Cont.:
A Question of Numbers
In spite of their comparative lack of organisation and overarching division of labour (all vigils were miniature armies in themselves and did not specialise too much, and the command and representation structure of the added-up confederal army made restructurings, which would group all heavy and all light cavalry, all infrantry etc. together, difficult), the war went well for the Confederacy in the Eastern theatre.
The Confederates and Mucianus` army met at Laodikeia. Mucianus was outnumbered by far: his 40,000-50,000 soldiers stood against 120,000 revolutionary soldiers. Under these auspices, the Battle of Laodikeia became the predictable slaughter. Less than an hour into the battle, Mucianus and his generals were aware that the battle would be lost. Their cavalry was dismantled and their infantry encircled. Thanks to the intense discipline of their troops - and the comparative lack of experience and coordination among the Confederates -, they nevertheless managed to break free from the encirclement, pushing with all their force Northwards. On their flight, they were harassed by the Confederate cavalry, but Mucianus managed to withdraw with more than 20,000 soldiers to Nysa.
On the Western front, things looked different. Probus and the commander of the Gallo-Roman detachment, Flavius Ingenianus, had advanced as far East as Icosium, defeating local vigils and sacking towns on their way. The Confederate vicarius Mactarius, a diligent, unzealous Neopunic- and Latin-speaking man from Leptis Magna with political and military experience of sorts, was disinclined to send his army of little over 30,000 men against the presumably stronger combined imperial forces. He insisted on additional drafts from the surrounding towns, and was backed by the Cretan commanders and tribunes. The Agonistic African commanders and tribunes, on the other hand, pressed for immediate action. It was their own towns they sought to protect - and, some murmured, their church`s treasure, gathered at Sitifis, where construction of a magnificent prayer and assembly house had begun before the war.
The protocol in such a situation was unclear, no precedent was known where a majority of military tribunes opposed the strategy of the vicarius in command. As it was, almost 15,000 Agonistic militiamen left Hippo against Mactarius` orders and confronted the imperial armies on their way inland towards Sitifis. They were able to inflict serious losses on the imperial forces in the Battle of Tamanuna, but ultimately, they were outnumbered and dispersed. They took another desperate stand at Sitifis, which withstood the siege for more than three weeks, until yet another Agonistic town fell.
In the meantime, the remaining Agonistici loyal to Mactarius had serious difficulties levying sufficient new troops. Carthage, Hippo, Oea, Leptis Magna, Cirte or Hadrumetum were large cities who had contributed very meagre contingents - but there was a reason for this. The Agonistic church and movement had originated in these cosmopolitan and open-minded African coastal towns - but they had never become a majority there. Their control over these towns was fragile and rested on the movement`s political and military monopoly. Young non-Agonistic men were not easily convinced to fight for a Confederacy in which they had no say and whose local representatives kept trying to proselytise them and had not proven overly apt at managing their large and economically complex cities with their simplistic egalitarianist policies, either.
It was only when Mactarius and his supporters took over the negotiations and conscriptions, promising to install universal comitia (instead of exclusively Agonistic ones) to rule their civitates by confederal law, that levying a force strong enough to confront Probus and Ingenianus became possible.
Probus and Ingenianus had marched on the shortest military road Eastwards, ignoring the Agonistic stronghold Theveste and sacking the weakly protected Sufetula instead, when Mactarius` Confederate army finally managed to confront them in the Battle of Septiminicia. The Confederates were marginally fewer soldiers and considerably less well-trained and organised, but they put up a great fight and held out until Probus and Ingenianus were forced to withdraw.
The imperial troops were condemned to garrison themselves in inimical towns now, attempting to recover, but unable to draw fresh forces. The Confederates had suffered heavy losses, too, but they were able to muster new recruits who`d defend their free homeland. Time was working against Probus and Ingenianus, and they knew that. It must have been soon after Septiminicia that the two leaders abandoned their plans for a march on Egypt and decided to defend their gains in Numidia.
In the meantime, Mucianus repeated Decius` mistake and extorted as many new recruits and resources for his army from among the wealthy and populous Asian civitates as he was able to in order to withstand the onslaught of the Confederacy, who had taken over the offensive in Anatolia with their victory at Laodikeia.
Predictably, Mucianus` policy was highly unpopular with the locals and antagonised countless poleis. One by one, large cities like Ephesos, Smyrna and Pergamon appealed to the Confederacy for help. One by one, they shut their gates to Mucianus` soldiers and relied on aid by the confederal navy. Smaller poleis joined them, too - and so did Athens, on the other shore of the Aegean Sea, where a group with a slightly varied philosophy of that of the Alexandrian Good Citizens had swung public opinion in favour of restoring the great city`s independence and joining the Confederacy.
Mucianus had little power and time to spare for counterinsugrency efforts.
To be continued.
A Question of Numbers
In spite of their comparative lack of organisation and overarching division of labour (all vigils were miniature armies in themselves and did not specialise too much, and the command and representation structure of the added-up confederal army made restructurings, which would group all heavy and all light cavalry, all infrantry etc. together, difficult), the war went well for the Confederacy in the Eastern theatre.
The Confederates and Mucianus` army met at Laodikeia. Mucianus was outnumbered by far: his 40,000-50,000 soldiers stood against 120,000 revolutionary soldiers. Under these auspices, the Battle of Laodikeia became the predictable slaughter. Less than an hour into the battle, Mucianus and his generals were aware that the battle would be lost. Their cavalry was dismantled and their infantry encircled. Thanks to the intense discipline of their troops - and the comparative lack of experience and coordination among the Confederates -, they nevertheless managed to break free from the encirclement, pushing with all their force Northwards. On their flight, they were harassed by the Confederate cavalry, but Mucianus managed to withdraw with more than 20,000 soldiers to Nysa.
On the Western front, things looked different. Probus and the commander of the Gallo-Roman detachment, Flavius Ingenianus, had advanced as far East as Icosium, defeating local vigils and sacking towns on their way. The Confederate vicarius Mactarius, a diligent, unzealous Neopunic- and Latin-speaking man from Leptis Magna with political and military experience of sorts, was disinclined to send his army of little over 30,000 men against the presumably stronger combined imperial forces. He insisted on additional drafts from the surrounding towns, and was backed by the Cretan commanders and tribunes. The Agonistic African commanders and tribunes, on the other hand, pressed for immediate action. It was their own towns they sought to protect - and, some murmured, their church`s treasure, gathered at Sitifis, where construction of a magnificent prayer and assembly house had begun before the war.
The protocol in such a situation was unclear, no precedent was known where a majority of military tribunes opposed the strategy of the vicarius in command. As it was, almost 15,000 Agonistic militiamen left Hippo against Mactarius` orders and confronted the imperial armies on their way inland towards Sitifis. They were able to inflict serious losses on the imperial forces in the Battle of Tamanuna, but ultimately, they were outnumbered and dispersed. They took another desperate stand at Sitifis, which withstood the siege for more than three weeks, until yet another Agonistic town fell.
In the meantime, the remaining Agonistici loyal to Mactarius had serious difficulties levying sufficient new troops. Carthage, Hippo, Oea, Leptis Magna, Cirte or Hadrumetum were large cities who had contributed very meagre contingents - but there was a reason for this. The Agonistic church and movement had originated in these cosmopolitan and open-minded African coastal towns - but they had never become a majority there. Their control over these towns was fragile and rested on the movement`s political and military monopoly. Young non-Agonistic men were not easily convinced to fight for a Confederacy in which they had no say and whose local representatives kept trying to proselytise them and had not proven overly apt at managing their large and economically complex cities with their simplistic egalitarianist policies, either.
It was only when Mactarius and his supporters took over the negotiations and conscriptions, promising to install universal comitia (instead of exclusively Agonistic ones) to rule their civitates by confederal law, that levying a force strong enough to confront Probus and Ingenianus became possible.
Probus and Ingenianus had marched on the shortest military road Eastwards, ignoring the Agonistic stronghold Theveste and sacking the weakly protected Sufetula instead, when Mactarius` Confederate army finally managed to confront them in the Battle of Septiminicia. The Confederates were marginally fewer soldiers and considerably less well-trained and organised, but they put up a great fight and held out until Probus and Ingenianus were forced to withdraw.
The imperial troops were condemned to garrison themselves in inimical towns now, attempting to recover, but unable to draw fresh forces. The Confederates had suffered heavy losses, too, but they were able to muster new recruits who`d defend their free homeland. Time was working against Probus and Ingenianus, and they knew that. It must have been soon after Septiminicia that the two leaders abandoned their plans for a march on Egypt and decided to defend their gains in Numidia.
In the meantime, Mucianus repeated Decius` mistake and extorted as many new recruits and resources for his army from among the wealthy and populous Asian civitates as he was able to in order to withstand the onslaught of the Confederacy, who had taken over the offensive in Anatolia with their victory at Laodikeia.
Predictably, Mucianus` policy was highly unpopular with the locals and antagonised countless poleis. One by one, large cities like Ephesos, Smyrna and Pergamon appealed to the Confederacy for help. One by one, they shut their gates to Mucianus` soldiers and relied on aid by the confederal navy. Smaller poleis joined them, too - and so did Athens, on the other shore of the Aegean Sea, where a group with a slightly varied philosophy of that of the Alexandrian Good Citizens had swung public opinion in favour of restoring the great city`s independence and joining the Confederacy.
Mucianus had little power and time to spare for counterinsugrency efforts.
To be continued.
