I have long considered that Italian neutrality- or even better, Italy honoring the Triple Alliance- was th easiest way to secure a German victory, even given 1914 conditions. Italy remaining neutral in the conflict means bolstering Austrian performance in 1914-1915, or else forcing her to make territorial concessions to Italy, or both; not impossible even starting from Franz Ferdinand’s assassination, but it requires probable German intervention, diplomatically or otherwise, and by definition precludes the OTL war beyond its earliest months.
The French deployments with a CP Italy are not likely to change much- the Savoy Alps are probably among the most defensible land borders in Europe, and the Nice region is horridly exposted to French navy, so even if Italy wasted her army in an all out attack the French could probably hold them off with a smaller force. While I would not put it past the Italians to focus on an Alpine offensive given the close cooperation with Germany I suspect wiser heads will prevail. Italy had 1.2 million soldiers in 1914, and put ~33 divisions on the initial offensive against Austria (and mobilized 5 and a half million total); assuming that she mirrors France’s likely deployment and concentrates in Lorraine, then with the OTL deployment that could place 68 German Divisions and 33 Italian divisions versus 62 French divisions, or roughly a 5:3 advantage towards the Central powers. An attack through Lorraine could be feasible, perhaps, but I think unlikely. The big question facing the Germans is whether to go east or west. With the extra Italian divisions the Schleiffen Plan looks awfully tempting, and for good reason- IMHO Germany can take Paris if Italy is with them in 1914. Add to this that British neutrality, while unlikely, is not impossible- quoting the Sleepwalkers:
IMHO given a stronger Russia (for reasons I will detail below) I think that Germany will ultimately choose either an east-first policy or a modified Schleiffen Plan which limits the offensive through southern Belgium and Luxemburg, which in combination with the Irish Home Rule debate will probably be enough to guarantee initial British neutrality for the initial engagement, though probably not indefinitely unless the war ends quickly.
Before I start with my PoD I want to review the strategic situation in the Mediterreanean. All the following quotes are Paul G. Halpern’s The Mediterreanean Naval Situation 1908-1914.
On Britain:
On Italy:
The French typically possessed a serious numerical advantage and a far more significant tactical advantage over Italy and Austria but her position was relatively fragile. France needed to exploit her superior numbers to decisively engage and defeat the Italian navy, prior to its junction with Austria’s, therefore avoiding the necessity of engaging in risky shore offensives against the Italians, which would expose them to dangerous losses against enemy submarines, mines, and torpedo craft. This was to be accomplished by offensive actions against the Italian coast- probably Sardinia, though Sicily, and the Ligurian coast were also likely targets- with the goal of neutralizing Italy’s naval bases and cruiser/submarine fleet, and to additionally goad the Italian fleet into an engagement by seizing territory from them. Austria was basically a non-factor absent Italian assistance as her fleet was too weak, too distant, and too easily contained in the Adriatic to pose a serious threat on her own; but in combination with Italy she could, in theory, pose a serious challenge to French hegemony.
Italy was well positioned to harass French efforts, albeit probably not capable (barring exceptional circumstances) of winning a straightforward engagement even with Austrian assistance and British neutrality. Nevertheless with an earlier emphasis on creating a fleet in being of fast dreadnoughts, supplemented by a substantial expansion in destroyers, cruisers, submarines, and her coastal defenses in Sicily and Sardinia, she could in theory seriously hamper French operations, forcing her to commit her fleet to risky coastal offensives/blockades and attritioning her navy over time- basically, the ideal Italian strategy is to force France to fight several Gallipolis, then move in for the kill at an opportune moment. If successful, a combination of the Italian and Austrian fleets could thereafter consider future offensive operations against France and Britain, or at the very least pose enough of a threat to draw off British ships from the Atlantic.
Entente forces depended utterly on naval supremacy, specifically French naval supremacy- England withdrew her larger assets, keeping only a minimal land garrison and lighter craft to deter a Central Powers attack on their bases. These craft- based out of Cyprus, Malta and Egypt- would be tasked with interdicting any potential landings or raids against the aforementioned bases, as well as monitoring the entrance to the Adriatic. French forces were primarily concentrated in Toulon, where they could engage in rapid action against Italy and deter a landing in Provence- which would threaten the Alpine defense- as well as providing cover to convoys from Algeria, which were to transfer the colonial garrison as quickly as possible; her lesser force at Bizerte was tasked with guarding the Straits of Messina, potentially interdicting the Austrians or else preparing an attack on Sicily or Sardinia. Owing to the security of the Savoy-Rhone border France kept minimal forces in the area, opting instead to concentrate her armies in the Rhine, where they would be needed against the Germans; as with England France’s security therefore depended utterly on her naval advantage. The Central Powers’ strategic objective vis a vis is therefore the following:
1) to effect, as quickly and safely as possible, a consolidation of the Italian and Austrian navies; 2) to maintain defenses in Sardinia and other coastal regions, in order to deter French attacks, or at least impose disproportionate losses against them in the process; 3) to preserve their capital ships as a fleet in being, imposing additional burdens on the Entente navies; 4) to exploit to the fullest the use of lighter craft against enemy commerce and coastal activities, in order to defend Italy’s coast and allow potential torpedo or mine strikes against French capital ships, and 5) to position themselves for a decisive counterattack in the event of severe attritional losses as a consequence of the former
Should the French navy suffer severe losses as a result of the prior points, the Entente position in the Mediterranean rapidly becomes untenable. Naval action against Provence likely allows a mass breakthrough across the Alps; absent French capital ships, strategic bases- Malta, Corsica, Tunisia, Egypt- are exceedingly vulnerable to a naval invasion, and could likely be taken by a Central Powers offensive before British reinforcements can arrive from the Atlantic.
To all of this I would add that the relative strengths of the Austrian, Italian, and French fleets varied considerably; when the war starts matters a great deal, as does when and how many dreadnoughts are built by the powers. Given the prompt, and the trend of Austrian and Italian naval building (in direct competition with each other) eventually leading to British position becoming untenable, the easiest way to accomplish this is to have one of those two powers become a dreadnought power earlier.
Now finally for my PoD: Umberto I avoids his assassination. Conservative and vaguely Germanophile, the king’s survival has a few knock on effects in the government; the main goal is to strengthen Italo-German relations. The most immediate impact of this is an earlier dreadnaught race: OTL, Italian engineer Vittorio Cuniberti was the first to propose the concept which eventually became the Dreadnaught Class. In 1903 Cuniburti wrote an article for Jane’s Fighting Ships which advocated an “all big gun” warship, in contrast to the pre-Dreadnaught standard of many guns of mixed caliber. Cuniberti advocated having four turrets of the largest caliber then in use- a twelve inch gun- atop a heavily armored, fast vessel which can therefore overwhelm existing ships while shrugging off their typically weaker armament. OTL he proposed the design to the Italian government but it was rejected due to lack of funds, and with government permission he published his article; TTL the king’s government, still sulking from the defeat in Ethiopia, accepts… so in ~1904 the Italian Colossus is launched, sparking a panic in London, and prompting the other powers (especially Austria) to embark on major building programs. The Dreadnaught race begins much sooner, as does the Entente Cordiale; in practice this also pushes Austria closer to Italy, as the Austrian buildup (along with that of the French) makes the alliance more valuable. A stronger Triple Alliance may, in theory, also help alleviate the principal problem facing Italy’s navy- her insufficient steel industry and relative lack of funds. A smarter Italian navy would emphasize destroyers, fast cruisers and torpedo boats, and fewer, lighter/cheaper battleships (as opposed to the heavy emphasis on expensive super-dreadnaughts which were always delayed and far beyond Italy's budget). Add an earlier promotion of Paolo Thaon, whose ideas seem on the whole to have been more sensible to Italy's strategic situation.
Absent the king’s assassination Giuseppe Siracco’s government, presumably, can last longer; his lenient attitude towards the strikers isn’t as much of a drag when the king wasn’t shot by one of them, and- assuming the king is more firmly committed to an anti-French/pro-German policy- financial reforms would be attractive as a precondition to building any Italian dreadnaughts. A near-death experience might convince the king to moderate his strong conservative stance (or it might cause him to double down; since this is a pro-Italian timeline I’m leaning towards the former, or rather a typical conservative crackdown followed by grudging bread-and-circuses concessions afterwards to mollify the mob). More importantly, from our perspective, the king also retains strong interest in north Africa- Italy takes a strong interest in both Libya and Morocco (as well as a potential Spanish alliance/engagement) but does not invade Libya, instead accepting the compromise deal of administering the province nominally in the sultan’s name. This avoids the Italo-Turkish War, which has immense implications for the eastern Mediterranean, and also saves Italy considerable effort and expense.
When the Tangier Crisis hits, Italy and Austria-Hungary both back Germany. The crisis is peacefully resolved but it strengthens the bonds between the Triple Alliance and convinces Italy to embark on a stronger, anti-French naval expansion. This in turn prompts an Austrian naval race… France looks on uneasily and draws closer to Britain and Russia.
With the Libyan War averted the Ottomans are on a much firmer footing. The war, OTL, cost the Ottomans significant territory and prestige, and directly led to the First Balkan War (which, directly, led to the First World War, which was in many ways also the Third Balkan War). The Ottoman government is somewhat more stable and more prosperous, and with British and German capital is able to put a firmer foot forward. The Berlin-Baghdad Railway precedes somewhat ahead of schedule, as does the Hejaz Railway. The First World War is also delayed, which strengthens Italy and Austria versus France (more time to build their navy), the Ottomans (a near-complete Baghdad to Berlin railway, further reforms, and a complete Hejaz railway) and the Russians (who have much better railways, a modest air force, and better artillery).
The French deployments with a CP Italy are not likely to change much- the Savoy Alps are probably among the most defensible land borders in Europe, and the Nice region is horridly exposted to French navy, so even if Italy wasted her army in an all out attack the French could probably hold them off with a smaller force. While I would not put it past the Italians to focus on an Alpine offensive given the close cooperation with Germany I suspect wiser heads will prevail. Italy had 1.2 million soldiers in 1914, and put ~33 divisions on the initial offensive against Austria (and mobilized 5 and a half million total); assuming that she mirrors France’s likely deployment and concentrates in Lorraine, then with the OTL deployment that could place 68 German Divisions and 33 Italian divisions versus 62 French divisions, or roughly a 5:3 advantage towards the Central powers. An attack through Lorraine could be feasible, perhaps, but I think unlikely. The big question facing the Germans is whether to go east or west. With the extra Italian divisions the Schleiffen Plan looks awfully tempting, and for good reason- IMHO Germany can take Paris if Italy is with them in 1914. Add to this that British neutrality, while unlikely, is not impossible- quoting the Sleepwalkers:
Even the question of Belgium seemed unlikely to trigger an intervention. It was widely assumed, on the basis both of military intelligence secured by the French General Staff and of military inference, that the Germans would approach France through Belgium, breaching the 1839 international treaty guaranteeing its neutrality. But the cabinet took the view that, while Britain was indeed a signatory to the treaty, the obligation to uphold it fell on all the signatories collectively, not on any one of them individually. Should the matter actually arise, they concluded, the British response would be ‘one of policy rather than obligation.’
Indeed, it is striking with what sang-froid senior British military and political leaders contemplated a German breach of Belgian neutrality. On the basis of Anglo-French General Staff conversations in 1911, Henry Wilson had come to the conclusion that the Germans would choose to cross the Ardennes through southern Belgium, confining their troops to the area south of the rivers Sambre and Meuse; these findings were presented to the 114th meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defense. The same scenario was discussed by the cabinet on 29 July, when Lloyd George showed, using a map, why it was likely that the Germans would cross ‘only […] the furthest southern corner’ of Belgium. Far from greeting this prospect with outrage, the ministers accepted it as strategically necessary (from Geramnys’ standpoint) and thus virtually inevitable. British strategic concerns were focused primarily on Anwerp and the mouth of the river Schelde, which had always been regarded as one of the keys to British security. ‘I don’t see,’ Churchill commented, ‘why we should come in if they go only a little way into Belgium.’ Lloyd George later claimed that he would have refused to go to war if the German invasion of Belgium had been confined to route through the Ardennes. British policy-makers assumed in any case that the Belgians themselves would not make their last stand in the south but would, after offering token resistance to demonstrate that they had not permitted the violation, fall back on their lines of fortification further to the north. There would thus be nothing automatic about the relationship between a German invasion of Belgium and British intervention in the conflict.
IMHO given a stronger Russia (for reasons I will detail below) I think that Germany will ultimately choose either an east-first policy or a modified Schleiffen Plan which limits the offensive through southern Belgium and Luxemburg, which in combination with the Irish Home Rule debate will probably be enough to guarantee initial British neutrality for the initial engagement, though probably not indefinitely unless the war ends quickly.
Before I start with my PoD I want to review the strategic situation in the Mediterreanean. All the following quotes are Paul G. Halpern’s The Mediterreanean Naval Situation 1908-1914.
On Britain:
In early 1912, changing diplomatic, military, and naval circumstances forced the Admiralty into some hard thinking about the Mediterranean situation. The result of this was the new organization of the fleet announced by Churchill in the House of Commons on March 18. The underlying causes of the reorganization were the growth of the German, Austro-Hungarian and Italian navies in the preceding few years. It was, however, the failure of the Haldane mission to achieve a detente in the naval race with Germany that finally forced Churchill and the admiralty to act.
Churchill, after the Admiralty had scrutinized Cassel’s report, wrote Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, on January 31 that the German proposal would require a new and vigorous British response. To match the old German six-year program of
Of the various possible contingencies, the Admiralty considered that the propoesd deployment would “secure” the Mediterreanean in case of war between Britain and France against Germany and Austria. It would be “adequate” if Britain and France- and possibly Russia- were opposed to the entire Triple Alliance. In the less probable situation that Britain alone at war against Germany and Austria, it was thought by good management Britain could maintain herself simultaneously in both theaters- the North Sea and the Mediterranean- once mobilization was complete; but until a decision was reached in the North Sea many risks would have to be taken in the Mediterranean. In the improbable contingency of Britain alone against the entire Triple Alliance, the situation “would then become very grave” with certain heavy losses in the Mediterranean, although a meeting between the hostile Mediterranean fleets (Austria and Italy) and the German fleet could probably be prevented, and each could be attacked separately with superior strength. This was a far cry from the casual acceptance of the same possibility in the 1908 war plans and reflects how far the situation had altered to Great Britain’s disadvantage in only four years.
On Italy:
With her long coastline and populous ports exposed to attack, and her navy notably weaker than that of a suspicious and none too friendly France, the extent to which Italian naval forces could have been committed away from home in adventures among the Dodecanese in case of war with a major maritime power is questionable. The memorand of Admirals Rocca Rey and thaon di Revel seem primarily concerned with more immediate problems in the Adriatic or Tyrrhenian. Captain Boyle, the British naval attache, believed that acquisition of Tripolitana and Cyrenica had actually weakened Italy by increasing her dependence on the sea and vulnerability to naval attack. He indicated the fallacy of the popular assumption that because Italy held both shores of the central Mediterranean she would be able to control it: this would require a fleet strong enough to deny passage to ships of two great powers, Britain and France, who had excellent bases adjacent to the waters in dispute
At the end of 1912 the French naval attache also reported that the Italian fleet could not think of engaging the French fleet without risking disaster because of the numerical and technical inferiority of its ships and the state of its training, which had fallen off during the Libyan war...
A year later, however, the French attache sounded a note of alarm. He still considered the Italian navy clearly behind the French at approximately the state the French found themselves in 1906. But, he added, if one took account of the distance the Italians had already come, it was necessary for France to be on guard in the future and to keep the lead. He warned that by 1917 an Italian fleet led by vigorous new chiefs, and with a dozen dreadnoughts based on Maddalena, might constitute a danger. This danger might have materialized sooner if the Italians, instead of being forced closer to the Triple Entente powers by their maritime vulnerability as the British naval attache and many others in England confidently believed, turned toward close naval cooperation with their Austrian rival and ally whose fleet was no longer to be disdained. This is exactly what happened in the spring and summer of 1913.
The French typically possessed a serious numerical advantage and a far more significant tactical advantage over Italy and Austria but her position was relatively fragile. France needed to exploit her superior numbers to decisively engage and defeat the Italian navy, prior to its junction with Austria’s, therefore avoiding the necessity of engaging in risky shore offensives against the Italians, which would expose them to dangerous losses against enemy submarines, mines, and torpedo craft. This was to be accomplished by offensive actions against the Italian coast- probably Sardinia, though Sicily, and the Ligurian coast were also likely targets- with the goal of neutralizing Italy’s naval bases and cruiser/submarine fleet, and to additionally goad the Italian fleet into an engagement by seizing territory from them. Austria was basically a non-factor absent Italian assistance as her fleet was too weak, too distant, and too easily contained in the Adriatic to pose a serious threat on her own; but in combination with Italy she could, in theory, pose a serious challenge to French hegemony.
Italy was well positioned to harass French efforts, albeit probably not capable (barring exceptional circumstances) of winning a straightforward engagement even with Austrian assistance and British neutrality. Nevertheless with an earlier emphasis on creating a fleet in being of fast dreadnoughts, supplemented by a substantial expansion in destroyers, cruisers, submarines, and her coastal defenses in Sicily and Sardinia, she could in theory seriously hamper French operations, forcing her to commit her fleet to risky coastal offensives/blockades and attritioning her navy over time- basically, the ideal Italian strategy is to force France to fight several Gallipolis, then move in for the kill at an opportune moment. If successful, a combination of the Italian and Austrian fleets could thereafter consider future offensive operations against France and Britain, or at the very least pose enough of a threat to draw off British ships from the Atlantic.
Entente forces depended utterly on naval supremacy, specifically French naval supremacy- England withdrew her larger assets, keeping only a minimal land garrison and lighter craft to deter a Central Powers attack on their bases. These craft- based out of Cyprus, Malta and Egypt- would be tasked with interdicting any potential landings or raids against the aforementioned bases, as well as monitoring the entrance to the Adriatic. French forces were primarily concentrated in Toulon, where they could engage in rapid action against Italy and deter a landing in Provence- which would threaten the Alpine defense- as well as providing cover to convoys from Algeria, which were to transfer the colonial garrison as quickly as possible; her lesser force at Bizerte was tasked with guarding the Straits of Messina, potentially interdicting the Austrians or else preparing an attack on Sicily or Sardinia. Owing to the security of the Savoy-Rhone border France kept minimal forces in the area, opting instead to concentrate her armies in the Rhine, where they would be needed against the Germans; as with England France’s security therefore depended utterly on her naval advantage. The Central Powers’ strategic objective vis a vis is therefore the following:
1) to effect, as quickly and safely as possible, a consolidation of the Italian and Austrian navies; 2) to maintain defenses in Sardinia and other coastal regions, in order to deter French attacks, or at least impose disproportionate losses against them in the process; 3) to preserve their capital ships as a fleet in being, imposing additional burdens on the Entente navies; 4) to exploit to the fullest the use of lighter craft against enemy commerce and coastal activities, in order to defend Italy’s coast and allow potential torpedo or mine strikes against French capital ships, and 5) to position themselves for a decisive counterattack in the event of severe attritional losses as a consequence of the former
Should the French navy suffer severe losses as a result of the prior points, the Entente position in the Mediterranean rapidly becomes untenable. Naval action against Provence likely allows a mass breakthrough across the Alps; absent French capital ships, strategic bases- Malta, Corsica, Tunisia, Egypt- are exceedingly vulnerable to a naval invasion, and could likely be taken by a Central Powers offensive before British reinforcements can arrive from the Atlantic.
To all of this I would add that the relative strengths of the Austrian, Italian, and French fleets varied considerably; when the war starts matters a great deal, as does when and how many dreadnoughts are built by the powers. Given the prompt, and the trend of Austrian and Italian naval building (in direct competition with each other) eventually leading to British position becoming untenable, the easiest way to accomplish this is to have one of those two powers become a dreadnought power earlier.
Now finally for my PoD: Umberto I avoids his assassination. Conservative and vaguely Germanophile, the king’s survival has a few knock on effects in the government; the main goal is to strengthen Italo-German relations. The most immediate impact of this is an earlier dreadnaught race: OTL, Italian engineer Vittorio Cuniberti was the first to propose the concept which eventually became the Dreadnaught Class. In 1903 Cuniburti wrote an article for Jane’s Fighting Ships which advocated an “all big gun” warship, in contrast to the pre-Dreadnaught standard of many guns of mixed caliber. Cuniberti advocated having four turrets of the largest caliber then in use- a twelve inch gun- atop a heavily armored, fast vessel which can therefore overwhelm existing ships while shrugging off their typically weaker armament. OTL he proposed the design to the Italian government but it was rejected due to lack of funds, and with government permission he published his article; TTL the king’s government, still sulking from the defeat in Ethiopia, accepts… so in ~1904 the Italian Colossus is launched, sparking a panic in London, and prompting the other powers (especially Austria) to embark on major building programs. The Dreadnaught race begins much sooner, as does the Entente Cordiale; in practice this also pushes Austria closer to Italy, as the Austrian buildup (along with that of the French) makes the alliance more valuable. A stronger Triple Alliance may, in theory, also help alleviate the principal problem facing Italy’s navy- her insufficient steel industry and relative lack of funds. A smarter Italian navy would emphasize destroyers, fast cruisers and torpedo boats, and fewer, lighter/cheaper battleships (as opposed to the heavy emphasis on expensive super-dreadnaughts which were always delayed and far beyond Italy's budget). Add an earlier promotion of Paolo Thaon, whose ideas seem on the whole to have been more sensible to Italy's strategic situation.
Absent the king’s assassination Giuseppe Siracco’s government, presumably, can last longer; his lenient attitude towards the strikers isn’t as much of a drag when the king wasn’t shot by one of them, and- assuming the king is more firmly committed to an anti-French/pro-German policy- financial reforms would be attractive as a precondition to building any Italian dreadnaughts. A near-death experience might convince the king to moderate his strong conservative stance (or it might cause him to double down; since this is a pro-Italian timeline I’m leaning towards the former, or rather a typical conservative crackdown followed by grudging bread-and-circuses concessions afterwards to mollify the mob). More importantly, from our perspective, the king also retains strong interest in north Africa- Italy takes a strong interest in both Libya and Morocco (as well as a potential Spanish alliance/engagement) but does not invade Libya, instead accepting the compromise deal of administering the province nominally in the sultan’s name. This avoids the Italo-Turkish War, which has immense implications for the eastern Mediterranean, and also saves Italy considerable effort and expense.
When the Tangier Crisis hits, Italy and Austria-Hungary both back Germany. The crisis is peacefully resolved but it strengthens the bonds between the Triple Alliance and convinces Italy to embark on a stronger, anti-French naval expansion. This in turn prompts an Austrian naval race… France looks on uneasily and draws closer to Britain and Russia.
With the Libyan War averted the Ottomans are on a much firmer footing. The war, OTL, cost the Ottomans significant territory and prestige, and directly led to the First Balkan War (which, directly, led to the First World War, which was in many ways also the Third Balkan War). The Ottoman government is somewhat more stable and more prosperous, and with British and German capital is able to put a firmer foot forward. The Berlin-Baghdad Railway precedes somewhat ahead of schedule, as does the Hejaz Railway. The First World War is also delayed, which strengthens Italy and Austria versus France (more time to build their navy), the Ottomans (a near-complete Baghdad to Berlin railway, further reforms, and a complete Hejaz railway) and the Russians (who have much better railways, a modest air force, and better artillery).
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