Rethinking the Kaiserreich, or a surviving Triple Alliance

I have long considered that Italian neutrality- or even better, Italy honoring the Triple Alliance- was th easiest way to secure a German victory, even given 1914 conditions. Italy remaining neutral in the conflict means bolstering Austrian performance in 1914-1915, or else forcing her to make territorial concessions to Italy, or both; not impossible even starting from Franz Ferdinand’s assassination, but it requires probable German intervention, diplomatically or otherwise, and by definition precludes the OTL war beyond its earliest months.

The French deployments with a CP Italy are not likely to change much- the Savoy Alps are probably among the most defensible land borders in Europe, and the Nice region is horridly exposted to French navy, so even if Italy wasted her army in an all out attack the French could probably hold them off with a smaller force. While I would not put it past the Italians to focus on an Alpine offensive given the close cooperation with Germany I suspect wiser heads will prevail. Italy had 1.2 million soldiers in 1914, and put ~33 divisions on the initial offensive against Austria (and mobilized 5 and a half million total); assuming that she mirrors France’s likely deployment and concentrates in Lorraine, then with the OTL deployment that could place 68 German Divisions and 33 Italian divisions versus 62 French divisions, or roughly a 5:3 advantage towards the Central powers. An attack through Lorraine could be feasible, perhaps, but I think unlikely. The big question facing the Germans is whether to go east or west. With the extra Italian divisions the Schleiffen Plan looks awfully tempting, and for good reason- IMHO Germany can take Paris if Italy is with them in 1914. Add to this that British neutrality, while unlikely, is not impossible- quoting the Sleepwalkers:

Even the question of Belgium seemed unlikely to trigger an intervention. It was widely assumed, on the basis both of military intelligence secured by the French General Staff and of military inference, that the Germans would approach France through Belgium, breaching the 1839 international treaty guaranteeing its neutrality. But the cabinet took the view that, while Britain was indeed a signatory to the treaty, the obligation to uphold it fell on all the signatories collectively, not on any one of them individually. Should the matter actually arise, they concluded, the British response would be ‘one of policy rather than obligation.’

Indeed, it is striking with what sang-froid senior British military and political leaders contemplated a German breach of Belgian neutrality. On the basis of Anglo-French General Staff conversations in 1911, Henry Wilson had come to the conclusion that the Germans would choose to cross the Ardennes through southern Belgium, confining their troops to the area south of the rivers Sambre and Meuse; these findings were presented to the 114th meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defense. The same scenario was discussed by the cabinet on 29 July, when Lloyd George showed, using a map, why it was likely that the Germans would cross ‘only […] the furthest southern corner’ of Belgium. Far from greeting this prospect with outrage, the ministers accepted it as strategically necessary (from Geramnys’ standpoint) and thus virtually inevitable. British strategic concerns were focused primarily on Anwerp and the mouth of the river Schelde, which had always been regarded as one of the keys to British security. ‘I don’t see,’ Churchill commented, ‘why we should come in if they go only a little way into Belgium.’ Lloyd George later claimed that he would have refused to go to war if the German invasion of Belgium had been confined to route through the Ardennes. British policy-makers assumed in any case that the Belgians themselves would not make their last stand in the south but would, after offering token resistance to demonstrate that they had not permitted the violation, fall back on their lines of fortification further to the north. There would thus be nothing automatic about the relationship between a German invasion of Belgium and British intervention in the conflict.

IMHO given a stronger Russia (for reasons I will detail below) I think that Germany will ultimately choose either an east-first policy or a modified Schleiffen Plan which limits the offensive through southern Belgium and Luxemburg, which in combination with the Irish Home Rule debate will probably be enough to guarantee initial British neutrality for the initial engagement, though probably not indefinitely unless the war ends quickly.

Before I start with my PoD I want to review the strategic situation in the Mediterreanean. All the following quotes are Paul G. Halpern’s The Mediterreanean Naval Situation 1908-1914.



On Britain:
In early 1912, changing diplomatic, military, and naval circumstances forced the Admiralty into some hard thinking about the Mediterranean situation. The result of this was the new organization of the fleet announced by Churchill in the House of Commons on March 18. The underlying causes of the reorganization were the growth of the German, Austro-Hungarian and Italian navies in the preceding few years. It was, however, the failure of the Haldane mission to achieve a detente in the naval race with Germany that finally forced Churchill and the admiralty to act.

Churchill, after the Admiralty had scrutinized Cassel’s report, wrote Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, on January 31 that the German proposal would require a new and vigorous British response. To match the old German six-year program of

Of the various possible contingencies, the Admiralty considered that the propoesd deployment would “secure” the Mediterreanean in case of war between Britain and France against Germany and Austria. It would be “adequate” if Britain and France- and possibly Russia- were opposed to the entire Triple Alliance. In the less probable situation that Britain alone at war against Germany and Austria, it was thought by good management Britain could maintain herself simultaneously in both theaters- the North Sea and the Mediterranean- once mobilization was complete; but until a decision was reached in the North Sea many risks would have to be taken in the Mediterranean. In the improbable contingency of Britain alone against the entire Triple Alliance, the situation “would then become very grave” with certain heavy losses in the Mediterranean, although a meeting between the hostile Mediterranean fleets (Austria and Italy) and the German fleet could probably be prevented, and each could be attacked separately with superior strength. This was a far cry from the casual acceptance of the same possibility in the 1908 war plans and reflects how far the situation had altered to Great Britain’s disadvantage in only four years.

On Italy:

With her long coastline and populous ports exposed to attack, and her navy notably weaker than that of a suspicious and none too friendly France, the extent to which Italian naval forces could have been committed away from home in adventures among the Dodecanese in case of war with a major maritime power is questionable. The memorand of Admirals Rocca Rey and thaon di Revel seem primarily concerned with more immediate problems in the Adriatic or Tyrrhenian. Captain Boyle, the British naval attache, believed that acquisition of Tripolitana and Cyrenica had actually weakened Italy by increasing her dependence on the sea and vulnerability to naval attack. He indicated the fallacy of the popular assumption that because Italy held both shores of the central Mediterranean she would be able to control it: this would require a fleet strong enough to deny passage to ships of two great powers, Britain and France, who had excellent bases adjacent to the waters in dispute
At the end of 1912 the French naval attache also reported that the Italian fleet could not think of engaging the French fleet without risking disaster because of the numerical and technical inferiority of its ships and the state of its training, which had fallen off during the Libyan war...
A year later, however, the French attache sounded a note of alarm. He still considered the Italian navy clearly behind the French at approximately the state the French found themselves in 1906. But, he added, if one took account of the distance the Italians had already come, it was necessary for France to be on guard in the future and to keep the lead. He warned that by 1917 an Italian fleet led by vigorous new chiefs, and with a dozen dreadnoughts based on Maddalena, might constitute a danger. This danger might have materialized sooner if the Italians, instead of being forced closer to the Triple Entente powers by their maritime vulnerability as the British naval attache and many others in England confidently believed, turned toward close naval cooperation with their Austrian rival and ally whose fleet was no longer to be disdained. This is exactly what happened in the spring and summer of 1913.


The French typically possessed a serious numerical advantage and a far more significant tactical advantage over Italy and Austria but her position was relatively fragile. France needed to exploit her superior numbers to decisively engage and defeat the Italian navy, prior to its junction with Austria’s, therefore avoiding the necessity of engaging in risky shore offensives against the Italians, which would expose them to dangerous losses against enemy submarines, mines, and torpedo craft. This was to be accomplished by offensive actions against the Italian coast- probably Sardinia, though Sicily, and the Ligurian coast were also likely targets- with the goal of neutralizing Italy’s naval bases and cruiser/submarine fleet, and to additionally goad the Italian fleet into an engagement by seizing territory from them. Austria was basically a non-factor absent Italian assistance as her fleet was too weak, too distant, and too easily contained in the Adriatic to pose a serious threat on her own; but in combination with Italy she could, in theory, pose a serious challenge to French hegemony.


Italy was well positioned to harass French efforts, albeit probably not capable (barring exceptional circumstances) of winning a straightforward engagement even with Austrian assistance and British neutrality. Nevertheless with an earlier emphasis on creating a fleet in being of fast dreadnoughts, supplemented by a substantial expansion in destroyers, cruisers, submarines, and her coastal defenses in Sicily and Sardinia, she could in theory seriously hamper French operations, forcing her to commit her fleet to risky coastal offensives/blockades and attritioning her navy over time- basically, the ideal Italian strategy is to force France to fight several Gallipolis, then move in for the kill at an opportune moment. If successful, a combination of the Italian and Austrian fleets could thereafter consider future offensive operations against France and Britain, or at the very least pose enough of a threat to draw off British ships from the Atlantic.


Entente forces depended utterly on naval supremacy, specifically French naval supremacy- England withdrew her larger assets, keeping only a minimal land garrison and lighter craft to deter a Central Powers attack on their bases. These craft- based out of Cyprus, Malta and Egypt- would be tasked with interdicting any potential landings or raids against the aforementioned bases, as well as monitoring the entrance to the Adriatic. French forces were primarily concentrated in Toulon, where they could engage in rapid action against Italy and deter a landing in Provence- which would threaten the Alpine defense- as well as providing cover to convoys from Algeria, which were to transfer the colonial garrison as quickly as possible; her lesser force at Bizerte was tasked with guarding the Straits of Messina, potentially interdicting the Austrians or else preparing an attack on Sicily or Sardinia. Owing to the security of the Savoy-Rhone border France kept minimal forces in the area, opting instead to concentrate her armies in the Rhine, where they would be needed against the Germans; as with England France’s security therefore depended utterly on her naval advantage. The Central Powers’ strategic objective vis a vis is therefore the following:

1) to effect, as quickly and safely as possible, a consolidation of the Italian and Austrian navies; 2) to maintain defenses in Sardinia and other coastal regions, in order to deter French attacks, or at least impose disproportionate losses against them in the process; 3) to preserve their capital ships as a fleet in being, imposing additional burdens on the Entente navies; 4) to exploit to the fullest the use of lighter craft against enemy commerce and coastal activities, in order to defend Italy’s coast and allow potential torpedo or mine strikes against French capital ships, and 5) to position themselves for a decisive counterattack in the event of severe attritional losses as a consequence of the former

Should the French navy suffer severe losses as a result of the prior points, the Entente position in the Mediterranean rapidly becomes untenable. Naval action against Provence likely allows a mass breakthrough across the Alps; absent French capital ships, strategic bases- Malta, Corsica, Tunisia, Egypt- are exceedingly vulnerable to a naval invasion, and could likely be taken by a Central Powers offensive before British reinforcements can arrive from the Atlantic.

To all of this I would add that the relative strengths of the Austrian, Italian, and French fleets varied considerably; when the war starts matters a great deal, as does when and how many dreadnoughts are built by the powers. Given the prompt, and the trend of Austrian and Italian naval building (in direct competition with each other) eventually leading to British position becoming untenable, the easiest way to accomplish this is to have one of those two powers become a dreadnought power earlier.


Now finally for my PoD: Umberto I avoids his assassination. Conservative and vaguely Germanophile, the king’s survival has a few knock on effects in the government; the main goal is to strengthen Italo-German relations. The most immediate impact of this is an earlier dreadnaught race: OTL, Italian engineer Vittorio Cuniberti was the first to propose the concept which eventually became the Dreadnaught Class. In 1903 Cuniburti wrote an article for Jane’s Fighting Ships which advocated an “all big gun” warship, in contrast to the pre-Dreadnaught standard of many guns of mixed caliber. Cuniberti advocated having four turrets of the largest caliber then in use- a twelve inch gun- atop a heavily armored, fast vessel which can therefore overwhelm existing ships while shrugging off their typically weaker armament. OTL he proposed the design to the Italian government but it was rejected due to lack of funds, and with government permission he published his article; TTL the king’s government, still sulking from the defeat in Ethiopia, accepts… so in ~1904 the Italian Colossus is launched, sparking a panic in London, and prompting the other powers (especially Austria) to embark on major building programs. The Dreadnaught race begins much sooner, as does the Entente Cordiale; in practice this also pushes Austria closer to Italy, as the Austrian buildup (along with that of the French) makes the alliance more valuable. A stronger Triple Alliance may, in theory, also help alleviate the principal problem facing Italy’s navy- her insufficient steel industry and relative lack of funds. A smarter Italian navy would emphasize destroyers, fast cruisers and torpedo boats, and fewer, lighter/cheaper battleships (as opposed to the heavy emphasis on expensive super-dreadnaughts which were always delayed and far beyond Italy's budget). Add an earlier promotion of Paolo Thaon, whose ideas seem on the whole to have been more sensible to Italy's strategic situation.

Absent the king’s assassination Giuseppe Siracco’s government, presumably, can last longer; his lenient attitude towards the strikers isn’t as much of a drag when the king wasn’t shot by one of them, and- assuming the king is more firmly committed to an anti-French/pro-German policy- financial reforms would be attractive as a precondition to building any Italian dreadnaughts. A near-death experience might convince the king to moderate his strong conservative stance (or it might cause him to double down; since this is a pro-Italian timeline I’m leaning towards the former, or rather a typical conservative crackdown followed by grudging bread-and-circuses concessions afterwards to mollify the mob). More importantly, from our perspective, the king also retains strong interest in north Africa- Italy takes a strong interest in both Libya and Morocco (as well as a potential Spanish alliance/engagement) but does not invade Libya, instead accepting the compromise deal of administering the province nominally in the sultan’s name. This avoids the Italo-Turkish War, which has immense implications for the eastern Mediterranean, and also saves Italy considerable effort and expense.

When the Tangier Crisis hits, Italy and Austria-Hungary both back Germany. The crisis is peacefully resolved but it strengthens the bonds between the Triple Alliance and convinces Italy to embark on a stronger, anti-French naval expansion. This in turn prompts an Austrian naval race… France looks on uneasily and draws closer to Britain and Russia.

With the Libyan War averted the Ottomans are on a much firmer footing. The war, OTL, cost the Ottomans significant territory and prestige, and directly led to the First Balkan War (which, directly, led to the First World War, which was in many ways also the Third Balkan War). The Ottoman government is somewhat more stable and more prosperous, and with British and German capital is able to put a firmer foot forward. The Berlin-Baghdad Railway precedes somewhat ahead of schedule, as does the Hejaz Railway. The First World War is also delayed, which strengthens Italy and Austria versus France (more time to build their navy), the Ottomans (a near-complete Baghdad to Berlin railway, further reforms, and a complete Hejaz railway) and the Russians (who have much better railways, a modest air force, and better artillery).
 
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Very good analysis. One factor you might want to consider us what the repositioning and strengthening of the Ottomans does to Russia commercially during wartime however. With no Three Pasha coup, you are seeing a continuation of the fairly equal divide of power between the CUP and LU wings of the Young Turks and removing the public revachism and extistental crisis, overcenteralization of power in the military and executives,ect.that motivated them to jump into bed with Germany (who then manuverd them into war). This OE, stradling a more balanced line between Britain-France and Germany, won't likely be closing the straits to Russian commerce and could very well be bribed into letting out the Black Sea Fleet by the British once they've declared war on Germany and realize they need as much power as they can get into the eastern Med. to drive or intimidate the CP fleets into harbor. Combined with French efforts in the western med. You limit Italy's ability to strategically focus on disrupting the commercial flow either through theSuez and around Africa, or hugging a friendly North African coast, thus benefiting the Russian economy and allowing not just grain to flow but Donbass coal as well; whichFrance will no doubt be able to make use of. This is a net boost to the the Entente easy.

Tldr: Don't take Turkish CP status for granted here, and their neutrality greatly bemefits Russia and the UK
 

NoMommsen

Donor
Without the italian-ottoman war about Libya ...
Will there and if when still be a 1st Balkan-war ? ... and how might this go without the restrictions the ottomans suffered in it due to the war with italy IOTL ?

Really curious what you @The Undead Martyr will present us here about that. :)

... fairly equal divide of power between the CUP and LU wings of the Young Turks ...
....
Tldr: Don't take Turkish CP status for granted here, and their neutrality greatly bemefits Russia and the UK
What is the "LU wing" you mention there ?

The ottomans would even ITTL be searching for a Great to Big Power 'patron' as they were IOTL ... almost from the beginning of the 'Young Turks' revolution 1908. And I don't see why the comming Entente-powers would ITTL give in to the ottomans 'demands' as reverting their encroachment on ottoman sovereignety as well as territory (capitulations, french monopols i.e. tobacco trade, british 'machinations' with locals at the Shat-el-Arab, omani and/or jemenite coast).

THE big advantage Germany had ITOL - and I don't see this changing ITTL - was :
It was the most minor 'player' in the game of ottoman dismembering, still offering the ottomans at least some leverage on buisness (as i.e. in the way the Baghdad-railways were managed and financed in the end, on ottoman side mainly with promises on a possible future).

The often proposed 'choice' for the ottomans to stay out of the frail IOTL ... IOTL IMHO it didn't existed.
Choice one : go with the Entente powers
be sure to be dismembered​
Choice two : go with the CP-powers
at least a chance to keep on existing on own terms​

Therefore I don't see the ottomans having ITTL as wella as any other choice as they had IOTL :
'joining' the CP/german side in whatever form.
 
My general thought is that the war starts in 1915/16 as an Alt!Balkans war is precipitated by Greece/Serbia over Ottoman Europe with Entente backing, so CP Ottomans is a given. As part of the negotiations Italy gains Trentino and Gorizia from Austria and a pledge of her irredentist territories versus France. Further discussions attempt to reconcile albania, Macedonia but ultimately it is put off till after the war.

Germany does a smaller Schlieffen plan, leaving the Rhine defense to Italy, and focuses more soldiers east. England remains neutral (Irish crisis distracts them) initially but closes the Channel to Germany's navy. Austria combines with Italy around Messina and the combined fleets trounce the French at a Mediterranean Jutland. Italy lands in Provence, turning the alps frontier and taking Lyons and Mersailles as well as occupying Corsica, while the French attack on Alsace goes about as well as it did in OTL, leaving them open to a German counteroffensive. Nevertheless the French manage to halt Germany much sooner than OTL owing to the latter's eastern focus.

In the east the initial German offensive takes Poland but bogs down due to logistical difficulties and the russian counterattack proves devastating. Russian forces overwhelm Galicia and occupy East Prussia and parts of Posen and Silesia as well as breaking into the Carpathian basin. Montenegro, owing to Italian influence, remains neutral and eventually joins the central powers, while Serbia focused on Austria. An Austrian attack on Serbia ends disastrously and the Serbs advance through the Vojvodina. Romania declares on Austria and invades Transylvania.

The Ottomans are stronger, and facing only the Bulgarians and Greeks with more time to prepare, but still have a rough time of it even if they avoid the utter disaster of the OTL Balkans War. The Bulgars take Edirne and Greeks troops break through Ottoman lines in Thessaly, only being repulsed from Thessalonika due to timely Austrian/Italian intervention. Farther east Russia invades Ottoman Armenia, seizing those provinces with local Armenian aid, but the front stabilizes around Lake van and remains static for the rest of the war.

Germany goes east, blunting the alt Gorlice tarnow offensive but facing continued difficulties in Ruthenia and eastern Poland. The ottoman front stabilizes in Thrace along roughly pre-war borders following significant Austrian and Italian intervention and the Russians continue to fall back under the German onslaught. A German offensive in Lorraine at alt Verdun ties down the French army, ultimately with little strategic change as the western front bogs down into largely static trench warfare, similar to OTL.

Though neutral, Britain takes an unabashedly pro French stance, not only interdicting German naval actions but seizing coal/supply convoys towards the Mediterranean. This greatly annoys the Americans, who defy Britain's blockade and maintain open trade with Germany even with weapons and war material. Italian offensives in North Africa face considerable harassment and the French submarine force gives several bloody noses to the Regia Marina. France's surface navy is by this time a non entity but she can still inflict a toll on CP naval actions, especially on the defensive.

Spain is mildly favorable to France due to the Moroccan crisis and naturally averse to antagonizing Britain but the latter's technical neutrality and French defeats make her receptive to CP diplomacy. In secret negotiations spain opens her ports to the Triple Alliance and additionally agrees to support German claims to Morocco and ceding her own possessions there to Italy; in return she is pledged Rousillon and the French Guyana/Caribbean.

Britain eventually joins sometime in 1916/1917 over German support for Irish separatists and various "provocations" in the English Channel, and faces a rough time in the Mediterranean. War hawks under Sir Edward Gray pushed the French alliance but failed to accommodate liberal majority which opposed continental entanglements. Now the British navy faces the entire triple alliance by herself, the very scenario the Entente was meant to avoid, and the disaster is greater than the worst of the admiralty's nightmares.
The prior two years have taught the Italians painful lessons in anti submarine warfare. By Britain's entry they have greatly expanded their destroyer forces, developed a strong air force, invented depth charges and developed anti submarine tactics. Maltas vaunted squadrons face an uphill battle against a Regia Marina honed by two years of bitter effort against the French raiders, and Malta is quickly overwhelmed. Gibraltars battlecruiser squadron is mauled by an Italo-Austrian dreadnaught force and Gibraltar falls.

Meanwhile Austria and Italy have stabilized Turkey, occupying Serbia, seizing Sofia and pushing Greece back to pre war borders. An Austro-turkodh force almost contemptuously seized Cyprus and forces through the squadron at Alexandria with some losses, effecting an invasion of the Nile delta by land and by sea with the conjunction of a Turkish army out of Syria. In a mere fifteen days the Mediterranean has become a Central Lowe's lake.

The English now have to hold inner Egypt from reinforcements, but even this proves troublesome, as Eritrea, Somalia and the suez canal enable raiders from the Mediterranean to constantly harass shipments in the Persian gulf, the German far East squadron is having a jolly time beating a bloody path across the south Pacific.

Eventually the Russian revolution happens. Austria, weary from four years of war, had like OTL largely devolved into a military dictatorship. Civil government breaks down, and the accession of the anti Hungarian grand Ferdinand incites further tensions. Worse the brief Entente occupation resulted in ethnic violence against the Hungarian populations, which in turn incited reprisals when the Austrians returned. The violence spirals out of control and in 1917 ish the hungarians begin ethnically cleansing the Romanians and Serbs. Franz Ferdinand tries to intervene but this sparks a broad collapse of the Dual Monarchy. Italy moves to occupy her irredentist claims, further aggravating the situation.
As Germany achieves breakthrough into Normandy and occupies Paris the allies finally sue for peace.

Italy gains Corsica, Sardinia, Tunisia, eastern Algeria and Savoy from France and Sudan and Malta from England, as well as taking The Ionian islands from Greece. The Spanish treaty is also affirmed. The remainder of France's colonies are given to Germany, which also annexes Gibraltar and Luxemburg and establishes a Brest Litovsk over Russia and protectorate over Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Austria is eventually split in two- Italy gains for her Montenegro ally Bosnia and Dalmatia, a protectorate over Albania (includimg kosovo) and de facto control over Egypt, while Franz Ferdinand is forced to abdicate Hungary and Galicia to his brother. His son is installed as king of Macedonia (including Serbia) resolving the difficulty of his morganatic marriage and the Serbian dilemma. The ottomans take Cyprus, Crimea and Yemen+and some border gains versus Bulgaria, but this barely compensated for The "loss" of Egypt, Libya, and Macedonia. The ottoman regime, suffering under the war effort and Arab nationalism collapses into a military dictatorship. Eventually they embark on expansionistic wars, occupying Crete and invading Iran and Bulgaria.

In the main the resulting peace is rather unsatisfactory to everyone involved. Germany feels cheated of continental annexation, while bad blood between Italy and Austria has sabotaged the Triple Alliance. The ottoman s, nominally victorious, posses less territory now than they did before the war, having been robbed of Libya and Egypt (to Italy), along with most of her European holdings, and denied compensation in the Caucasus by the Germans. Austria's fate proves a permanent bone of contention between Italy and her allies. By the laws of succession Franz Ferdinands brother would become the new archduke on his death, but given Hungarian attitudes it's unlikely he would accept the crown. His morganatic children, now kings in Macedonia, might be allowed to inherit, though this poses an awkward geographic question. A growing segment of Viennese liberals/nationalists advocate union with Germany- something steadfastly opposed by the Italians, who are terrified that a German Anschluss would make their independence from Berlin strategically untenable. In Germany many are dissatisfied at the lack of any territorial annexation contra France, and the military, which are already de facto in control of the state by the wars end, abolish elections and institute several race laws. The rise of fascism in France also causes great concern, as many in France blame pernicious Albion for abandoning them. Ominously the French government also begins cracking down on "degenerate races" ie Jews and pied noirs. Italy avoids Mussolini but is still wracked by severe economic and social crises and territorial/colonial expansion is not going to paper over those problems. England is still the strongest colonial power but her position is very tenuous in the face of Germany's rapid expansion. Following the rise of Communism in Russia and fascism in France Great Britain increasingly cozies up to the Italians, viewing the tensions inside the Triple Alliance as the best way to break German hegemony.

The boiling point comes following the death of Franz Ferdinand. As the Viennese and Czech parliaments debate the proper course of action, radicals seize control and declare unilateral union with Germany. This has little immediate effect in the bemused provinces but confirms Italy's worst fears and she immediately invades along with her Illyrian ally. This infuriates the Germans, but cooler heads manage to avoid war at the moment, and a partition is agreed essentially on OTL post-WW1 borders- Italy takes south Tirol and the Adriatic littoral, Illyria takes carniola, and Germany gains the rest. The status of the now defunct Austrian navy is a bit of a thorny issue bit is ultimately resolved in Germanys favor. Nevertheless the Triple Alliance is effectively a dead letter.

World War Two breaks out sometime in the 1930s/1940s between Italy, Britain and the *USSR vs Kaiserreich Germany and the Ottomans. France pulls a Franco (or else jumps in at the last minute to grab Alsace-Lorraine) but also possibly partitions Belgium with the Germans and involves herself in the *Spanish civil war. The US stays neutral, unless Japan gets involved, in which case they enter on the British and German sides respectively.
 
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NoMommsen

Donor
Nice narrative :)

Some proposals, as at least one point hasn't been covered by your narrative so far : Bosnia in 1908.

As an alternative possibility of its solution :
- Austria-Hungary now also officially rules over Bosnia
- By agreement between A-H, Germany and Russia the Balkan will be 'put on ice' furthermore ... much to the delight of the ottomans as
- The ottomans further territorial integrity will be guaranteed by the Triple Alliance - including Russia, still weakened from the relolution of 1905 and the lost war with japan, but
- Russia will be 'promised' some solution for its sea-trade and traffic through the straits in the near future
- Italy might be offered some 'right' at first in Libya (maybe extended to some arrangement similar to Egypt with nominal sovereignity of the Porte) as well as be shown into the direction of Tunesia ...

Tunesia is kinda 'integrated' into the french sphere but nevertheless legally still an independant country under french ... 'protection'/occupation.
... don't see why their couldn't be some ... italian support for the at the beginning of the century slowly rising anti-french movement ...

Might also 'fit' into the beginning italian-austrian-french opposities.
 

yourworstnightmare

Banned
Donor
I think Austria would have cede Trento and Trieste to italy for Italy to remain in the Triple Alliance and fight on the same side as Austria.

Also if there's no coup in the Ottoman Empire 1913, won't the LU be in Power, since they were in government after the political chaos during the Balkans war that had forced the CUP out of power (and was the reason the CUP decided to stage a coup in the first Place, of course the defeat in the First Balkan war made LU's position extremely weak). And the Grand Vizier of the LU government was Mehmid Kamil Pasha, who was an Anglophile. As long as his government persist the Ottoman Empire would probably not join the war.
 
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NoMommsen

Donor
...
Also if there's no coup in the Ottoman Empire 1913, won't the LU be in Power, since they were in government after the political chaos during the Balkans war that had forced the CUP out of power (and was the reason the CUP decided to stage a coup in the first Place, of course the defeat in the First Balkan war made LU's position extremely weak). And the Grand Vizier of the LU government was Mehmid Kamil Pasha, who was an Anglophile. As long as his government persist the Ottoman Empire would probably not join the war.
What "LU" are you talking about ?
The "Freedom and Accord Party" ? ... of stunning 6 seats out of 288 respectivly 275 in 1908 and 1912 ? ...

Also : a mayor reason for the 'necessary' coup of the CUP in 1913 was the loss 1st Balkan-war.
Not happening ITTL.
 
I think Austria would have cede Trento and Trieste to italy for Italy to remain in the Triple Alliance and fight on the same side as Austria.

Also if there's no coup in the Ottoman Empire 1913, won't the LU be in Power, since they were in government after the political chaos during the Balkans war that had forced the CUP out of power (and was the reason the CUP decided to stage a coup in the first Place, of course the defeat in the First Balkan war made LU's position extremely weak). And the Grand Vizier of the LU government was Mehmid Kamil Pasha, who was an Anglophile. As long as his government persist the Ottoman Empire would probably not join the war.

Trieste itself is probably off the table at least pre war, it's too important as a port, some sort of autonomy deal including an Italian university is probably the most Italy can get prior to a possible post war AH collapse.

Not unless the war came to them, or England was ostensibly neutral. Which is sort of the idea and probably inevitable given Russian ambitions towards the straits (insofar as anyone had blame for WW1 Czarist Russia IMHO is it).

Quesrion: assuming British neutrality (and later difficulties) and French defeats in the mediterranean what does Japan do? Do they make a grab at Vietnam, or even the Dutch East Indies? That would look awfully tempting circa 1917 ish, but could very well explode in their face when the peace is signed and Britain is free to curbstomp Japan. If they're smart theyd attack Vietnam or possibly Manchuria in 1914, after France's navy is sunk, since Britain staying out immensely simplifies the situation.

Resentment over being "robbed" again probably would contribute to Japan taking an anti Britain stance in the *Second World War.
 
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Another thing to keep in mind- with Umbero still alive Victor Emmanuel might be more amenable to tolerating left wing politics, especially if (as a thirty something crown Prince) he decides to disassociate himself from his fathers regime. Particularly if the king dies sometime during or after the war this could also have an impact on the Triple Alliance as from what I gather the liberal parties in Italy tended to be anti Austrian while the conservatives were more in favor of rapprochement.
 

yourworstnightmare

Banned
Donor
What "LU" are you talking about ?
The "Freedom and Accord Party" ? ... of stunning 6 seats out of 288 respectivly 275 in 1908 and 1912 ? ...

Also : a mayor reason for the 'necessary' coup of the CUP in 1913 was the loss 1st Balkan-war.
Not happening ITTL.
Yes, they did not have the seats, but due to government chaos in 1912 actually were the government. Basically it was a very tumultous year, and the LU government that was appointed shortly before the Balkan War begun was the third government of that year. They had the support of the "Saviour Officers" that had forced the CUP government out earlier (then there was a non-partisan government for some time in between). And the Saviour Officers were pissed that the CUP had cheated in the 1912 elections and thus forced them out (this can easily too be considered a coup).

So with no Balkan War the LU government would probably have launched election at some point, and then the question would be who would win. And of course neither side were really beyond cheating. It's possible that another Saviour Officer coup might happen after said elections. But LU would stay in charge for some time from 1912 until elections are called again, and then it would be unclear who'd win.
 

BigBlueBox

Banned
Nice narrative :)

Some proposals, as at least one point hasn't been covered by your narrative so far : Bosnia in 1908.

As an alternative possibility of its solution :
- Austria-Hungary now also officially rules over Bosnia
- By agreement between A-H, Germany and Russia the Balkan will be 'put on ice' furthermore ... much to the delight of the ottomans as
- The ottomans further territorial integrity will be guaranteed by the Triple Alliance - including Russia, still weakened from the relolution of 1905 and the lost war with japan, but
- Russia will be 'promised' some solution for its sea-trade and traffic through the straits in the near future
- Italy might be offered some 'right' at first in Libya (maybe extended to some arrangement similar to Egypt with nominal sovereignity of the Porte) as well as be shown into the direction of Tunesia ...

Tunesia is kinda 'integrated' into the french sphere but nevertheless legally still an independant country under french ... 'protection'/occupation.
... don't see why their couldn't be some ... italian support for the at the beginning of the century slowly rising anti-french movement ...

Might also 'fit' into the beginning italian-austrian-french opposities.
So Russia abandons all of its goals and accepts German dominance in Europe in exchange for vague promises that Germany can easily break, and Italy abandons most of its goals for similarly vague promises that can be also broken. Sounds realistic.
 
Quesrion: assuming British neutrality (and later difficulties) and French defeats in the mediterranean what does Japan do? Do they make a grab at Vietnam, or even the Dutch East Indies? That would look awfully tempting circa 1917 ish, but could very well explode in their face when the peace is signed and Britain is free to curbstomp Japan. If they're smart theyd attack Vietnam or possibly Manchuria in 1914, after France's navy is sunk, since Britain staying out immensely simplifies the situation.

Resentment over being "robbed" again probably would contribute to Japan taking an anti Britain stance in the *Second World War.

Manchuria is probably on the table, given it undermines Russian interests in the region and so would at least get a tolerant nod from London as, at least offically, it dosen't violate the colonial status quo. Attacking French colonies lays out some troubling precident though, and I doubt the financers in Britain or New York would be too keen to open up the credit tap to fund the campaign to seize them which would be a crippling blow to Japan.

Also, if the French navy is at the bottom of the sea I doubt the British are going to remain neutral. A decade of invasion literature has ramped up public paranoia of German naval hegemony to a fever pitch, and the Admirality is going to be wringing its hands quite a bit if the Triple Alliance has eliminated any other potentially balancing force iin European waters. Expect Britain in a "French Fleet sunk in 1914" scenario to push HARD for a mediated peace, which probably ends up with the Balkan States tossed onto the tracks of the proverbial oncoming Oriental Express in exchange for moderating the demands on France. Russia this early on can likely get away with insisting on a White Peace and get back to her infastructural and economic reforms, which holding off political reforms behind a picket of bayonets until the population gets a little more placated by improving quality of life. If the CP refuse to accept reasonable terms, I'm sure the Brits will step in actively.
 
So Russia abandons all of its goals and accepts German dominance in Europe in exchange for vague promises that Germany can easily break, and Italy abandons most of its goals for similarly vague promises that can be also broken. Sounds realistic.

Italy's goals impel her against both France and Austria; there is a reason that she entered into the Triple Alliance in the first place, and waited a year to enter WWI. Or to put it another way- Italy is forgoing Istria and Dalmatia and accepting Ottoman Albania to prevent Austria from getting it; in return she is able to realistically challenge France and England for dominance in the Mediterranean, making good on her claims to Tunisia, Malta, Nice, Savoy and Corsica.

Manchuria is probably on the table, given it undermines Russian interests in the region and so would at least get a tolerant nod from London as, at least offically, it dosen't violate the colonial status quo. Attacking French colonies lays out some troubling precident though, and I doubt the financers in Britain or New York would be too keen to open up the credit tap to fund the campaign to seize them which would be a crippling blow to Japan.

Also, if the French navy is at the bottom of the sea I doubt the British are going to remain neutral. A decade of invasion literature has ramped up public paranoia of German naval hegemony to a fever pitch, and the Admirality is going to be wringing its hands quite a bit if the Triple Alliance has eliminated any other potentially balancing force iin European waters. Expect Britain in a "French Fleet sunk in 1914" scenario to push HARD for a mediated peace, which probably ends up with the Balkan States tossed onto the tracks of the proverbial oncoming Oriental Express in exchange for moderating the demands on France. Russia this early on can likely get away with insisting on a White Peace and get back to her infastructural and economic reforms, which holding off political reforms behind a picket of bayonets until the population gets a little more placated by improving quality of life. If the CP refuse to accept reasonable terms, I'm sure the Brits will step in actively.

That is my thought indeed, Japan sneaks an invasion of Manchuria in while Russia's back is turned.

Britain may push for a mediated peace but what is reasonable to her may well not be reasonable to the Triple Alliance, remember at this point they are occupying the Rhone Valley and a good chunk of Picardy and Lorraine, Germany et al are going to demand (aside from Italian gains) a good chunk of France's colonies and I doubt Britain would accept that. If Russia is doing fairly well (as I posited) then I don't think he would consent to abandon his gains just because France dropped the ball.
 
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That is my thought indeed, Japan sneaks an invasion of Manchuria in while Russia's back is turned.

Britain may push for a mediated peace but what is reasonable to her may well not be reasonable to the Triple Alliance, remember at this point they are occupying the Rhone Valley and a good chunk of Picardy and Lorraine, Germany et al are going to demand (aside from Italian gains) a good chunk of France's colonies and I doubt Britain would accept that. If Russia is doing fairly well (as I posited) then I don't think he would consent to abandon his gains just because France dropped the ball.

I would argue you're thinking of Germany and Russia's interests far to greatly in immediate military and prestige/pride terms and not putting enough weight on politics and economics. Remember,this is still relatively early in the war before the dramatic supression and total societal mobalization has been resorted to (which made a political moderate peace intolerable), but the strain on budgets and industry an extended war would lead to (the shell shortages, known pre-war concerns over finances and proven expenses, ect.) have already become obvious. Remember that everybody had expected that upcoming conflicts would still be short, decided by an early decisive clash, and have peace settlements resembling those of the 19th century conflicts (The side occupying a position of strength negotiating a few gains,getting their indemnities, and both parties going home alive)... and the scenario you described fits those preconditions to a T.

As for getting Russia and Germany to agree, I doubt the Germans are going to stick out their neck to grab large chunks of Africa when the Russian steamroller has made a good showing in the East and a delay risks getting worse terms in Europe, while Russia knows she needs continued steady flow of forgein credit to keep up her modernization efforts: which only Britain and France are able and willing to provide.
 
I would argue you're thinking of Germany and Russia's interests far to greatly in immediate military and prestige/pride terms and not putting enough weight on politics and economics. Remember,this is still relatively early in the war before the dramatic supression and total societal mobalization has been resorted to (which made a political moderate peace intolerable), but the strain on budgets and industry an extended war would lead to (the shell shortages, known pre-war concerns over finances and proven expenses, ect.) have already become obvious. Remember that everybody had expected that upcoming conflicts would still be short, decided by an early decisive clash, and have peace settlements resembling those of the 19th century conflicts (The side occupying a position of strength negotiating a few gains,getting their indemnities, and both parties going home alive)... and the scenario you described fits those preconditions to a T.

As for getting Russia and Germany to agree, I doubt the Germans are going to stick out their neck to grab large chunks of Africa when the Russian steamroller has made a good showing in the East and a delay risks getting worse terms in Europe, while Russia knows she needs continued steady flow of forgein credit to keep up her modernization efforts: which only Britain and France are able and willing to provide.
You are correct in that everyone is thinking in terms of a 19th century conflict. That is precisely the problem: they are imagining a decisive, rather than total, victory; or in other words a short, rather than a long, war.
The problem is that Germany failed to achieve a decisive victory, and nothing less would have allowed her to impose satisfactory terms on the Entente. The strategic situation is fundamentally disadvantageous to the Central Powers- the First World War was, in many ways, a protracted siege effort against the entire German Empire- and even gaining a status quo ante would be a disadvantageous peace from Germany's perspective, because it does nothing to break her encirclement or the demographic and geographical advantage the Entente can bring to bear against her. In the east this meant Brest-Litovsk; in the west, probably an annexation of Belgium and/or Luxemburg and/or Picardy and/or Brie-Longwy.

The scenario I described- initial British neutrality, Italian and German success, avoiding a complete collapse of Austria and Turkey- was about as favorable to the Triple Alliance as one could reasonably expect; and there will be a powerful faction in the German leadership wanting to capitalize on their victories to alter the strategic situation to her favor. Russia's advance confirms all of their worst nightmares- they threw everything they had at stopping the Russians and they barely succeeded; what will they do in a decade? Add to this the belief that- if they can just push the Russians back to their pre-war borders- they can get a more favorable deal, rather than having to compromise. The Russians too will be reluctant to accept a status quo deal- abandoning the Serbs to their fate would be a massive loss of prestige, and essentially abandoning their victorious allies; and if France can't hold her own with the Serbs, Bulgars, and Greeks fighting valiantly on her behalf, then how can she be trusted after they have been thrown to the wolves? And so the Russians will want to do one final push. If they can just go that extra distance and reach Berlin, or Vienna, or Constantinople- Constantinople, of all cities, mere miles from the front lines!- then they can sue for an honorable peace.

And then there are the French. Certainly sour at Britain's withdrawal, which will probably be blamed (not wholly inaccurately) for the catastrophe. Yet the Russian performance offers hope- clearly, Russia has the Triple Alliance on the ropes, see the Germans running back east. If they can just rally around the flag, and find the elan for one final push while the Germans are preoccupied, then they can reverse the losses and rescue France from the brink. Given how the technology favors the defense, and how the Italo-German forces have a strong position (the Rhone, and the Meuse, respectively) I doubt France will get very far. But I don't doubt that they will try.

In terms of a negotiated settlement, everyone would understand it to be only a temporary armistice; the terms would be listed accordingly.

I expect an offer like this from Berlin:
Italy to annex Nice, Savoy, Corsica, and Tunisia
-this rewards Italy for her fealty and her success; it additionally binds her securely to the Triple Alliance as Italy now also faces French revanchism. Strategically Savoy and Nice advance the line across the Alps; Corsica eliminates a salient in the Italian Mediterranean and gives a forward base to raid the French coast; and Tunisia puts pressure on Malta, and advances the line versus French Algeria.

Germany takes Luxembourg, the Belgian Ardennes, and Morocco
-French annexations aren't likely, without a total victory; but annexing the former territories opens a permanent German salient against France, and eliminates the bloody shirt of Belgian neutrality from Britain's political class. Morocco gives Germany a Mediterranean and Atlantic coastline, eases logistics between the allied powers and acts as a forward base against Gibraltar and Algeria.

in the east the best they could hope for is probably status quo ante; this is the sticking point, and where I expect most of the pressure for continuing the war will come from.

Russia's extra year may have benefited from her modernization but the bigger reason for her success is the fact that, paradoxically, Germany decided to attack her first rather than France. This plays to Russia's strengths- the Germans close the Polish salient, lengthening their line and placing the logistical burden on her, whereas Russia can trade distance for time, rallying her numbers for a counterstrike against the now overextended Germans. The German counter-counter offensive flips the script once more- now it's the Russians operating at the far end of their logistics (far longer than Germany's at that, and they're much worse at this sort of thing), who need to switch over rail gauges, who are strung out and exposed. So I expect the Germans to do much better and push the Russians back quite a bit, just as they did in OTL's 1914-1915. But as with OTL this will give her the wrong impression- just because you can take Poland, or retake Galicia and East Prussia, or even push into western Ruthenia, doesn't mean you've got Russia on the ropes. As OTL I expect the front to degenerate. The Western Front, likewise, sees largely static trench warfare- waves of attacks, counterattacks, which may temporarily move the lines a bit but ultimately fail to make a meaningful change beyond the casualty counts and the shell craters. As with OTL the 19th century mindset runs headfirst into 20th century realities, and creates a 20th century tragedy.
 
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