Reverse axis and allied code breaking achievemtns

if axis powers were better and the allies wors with codes

  • war 6 months long

    Votes: 3 14.3%
  • war 12 months longer

    Votes: 10 47.6%
  • War 2 years longedr

    Votes: 4 19.0%
  • Axis win

    Votes: 4 19.0%

  • Total voters
    21
  • Poll closed .

Deleted member 1487

Totally reverse? The Germans had a lot of success early on, especially in British convoy codes.
 
Totally reverse? The Germans had a lot of success early on, especially in British convoy codes.

sorry cannot find the reference just now, but didn't the Vichy regime have at least some of the Polish code breakers working under their control? (or more accurately continue working under their control)

so there was at least a chance of reveal to Germans? and their Enigma machine could be easily enhanced to foil Allied efforts?
 

Deleted member 1487

sorry cannot find the reference just now, but didn't the Vichy regime have at least some of the Polish code breakers working under their control? (or more accurately continue working under their control)

so there was at least a chance of reveal to Germans? and their Enigma machine could be easily enhanced to foil Allied efforts?
Vichy code breakers were not working for the Germans and neither were any Poles undercover working for them:
https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-28167071
 
sorry cannot find the reference just now, but didn't the Vichy regime have at least some of the Polish code breakers working under their control? (or more accurately continue working under their control)

so there was at least a chance of reveal to Germans? and their Enigma machine could be easily enhanced to foil Allied efforts?

Vichy code breakers were not working for the Germans and neither were any Poles undercover working for them:
https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-28167071

from the link you posted

"When the war broke out they were evacuated to France - and for a while worked under cover in Vichy France"

my understanding the Vichy authorities (at some level) were aware of code breaking work being conducted? my statement was since there was collaboration between Vichy regime and Germany that possibly (as a POD) could have been revealed, NOT that any Polish code breakers were working for them.
 
sorry cannot find the reference just now, but didn't the Vichy regime have at least some of the Polish code breakers working under their control? (or more accurately continue working under their control)
...

Until November 1942. When Op ANTON was executed the Poles and French cryptologists were evacuated to Spain and filtered out to the UK & Free French.
 
sorry cannot find the reference just now, but didn't the Vichy regime have at least some of the Polish code breakers working under their control? (or more accurately continue working under their control)

Until November 1942. When Op ANTON was executed the Poles and French cryptologists were evacuated to Spain and filtered out to the UK & Free French.

cannot find the reference, but had the impression that the French were aware of what was ongoing? hence my suggestion that it was something they might exploit, of course Germans never seriously pursued collaboration.

AND wonder if they had received some vague indication that Enigma was less than perfect if they would have even acted?
 
cannot find the reference, but had the impression that the French were aware of what was ongoing? hence my suggestion that it was something they might exploit, of course Germans never seriously pursued collaboration.

AND wonder if they had received some vague indication that Enigma was less than perfect if they would have even acted?

The presence of the ongoing operation was a very close held secret. Tho had the Germans discovered it they would have been looking at equipment not much advanced from the 1939-40 items. The French military 1941-42 had no way to take it to the level the Brits or Yanks were with the Enigma system, the JN 25, or the PURPLE, systems & the increasingly sophisticated decryption machines.

Busting the French operation just might have led the Germans to the wrong conclusions, if they still failed to understand completely the implications in what they found.
 

Deleted member 1487

AND wonder if they had received some vague indication that Enigma was less than perfect if they would have even acted?
Supposedly they understood there were issues, but simply didn't think anyone would put in the enormous effort it would take to reliably break it. As it was it took the Allies half the war to do so and pretty major investment of resources to tackle all the different systems.

The other part of it was the Lorenz cipher, which is commonly lumped into the Engima situation, but it was a separate issue and only broken due to one of the machine operator's breaking protocol and requested in-the-clear for a repeat message send due to an error in transmission of the first broadcast. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lorenz_cipher#Code_breaking
This system was OKW's commands to army headquarters all over Europe and the highest level SigInt available to the Allies.
 
Stalin thought British warnings about Barbarrosa were a trap to get him into the war on the British side. Without his paranoia about British dirty tricks would he have taken more notice of intelligence he was recieving from his agents in Tokyo and Berlin.
 

Deleted member 1487

Stalin thought British warnings about Barbarrosa were a trap to get him into the war on the British side. Without his paranoia about British dirty tricks would he have taken more notice of intelligence he was recieving from his agents in Tokyo and Berlin.
Part of the problem there is that the intel had been repeatedly wrong. They were continually predicting invasion and had claimed the invasion would be on May 15th (which was the original invasion date but the weather and Balkan campaign changed it) and then repeatedly in May and early June, each time being wrong until of course the 22nd of June. The Germans were also launching their own deception operations suggesting the build up in the East/Norway was preparation for an invasion of Britain, while Stalin saw the Balkan invasion as something aimed at the British due to the push into Greece and fight over Crete. Plus supposedly Hitler personally sent Stalin letters explaining the build up in the East and warning against a potential plot by his anti-communist officers to start a war by a border incident, which when coupled with all of the above would lead Stalin to think the intel coming in was at least in part a British plot to get him to fight Hitler to save them. It also would explain why he demanded border units stand down and not respond to any provocation.
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-...es/studies/vol50no1/9_BK_What_Stalin_Knew.htm
 
To elaborate on a previous post; The ENIGMA machine was expanded from one to four rotors, had the Stecker board added, and other lesser improvements during it's operational use. The real failure was in sloppy use, particularly by Luftwaffe operators. Routine errors in use left the message keys far easier to identify than they should have been. Even the mega paranoid naval communications leaders allowed critical procedural errors to become routine in submarine fleet communications.
 
*Unite German codebreaking efforts under SD or Reich Mail Office
*Put Konrad Zuse with Z3s, and perhaps by 1942/3 a few Z4s (could the Z5 be made by 1945...?)
*Profit!
 
Let's not forget that there's an expiration date to the war: as long as Britain remains free, the war will end within a few months of August 1945.

Also, let's not forget that Germany drove most of its best mathematicians away in the years before the war. To quote David Hilbert in response to a question by the Nazi Minister of Education Bernhard Rust, "Suffered? It [the fame Gottingen school of mathematics] doesn't exist any longer, does it?" And it was hardly absorbing Polish or other exiled mathematicians like Britain.
 
Part of the problem there is that the intel had been repeatedly wrong. They were continually predicting invasion and had claimed the invasion would be on May 15th (which was the original invasion date but the weather and Balkan campaign changed it) and then repeatedly in May and early June, each time being wrong until of course the 22nd of June. The Germans were also launching their own deception operations suggesting the build up in the East/Norway was preparation for an invasion of Britain, while Stalin saw the Balkan invasion as something aimed at the British due to the push into Greece and fight over Crete. Plus supposedly Hitler personally sent Stalin letters explaining the build up in the East and warning against a potential plot by his anti-communist officers to start a war by a border incident, which when coupled with all of the above would lead Stalin to think the intel coming in was at least in part a British plot to get him to fight Hitler to save them. It also would explain why he demanded border units stand down and not respond to any provocation.
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-...es/studies/vol50no1/9_BK_What_Stalin_Knew.htm

If Britain isn't breaking German codes there will be no false warnings. Stalin had all the information about Barbarossa he needed he ignored the best spy network in the world.
 

Deleted member 1487

Anyone have a take on how vulnerable the British TYPEX or US SIGABA encryption machines were?
http://chris-intel-corner.blogspot.com/search/label/Typex

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SIGABA#Security

http://chris-intel-corner.blogspot.com/2014/03/united-states-cryptologic-security.html

If Britain isn't breaking German codes there will be no false warnings. Stalin had all the information about Barbarossa he needed he ignored the best spy network in the world.
Nonsense, the Soviets had their own sources which were incorrect. Even without code breaking the British were also passed info about the Barbarossa plan by German traitors. Saying Stalin had all the info he needed is at very least a glib comment, as he had a ton of false positives and though we can look back with hindsight and criticize him ultimately he was provided with info which was less than he needed to make the correct decision. I'll refer you back to the link I cited from the CIA earlier which explores the reason why what Stalin knew wasn't enough to actually act.
 
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