REDUX: Place In The Sun: What If Italy Joined The Central Powers?

Chapter VI- Planning For The Inevitable

Chapter VI

Planning For The Inevitable


Following the secret Cabinet meeting where the decision for war was made, Italy had begun mobilisation. Like all European states, Italy's General Staff had pre-existing mobilisation tables designed to organise and simplify the process, yet those caused as many problems as they solved. Some aspects of the plan were over twenty years old, written by politically minded paper-pushers totally neglectful of modern logistical demands, human error, and political pressure. Ordering execution was one thing, but implementing it was another. Things soon fell far behind schedule. Worsening relations with Austria-Hungary in the years before the war had led many to prioritise northeastern defences over northwestern, leaving Cadorna with broken, ageing fortifications and logistics. Immense backlogs developed on the railroads; commandeered civilian vessels overcrowded northern ports. Men arrived at prearranged destinations without supplies or vice versa. Weeks-long delays and lost units were too frequent. Yearly reports by paper-pushing officers had assumed adequate artillery: much of this turned out to be obsolete, rusting in disused warehouses, or missing altogether. There was a particular shortage of mobile mountain howitzers- precisely what would be most important to break through the French lines. Manpower proved another problem. Both greying reservists and fresh-faced eighteen-year-olds needed considerable training, but there was a lack of camps, instructors, and modern equipment. In the absence of proper training, these men had to learn by experience; something which would kill many. (1)

Cadorna's predecessor Enrico Cosenz had constructed the first contingency for war with France twenty-one years ago. Cosenz's main principle was that the Italian Alps were impenetrable and Italian forces should engage France in secondary theatres. He too called for an expeditionary force to France (something the Germans ceaselessly reminded Cadorna of), but also advocated an amphibious seizure of Corsica and vigilance against enemy landings near Rome. Cadorna had written of the need to adhere to these plans, and had spent the mobilisation period updating them.

However, the problems encountered dictated change. The equipment and rail issues in moving armies north made Cadorna doubt his ability to send an expeditionary force afield. Italian soil, with ready stockpiles hours away, everyone speaking and reading the same language, and no political issues with foreign governments, made for optimal conditions. How would units function in the French mud, having to coordinate with German officers and ship things hundreds of miles away across foreign rail? Veterans of the 1912 war recalled the challenges of supply and command in the Libyan desert with horror. Would this not be more of the same? From a political perspective, even if a united Italian Expeditionary Force fought as a whole, Germany would always be in true command. Italy's Constitution made the Chief of Staff supreme commander of the military, a title Cadorna treasured. Pride forbade him from letting German officers push his men about.

When Cadorna communicated these concerns to Berlin via von Dellmensingen, the reaction was furious. He quickly discovered the dark side to German generosity: Berlin expected Italy to cooperate in its own vision for war. Cadorna insisted that since Italy was a sovereign nation and equal partner, these choices were his to make. Berlin replied that if Italy did not send an expeditionary force, as a sovereign nation and equal partner it would cancel the deployment of mountain units to the Alps. Arguing wasted valuable time and left a trail for Entente intelligence. Compromise was eventually had: Cadorna established a paper command for an Italian Expeditionary Force (Corpo di Spedizione Italiano, CSI) under General Armando Diaz. As per General Cosenz's 1894 plan, five corps and two 'independent' divisions (mostly from the First Army) were earmarked for the role, though excuses about poor weather and crowded logistics let Cadorna delay deployment until spring 1916.

Though imperfectly satisfied, Berlin relented. Attacking the Alps was surely hopeless, but at least it would tie down the French- and they had what they considered a guarantee of Italian support. Still, Cadorna had tarnished his reputation with Germany's General Staff. Problems mounted all around, but Cadorna could only go forward.

Cadorna travelled to Turin a week before the war began to assume command of his new headquarters. Having replaced those he deemed incompetent with fresh junior officers and veterans of 1912, he enjoyed the comfort of skilled subordinates. In the course of four weeks, he reminded them, they had worked miracles. They had updated their war plans, deployedAll this was thanks to their effort and skill. The coming war would not be easy, he told them, "but we are to remember the tasks of our forefathers, and to remind ourselves that we fight in their name, to finish what they began!" Rousing cheers filled the General Staff auditorium, reminding Cadorna that victory was inevitable.

While the CSI assembled at Turin, the rest of Italy's army streamed to the French frontier. Prewar plans had called for a passive strategy, letting geography keep France out. Cadorna's deep knowledge of the Alps and the need to prioritise the CSI's logistic needs confirmed the need for defence, but he rejected passivity. Italy needed to prove itself as a Great Power and actively contribute to the war, something cowering in mountain bunkers wouldn't do. A fragment of the army could hold the bulk of the 150-mile front. The rest would launch a short, swift attack against Nice. It lay a scant fifteen miles from the border and the terrain was better than anywhere else on the front. Historic Savoyard claims to the city made it a politically feasible objective. Taking it would deprive France of one of her Mediterranean bases, making an amphibious assault on Corsica much more feasible. The Fourth Army, supplemented by Italy's famous mountain divisions, and von Dellmensingen's Alpenkorps, was to accomplish the task. Once the word came, Cadorna knew the Italian Army would live up to expectations.

Preparations were just as furious on the other side of the mountains.

Italy's slide into the Central Powers had troubled the Entente less than it might appear. MI6 and Duxieme Bureau agents had thoroughly penetrated the country once war began, and knew the scope of its economic problems and the resulting political drama. Once Sonnino replaced Salandra, Entente agents reported back to their respective countries that "hostilities... may be considered likely if not imminent." After the resumption of negotiations with Austro-German diplomats, the French activated their contingency for war with Italy. Like all nations, France maintained a strategic reserve for such emergencies and, even if it could no longer actively reinforce the Western Front, did not have to deprive it of men.

The realisation that war with Italy was inevitable prompted serious debate. France had updated its contingency plan for war with Italy eleven years prior following a major intelligence leak. Its fundamental assumptions were that Italy would dispatch the bulk of its army to the Western Front, leaving little for domestic defence. Heavily influenced by the prewar cult of the offensive, the plan called for concentrating in the mountain passes to overwhelm the token Italian defenders. That would leave Turin, less than fifty miles away, exposed. With their greatest industrial city gone, Italy would surrender. The whole process was supposed to take three weeks.

Few had questioned the plan before the war, but in 1915 it seemed ludicrous. The distance from the border to Turin was the same as from Ypres to Ghent, or Loos to Mons. If such progress was unthinkable on the flat ground of northern France, how could it be achieved in Europe's highest peaks? There was also the matter of Italy's expeditionary force. Unaware that Cadorna was dragging his feet, the French assumed a sizeable Italian force would appear on the Western Front in months, if not weeks. Intelligence suggested the blow would fall in Alsace, hitherto a quiet sector. This was no time to deploy the strategic reserve to the peripheries! Many had a different objection, one based on principle rather than analysis. The plan was steeped in antiquated notions of courage conquering all, a doctrine which had killed countless Frenchmen in 1914. Sending the men on a hopeless endeavour as though they still wore red trousers was no way to win.

Factors incentivising Cadorna to defend applied to France. Only five passes were accessible by vehicles. They were heavily fortified on the French side; it was reasonable to assume the Italians had done likewise. Militarily, letting Italy attack first and weaken itself would waste their supplies and give insights as to how their army operated. Seeing their first attack dashed on the rocks would hopefully make Italy question the war and boost French morale. Best of all, it would require only minimal reinforcements.

Half a dozen officers approached Joseph Joffre at his chateau in Bas-sur-Arbe, asking him to reconsider. All were highly experienced in both field and staff service, with years of service and distinguished war records. Their General Staff colleagues had selected them for this role hoping that their credentials would endear them to the Chief. War with Italy was inevitable, they said, but calamity was avoidable. The present war plans courted disaster, and they outlined the arguments for strategic defence. A twenty-page essay, annotated with maps and charts and signed by many staff officers, boosted their case and could serve as the nucleus of a new plan.

Joseph Joffre's long career, much of it spent fighting low-technology engagements against colonial natives, had shaped him. Before the war, he'd repeatedly seen French infantry and cavalry attack and destroy their foes. His preface to Plan XVII, France's failed attempt to recapture Alsace-Lorraine at the outbreak of war, declared his intention to "advance with all forces, united to the attack..." Joffre accurately credited national survival at the Marne (and his subsequent rise to fame) to his counterattacks. All this had taught him a dangerous lesson: pushing the foe hard enough would always yield results. The failure of his spring offensives was, in his mind, due not to strategic error but inept subordinates. Joffre had doubled down, convinced he alone had the answers.

He listened politely to what the officers had to say, perused through their writing, and sacked them on the spot. The offensive would go forward. French honour demanded nothing less!

Tension marked the last days of official peace. Cadorna was as ready as he could be, and awaited only the signal from Sonnino. A pre-emptive French strike remained a danger, yet with mobilisation complete he could absorb the blow. Subordinates raised paranoid concerns of Anglo-French landings in Sicily or on Italy's long west coast, yet neither were real possibilities. He would have liked to deploy forces to Albania- protecting Italian interests there under the guise of fighting Serbia- or on North African adventures, yet neither were feasible. He spent the last days of peace in the map room, running over plans for Nice. A hundred miles away in Grenoble, Joffre conferred with General Paul Maistre, chief of staff of the newly recreated Ninth Army. Ten well-trained divisions sat along the frontier, waiting for the signal. Joffre would have liked to attack first but political pressure from Paris forbade it. (2) Once the word came, he was ready.

Sidney Sonnino announced the agreement with Germany and Austria-Hungary on 1 October 1915. The telegram reached Turin at five PM the same day: combat operations were to begin in twelve hours.

Italy had joined the Central Powers.


  1. Akin to what happened to the AEF because General Pershing wouldn't listen in OTL
  2. He always abhorred civilian authority over him, but starting a war on his own would be too much.
Comments?
 
I suspect that the French are about to get bloodied then rolled. Probably charge right into the preping front for the assault which from your description makes it sound like cadorna is expecting such an attack. So they charge in get butchered then the Italians launch their counter attack achieve a good deal of success because of French Tomfoolery but get over confident and faceplant because well cadorna is cadorna.
 
I suspect that the French are about to get bloodied then rolled. Probably charge right into the preping front for the assault which from your description makes it sound like cadorna is expecting such an attack. So they charge in get butchered then the Italians launch their counter attack achieve a good deal of success because of French Tomfoolery but get over confident and faceplant because well cadorna is cadorna.
nth battle of Nice here we gooooo

But seriously I am really curious how the Corsican campaign will go since there's a naval component.
 
nth battle of Nice here we gooooo

But seriously I am really curious how the Corsican campaign will go since there's a naval component.
Honestly it would be amazing if nice was the battleground itself having such a nightmare battle in the physical city as well as around it b would give such vivid imagery which a lot of ww1 stories I find lack
 
Honestly it would be amazing if nice was the battleground itself having such a nightmare battle in the physical city as well as around it b would give such vivid imagery which a lot of ww1 stories I find lack
Hmm I think we won't get a serious battle of Nice in the city since when the French collapse they'd collapse hard. You're right tho having a battle in the city would be dope.
 
Hmm I think we won't get a serious battle of Nice in the city since when the French collapse they'd collapse hard. You're right tho having a battle in the city would be dope.
IIRC, in the original version of TTL, the French held the Italians off at Menton for about a year, before the deployment of German stormtroopers to Italy - plus a concurrent and successful German attack on Verdun - allowed the Italians to breakthrough at Bardonecchia. They struck at Grenoble afterward, though, instead of Nice, and leveled most of the city taking it.
 
IIRC, in the original version of TTL, the French held the Italians off at Menton for about a year, before the deployment of German stormtroopers to Italy - plus a concurrent and successful German attack on Verdun - allowed the Italians to breakthrough at Bardonecchia. They struck at Grenoble afterward, though, instead of Nice, and leveled most of the city taking it.
IIRC you are correct. Though myself had problems with how such a campaign was written mainly as it situated the italian military situation was to a degree treated similar to otl a-h one. Which i think is a rather flawed way of viewing the inherent structural problems and faults of the Italian army. Especially in the sense that italy required operational elements such as the stormtroopers and alpine divisions from Germany when from a military standpoint these were some of Italy's strongest operational elements on their own. Rather Italy's weaknesses lay not in analysis or the on the ground operation but in the very elements that cadorna insists will ultimately win him this conflict even with his appearant military deficiencies.

That and italy both otl and Especially here were able to conduct their war effort on the front pretty much completely independently with only otl after the disaster of caporetto requiring their allies assistance which ultimately did not play too large of a role anyway. And ittl I doubt the plausibility of any such failure on the scale of caporetto as the French would just not be in a strategical position to pull it off. Aka the italian front will be seriously and horrendously bloody but handled practically by the italians alone
 
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Comes with having a German name, right? /s
Well, a not insignificant portion of Russian leadership (including some of their most competent, and especially military), were Germans, usually from the Baltic, who spoke French - ironically enough.
One of the greatest enemies of the Murids was von Klugenau, the conqueror of Central Asia was von Kaufmann, and one of Russia's greatest leaders (Catherine the Great) was from Stettin.
 
Well, a not insignificant portion of Russian leadership (including some of their most competent, and especially military), were Germans, usually from the Baltic, who spoke French - ironically enough.
One of the greatest enemies of the Murids was von Klugenau, the conqueror of Central Asia was von Kaufmann, and one of Russia's greatest leaders (Catherine the Great) was from Stettin.
I was being sarcastic but you are of course correct.
 
Regarding Albania, if things have gone as OTL there is already an italian presence there as the italian occupied Vlore in December 1914 and later enlarged their zone to enhance their security (and influence).
Just that will basically cut out the Serbian army from the OTL retreat (not considering the fact that italian ships were extremely important in transport the soldiers to safety) unless the Entente launch an assault to conquer the port
 
Regarding Albania, if things have gone as OTL there is already an italian presence there as the italian occupied Vlore in December 1914 and later enlarged their zone to enhance their security (and influence).
Just that will basically cut out the Serbian army from the OTL retreat (not considering the fact that italian ships were extremely important in transport the soldiers to safety) unless the Entente launch an assault to conquer the port
Exactly right. While I'm not sure how much Italy will commit to the Balkans it will certainly be something; furthermore King Peter will not be escaping to Egypt courtesy of the Royal Navy ITTL.
 
Exactly right. While I'm not sure how much Italy will commit to the Balkans it will certainly be something; furthermore King Peter will not be escaping to Egypt courtesy of the Royal Navy ITTL.

Cadorna will be very pressed to send reinforcements in Albania, scrapping whatever is possible...to keep the Austrian honest, it's not that the italian government don't trust them, no sir, absolutely not.
 
TBH, I'm not sure even the British would risk operating in the Adriatic Sea, even with French support. Not against both the Habsburgs and the Italians, not without overwhelming numerical superiority. And I don't see that happening without Britain having to transfer ships from home commands, which would be even more unthinkable, what with the threat of the High Seas Fleet and the First Scouting Group.
 
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