesian African Rifles & other black Rhodesian security units (which by 1978 constituted 70% of Rhodesia's security forces) ? How would Rhodesia' international image have been better off if nonwhites as well as whites had been willing to fight against Communist forces during these bush wars ?
 
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Before 1969, and the UDI, non-whites were able to participate in the electoral process and moving from list B to list A was a matter of property and wealth. IIRC a small percentage of list A was nonwhite, and a small but larger percentage of list B was white. My understanding is that Rhodesia was never as out and out racist as Apartheid-era South Africa, and tended to channel their racism through obstacles like property and wealth qualifications.

Rhodesia's international isolation was driven mostly by Britain and their commitment to NIBMAR. The US had a consulate in Salisbury until around the time of the UDI, and Rhodesia had relations with South Africa, Israel, Iran and a handful of others, as well as unofficial relations with Portugal, West Germany, Japan, Zambia and Mozambique.
 
The Lord pulls it off

One possibily I see here, is if the Agreement between Ian Smith and Sir Alec Douglas Hume, held up. This called for a compromise between immediate majority rule and the white Paternalism of UDI.
One of the agreements, conditions was immediate intergration of the army. This might have led to a need for African American volunteers, to serve as officers during a transtion period.
 
well, if Zimbabwe Rhodesia had lived, black would of been in the RSF, though should be noted that Blacks were in the Rhodesian Army, the Rhodesian African Rifles.
 
One possibily I see here, is if the Agreement between Ian Smith and Sir Alec Douglas Hume, held up. This called for a compromise between immediate majority rule and the white Paternalism of UDI.
One of the agreements, conditions was immediate intergration of the army. This might have led to a need for African American volunteers, to serve as officers during a transtion period.

But why on Earth would African Americans serve in the South Rhodesian military? Why wouldn't they serve in the U.S. military?
 
These might be "on loan" from the American military, to help solve the problem.

That was my thought too. As I understand it, the CIA was worried about communism spreading in Africa, but the focus was South Africa because of its resources. Perhaps the CIA changes tactics and instead decides to try and stop the spread of communism into Rhodesia as well? This could result in African-American officers for the Rhodesian military.
 
This does seem a rather odd POD really. If the UDI regime had been the type of regime that would accept large numbers of non White (Rhodesian or otherwise) in senior ranks early in the war then it probably wouldn't have been the UDI we know (and love?). If it did accept large numbers in the late 70s that would be a symptom of desperation and besides of which by that time outside of another major POD the war was most likely already lost.

How about these instead?

1. Some sort of more effective leadership decapitation effort against the Liberation forces that would make the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia settlement more likely to stick, say, Mugabe and his five closest allies were killed in a car crash?
2. A succesful subversion by the US/Rhodesia/SA or co-option of either a substantial ZANU or ZAPU faction. If you can get this, combined with the Bishop/better US support/funding then perhaps that might be enough to make a non ZANU settlement stick, or make the war last a lot longer
 
How about these instead?

1. Some sort of more effective leadership decapitation effort against the Liberation forces that would make the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia settlement more likely to stick, say, Mugabe and his five closest allies were killed in a car crash?

Just have 'em killed by the Rhodesian SAS instead. The Rhodesians got quite good at special forces stuff by the end of the Bush War. dropping in out of nowhere, blowing stuff up and killing targets, then getting out in a big hurry.

2. A succesful subversion by the US/Rhodesia/SA or co-option of either a substantial ZANU or ZAPU faction. If you can get this, combined with the Bishop/better US support/funding then perhaps that might be enough to make a non ZANU settlement stick, or make the war last a lot longer

Have ZAPU join the deal between Smith and Muzorewa in 1979. which would solve it, right there. It would however, leave the Ndebeles siding with the whites, which means if Mugabe does come to power later on Gukurahindi is going to be far nastier than it was in OTL. (And Gukurahindi wasn't pretty to start with.)
 
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