This is somewhat similar to the "Nomonhan" thread I just posted, but I
approach it from a different angle.
Tokyo-based civilian and military officials opposed early Japanese
aggression in Asia, but did not enforce their policy preferences on
commanders in the field.
Instead, they allowed the forward commanders, especially in the
Kwangtung Army, to present them with a fait accompli. As these faits
accompli were successful, Tokyo's objections lessened, and the
prestige and boldness of aggressive militarists increased.
Other leaders in the world, local Chinese authorities, Chiang Kai-
shek, Stalin, Ramsay McDonald, Herbert Hoover and Henry Stimson, were
immediately disturbed by Japan's occupation of Manchuria in 1931, and
frightened at the disruption of the Pacific status quo.
However, all of them judged that resisting Japan would be counter-
productive. In China, local commanders in Manchuria for instance felt
like Chiang Kaishek was deliberately sabotaging their attempts to
resist, and that he was certainly unsupportive. The Soviet Union did
not react, and even withdrew its troops from the Chinese eastern
railway in northern Manchuria to get out of the way of the Japanese in
the winter 1931-32. This was a reversal of Soviet behavior in 1929,
when they fought back against Chinese forces that tried to oust
them,and sharply reasserted their position. In both Chiang's and
Stalin's case, regardless of whether they saw Japan's moves as rogue,
or centrally directed, they assumed that any reaction or resistance
would be more likely to escalate rather than quell Japanese
aggression.
In Britain and America, some talked about economic sanctions and naval
shows of force, but in the end MacDonald and Hoover were of the
opinion that those moves risked war without prospects of changing
Japan's course of action, and they ended up only posing moral and
unbacked diplomatic objections.
What if Chiang Kai-shek instead calculated that the Kwangtung Army was
violating Tokyo's policy, and that what Tokyo needed to get control of
its forces was to have the costs and ineffectiveness of KA land-grabs
to be demonstrated, and this caused him to try to crush the incursion?
Separately, what if Stalin made the same calculation and opted for a
show of force to either hold the line against the Japanese or throw
them back?
What-if the MacDonald or Hoover opted for naval shows of strength,
either in reaction to the Manchuria crisis or the 1932 Shanghai
clashes, or if they resorted to trade or financial harassment of
Japan?
In each of these variants, is the more likely result Tokyo pulling in
the horns of the Kwangtung Army or its Navy, or is it escalation to
fullscale war between Japan and China, Japan and the Soviet Union, or
Japan and the west in the early 1930s?
approach it from a different angle.
Tokyo-based civilian and military officials opposed early Japanese
aggression in Asia, but did not enforce their policy preferences on
commanders in the field.
Instead, they allowed the forward commanders, especially in the
Kwangtung Army, to present them with a fait accompli. As these faits
accompli were successful, Tokyo's objections lessened, and the
prestige and boldness of aggressive militarists increased.
Other leaders in the world, local Chinese authorities, Chiang Kai-
shek, Stalin, Ramsay McDonald, Herbert Hoover and Henry Stimson, were
immediately disturbed by Japan's occupation of Manchuria in 1931, and
frightened at the disruption of the Pacific status quo.
However, all of them judged that resisting Japan would be counter-
productive. In China, local commanders in Manchuria for instance felt
like Chiang Kaishek was deliberately sabotaging their attempts to
resist, and that he was certainly unsupportive. The Soviet Union did
not react, and even withdrew its troops from the Chinese eastern
railway in northern Manchuria to get out of the way of the Japanese in
the winter 1931-32. This was a reversal of Soviet behavior in 1929,
when they fought back against Chinese forces that tried to oust
them,and sharply reasserted their position. In both Chiang's and
Stalin's case, regardless of whether they saw Japan's moves as rogue,
or centrally directed, they assumed that any reaction or resistance
would be more likely to escalate rather than quell Japanese
aggression.
In Britain and America, some talked about economic sanctions and naval
shows of force, but in the end MacDonald and Hoover were of the
opinion that those moves risked war without prospects of changing
Japan's course of action, and they ended up only posing moral and
unbacked diplomatic objections.
What if Chiang Kai-shek instead calculated that the Kwangtung Army was
violating Tokyo's policy, and that what Tokyo needed to get control of
its forces was to have the costs and ineffectiveness of KA land-grabs
to be demonstrated, and this caused him to try to crush the incursion?
Separately, what if Stalin made the same calculation and opted for a
show of force to either hold the line against the Japanese or throw
them back?
What-if the MacDonald or Hoover opted for naval shows of strength,
either in reaction to the Manchuria crisis or the 1932 Shanghai
clashes, or if they resorted to trade or financial harassment of
Japan?
In each of these variants, is the more likely result Tokyo pulling in
the horns of the Kwangtung Army or its Navy, or is it escalation to
fullscale war between Japan and China, Japan and the Soviet Union, or
Japan and the west in the early 1930s?