Regnator Hiberae Magnanimus Terrae- A Viriatus TL

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"And, in fine, he carried on the war not for the sake of personal gain or power nor through anger, but for the sake of warlike deeds in themselves; hence he was accounted at once a lover of war and a master of war." ~ Cassius Dio​

Here he was, the man so feared by the Romans that they would no longer dare face him in battle and the man who had done what even Hannibal had never succeeded in doing, this was the man who had beaten Rome. In his 8 years as general of the Lusitani this man, Viriatus, had defeated the Romans time and again and had driven even many of the Gauls to rebellion. 6 Roman armies had fallen to him and the mighty Rome had been compelled to accept Lusitani domination of their conquered territories.

Now they were resorting to treachery and murder to destroy he whom they had failed to destroy in battle. So it was that on that fateful night in the Summer of 139 BCE that 3 men, Audax, Ditalcus and Minurus, crept into Viriatus' tent with the intention of killing this great general. In the darkness and stifling heat, these three men fanned out around the bed and the slumbering body of Viriatus. With sweat running down their heads and palms these three men gave one another glances before raising their daggers for the final, killing blow against the general. With this blow they expected to be paid riches beyond their imaginings from Rome and with this blow they expected to destroy one of her greatest enemies once and for all.

The daggers rose as the men took a deep breath, bracing themselves to finally commit the terrible deed. A sliver of moonlight shone in through the flap in the tent and illuminated the three daggers which now hung above the Iberian's body. But at that moment there was a shout and the three men froze in panic as a number of Iberian soldiers pushed through the flaps into the tent to save their general. The first man, Audax and the man originally hired by the Romans fell to the ground in surrender to the Iberians. Ditalcus, however, was a royal guard and made an attempt to continue with the assassination attempt only to be struck down before his dagger could fall. Viriatus, now awake, could perfectly see the third assassin and rolled to the side to avoid the third dagger which pierced the bed just in time for Viriatus to avoid the strike.

The Iberian reached for his sword to defend himself as the third assassin, determined to finish the job, leapt over the bad in an attempt to land a killing blow. The knife connected with Viriatus but left only a small, non-crippling wound to the general shortly before Minurus was, in turn, dispatched by the Iberian guards. These events, which took place in the course of only a few minutes, would have vital importance in the future of Iberia and Rome as a whole. As Audax, the last remaining assassin, was dragged off into the night as a prisoner, few could have foreseen what these events would bring.
 
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A Viriato timeline, nice. Most of the timelines that deal with the romans being defeated seem to forget this man who did more to humiliate Rome than Vercingetorix or Boudica did and was acclaimed by the romans themselves as one of the best military leaders they ever faced to the point they preferred to resort to assassination rather than to keep facing him in the battlefield. Keep up the good work.
 
A Brief Overview of Viriatus

Who was Viriatus? Really? The Romans knew him as 'Regnator Hiberae Magnanimus Terrae' or the 'most magnanimous king in all of the Iberian land'. The Greeks honoured Viriatus and was known by titles often exclusive to the Greeks such as 'soter' or 'saviour'. The Lusitanians honoured Viriatus as their benefactor and he was a man praised by later historians even many Roman historians. For Cassius Dio he could be compared to pure Roman ideals as he fought for neither war spoils or any material gain.

By all accounts, however, we know very little about Viriatus especially prior to his ascension as leader. We do know that he was in the prime of life and still quite young and strong even around 139 BCE when the assassination attempt took place. This could come to mean that he was still in his 20s at this point or in his early 30s as of 139 BCE but this still doesn't give much insight into his background other than he may have been born sometime between 170 and 150 BCE. He is often thought to have been born around the mountain range known to the ancient historians as Herminius Mons (also known today as Serra da Estrela) in the heart of the Lusitani tribe or possibly in the Beira Alta region.

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Rough map of the Iberian tribes prior to the Carthaginian and Roman invasions.

Either way there is little evidnece or information on Viriatus' early life in Iberia until about 150 BCE when he first really cropped up. At the time the praetor of the Roman province of Hispania Ulterior (along the Southern coast of Iberia) was a man named Servius Sulpicius Galba while the governor of Hispania Citerior (along the Eastern coast of Iberia) was a man named Lucius Licinius Lucullus. These two men joined forces to launch an invasion of the Lusitani tribe.

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The invasion was a swift affair and, after numerous defeats at the hands of the Romans, the Lusitani were driven to peace terms. In these peace terms the Lusitani lost everything, they lost their city, possessions and land to the Romans and were largely driven out into the countryside. Even so the treaty was a trap and when the Lusitani had their guard down the Romans massacred them. The survivors were then sold into slavery in Gaul save for a small number who escaped the Roman massacre among whom was a young Viriatus.

This triggered a rebellion against the Romans on the part of the Lusitani. In 149 Viriatus was part of an army of 10,000 men who invaded the Turdetani tribe. This army was soon cornered by the praetor Caius Vetilius who had been sent to Iberia to defeat the rebellion. Soon enough the Lusitani were once again on the verge of surrender to the Romans until Viriatus, mistrusting the Romans, made a speech during which he proposed an escape plan. Viriatus was made their new commander and took control of the army with plans to escape the Romans.

Viriatus baited the Romans into thinking the Lusitani were preparing for battle but when the Romans charged his line the Lusitani broke. The Lusitani scattered in organised groups with 1000 remaining under the command of Viriatus to cover their escape. Virtually all of the Lusitani soldiers survived the battle and became increasingly loyal to Viriatus. From here Viriatus would begin his campaign against the Romans with the defeat and death of Caius Vetilius at Tribola. Next Viriatus crushed a Celtiberian army hired by the Romans to defeat him. Over the next few years between 149 and 144 BCE Viriatus crushed 4 Roman armies throughout Iberia through the use of guerilla warfare mixed with pitched battles. In 144 BCE another army was sent to Iberia under the command of Quintus Fabius Maximus Aemilianus (the elder brother of Scipio Aemilianus who defeated Hannibal at Zama) to reinforce Roman soldiers already there.

Quintus Aemilianus eventually lost most of his 17000 soldiers at Ossuma before being completely defeated near Beja. This victory finally opened access for Viriatus into Southern Iberia and caused a number of problems in Rome. Finally the Romans sent their best general, Quintus Fabius Maximus Servilianus to Iberia to defeat Viriatus. But when he fell into Viriatus' ambush but was left unharmed, Servillianus finally organised a peace treaty with the Lusitani which recognized their control of the conquered regions. But this came to an end when Quintus Servilius Caepio was appointed commander of the army and affairs in Iberia and sought to bring an end to Viriatus. This brings us finally to where Viriatus narrowly escaped an assassination attempt sent by Caepio in 139 BCE.
 
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Yes yes yes! This is a much needed timeline, I had hoped someone would make a Viriatus or Sertorious timeline at some point . Great start, very well written. Will be following this.
 
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The peace which Viriatus had managed to arrange with the Romans after his previous victories over their armies in Iberia, was not to last long. Technically upon the attempted assassination of Viriatus in 139 BC, the war had already begun and movements had taken place in Iberia. Caepio himself was the brother of Servilianus who had first made the treaty with Viriatus and a major opponent of such a peace treaty. This was why, when he had first arrived in Iberia, he had appealed successfully to the senate for permission to harass Viriatus’ army in an attempt to provoke the Iberian to break the treaty and attack them. Who exactly it was that broke the treaty in 139 BCE is unknown but what is known are the movements that took place early on into the war. Viriatus was well aware that he was massively outnumbered by Caepio and chose to go on the retreat while taking up a policy of scorched earth to prevent Caepio being able to properly supply his army. It was this retreat that allowed Caepio to take the town of Arsa early on into the war but also allowed Viriatus to escape his pursuers. Having lost Viriatus into Western Iberia, Caepio began to turn on the local people who had supported the Iberian during the conflict over the previous 8 years. It was at this point that Caepio finally turned to trying to assassinate Viriatus, recognising that the general was the primary reason why the Iberians had been able to resist the Romans so well and why the Romans had proven unable to subdue the Lusitani.

But with the assassination attempt on Viriatus’ life a failure and the Iberian still very much alive to fight against the Romans and resist their attempted conquest. Ironically this assassination attempt could only backfire upon its failure, in Rome this was a massively unpopular move and deemed cowardly by the people. While, in the short term, the underhanded harassment of Viriatus’ army remained a secret in Rome, the very attempt on the life of Viriatus was largely condemnable in Rome. This caused problems for Caepio whose very presence in Iberia was out of a desire to achieve a triumph for subduing Viriatus and now suddenly found his popularity in Rome starting to drop. In Iberia the assassination attempt of the man who had become a hero for many Iberians for his successful defiance of Rome, proved to be even more dangerous to the Romans. In combination with the harsh treatment of the local Vettones and Callaici tribes in the region around Arsa, the Romans suddenly found themselves dealing with a rippling effect of dissent from the Iberians throughout the region. Even in established areas of Roman Spain the Romans started to find that they lost a lot of support from the Iberians while Viriatus succeeded in swelling his numbers from local supporters. Caepio now found himself in a very precarious position in Iberia and the threat of an uprising in Eastern Iberia cutting off his supply lines would have been a disaster. His hopes to isolate the Lusitani and cut off Viriathus from supplies now seemed to be backfiring as he found himself in a much more precarious position in Iberia. In the North the Romans were facing a number of defeats under Quintus Pompeius in the Numantine war as the Roman positions steadily became more and more precarious.

In comparison Viriatus found himself in a much better position than before, previously he had found himself steadily becoming more isolated and cut off from Northern support, but no longer. His forces swelled from locals joining him against the Romans and refugees fleeing the capture of Arsa and the ravaging of local tribes there. But Viriathus was a cautious man and had no intention of fighting Caepio head on, instead he intended to turn back to guerrilla-style warfare against the Romans. His first step was to move North against a Roman force under the command of Marcus Popilius Laenas, a consul and governor of Hispania Citerior in 139 BCE. Marcus was moving South against Viriatus through the Duero Valley, a natural defence point against invasions. It was here that Viriatus hoped to stop Marcus and re-establish communication and support to the Numantines. His force was still relatively small and further depleted by him leaving about 2000 men to shadow Caepio and keep him under threat. This left Viriathus with anywhere between 5000-9000 Lusitani soldiers to defeat an army of about 10,000-15,000 under Laenas in the North. He moved quickly, hoping to be able to prevent Laenas from clearing the Duero Valley and, with such a small force, managed to reach the valley exceptionally quickly.

The Duero Valley is a region dominated by the Douro River but containing a number of tributaries, it’s made up of a number of small canyons and forms an ideal place to counter and defeat invasions. In early 138 BCE, Viriathus finally came into contact with Laenas’ army in the Duero Valley in a number of very minor skirmishes between the two forces. In these early skirmishes Laenas’ force succeeded in driving back Viriathus’ warriors and gained a number of minor victories. But after these initial skirmishes on the banks of Duoro River, Viriathus turned back to guerrilla warfare to defeat Laenas once and for all. One night in March 138 BCE Laenas finally caught up to Viriathus’ force as he saw a large group of about 3000 Lusitani soldiers moving South along the river. Desperate to catch up to the Iberians to end Viriatus’ threat once and for all, Laenas hurried his soldiers along and pursued the Iberian force. However this pursuit would last all night with the Iberians always remaining just ahead of the Roman force until, early the next morning, the Iberians finally turned to face the exhausted Romans. But before Laenas could even hope to line up his army for battle, Viriathus’ well-rested and energised ambush force swept down from the West. Caught between two forces, exhausted and taken completely by surprise, the Romans began to panic and a number of them broke and fled. However for the other Roman soldiers the battle took a very heavy toll on their forces, the sheer weight of the Iberian assault pushed their disorganised army back into the river and their bombardment by the Iberian slingers only forced them further back. Unsurprisingly the cavalry was the first to go as they were pushed back into the river, unable to free themselves and drowned. The heavily armoured infantry didn’t fare much better and was heavily weighed down by their armour and weaponry with those unable or unwilling to dump their equipment also being drowned. Those who managed to remain on the banks of the river were cut down by the Lusitanian fighters and the army torn apart by their enemy. Only a few days later a fisherman along the river found Marcus Pompilius Laenas’ lifeless body floating down the river.

The destruction of Laenas’ army along the Duoro River would allow Viriathus to regroup his army and make preparations to defeat Caepio and reclaim Arsa. While Viriathus had been fighting Laenas in the North, the 2000 fighters left in the South had been shadowing Caepio’s army. Throughout the months between Caepio’s capture of Arsa and the defeat of Laenas’ army in March 138 BCE, Caepio had made a number of attempts to push further against the Lusitani but to no avail. Every time he moved significantly beyond Arsa, Caepio found his supply lines being attacked and significantly threatened by Viriathus’ force. Beyond this the army had consistently shadowed and followed the Roman army which had left Caepio’s soldiers on edge. A large part of this came from the fact that Caepio and his soldiers had no idea where Viriathus was and, for all they knew, that force shadowing them was Viriathus and was a much larger force than it looked. This fear in conjunction with the attacks on his supply lines, left Caepio trapped in Arsa and unable to make a significant advance. But things were about to take a turn with a number of developments that were to finally put Viriathus on the back foot.
 
Apologies for the large break, I've had a bus couple of months and not much time or will to post very often. I hope you haven't all moved on from my started timeline and will forgive me the large break.
 
Vercingétorix

The victories and the continued survival of the Lusitanian warrior, probably will have him the prestige to that perhaps will starting to join him at least some of the Iberian tribes.

Since there, if it happens, it will be seen if he has the ability to become in the Iberian Vercingétorix or if Viriato can succeed where the Gaul did not.
 
The War Turns

The death of Laenas triggered a wave of discontent in Hispania Citerior, with the Iberians there had always been the risk of uprising in supposedly settled regions. But a figurehead and a centre of anti-Roman sentiment such as Viriathus only worsened such discontent especially following a decisive victory over a Roman army and the death of the governor. In many ways the importance of the Battle of the Duoro River can't be underestimated in Viriathus' war against the Romans. Laenas' army had been left with virtually no avenue of escape by Viriathus and the casualties had been of an exceptionally high proportion. Estimates range at anywhere from 70-80% of the Roman force killed or captured at the Duoro River which constituted the near complete destruction of an army. This was a victory that certainly boosted the reputation of Viriathus, especially as a figurehead of the resistance against Rome in Iberia.

For Viriathus this marked a high-point in his fortunes in the peninsula as it freed his Northern border from Laenas' advance and helped destabilise the Roman provinces. In Central Iberia they had suffered a number of setbacks as part of the Numantine War and Caepio remained trapped in Arsa. In the aftermath of his victory, Viriathus travelled to Central Iberia to meet with the Arevaci tribe (the leaders of the Numantine Revolt) and reaffirm their alliance. As part of his diplomatic mission Viriathus brought the spoils of his victory in the form of anything precious that could be salvaged from the Roman forces. For Viriathus this was an important mission as it not only helped reaffirm the alliance between the two and secured good relations, but it also allowed him to negotiate the passage of his army through Arevaci lands towards his own territory in the South.

Viriathus was hoping to be able to, instead of travelling back through the Duero Valley and South-East to Arsa, travel South through Arevaci lands to attack Hispania Ulterior in the hope that he could force Caepio to retreat from Arsa. With the Arevaci victorious against the Romans in the North, this certainly seemed like an ideal time to strengthen their friendship and to secure passage towards home through Central Iberia without any Roman armies to stop them.

But the war was starting to reach a turning point in April 138 BCE with the arrival of Consul Decimus Junius Brutus Callaicus in Western Iberia. Concurrently another Roman force under Consul Publius Cornelius Scipio Nasica Serapio arrived in Southern Iberia with reinforcements for Caepio in Arsa. Both consuls were sent to Iberia with the intention of turning the tides of their respective wars, the Numantine War in the North and the Lusitani War in the South.

Serapio had never been the greatest or most successful general of the Roman Republic despite his relations to the famous Scipio Africanus. While praetor of Macedonia in 141 BCE, Serapio had led the Roman army that suffered a heavy defeat and the hands of the Pannonian tribes. However his rise to the office of consul had been solely based around his political machinations and, in particular, his skills as a shrewd politician. Ultimately Serapio was a relatively talented and shrewd politician but sorely lacking in military skills.

In comparison the 42-year-old Callaicus was a skilled and seasoned military man and general determined to prove himself. Ultimately we know very little about Callaicus' life before his appointment as consul in 138 BCE but we do know that he was just the kind off general that the Romans needed in Iberia. He was intelligent, quick thinking and certainly accustomed to military strategy. Whatever the problems that had been apparent in Iberia only a month before, the arrival of Callaicus and Serapio brought a change in the wind. The tides were beginning to turn.

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Re-Enactment of Decimus Junius Brutus Callaicus' march through Iberia.
 
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Do you need any help with anything dear author?

Thanks for the offer. I'm actually good right now.

It is good that you could resuming, because it has allowed me to discover this interesting TL.

Thanks for the support, glad you're enjoying it! I'm hoping to post with relative regularity but I can't say exactly how regularly I can or will post unfortunately.

YES IT LIVES

Indeed it does. I felt horrible about just leaving it after only a couple of posts but I've had a busy (and rough) couple of months so I've not really been in a position to actually focus on a Viriathus TL.
 
The Iberian Disaster​

Despite the arrival of Serapio and Callaicus, Caepio was still in a very bad position as of April 138 BCE. Serapio had made the choice to land his army at Carthago Nova as opposed to the nearer town of Gadir due to the dissent evident in the region. Effectively this meant that, despite the arrival of support, Caepio was still very much isolated from Serapio and would be for a while now. It was currently going into Spring at a time when there wasn't much food to be foraged for armies unlike there would be in the Autumn (the traditional campaigning season) so Caepio couldn't expect Serapio to make significant movement through Hispania Ulterior until Autumn. In this case it was because of problems in supply lines, campaigning in Hispania had always been a trouble in the way of supplies and conflicts of interest back in Rome meant that supplies were often inadequate. Even if Serapio did buy food from the locals there was no way that it would supply his army in Spring without a secure supply chain to provide enough food. Caepio knew that with the dissent in Hispania Ulterior, a secure supply chain from Carthagi Nova would unsustainable all the way to Arsa. Instead waiting until Autumn would allow Serapio's army to forage for needed food and even secure their supply line further until they could reach Arsa.

Indeed the victory at the Duoro River had led to much greater dissent in Hispania Ulterior than in Hispania Citerior. This was likely because the main Roman army in the region, Caepio's army, was effectively held in check at Arsa. This had further damaged Caepio's supply lines as every so often a set of supplies would be intercepted by bandits of local rebels. Even the Lusitani force had become braver as a result and some minor skirmishes had taken place along the border of Arsa. On top of this Caepio's harsh treatment of soldiers and his waning popularity both in Iberia and Rome in conjunction with the growing restlessness of soldiers longing to return home, had damaged Caepio's position. Caepio was likely hoping that Serapio's arrival would help alleviate his position and that the consul could hold Arsa and allow Caepio to return to Gadir and secure his supply lines. But his soldiers had grown tired of staying in Arsa and were steadily becoming more and more restless the longer they stayed in the town held in check by the Lusitani warriors. In some cases this resulted in Roman soldiers breaking discipline and trying to force fights with the Lusitani which even resulted in a minor skirmish in early May 139 BCE.

In response to this break of discipline, Caepio became even harsher on his soldiers and went for even crueller treatment of them. Cassius Dio says that soldiers who disobeyed Caepio were often executed. While treating the soldiers even harsher may have worked in the short term, it's long term effects could be brutal. In regards to Serapio, Caepio was right that he wouldn't risk a march through Hispania Ulterior in the current conditions and would wait until Autumn as he set up camp approximately 20 miles East of Carthago Nova to wait over the summer. But Caepio was wrong about the hope that Serapio would march straight to Arsa to relieve his soldiers. Instead Serapio had his eyes set on securing Gadir and establishing a proper supply line for his army.

This cost valuable time as Caepio found his discipline and control of the soldiers starting to wane as time went on. His hopes were that Serapio would relieve him in September and allow him to head to Gadir and secure the supply lines himself. But if Serapio himself headed to Gadir first then he likely wouldn't relieve him until November and possibly not even until the next year. This was valuable time and time in which Caepio could find himself facing a mutiny from disgruntled soldiers who were sick of campaigning and longed to return home.

In the North Callaicus similarly decided to remain in Hispania Citerior throughout the Summer albeit as a means of quelling dissent before marching towards Arevaci land. Unlike Serapio he could afford to take this time as there wasn't a disgruntled, mutinous army trapped in a town needing to be relieved.

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Note from the Author: So I would like to explain why Serapio landed at Carthago Nova in the first place and why he isn't moving until Autumn a bit more. Typically the Romans weren't fans of foraging and instead preferred to buy local food and, most commonly, sustain a supply line. But the campaigning in Hispania was rife with supply problems as the commanders tended to never get the food they needed and turned to foraging. Especially in early Spring there wouldn't be enough food to forage to properly supply a Roman army and without foraging or a supply line to actually help sustain the Roman army in this time, then it's unlikely a commander would risk moving in Spring and would wait until more favourable conditions in Autumn. (That's my logic. Please correct me if I'm very wrong but I based it upon exactly what went wrong with the People's Crusade in 1095 in that there wasn't enough food to supply 50,000 hungry people wandering through the countryside).

As for Serapio landing at Carthago Nova I also have a very good reason for that. In OTL one of Caepio's first moves after the assassination of Viriathus was to secure ports in Southern Iberia for reinforcements from Rome. In this TL he was trapped in Arsa by Viriathus' men and unable to do just that, on top of that there's dissent in the region as a result of his victory at the Duoro River making typical naval bases such as Gadir far less safe for landing an army than Carthago Nova. Serapio himself was a politician looking for military glory and not really a general so I would say it's likely he wouldn't take the riskier option of landing at Gadir but instead would land at Carthago Nova which would be safer.
 
The Fall of Arsa

In early August 138 BCE Serapio began his moves East only a month after Callaicus had made similar moves towards defeating the Numantines in the North. Those precious months between April and August 138 BCE had been devastating for Caepio who began to suffer very distinct dissent within the ranks as soldiers threatened to mutiny. News of Viriathus' arrival to the West of Arsa in June that year only served to worsen the problems within the ranks as Caepio's soldiers began to worry about the prospect of Viriathus taking them from behind.

It was these two months that were easily the most devastating to Caepio and his army as Viriathus ravaged his supply lines and his army began to starve. The land around Arsa was still in very poor shape and the army had no way of relieving itself with any attempts to leave the town resulting in Lusitani warriors ambushing any Romans who tried to escape. News of Serapio's movements to counter Viriathus and relieve Arsa certainly helped the feelings within the town but were by no means definitive enough to turn the problem around. Finally in late August Caepio accepted defeat and retreated from Arsa with his tired and hungry army in tow. Almost as soon as he left, the Iberians swarmed into the town and finally recaptured it after months of shadowing the soldiers within.

But the problems weren't over for Caepio as he now needed to escape the region around Arsa and with Viriathus blocking any route towards Gadir and the very Southern tip of Iberia, Caepio instead had to make a beeline for Carthago Nova. At the same time Serapio, inexperienced and by no means an exceptional military commander, made straight for Viriathus in an attempt to directly confront the defeat the Iberian.

October saw Caepio's bedraggled army limp back to Carthago Nova having lost a significant number of men and with those remaining being both tired and starved for food. Estimates would put Caepio's army at the beginning of the campaign at about 20,000 but by October 138 BCE that number had fallen to somewhere in the region of only 14,000 the rest of whom had died during the time spent in Arsa.

For these two months Viriathus refused to remain idle as he reunited with the soldiers who had spent the past number of months shadowing Caepio's army and began planning further movements. Ultimately from here he would turn his attention South so as to secure his Southern border while also cutting off one of the main points of supply for Roman armies, Gadir. In many ways while Gadir remained in Roman hands, Viriathus would never actually be able to defeat Rome as it potentially provided a point for the Romans to both supply their armies and land other armies to take Viriathus from the South.

Lusitania in 138 BCE

By now it would be prudent to look at what exactly the Lusitani were like in 138 BCE under Viriathus and how the Romans actually perceived them. By now the sheer perseverance and the number of victories that Viriathus had obtained against the Roman army had taken the Lusitanian War beyond simply being a tribal rebellion against Roman rule and into the realms of a full military war. By this point Spain had become a meat grinder into which Roman armies kept going to die and suffer humiliating defeats against Viriathus and the Numantines.

But under Viriathus the Lusitani were beginning to exercise control over a relatively large area as various tribes either joint them or were conquered for siding with Rome. After all the treaty that Viriathus had made with Servilianus had recognized Lusitani control over conquered territories. So by this point Rome considered themselves not just facing a rebellion but instead facing a tribe that was carving out a kingdom in Iberia. Indeed by this point the Lusitani controlled a relatively large area of land in Southern Portugal and Spain that lay just North of Hispania Ulterior.

Beyond this the continued opposition of Rome ad sheer loyalty of fighters to Viriathus was starting to give a sort of common almost national identity to what had originally been just a loose confederation of tribes. So much so that some historians have begun to interpret the Lusitani of 138 BCE as a very early stage proto-Iberian Kingdom in the making as it continued to defy Roman rule.
 
NOTE FROM THE AUTHOR: Apologies. I feel really bad for not getting this out sooner or more regularly but the past few months have been hectic with exams. Beyond that I've just kind-off forgotten at various points to actually update this but I hope this update will allow people to forgive my many transgressions. :)
 
Callaicus and the Numantine War

While Caepio and Serapio continued their operations in the South against Viriathus, operations that would ultimately result in Caepio's retreat from Arsa in August, Callaicus was in the North trying to quell dissent in Hispania Citerior. Viriathus' continued success had led to dissent among the native Iberian populace and Callaicus wouldn't feel comfortable moving against the Numantines with the prospect of rebellion in his rear.

As a result the months between April and July 138 BCE were spent both trying to quell dissent and prevent a rebellion of natives in the region as was still very possible in Hispania Ulterior and trying to sort out supply lines. Finally in July 138 BCE Callaicus began marching West to fight the Numantines and begin his campaign against them. Laenas, during his time as proconsul and governor of Hispania Citerior in 139 BCE [1], had refuted any peace that his predecessor had tried to make with the Numantines.

However the abrupt death of Laenas at the Battle of the Duoro River in 138 BCE had resulted in the Numantines growing both stronger and more confident as they launched attacks on Hispania Citerior. So in July that year Callaicus made moves to try and end these attacks once and for all by defeating the Numantines. Indeed Callaicus did manage to repel a number of attacks and even make inroads into Numantine territory throughout the months between July and October even coming to the walls of Numantia itself only to be repulsed.

Nevertheless Callaicus' campaign managed a lot despite the failure to make significant gains against the Numantines. He was a far cry from the totally inept Quintus Pompeius and showed more success than Laenas had in the region. Furthermore he succeeded in driving back Numantine attacks and restoring a degree of confidence to Roman forces in the region while also preventing a rebellion in the province.

But despite this Callaicus failed to make any concrete gains against the Numantines due to a mixture of the common supply problems that commanders in Iberia faced and his failure to take Numantia. His campaign was brought to an end in October 138 BCE due to the onset of winter and news from Hispania Ulterior. Under normal circumstances the end of Callaicus' consulship in December of that year would spell the end of his own campaigning in the region but not here. This was because in 137 BCE Callaicus became a proconsul and was granted governorship of Hispania Citerior given his experience in the region and the loss of Laenas as proconsul the previous year.

Serapio and Viriathus

Caepio's retreat from Arsa spelled the end of his hopes for a triumph in Rome for defeating Viriathus and the Lusitani. His rapidly decreasing popularity in both Rome and Iberia and even among his own men had effectively crushed his dreams of a triumph, at least for his actions in Iberia.

Serapio was very different to Caepio as a general and politician. He wasn't rash or stupid by any means and was a pretty skilled and capable politician but severely lacking in military skill. He had had the sense to wait before rushing out to Arsa due to supply problems but by August was starting to grow impatient. If he were to achieve a triumph or even gain any military standing, especially after the mess he had made of military tactics in Pannonia, then he would have to defeat Viriathus by the end of the year.

This was why when he finally left in August 138 BCE he made straight for Viriathus hoping to force a battle and win a victory over the Iberian. It would be a fatal mistake. Viriathus had spent the two months between August and October making plans to try and make a push into Hispania Ulterior and maybe even move on what could potentially be a crucial supply point at Gadir. But the rapid approach of Serapio put paid to that idea for the time being as Viriathus turned his attention to defeating the Roman army first. He had no intention of fighting them straight on given their superior numbers but he did have a plan...

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[1] For reference Laenas was consul in 139 BCE but it was common for consuls to be appointed proconsul and governor of a specific province once they stepped down for a period of anywhere between 1 and 5 years.

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Note from the author: If anyone out there has better knowledge of Roman political systems please feel free to correct or explain them to me. Because I really don't know all that much about republican Rome, I tried to do some research but I don't know for sure.

I have another update coming tomorrow at some point about exactly how Viriathus plans to defeat Serapio but done in a different format. Feedback appreciated although I don't know if anyone is still reading but... feedback appreciated! :).

RiseofBubblez
 
Loving this timeline, though noticed something:

However his rise to the office of consul had been solely based around his involvement in the murder of his cousin Tiberius Gracchus. Serapio and his cousin, Scipio Aemilianus, soon rose to power as major opponents to the supporters of Gracchus many of whom were ruthlessly hunted down. Ultimately Serapio was a relatively talented and shrewd politician but sorely lacking in military skills.

Tiberius Gracchus was not murdered until 133 BCE, which would appear to be 5 years later than where you are at currently. His proper political career wouldn't even begin until 137, when he was appointed quaestor to the consul Mancinus in Spain. Also, if you require any assistance on Roman politics of this time, you can PM me, I may be able to help.

All in all, great updates though.
 
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