As the Canadian Annual Review reported on the supposed Australian naval scheme, the issue itself was thrust front and center in Canadian politics once again. The proposal for the Australians read as such:
“This scheme calls for responsibility for local naval defense and the provision of 6 torpedo-boat destroyers, 9 submarines and 2 depot ships, at a cost of $6,387,500 together with the maintenance of 79 officers and 1,125 men provided by the imperial government with as many as possible taken from among Australians. The administrative control of the flotilla was to rest with the Commonwealth government, but the officers and men would form part of the Imperial Navy and would be subject to the King’s regulations. While in Australian waters, they would be under Commonwealth authority, but in other waters they would pass under the control of the senior imperial naval officer. The annual expense and maintenance would amount to $930,000 and the repairs be effected in local shipbuilding yards.”
This Australian plan rather neatly aligned with what Canada had been proposing, a force for defense of the dominion that was also autonomous. While some of the detailing and the exact plan itself would need to be different, it was proof that there was indeed precedent to what Canada desired to do. The goodwill from the Quebec celebrations were still fresh in the minds of local residents and surprisingly, the calls for direct financial aid to the Royal Navy and the typical French contrarian attitudes were drying up somewhat. It was becoming clear to everybody involved that the time to strike regarding implementation of something was nearly upon them. The French Canadians were generally busy regarding an ongoing dispute about language rights and religion in Quebec and were currently ignorant of the defense issues in the government. Surprisingly though, a disagreement came from the
Canadian Military Gazette, the mouthpiece of the Militia. Concerns were voiced that
“much study should be made before any large expenditure will be sanctioned in this country for naval purposes, especially if such would come at the cost of a reduction of the militia vote. A strong land force is better for imperial interests as a whole than a baby fleet would be.” While the Militia itself seemed to be somewhat ignorant about the value of a naval force, it is rather understandable for them to see a Canadian navy as a threat especially if it detracts from their already thin budget.
Regardless, the upcoming election held all sides firm on the issue. Hauling up a relatively large issue into Parliament was a death sentence and therefore even though the Conservatives and Liberals generally agreed on the issue, it was left until after the election. The Conservative party lost the election yet again and therefore had to spend some time rebuilding the party structure, allowing the Liberal party a small lead to potentially jump start the required legislation. In fact, it was the Conservative party who made the first major move. George Foster, the previous Minister of Marine and Fisheries in 1885 and the man who had overseen the founding of the Fisheries Protection Service, presented the House of Commons with a notice of motion. It read as such:
“In view of her great and varied resources, of her geographical position and national environment, and of that spirit of self-help and self-respect which alone befits a strong and growing people, Canada should no longer delay in assuming her proper share of the responsibility and financial burden incident to the suitable protection of her exposed coastline and great seaports.”
In the wake of the Foster resolution, Kingsmill put together a rough draft of a report for Minister Brodeur regarding
“how we should commence our work of assisting in the defense of our coasts.” While very much a preliminary document, Kingsmill’s experience allowed him to deliver a
“methodical yet realistic” plan to supplement existing government policy, IE the Fisheries Protection Service in the future. Originally, this report envisioned doing little more than improving existing establishments. Improvements listed things such as a military dockyard in Quebec, a signal service connecting all important lighthouses in Canada and the start of a training regime at the Halifax dockyard. From this training system, it was hoped to have enough men ready after the first year to crew either a destroyer or scout cruiser. Kingsmill was of the opinion that under this scheme, Canada would largely be relegated to destroyers and small cruisers for the foreseeable future. Kingsmill was careful to cater his reports to the tepid Brodeur, methodically informing the Minister of every cost for construction or upkeep of various platforms. Forming his words carefully, Kingsmill would tell Brodeur,
“the government should focus for the time being, on the countries development as in that is our only hope of some day being in a position to defend our coasts as they should be. If we embrace a project of too much ambition too quickly, our young and partially developed country may if not wreck itself, at any rate seriously injure its internal economy. On the other hand, though, to spend money on partial defense or rather inadequate defense is to waste it.”
While these events were ongoing in Canada, it was obviously time for Europe to throw another wrench into their plans. This would become quickly known as the
"Dreadnought Crisis” when Reginald McKeena (First Lord of the Admiralty) introduced the estimates for the Royal Navy in March of 1909, during which he had a shocking revelation. To the surprise of the British public, the Admiralty anticipated a massive upturn in the German shipbuilding, so much so that the Royal Navy would be outnumbered in dreadnoughts by 1912. McKenna would suggest that an additional 2 dreadnoughts be added to the 1909-1910 estimates which after the frenzy the British press, public and government fell into, was rather easy to push through. This was hoisted by the Admiralty as the only way to retain their grasp on worldwide sea power, effectively tying the governments hands in the matter. The pandemonium in the press quickly crossed the Atlantic and took hold in Canada to a point, drawing even more attention to the Foster motion. Even with that hold though, Canadian policy on the issue was rather detached and very critical of the seemingly manufactured panic over the issue. The
Canadian Annual Review very accurately summarized the general Canadian response to this crisis:
“Distance from the scene and non-appreciation of what naval power and supremacy really meant to the individual as well as the Empire, was responsible to a certain extent for the somewhat critical attitude assumed by the Canadian press in regard to the British ‘panic’ and for the tendency to ‘go slow’ in speech and action.”
A rather iconic colorized photo of the power of the Royal Navy in the past and in the present as HMS Dreadnought, namesake of the adeptly named crisis, passes HMS Victory.
Canadian historians generally attribute this lack of a knee jerk reaction by Canada as a whole to a belief in the fact that the Royal Navy by itself was able to keep the Germans in check on their own. Alongside the fact that Canada seemed to be quickly approaching a point where she wanted to be responsible for her own defense, New Zealand’s
‘call to action’ of confirming the nation would sponsor a dreadnought in the face of the crisis was rather worrying for some parties in Canada. This issue brought out every member of each party and how they fell around this issue. Various parties requested a single or pair of dreadnoughts to defend the Canadian coasts in the
“one for the Pacific and one for the Atlantic” layout, although due to the overall costs this was never really a serious proposition. The Montreal based paper
La Presse was largely concerned with the fact that Canada should retain its ability to participate or abstain from any unrelated British war against another faction, Canada should not merely be yet another pawn for Britain to throw freely onto the board. The
Ottawa Citizen had the opinion that direct financial contributions were the only valuable option able to be put forward by Canada and in their words,
“it must be apparent that the place of the colonies to defend their coasts is in the line of the British dreadnought fleet. The fate of that fleet will decide the fate of our colonies. If that fleet met with disaster, any trifling squadron, or warlike revenue cutters, or cheap warships, would only be so much more loot to the conquerors.” Out of all of the news outlets that spoke though, the two that caught the eyes and ears of the Liberals was the
Montreal Herald and the
Toronto Globe.
The
Herald stated that
“the importance of the action taken by cabinet in definitely preparing for a Canadian navy development has been evident for years that such steps would be taken. Canadian development in the past has came at times the British were no longer able to bear the burden alone, as in their departure in 1905 from various bases in Halifax and Esquimalt. Now the hint is given of the possible inability of the British Navy alone to keep the ocean free for shipping, Canada again avows her readiness to step in and take her share.” As regards to the
Globe, their statement was that
“the position laid down at the colonial conferences should now be accepted as the settled naval policy. What is done by Canada must be done deliberately along the lines of Canadian policy, and in the light of consultation with the imperial government. The details must be settled, not by passing or panicky popular opinion but, as Mr Asquith says, by the responsible authorities on the advice of experts. Whether it be dreadnoughts or fast cruisers or torpedo boats, and where and when and how many, are questions not for the man in the street, but for the government.”
George Foster would return to parliament to further discuss his previous motion. In doing so, Foster leveled that there was simply two options spread before the nation as a whole. A monetary or purely ship based contribution or the fact that Canada would assume the defense of her own ports and commerce in cooperation with the Admiralty. Foster personally accepted the fact that monetary contribution would be very acceptable to the Admiralty itself, he did not view it as a largely popular option within Canada itself. Foster was almost certain that Canada would have a naval force of its own in the future and decreed that
“the time is ripe to see something grafted on the soil of Canada’s nationhood.” In the eyes of Foster, the ships of the Fishery Protection Service were nothing more than
“simple children’s toys” when put up against an actual hostile naval force and therefore, an expansion of the Fisheries Service would not be enough to ensure Canada’s defense. Foster would personally advocate in the end for Canada to contribute a dreadnought to Britain’s plight. Prime Minister Laurier would rebuke Foster with the statement of
“we are not to be carried away, we are not to be stampeded from what has been the settled policy and deliberate course which we have laid down, by any hasty, feverish action, however spectacular such action may be.”
George Eulas Foster and his wife G.E. Foster pose for a photograph, date unknown.
Laurier closed with the fact that the Canadian naval development had been ongoing since 1902 and the fact that what the Conservatives were proposing as nothing new and something he generally agreed upon. Lord Tweedmouth’s remarks at the previous conference were distributed, hoping to give the needed legitimacy to Laurier’s statements. Robert Borden, the conservative opposition leader spoke next and echoed Laurier’s general statements. He was opposed to contributions to the Royal Navy unless it was an absolute emergency, pointing out that Canada had been undertaking a
‘long gestation period for naval development’ in the past. In one of his speeches he said,
“I do not think I am making any statement in breach of confidence when I say that I am thoroughly aware that the late Raymond Prefontaine thoroughly intended to establish a Canadian naval militia or naval force of some kind. He told me so about a year before his death. Mr. Prefontaine was a man of large views and of great courage, and it may be that policy which would have been carried out otherwise has not been carried out owning to the present head of that department finding it necessary to devote his attention to other matters.” Borden closed with his opinion that he recommends making contributions in an emergency however, Parliament must decide if this is an emergency or not.
While the rest of the debate generally consisted of hollow patriotic and imperialistic speeches and jargon, parliament seemed to eventually favor the formation of a Canadian Naval policy and a Navy itself, it seemed there was no immediate serious work to push dreadnoughts or contributions. During this political signalling, Borden and Laurier retreated from the stands to have a private discussion and while that conversation was never recorded, Laurier and Borden emerged from their discussion seemingly united in the issue. As such, Laurier put forward a resolution that would cement the organization of the future Canadian Navy.
“This house fully recognizes the duty of the people of Canada, as they increase in numbers and wealth to assume in larger measure the responsibilities in national defense. The house is of opinion that under the present constitutional relations between mother country and the self-governing dominions, the payment of regular and periodical contributions to the imperial treasury for naval and military purposes would not, so far as Canada is concerned, be the most satisfactory solution of the question of defense. The house will cordially approve of any necessary expenditure to promote the speedy organization of a Canadian naval service in cooperation with and in close relation to the imperial navy, along the lines suggested by the Admiralty at the last imperial conference, and in full sympathy of commerce, the safety of the empire and the peace of the world. The house expresses firm conviction that whenever the need arises the Canadian people will be found ready and willing to make any sacrifice that is required to give to the imperial authorities the most loyal and hearty cooperation in every movement for the maintenance of integrity and honor of the empire.”
The resolution being passed unanimously by all present parties was proof that at least some small victory was finally seized by Laurier. His commitment to patiently establish some kind of naval framework along the lines acceptable to all parties seem to have paid off as the goals of Laurier, Borden, Brodeur and even Prefontaine before them had finally started to come true. Now that the house was somewhat behind all future development and Laurier already had some of his tools required such as Kingsmill, they went to work grasping their power. The main upcoming challenge was for Laurier and his party to keep the naval development within the acceptable bounds of the previous established policy and stop it from ballooning out into a garbled mess. In response to George Foster requesting additional information on the interpretation of his previous resolution, Laurier responded with
“the government has decided that, as shortly as possible after prorogation, the Minister of Marine and Fisheries alongside the Minister of Militia shall proceed to London for the purpose of conferring with the Admiralty as to the best means to be adopted to give effect to our previous resolution.” Laurier’s sudden flip from caution to decisive action was surprising to parliament however, Laurier desired to settle the issue of a naval force as quickly as possible (correctly) deducing that allowing such a bill to drag along would do nothing but expose the divides within the house.
Prime Minister Laurier depicted in a 1909 Toronto Globe political cartoon leading a hypothetical Canadian Navy, somewhat fitting and ironic given the ultimate fate of his naval plans/
Dissent would come from a strange position though, from none other but the Governor General of Canada, Earl Grey. To a point, it seems Grey had overstepped his authority in his recommendations which read as such:
“I have serious concerns that this proposed policy will not be regarded either in Canada or in England as a very effective contribution to the solution of the defense problem, unless it is followed up by a display of vigor in formulating a plan and in carrying that plan into effect such as past experience does not encourage us to hope from Mr. Brodeur. The necessity of taking prompt business action in this matter makes it desirable that the change of minister at the head of the marine and fisheries department which you have more than once informed me was impending, should be hurried up. I know you will have to face a little criticism in Quebec, but you are quite big enough and strong enough to disregard that criticism. If you share my view that the duty which Canada owes to the empire is to put the best businessman she has got at the head of the marine department, Mr. Sifton is the best man possible.”
Clifford Sifton was a member of the Liberal cabinet until 1905 when he departed to protest government issues regarding western located schools. He had previous voiced the opinion of being completely against any kind of a Canadian Navy and although he was still a member of the Liberal party, his attitude towards Quebec was rather shaky at best. Laurier was in no position to throw out one of his closest allies and an asset in Quebec over the whim of the governor general, especially not with what was about to happen. Laurier expressed to Grey that Brodeur was in the middle of preparing his plans to reorganize the department and would have them in front of him soon.
Around this same time, Kingsmill finished finalizing his previous report on what he in his professional opinion thought Canada would require for a naval force. Kingsmill recommended that both Halifax and Esquimalt would need to have their defenses and general equipment put into
‘good order and modernized’ alongside the fact that training should begin immediately on each coast. As the fishery on British Columbia was extremely important and basically unprotected, Kingsmill advocated for immediate purchase of two small cruisers able to train 200 men be acquired for the West Coast. The Atlantic approach was rather similar with a cruiser of the
Apollo class being loaned alongside 2 torpedo boat destroyers in order to train roughly 300 men. Kingsmill desired these loaned ships to be either returned eventually or purchased and completely under the command of Canada, although with Royal Navy officers and partial personnel until they could be replaced. Alongside this, Kingsmill advocated for Canadian industry to immediately start construction of 2 ocean going destroyers and 2 coastal destroyers for the Atlantic while having 4 coastal destroyers for the Pacific, small enough to be able to be transported whole or in parts to BC by rail to avoid having to go around Cape Horn to reach the West Coast. These recommendations were completely reasonable in comparison to the scope of the navy the government had seemed to have envisioned, mainly that of coastal protection and fisheries enforcement. Kingsmill himself would state:
“It is with a strong feeling of diffidence that I submit, single-handed, a scheme of naval defense for Canada and wish to say that my views are given after due consideration of the fact that monetary contribution alone is out of the question. We must develop our naval assistance to the empire with this end always in view, that the Canadian Navy is to be under the control of the dominion government, the question of its disposition in the event of war being a matter for this in authority at the time; also that at an early date we must use the newly started naval service for the protection of our fisheries, in fact, that fisheries protection and training go hand in hand, thus using the appropriation for the former in carrying out the latter, which of course, will be a considerable assistance and in the end a better use will have been made of the money.”
Apollo class cruiser HMS Retribution in drydock, likely in Halifax, Nova Scotia. One of the many sister ships to the eventually infamous HMCS Rainbow.
While the scheme itself was generally acceptable and well thought-out, the Canadian government was very hesitant to adopt anything physical without explicit Admiralty approval, even if this scheme seemed itself to fit the plan Lord Tweedmouth had put forward in the 1907 conference. Needs and opinions change in the Admiralty especially with constantly coming and going appointees. Therefore, Canada would need to wait until their Minister met with the Admiralty to decide about the fate of the stillborn Canadian Navy. Before the trip commenced though, Militia Minister Frederick Borden had significant issues with the potential for naval development in Canada. Being asked the previous year to attempt to cut his departments estimates by around $1,000,000, he had only cut a little over half of that to less than desirable results. Some factions were voicing the opinion that a navy might be more important to national defense than a Militia and the land-based force was largely for peacekeeping purposes at home, such a large budget was not needed. Robert Borden had alluded to the fact that the naval budget might be half that given to the militia, therefore coming out to $3,000,000. This was reasonable as Kingsmill would later point out however, the Militia Minister was rather afraid this money would come at the cost to his own department. He would press Laurier repeatedly about some kind of a commitment that the Militia would not suffer and as Laurier needed Sir Borden’s assistance in Europe on the naval matter, no ill feelings could be afforded. Laurier assured Borden that the Militia would not suffer as both services were viewed as necessary to the security of the nation.
The plan for the upcoming meeting with the Admiralty was put before Governor Grey by Laurier,
“Brodeur and Borden have their general instructions which seem to me to be sufficiently precise. The first object of the conference is to lay down a plan of action, and towards that plan we will gravitate fast or slow, big or small, according to the development of our financial resources. The reasonable goal seems to me that we should do as much for the navy as for the militia, as this is well understood by Borden and Brodeur. It is also well understood by them that we will not be able to reach that goal the first year.”
As the pair of Ministers departed to Britain, the debate did not cease. The competing parties pushed for their own interests, even within a common goal. One party wished to deliver prompt implementation of their plans while the other worked to keep moderation and Admiralty approval at the forefront of any choices.