Renauds Government Refuses Armistice
- Thread starter Carl Schwamberger
- Start date
John Farson
Banned
Did you even read the previous posts before typing this ?
Killer Japanese bio weapons in the UK, anyone?
Never mind how you get those weapons there through two or three oceans dominated by the Allied navies.Everyone is talking about the French sweeping from Tunisia into Libya like it would be a walk in the park, but it wouldn't. The Italians had concentrated most of their assets in Libya on that location AND they had a short rail link to their main supply hub in Tripoli conveniently located near the border.
Meanwhile, the French had the fortifications of the Mareth Line they had built in case of war with Italy located some km further west :
Link
So, we have the French badly beaten up in their own homeland and severely disorganised. Most structures will be ad-hoc improvisations, something the French military was not really good at at the time. Moreover, they are in their prefered position: A fortified line they think cannot be flanked.
My guess is the French stay put, and the Italians advance the hundred and something km that separate the line from the border, and build their own defences opposite it after a failed half-hearted attack or two. Neither side is the able to break the stalemate until the British sweep in from the east, since, if the French attack, they would be facing Italian troops doing the only thing they know to do reasonably well: defending fortified positions in hilly terrain with no fear of flanking attacks.
Regarding the British offensive, I think it will be a bit slower than OTL.
On the plus side, a lot of the Italian forces are busy in the west building trenches opposite the French.
On the downside, Italy could probably spare more troops for Lybia, since getting stuff from the ports to the front was the main issue, much less than port capacity. With their units in Tunisia a stone throw away from Tripoli and with half that distance covered by rail, the Italians should have the needed trucks to supply new forces to be deployed east against the British. Moreover, these troops would not be caught out of position at the end of their supply line deep into Egypt, but rather behind pre-prepared coastal fortifications.
Thus, the British would probably face a series of somewhat more bloody and a bit more lenghty sieges, probably dragging on the conquest of Cyrenaica into March, or even April or May 1941 instead of February as OTL, especially if Balbo survives.
Now, the thing is on February 9th OTL, Churchill ordered a halt to the African offensive and shortly after had troops shipped to Greece. Question is: If his forces are still east of Benghazi in February, and the French are still in the war, would he still go ahead with the operation in the Balkans to impress the Americans ? My guess is yes.
If this happens, then British offensives in Lybia are halted and a lot of the troops are sent to Greece, where they are defeated by the Germans.
If Churchill refrains from Greece, he could probably take Lybia in short order as the precarious Italian position might collapse. Although, as said, I find this unlikely.
This means the British would be ready for another go at the Italians only after recovering from their Greek debacle in mid May, when they launched OTL Operation Brevity, or even as late as mid June, when they launched Battleaxe. Thus, the fall of Lybia should become apparent to Mussolini only after Barbarossa has been launched.
Would Hitler form the Afrika Korps with much needed tanks and trucks now that the ultimate struggle of the Arian race has begun ? My guess is no, which means the Italians loose Africa by early Autumn 1941 at the latest.
Meanwhile, the French had the fortifications of the Mareth Line they had built in case of war with Italy located some km further west :
Link
So, we have the French badly beaten up in their own homeland and severely disorganised. Most structures will be ad-hoc improvisations, something the French military was not really good at at the time. Moreover, they are in their prefered position: A fortified line they think cannot be flanked.
My guess is the French stay put, and the Italians advance the hundred and something km that separate the line from the border, and build their own defences opposite it after a failed half-hearted attack or two. Neither side is the able to break the stalemate until the British sweep in from the east, since, if the French attack, they would be facing Italian troops doing the only thing they know to do reasonably well: defending fortified positions in hilly terrain with no fear of flanking attacks.
Regarding the British offensive, I think it will be a bit slower than OTL.
On the plus side, a lot of the Italian forces are busy in the west building trenches opposite the French.
On the downside, Italy could probably spare more troops for Lybia, since getting stuff from the ports to the front was the main issue, much less than port capacity. With their units in Tunisia a stone throw away from Tripoli and with half that distance covered by rail, the Italians should have the needed trucks to supply new forces to be deployed east against the British. Moreover, these troops would not be caught out of position at the end of their supply line deep into Egypt, but rather behind pre-prepared coastal fortifications.
Thus, the British would probably face a series of somewhat more bloody and a bit more lenghty sieges, probably dragging on the conquest of Cyrenaica into March, or even April or May 1941 instead of February as OTL, especially if Balbo survives.
Now, the thing is on February 9th OTL, Churchill ordered a halt to the African offensive and shortly after had troops shipped to Greece. Question is: If his forces are still east of Benghazi in February, and the French are still in the war, would he still go ahead with the operation in the Balkans to impress the Americans ? My guess is yes.
If this happens, then British offensives in Lybia are halted and a lot of the troops are sent to Greece, where they are defeated by the Germans.
If Churchill refrains from Greece, he could probably take Lybia in short order as the precarious Italian position might collapse. Although, as said, I find this unlikely.
This means the British would be ready for another go at the Italians only after recovering from their Greek debacle in mid May, when they launched OTL Operation Brevity, or even as late as mid June, when they launched Battleaxe. Thus, the fall of Lybia should become apparent to Mussolini only after Barbarossa has been launched.
Would Hitler form the Afrika Korps with much needed tanks and trucks now that the ultimate struggle of the Arian race has begun ? My guess is no, which means the Italians loose Africa by early Autumn 1941 at the latest.
Who and the what now? That sounds absurd enough to actually be something from real life.
Cutting out the Tirpitz? Any chance you could give a brief summary or links to the stories in question as whilst it's piqued my interest, the site seems somewhat less than intuitive to search.
Regarding North Africa, here it's possible that Operation Compass (or should that be Protractor or Set Square?) would be a spoiling offensive to buy time for the French to reorganise.
With France fighting in Somaliland Italian forces would be stretched thinner, meaning that the 5th Indian division is unlikely to be sent to East Africa. This means that the British offensive would likely be a month ahead of OTLs schedule, which would have ramifications in Greece.
The real question is, how much damage would a French offensive from Tunisia do in January 1941?
With France fighting in Somaliland Italian forces would be stretched thinner, meaning that the 5th Indian division is unlikely to be sent to East Africa. This means that the British offensive would likely be a month ahead of OTLs schedule, which would have ramifications in Greece.
The real question is, how much damage would a French offensive from Tunisia do in January 1941?
The Italians that invaded British Somaliland numbered 25.000. They had light and medium armour, artillery and superior air support. In their invasion, they demonstrated the ability to use superior firepower (especially tanks) to influence the battle, the ability to infiltrate and outflank enemy positions and to coordinate large columns of men across many miles of desert.
They faced 4000 British troops, most of them colonials of dubious quality. They were short on artillery and had no tanks or armoured cars nor any anti-tank weapons to oppose the Italian medium and light tanks.
If you add to them the French, then you get (according to wiki) some 7,000 men in seven battalions of Senegalese and Somali infantry (who are probably not the best of quality), 3 batteries of field guns, four batteries of anti-aircraft guns, a company of light tanks, four companies of militia and irregulars, two platoons of camel corps, and an assortment of aircraft.
Even combined, the Italians still outnumber the Allies 2-1. However, their odds will be far better since they will be able to attack, cut off and defeat the French separately before the British can do anything about it.
Thus, it's unlikely IMHO that the Allies can somehow achieve victory in the theater, meaning that the 5th Indian div. will probably be withdrawn to Sudan as OTL, leading to a slow, grinding campain of sieges and assaults on Italian fortified bases in Lybia, maybe long enough for the the troops to be transferred to Greece before Benghazi is taken.
I agree with the start. The decisive factor here is the vulnerable sea route from Italy to Libya. As I pointed out earlier the French airfields in Tunisia interdict that route far more effectively than Malta, the airfields in Algeria provide depth the Axis cant reach. Then there is the French navy & its bases @ Oran & the other ports on the Algerian littoral. The Italians would be swiftly defeated at sea by the combined weight of the Anglo/French navies & air cover from Tunisia & Algeria. Unless Germany intervenes with a significant part of it air force the Italian supplies to Tripoli will fall off to useless levels by autum. If German air power intervenes decisively then the air attack on Britain will be weakened to useless levels. If the German air force is kept up in strength to suppress the Allied air power & keep their fleets at bay then there will be wholly inadequate support for attacking the USSR in 1941. If the necessary airpower is withdrawn for a new eastern front then the Axis are back on the losing side of the air battle in the Mediteranean, the same as they were in early 1943.
If the necessary strength of the GAF is kept in the Med to dominate the Anglo French then they have been committed to a strategic direction lacking useful resources & otherwise without any stratgecly decisive opportunity.
What the mostly like stratiogic choice for Hitler might be is for another post.
I agree that the Italian navy will suffer huge losses given time. However, the above scenario is, IMHO, a bit too optimistic for the Allies. What aircraft do the French use to destroy Italian convoys in little over a month ("til autumn") ?
Asuming they have some left and didn't commit (and loose) most of them to cover the evacuation from the mainland (which would have been France's top priority), how long do they keep them serviceable, given that the factories that produced replacements and spare parts, and most of the supply dumps where reserves where held, are now in German hands ?
And if you say that it will be the British staging bombers from Tunisia, keep in mind that most of them HAVE to be kept in England to help repulse what seems to be an imminent invasion. Even once fears of Sealion are over, London still has to juggle demands for bomber aircraft from
- Bomber Command (hitting back at Germany, the still held false belief that the bomber might decide the war, necessary for morale on the home front)
- Coastal Command (Battling the U-Boats)
- RAF in Egypt for the offensive into Libya ('THE' operation as far as Britain is concerned)
- East Africa
- minor commitments elsewhere
Sure, they'll sink far more Italian merchant ships. However, in the short term, this isn't a problem for Italy, as they can afford to take increased losses going by the tonnange they had and were producing.
Regarding the navy, the Italians adopted the "Fleet-in-Being" strategy, meaning they were quite carefull (probably way more than neccesary, maybe even cowardly on occasions) about having their heavy units engage the enemy. This means there probably wont be any quick and decisive naval victory over Benny's navy, but rather a slow and steady process of grinding it away in limited engagements, skirmishes, air strikes etc, long enough for the Italians to supply their colony into Spring 1941 when the decision to send troops to Greece would be taken, and probably beyond that into summer '41.
Just out of curiosity what kind of game model/system do you use, I would be interested in knowing more about them?
The Italian air force won't be able to field anything better than Fiat CR32 in this theatre, these guys will be minced by Bloch MB152 and later on evacuated Dewoitine from the mainland.
The French Air Force will have key advantages when defending southern France during July 1940. First of all it will be using bases close to the frontline, whereas the Luftwaffe will be reliant on north of the Loire airbases, this also means that Bf109 won't be able to fight very long over southern France, at last until their airbases are moved forward.
Factories will produce right until they are destroyed by the retreating French forces. War production in southern France lasted until the armistice and stories abounds of retreating units recieving new equipment and weapons right until the end.
About 800 aircrafts and 400 tanks were based in North Africa in June 1940 before evacuations started. Some of the tanks were heavier D1 models, against which the Italians would have nothing to bring to bear.
Resupplying will be a problem, but not during the first few months, since pre based supply dumps and stockpiles can be used at first. Once Libya is taken, things will be harder but then the Allies will be on the defensive so it won't matter as much. Anglo-American industry will be able to take up some of the slack as well later on.
All the ships in the world, won't do any good if on arrival in Tripoli and Benghazi you can't unload them promtly. Research indicates that harbour facilities in Italian Libya were primitive for want of a better word. It is them which are a far mor eimportant target for bombing, especially as neutralising harbours only takes mines or sunken ships blocking key entrances.
A super Taranto strike with more carriers would do the trick of crippling the Italian navy.
They were using US made Martin 167 to bomb the British fleet at Gibralter. The Wiki article will do: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Martin_Maryland
Some 800 French aircraft made it to Africa when the armistice ended evacuation, how many more might have done so I cant estimate accurately. All possible remaining late models types were to be sent, but some were still comitted to combat alongside the older types. There were roughly 300 more accepted aircraft awaitng shipment or already loaded in the US. The aircraft carrier Bearn was loaded when the armistice came. The US based martin aricraft company had already set up one assembly/prep facility in Morroco and another was being prepared in Algeria. Deliveries of aircraft from the US is suposed to have amounted to 1,200 more by December & over 3000 scheduled for production in 1941. Payment was not a serious problem as France had deposited two large shipments of gold bullion in North American banks the to secure credit for all the war material orders France had placed.
My best guess is the Fernch could have had 20+ aircraft in operational combat groups in Tunisia fairly queickly. The remainder would best be initially held in Algeria & Morroco while groupes were organized, aircraft serviced/prepared, and crew trained. For the autum & winter a fair number of fresh groupes with modern French & US aircraft could be shifted to the Tunisian airfields as needed.
Aside from the service facility for the US aircraft Africanhad been designated for expansion of the French training establishment. The exisiting facilities for supporting the peace time aircraft garrison were being expanded. Since part of the role of the Noth African aviation establishment was to deter & oppose Italy the facilities were not trivial. The number of all weather runways and aircraft parking in Tunisia rivaled what the Italians had in Sicilly. From early June France had been planning, and then executing a evacuation of its most valuable military material to Africa. The armistice cut that short, but the support material arriving at the docks or embarked & at sea was not trivial.
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If Germany threatens Britain with air & surface attack then any Allied forces in Africa will face mostly Italians with trivial numbers of German reinforcements. The Germans have the same problem as the Allies, they cant be strong everywhere. If Hitler chooses to pursue the French to Africa post haste then Britain would clearly be in no danger & can afford to send reinforcements elsewhere. Best case for the Allies is Hitler directs the Wehrmacht to campaigns in both directions bringing what amounts to a two front war to the German AF.
The relatively weak Brit attacks on the Italy/Libya route of OTL were fairly destructive. In this case the French would early on be able to direct far more aircraft vs the sea route, and the Tripoli docks that the Brits could. they also had a submarine fleet that could start operations imeadiatly, and a flotillia of torpedo boats able to interdict from the Tunisian ports all along the littoral. Raids by destroyers & cruisers from Tunis & ports further west in Algeria would renforce all that. the thing is the French are able to support far more forces in reach of the cargo ships than the Brits could from Malta & distant Alexandria. Note that in this case the Brits still have their historical fleet based in Egypt, so the Italian sea route is not threatened from both directions.
You are correct in that the Italian cargo fleet wont be attritioned away in a fortnight or a couple months. However in OTL the italians depended heavily on active fleet & air actions to protect the cargo delivieries. They also resorted to organizing a convoy system. In OTL Italy halted shipments at frequent intervals when the British interferance became to great. In this TL Allied naval & air activity into the autum would be forcing the Italians to choose between keeping a "fleet in being" & seeing unacceptable interferance with supply shipments, reducing shipments, or commiting the fleet.
I'm not much up on the current games of the last decade or two. For a fast test of the long terms stratigic problems the old Third Reich game would do. There are a lot of questions about details or resources, and force sizes, but the old carpenters saying "yer not building furniture" applies here. For the equivalent of building good furniture the ancient Europa system would be ok for modeling the short term campaigns. A friend has one of the decendant of 3rd Reich - A World at War set up in his basement & his crowd want me to learn it. Sounds like it would be years for that to be productive given the demands making a living puts on my time.
MOving the Kuftwaffe bases from Germany to the northwestern French airfields facing the UK took a bit over a month. that was over 75% of the strength. Moving to souther France, or Sicilly is tougher due to fewer airfields, and a thinner rail & automotive road system.
In OTL Roosevelt managed some massive emergency shipments the Britain July-September. With the French cargo fleet available more could be sent.
I've noticed attacking ships at anchor in harbors causes more trouble than those at sea. Maybe the French would pay lot of bombers visits on the Tripoli harbor? It represents one obvious choke point.
Unfortunalty the Bearn was not a combat carrier. It was originally built as a test & then converted to a "aircraft transport". The Brits are on their own at Taranto. Anyway the French subs, MTB, and cruiser raids should either draw out the Italian fleet, or threaten havoc on the cargo ships.