REDUX: Place In The Sun: What If Italy Joined The Central Powers?

Chapter V- A Change In Government

Chapter V

A Change In Government

Antonio Salandra awoke early on the fourth of August 1915, dressed, and took his first smoke of the day. His nerves wouldn't stomach coffee, much less food. Every step felt like that of a condemned man towards the gallows. There was nothing for it, he told himself. No government lasted forever; seldom was the collapse of a government fatal to one's career. Servants moved his property out of the Prime Minister's residence as his wife decamped for their country estate. There they would remain throughout the war, enjoying exile as Salandra planned a return to power.

First, however, he had to be in at the death.

Speaker after speaker arose to criticise the Government. Most belonged to the Liberal Union, a fusion of liberal and conservative parties which had politically dominated for two years. They didn't claim the Liberal Union ought not to govern- that would have imperilled their own positions- but rather that Salandra was not the man for the job. Antonino Castello, who bore a grudge for being removed as Foreign Minister in November 1914, savaged Salandra's foreign policy, calling him a "sell-out to the inghlesi" and accusing him of betraying the Triple Alliance. Defence Minister Zapelli reasoned that nothing he did could save the Salandra government, so best to ingratiate himself with the successor. He castigated the Prime Minister's neglect of the military and "inability- or is it lack of desire?- to defend our honour". General Cadorna made a speech on similar lines. Even Giovanni Giliotti, who had tried to protect Salandra at the previous day's Cabinet meeting, questioned his ability to foster national unity.

Backed into a corner, it was all the Prime Minister could do to behave honourably.

Salandra defended his conduct before Parliament and the King, stating his honest belief that neutrality was best for Italy. He claimed that had Britain not "infringed out honour" he would have tried to deepen his partnership with them, but did not shy from blaming them for the country's economic woes. Had he his way, Italy would have sided with "whichever powers proved most willing to back our sacro egoisimo", or remained neutral if neither suited him. British stupidity and the impatience of the Italian right wing, not his own failings, were responsible for the Government's failings. "Look to self-interest in London, not any policy of my Government, as the source of our ills. My record has been one of placation, attempted compromise, and reason in time of war and unruly passion. Consider that for all our ills, the Italian soldier remains at peace because of deliberate policies of this Government..." It was a fair speech, and after the horrors of war and disappointments of peace many realised Salandra hadn't been incompetent; merely trying to do what was moral against overwhelming odds and uncooperative actors. Modern historians have rehabilitated the man (for an excellent analysis of his tenure, see A Precarious Neutrality: The Impossible Prime Ministership of Antonio Salandra, published by the University of Rome, 1994). Yet none of that did any good on the day of.

By a two-thirds majority, Parliament and the Chamber of Deputies voted no confidence in the present government.

The speeches and vote itself had taken most of the day, and Parliament adjourned at five PM. Those unsullied by their leader's fall went out to celebrate. While some ate and drank, the fallen Salandra returned home. He sat in the half-empty Prime Minister's residence, all the Classical statues and Baroque paintings en route to his estate, the lights and heat turned off to save money, and put his head in his hands. Everything he had done in his tenure had been for Italy- and now he knew what the people thought of him. Whoever they elected would be a demagogue, he would take Italy into a war which didn't suit its interests, and the people would suffer as a result. Perhaps then they would regret voting out Prime Minister Antonio Salandra, whose only crime was to have reacted to provocation with reason rather than passion. But whatever else came, he would play no part in it. Salandra remained in Rome long enough to get his successor's government up and running before decamping to his country estate; after the war, when his expected political renaissance failed to come, he emigrated to the United States. After ten years of teaching law and economics at Yale, he died in 1931. His epitaph came from Scipio Africanus, "Ingrata patria, ne ossa quidem habebis." (1)

The business now began of forming a new government. No one doubted that the Liberal Union would lead; the question was which individual had the confidence of his peers. That man's clique would form the centre of power. The fifth of August passed in deliberation and argument as King Vittorio Emmanuel considered the prospects. Shortly before seven PM, a confidential letter was sent from the Quirinal Palace to Sidney Sonnino's townhouse in Rome. His Majesty wished to see the two-time Prime Minister within the hour.

Born on the eve of the Revolutions of 1848, Sonnino was an "elder statesman" of Italian politics. More of an administrator than a politician- he had served as Finance Minister thirty years ago and Foreign Minister under Salandra- he enjoyed much respect as one who got things done and as a staunch defender of the liberal monarchy. He respected Salandra's conservative instincts, yet had pushed for a more assertive foreign policy. When war began, Sonnino had favoured neither side, yet British actions now inclined him towards the Central Powers, or at least towards a "militant neutrality." Besides, he knew how to ride the Anglophobic crest in Parliament. Sonnino submitted to the Monarch's request to form a Government. King Vittorio Emmanuel postponed Parliament twenty-four hours to give the new man time to act.

Politically adept and moderately conservative, Sonnino's abrasiveness made him hard to work with. His government picks suggested continuity with Salandra and a desire to minimise friction with other, strong-willed men. He claimed Finance and Foreign Affairs for himself and kept Vittorio Zupelli as Defence Minister. Sinecures filled the other positions; men who could handle paperwork and manage subordinates well enough but who would never challenge the Prime Minister. Reviewing the Cabinet picks, the King is said to have remarked, "perhaps I ought to surrender my crown now; Sonnino's word will shortly be law!" Giovanni Giliotti was furious at being excluded from the new machine, and rumour spread of a schism within the Liberal Union. The more astute observers soon realised Sonnino had little agenda beyond being the conservative Salandra ought to have been. Yet with Royal Assent and something resembling parliamentary confidence, Sidney Sonnino returned to the Prime Ministership on 6 August 1915.

Though the war and collapse of the Liberal Union would ruin his reputation, in August 1915 Sonnino was genuinely popular. People had hoped Salandra would be a beacon of conservatism; he ended up an ineffective leader and scapegoat for national ills. Sonnino had won the confidence of Italy not by repudiating Salandra's ideas but promising to build on them. The old man had good ideas but could not enact them; I can. He reportedly wrote to his predecessor shortly after taking office, asking if he wanted a government post or increased pension; pride kept Salandra from answering. Having had two short-lived governments before, Sonnino was determined to make this one work. Defending national honour and maritime rights (though he didn't specifically mention Britain) growing the economy, protecting the liberal system from "radicalism of all stripes and all positions"- whatever earned him cheers went. Control of finance and foreign policy gave him the heaviest hand Italian politics had seen for years. Giliotti and his ilk remained on the back benches, heckling but not threatening. Everything was going according to plan.

Then as crisp September dawned, the Defence Minister and Chief of the General Staff invited him to the German embassy. An hour later he staggered out, face white as a sheet, clutching a confidential folder.

The Cabinet convened at dawn the next day, ostensibly to hear a budgetary report from the General Staff. Only Cadorna, Zupelli, and Sonnino knew their true purpose. Secrecy and short notice kept nosy reporters ignorant. Political pressure had forced Salandra to choose between country and career; Sonnino wasn't about to make the same mistake. Defying policy, the Prime Minister ordered that no potentially incriminating minutes be kept, leaving historians with only journal entries and postwar interviews to reconstruct the scene. Not even servants were allowed; they tabled all discussion while coffee was poured.

Sonnino was about to decide the future of Italy and the trajectory of the Great War. Absolute secrecy was the least he could have asked for.


He tossed the packet on the table and collapsed into the leather armchair, heart racing, and took a soothing sip of espresso. Nine wide-eyed men, only a few of whom truly mattered, stared back. Their aristocratic beards and commanding uniforms only made their faces seem paler. It was said, at any rate, and he knew a certain idle pride at delivering the news himself rather than delegating it to Cadorna or Zupelli. Doubtful they will turn on me. Good Cabinet members didn't argue. And if they do, I will bring them down, burn the documents. They'll never prove anything. The right words eluded everyone. Another fifteen seconds passed.

"This, it must go without saying, enjoys the full confidence of Germany's General Staff. Both the Ambassador and General von Dellmensingen confirmed this to me." (2) Luigi Cadorna sat at Sonnino's right, Defence Minister Zupelli on his left. The rest of the Cabinet was sprawled down a thirty-foot oak conference table. "Reliable members of our own General Staff have also reviewed the report and found it satisfactory. Naturally, had either party found any deficiency, this would never have reached yourselves." What Cadorna hadn't told the Cabinet, Sonnino knew too well, was that von Dellmensingen's strategy didn't align with Italy's existing war plans for France. But one thing at a time.

"We cannot wait forever, gentlemen. All the components of victory are in place now, and a strike will bring success. Yet in six months, or a year, the war may be over and our chance will have vanished." And beating the war-drum will no longer be politically valuable. Mustn't tell the reporters that one. "Shall we say we sat on our hands when, as our German allies have made so clear, the chances of victory have never been higher?" The Prime Minister frowned. "Shall we give our enemies another excuse to call us cowards?"

The Education Minister, small both in stature and spirit, rose and grabbed one of the maps from Cadorna's packet and pointed to France. "See how far these lines have moved in a year? See how much glory the French have won so far? And at what cost?" He spread his hands. "How many French and Germans have been wasted because their imbecile governments cannot make peace? Should we join them and, like Lucretia, commit suicide for honour's sake" Education took a deep breath. "For all the damage to our economy, we prosper because of our neutrality. Letting Germany convince us to throw that away for "honour", sir, would be a decision beneath this Government."

Who gave you a voice at this table? Presence didn't equal power, and no junior minister had the right to speak so frankly. "Would you have said the same to Garibaldi sixty years ago? Would you have told him our honour is not worth it? The austriaci are finally seeing reason; we have an assurance of Trentino and all of Zadar once we win, as well as Nice and Savoy- ancestral land of His Majesty!- once we win." Sonnino leaned over the table at the Education Minister. "Or do you not think Italia irredenta is worth it?" If the man said no, he was gone. But the Education Minister nodded slowly.

"What about our energy needs?" The Minister of Industry waved his own documents. "I do not dispute your moral, political point, Signore, but I do fear shortfalls. Honour is a beautiful thing, but it cannot power an economy. And I fear war may push us over the edge." Sonnino grimaced- the man could clearly prove his point- and nodded. "Well, Signore", Industry continued, "the year before the war we imported 10.6 million tonnes of coal and produced a mere 600,000 tonnes ourselves, consuming all of this. The outbreak of war distorted figures for 1914, but in the first three quarters of this year we imported nine million tonnes, half of which came via special arrangement with Germany. Domestic production remained minor. Without support from the Germans..." Industry took a sip of fortified coffee, bracing himself. "Without support from the Germans, total economic collapse on an unseen scale would have occurred following the suspension of British coal."

All the prosperous careerists around the table cringed. Being reminded that failure was real and their grand plans could crash around their ears was sobering. The worst part, Sonnino knew, was that Industry was right. Years of economic experience had shown him the country's weaknesses, and like everyone he'd seen coal rise with his own eyes. "Are you saying we cannot sustain our economy if we transition to war?" But how have we managed without the inghlesi for the better part of a year?

"Not precisely, Signore. What I am saying is that German aid was a deliverance, a deus ex machina. We cannot count on such miracles very often. Now as per the agreement, Germany will send another three million tonnes of coal throughout this year, which will sustain us well into 1916. But once the agreement ends, we will still be in the same position unless Germany renews it. Even if we declare war tomorrow and achieve victory by Christmas"- Cadorna thrust out his chin- "we will still face dire shortfalls in the coming year." He paused. "I am an economist, Prime Minister, not a diplomat. Yet it seems painfully clear that, dependent on two producers of coal, it would behoove us to maintain relations with both. We cannot rely on Germany the same way we did Britain, and..."

"Understood. I thank you for your analysis, but you are correct- you are not a diplomat." Sonnino sighed, trying to think like a German. He knew rerouting coal from the home front to Italy came at a high cost. But would Berlin be willing to extend the treaty another year, if it meant getting a second front against the French? Nothing von Dellmensingen had said suggested otherwise, but what did one liaison officer know about economic policy? "Suppose we can procure a similar agreement from Germany. What could we accomplish given another 7.5 million tonnes a year from them?"

"Peacetime operations would be feasible, but war would be another matter. The belligerents have converted their whole economies to war footings and still have problems. Our stockpiles will sustain us for a time, but..." Zupetti and Cadorna glared daggers at the nervous Minister. "...but they were designed for a briefer conflict. Expanding the Army, training conscripts, replacing expended munitions, maneouvering the Regia Marina will all add up. And speaking as an economist- not a diplomat or an officer- I cannot see how to make it work. I hope the General Staff and our diplomatic corps can prove me wrong" He spread his hands and sat back down. (3)

Zupetti and Cadorna looked ready to strangle the Minister for Industry. His look declared that, having spoken the truth, his conscience was clean. After a moment's thought, Sonnino stood up. "Gentlemen, I thank you for coming today. Having heard all this, the issues are far clearer." This is why Salandra couldn't join the war, and it destroyed him. For a moment Sonnino pictured himself denounced in Parliament, the Minister for Industry's arguments blown aside. Facts trumped honour. "My conversations with German officials suggest that we can extend our economic agreement", he said slowly. "I will attempt to get a formal agreement via our Berlin embassy. If we can obtain another 7.5 million tonnes for the coming year-"

"Ten." Industry shook his head. "Ten at minimum for war, though twelve and a half would be better. And I doubt we will get a bargain price."

"Fine. Whatever we need to pay, we will. If we can get all this, it buys us a year to win the war, after which, our political objectives achieved, we can determine a sustainable path for coal supply." Industry reluctantly nodded. "General Cadorna, if given full writ to prosecute hostilities, can we win by the end of 1916?"

"Absolutely." No hint of worry in Cadorna's voice- but then, there wouldn't be. "As I told our German allies and the Defence Minister, our officer corps is superb. Men and equipment are adequate. Given French weakness and sufficient resources, victory is assured." His scowl dared any mere civilian to defy him. Defence Minister Zupetti wordlessly confirmed with a nod. "We do not deny the science of economics, but rather insist on the supremacy of strength and courage. Enough of that will let us win, regardless of what comes next." (4)

Sonnino nodded. "If we can secure coal supplies from Germany for 1916, and if our Armed Forces can bring victory within months, as General Cadorna claims,"- and as everyone claimed a year ago, he thought, "then this war will be winnable. Italy will avenge the insults to her honour and secure our countrymen beyond the frontiers." He stared around the table. Ten men, one of whom wasn't even on the Cabinet, another of whom held three offices, were about to cast their nation into the furnace. The road would be long and bloody, forcing another of Europe's peoples from peace to war. It would throw the national economy into turmoil. No one wanted to contemplate how calamitous defeat would be. Am I in the right? Not just in my calculations, but morally? Imperceptibly, Sonnino shook his head. Having reached a decision, he couldn't question it even in his own heart. Twenty-five years of politics had made that very clear. He rose.

"It is settled, then. I will establish diplomatic overtures to Vienna and Berlin, communicating our interest in joining. If the negotiations go well, we will have war. If not, we shall send General von Dellmensingen home, I shall burn this packet, and we shall say no more about it." That is reasonable... surely?


Having decided for war, the Sonnino Government now had to lay the groundwork. Italy in autumn 1915 was neither militarily nor politically ready for war. (5) Economic arrangements had to be made with Germany and concessions from the Habsburgs finalised. Italy's economy could not function without the first and it would lack the political will for war without the second. Meanwhile, General Cadorna had to modify pre-existing war plans, devise a united strategy with Germany and Austria-Hungary, and begin mobilisation. All this had to occur without arousing Entente suspicion and prompting a pre-emptive strike.

The Habsburgs were understandably hesitant to cede territory to Italy. Ethnic divisions were a major problem, and acknowledging that the Italians under their flag had a right to unite with Rome would set precedent. If it could happen in Trentino, why not Transylvania? Pride was another factor- Emperor Franz Joseph had been in his thirties when the Italian state was founded, and now they wanted concessions from him? These issues had impeded negotiations back in January, and few in Vienna had any appetite for revisiting them. With the war going well enough, Italian neutrality was perfectly sufficient.

Yet Germany saw things differently. Habsburg stature had fallen since the war began and their wishes carried less weight. Having gone to war partially on Austria's behalf and bailed them out in Serbia and Galicia, Germany felt entitled to sacrifice Habsburg interests for "the greater good". Facing another year of Western Front stalemate, Germany would do whatever was needed to open a second front against France. Diplomatic but terse exchanges between Heinrich von Tschirschky, German ambassador to Vienna, and their Foreign Minister Stephan von Rajcez, set the tone. If Austro-Hungarian recalcitrance kept Italy out of the war, Germany would retaliate. Von Tschirschky failed to specify, but von Rajcez knew too well how dependent his nation was.

Italy, Germany, and the Dual Monarchy agreed to meet at a Swiss country estate belonging to a wealthy German. Sonnino personally led Italy's delegation; Tschirschky, von Rajcez, and German ambassador to Italy Hans von Flotow were all present. This was a diplomatic summit, not a military one; only civilians were present and military matters barely discussed. In his memoirs, von Rajcez described the negotiations as "Germany and Italy uniting, forcing our delegation to agree to a compromise peace." He was not wrong. German diplomats frequently spoke for and went over the heads of their Austro-Hungarian counterparts, demonstrating considerable generosity towards Italy. Germany and Italy wielded Austro-Hungarian agreements "in principle" to cede "certain territories" as rhetorical weapons: they weren't imposing anything new, merely insisting on existing agreements.

The principal issues had not changed: Italy insisted on ethnic Italian and strategically valuable territories; the Dual Monarchy defended its territorial integrity. Nonetheless, with German backing, Italy made inroads. Sonnino was willing to sacrifice the South Tyrol and city of Bolanzo, and under German pressure decided not to press his claims, something von Rajcez took as an olive branch. Sonnino also coveted a small border strip containing the towns of Tolmino, Gradisca, and Gorizia. These towns were strategically positioned and- though no one dared say it aloud- would enhance defence in any Austro-Italian war. Von Rajcez ceded them only under pressure.

Despite von Flotow's best efforts, negotiations nearly failed over the question of Trieste. Sonnino had demanded it earlier in the year and been rebuffed. Now, faced with a second refusal, he made a careful gambit, threatening to walk out of negotiations if the port wasn't ceded. He would never have followed through- to return to his cabinet empty-handed would have destroyed his nascent government- but knew Germany would back him if he put his foot down. In exchange for abandoning claims to the rest of the Istria Peninsula, Sonnino was able to pocket Trieste. Austria-Hungary retained free basing and commercial rights in perpetuity. After a debate over whether or not Italy should get the territories immediately or at the war's end, the Germans proposed a compromise. Italy would get provisional control in thirty days, during which anyone who desired to leave could. Citizens of the Dual Monarchy could retain that status, and plebiscites would occur at the war's end. The Austro-Hungarians howled at such mistreatment, but Germany was unrelenting. Both parties walked away imperfectly satisfied, but well aware that it could have been worse. Sonnino sent Cadorna a telegram the night of the signing with three words:

Alea iacta est.



(1) Ungrateful fatherland, you shall not even have my bones
(2) See the previous chapter
(3) Most of these issues didn't apply in OTL because, as an Entente nation, Italy still had access to British coal.
(4) In August 1914, this was foolish, yet forgivable. Thirteen months later, it's detached from reality.
(5) Joining the Entente was easier; the Anglo-French could promise more territory and Britain could bankroll the whole thing.

Comments?
 
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Personally, I'm hoping Italy still gets amply compensated for all her losses, much like in the first version of this TL. Trentino and Trieste for starters, then Albania, Nice, Savoy, Corsica, plus Tunisia and Djibouti. Oh, and getting Eritrea and Italian Somaliland back, the British will almost certainly occupy that colony in the war. Maybe no border revisions in Libya, or getting British Somaliland, I'll admit in hindsight Italy getting Britain to give them those was somewhat far-fetched, likewise for being able to buy Malta.

Still, everything else was fine. If nothing else, it binds Italy closer to their allies in the north...and that maybe someday, there'll be a timeline where the victorious CPs get ISOT to OTL just as the Entente are patting each other on the back...and Orlando, on seeing CP Italy drunk on the spoils of war - and more to the point, the Triple Alliance actually kept its word on promised gains - compared to OTL's mutilated peace, proceeds to rip his shirt off before punching Wilson twice, turns him around, and finishes him with a German suplex.

Okay, maybe that's too crazy...well, not really, imagining Wilson getting sucker-punched before Clemenceau gets a kick in the balls before the bodyguards manage to drag Orlando off (but still giving Lloyd-George the one-finger salute) is just darling.
 
Also keep in mind that the figure of Cadorna is much more complex than you think and her actions are not silly, but respond to a specific rational logic.Cadorna was a man of the nineteenth century, stubborn as a mule, not very diplomatic, incorruptible, something very rare among Italian generals, and with a great cold blood: something that many ignore, he was boundless culture in all fields including the history of art. also helped by an out of the ordinary memory (he recited the Divine Comedy by heart); he spoke French as well as Italian. He loved the mountains and knew the whole front line which he had also painted in various watercolors.When he was appointed in place of his predecessor Pollio, he was on the threshold of sixty-one years, he had not yet received any operational command on the theater of war. So, I have experience, he found himself catapulted into the middle of the Great War.

The first problem he had to face was politics: unlike France, Russia and Germany, where his reasons were subordinate to those of the generals, which precipitated events in 1914, the opposite happened in Italy. Cadorna knew that he would have to fight, but not against whom and when. Thus, he who since 1912, when he was put at the head of the second army, stationed in Genoa, had dedicated himself to preparing the fortifications of the border with France and to the study of cooperation between infantry and artillery, in order to stop the advanced enemies, in a few months he had to redesign all war plans from scratch.In particular, the negotiations with the Entente, which began on March 4, the negotiations lasted until April 26, while the uncertainty that reigned at the time in political-diplomatic circles, a consequence of a conduct based on similar opportunistic criteria, determined a significant delay in issuing the first mobilization orders

After the first provisions for a partial and purely precautionary mobilization, only on May 5 Cadorna was explicitly informed by Salandra of the need for a general mobilization, with a view to going to war against Austria-Hungary by the 26th of the same month.Article 2 of the Pact of London, signed by Salandra (but guarantor of the King) without Cadorna's knowledge, obliged Italy to keep the Austrians busy with all its resources. In fact, it therefore placed the Italian army under the allied command which requested its commitment every time the Germans attacked the French front, which greatly limited Cadorna's operational freedom, as happened on the occasion of Caporetto.

The second problem was tactical-organizational: Pollio's Prussian approach, with its enveloping and pincer maneuvers, presupposed a high level of training of soldiers and non-commissioned officers, officers of considerable preparation and a suitable terrain: due to the chronic lack of funds , the first two requirements had never been met, leading to petty figures in Libya. For the second, the Alps and the Karst did not allow the same mobility and tactical flexibility as the Polish plains and northern France.To find an alternative, he needed genius: Cadorna, despite his flashes of creativity, did not have one, as on the other hand Joffre, Haig and Nivelle. His ideas were no different from those of his contemporaries generals: from the French doctrine essentially centered on elan, to the Austrian maxim of "Vorwärts bis in den Feind" ("Always and in any case forward to the enemy").

Cadorna in his "red book" said he was convinced that an offensive movement would always result in a frontal attack, made very expensive by modern weapons if not well prepared and conducted; he believed, however, that the coordination of the various weapons, the exploitation of the land by the chains of advancing shooters and a cold determination of the commander would have made it possible to carry out a successful frontal attack as well. However, authoritative commanders, close-knit cadres, disciplined troops were needed: and precisely the last part was dedicated to the education of the departments, in whichthey recommended exercises of cadres to opposing parties on the ground and on paper.

The same conclusions that the German generals had reached: only that they had these things, the Italians did not. To get them, Cadorna started with the easiest things: knowing the chickens and mindful of the figures of chocolatiers made in previous years due to generals engaged in bickering among themselves, he centered his command on himself; moreover, not having this great charisma, he became convinced that the best way not to cause his troops to fall into chaos was to impose an iron discipline.

And the objective situation did not help him: Pollio had left an operetta army in his hands, on paper modern and efficient, in practice a madhouse: the lack of education of the third category recruits forced the recall of 13 enlisted classes to find the staff of soldiers to be sent to the front line, with an increase in times all in favor of the enemy; the mobile militia, provided for in the Army system, had not even been constituted; the fortress artillery was not in sufficient number to arm all the works completed and declared operational; in case of mobilization
general only some army corps had updated the list of quadrupeds to be ordered; of the 36 field artillery regiments envisaged on the map, 5 were not yet constituted and 5 were in the completion phase; of the 86 batteries of 75mm guns model 1911 - Deport - which were expected to enter service as early as 1913, only 12 were built in 1914; for the mountain batteries the material had not yet been foreseen, while the heavy field regiments had the howitzers but not the guns.

For the type of war that was taking shape, the situation of the machine gun sections was also serious: the equipment on paper was one section of machine guns per infantry battalion of the standing Army, one for each regiment of mobile militia and for each Regiment. cavalry, and there should also have been two sections for each Alpine battalion; in reality, in the event of mobilization, one could only count on 150 sections of machine guns for the entire Army.

Military education was also lacking due to the scarcity of shooting ranges and training camps, which made it difficult for already discharged soldiers to be recalled for education. The icing on the cake, given that for the Triple Alliance we had to make war on France, the geographical maps of the Austrian territory were old and of a very large scale, and there were no detailed ones. In addition, there were no railway connections dedicated to military transports and in the border stations the number of tracks for the stop of arriving and departing trains was inadequate.

Cadorna, with an unexpected organizational talent, managed to make this brothel a dignified instrument of war. And he did this with relentless energy, cleaning up, exonerating 206 generals and 255 colonels, organizing dignified logistics, and expanding the staff: the 548 infantry battalions of 1915 became 867 in 1917, with immensely superior armament, with 3,000 pieces of medium caliber instead of 246 and 5,000 of small caliber instead of 1,772.

The third problem was strategic and here Cadorna could do very little: the Alps are what they are and despite the good will of the Duke of Abruzzi, planning the landing on the French coasts is one thing, the Dalmatian coasts are one thing.At the same time, clashing with both Italian politics, anchored to a Risorgimento perspective, and allied commands, which were unable to look beyond Flanders, had a global perspective on the conflict. He would have liked to reduce the Italian forces in Libya and Albania and increase them in Macedonia, where they could represent a real danger to the enemy. He was also in favor of closer coordination with the allied armies, seeking the support of the Russians and Serbs in 1915, unleashing more than one agreed offensive with the Anglo-French, proposing in 1917 the concentration of the efforts of the Entente against Austria. -Hungary, weak point of the enemy coalition.

Cadorna, unlike what is said, was one of the few generals of World War I to have understood modern warfare, the Materialschlacht, a natural consequence of the war of attrition induced by the advent of the trenches. Also in this case the reasoning underlying Cadorna's decisions followed a simple quantitative logic (in relation to the quality of the troops, the characteristics of the terrain, the logistical situation and the alliances), based on the approach that required greater firepower to undermine entrenchments. more and more extensive and profound.

A strategy that, however, to be effectively implemented, needed an industrial base that Italy did not have: having to marry with dried figs, at the beginning it had to rely cynically on the human mass, counting on the greater Italian capacity to bear the losses.

Over time, as already mentioned, it was gradually replaced by firepower: this approach was leading Austria-Hungary to defeat by virtue of the simple disparity of the forces involved: already at the time of the conquest of Gorizia, Cadorna had just started to affect their human reserves, while the Austro-Hungarians had at that moment to face the first serious crisis since the beginning of the operations.

In the aftermath of the eleventh battle of the Isonzo, the Austrian situation had become desperate, with only Mount Ermada now remaining to block the passage of the Italian advance across the Karst towards Trieste: the resistance had reached a breaking point , and precisely this evidence induced the German High Command to finally grant the coveted reinforcements that led to the constitution of the XIV Army in view of that planned offensive of lightening.

In fact, Caporetto was the unexpected consequence of his strategic vision ... ITL Cadorna is aware that the battle of numbers is in favor of France: therefore, while waiting to modernize the Italian army with German help, it will maintain a delayed attitude. He will organize an expeditionary force in the Balkans, which given the difficulties in coordinating with the Austro-Hungarians, will not do much and will probably open an African front: this implies that the Italian attempt to find a compromise with Senussia, which due to both OTL shares failed, here could have a positive outcome

Sure Cadorna and god it pain me phisically said that, was greatly constricted by the terrain in his effort and strategy and was extremely good at organize and logistic as the preparation of the army before the Dow and the transfer from the French to the A-H border has been something short of a miracle, plus was a good strategist as the counterattack during the Battaglia degli Altipiani showed...unfortunely once the war started and become a 'war of attrition' all his 'good' bit become not only secondary but overshadowed by his bad part aka an abysmall capacity to manage and relate with the human side of the equation, something that was a characteristic of all his previous career and that in such a long war become a very important factor. His 'my way or the highway' united to a 'never my fault attitude' really doesn't win any loyalty or friendships, his horrible relationships with the goverment really stopped any type of real coordination; he has always been an harsher disciplinary in any of his previous assignement but frankly the excess during the war basically broke the italian army, at Caporetto many soldiers, my grand grandfather among them, were faced with the decision to chose between surrender and hope for the mercy of the enemy sometimes even shooting themselfs in the foot or return to the tender care of the army and Cadorna...many gone for option 1 (my grand grandpa among them and he always said that was the only reason he come back alive even if in the end the self inflicted wound that never healed properly killed him, more than 60 years later).

Said that, sure even him will point to the fact that the OG plan was to send the troops in Germany because, well the terrain is THAT difficult, but this will also mean put the troops on German command (something that will generally dislike a lot)
 
Imagine if the Italian military was operating with the same philosophy as the Italian government. What would a sacro egoismo military do?

Well, in my opinion it would attempt to gain its objectives with as little fighting as possible. It would posture by putting a substantial force on the French border in the Alps. It would probably skirmish a little with alpine troops, which I understand it actually has good exemplars of, but not commit to much besides probes and the like. It's main value there to the Germans would be forcing the French to honor their threat, probably pulling divisions and artillery.

Similarly its navy would not seek any decisive engagement, but would in concert with the Austria-Hungarian (and maybe even part of the Ottoman) navies would make the Adriatic theirs and would deter the Entente navies from decisive engagement. This might force the UK to detail more naval forces to the Med, which would weaken them elsewhere.

And by rapidly taking Albania, which should be pretty easy, they then threaten Serbia from the south (and Montenegro as well). This forces both of those Entente powers to weaken their defenses against Austria Hungary which might well cause a breakthrough without the need for Italians to spend much blood or treasure.

The true coup of sacro egoismo is probably beyond its Italian practitioners though. That would be to get the Entente to peace out sometime in early 1916 with France in worse shape than OTL, Serbia and Montenegro crushed, Romania not in the Entente (and maybe in the Triple Alliance), Russia on the ropes, and the US not interested in getting involved. That would allow Italy to get a substantial windfall at a low price in blood and treasure.
 
Or for that matter, keep Greece out of the war. If the Italians occupy Albania, while Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Bulgaria occupy Serbia and Montenegro, and either Romania stays neutral or joins the CP, even Venizelos wouldn't be crazy enough to join the Entente. Greece would be dogpiled and stomped flat.
 
Also keep in mind that the figure of Cadorna is much more complex than you think and her actions are not silly, but respond to a specific rational logic.Cadorna was a man of the nineteenth century, stubborn as a mule, not very diplomatic, incorruptible, something very rare among Italian generals, and with a great cold blood: something that many ignore, he was boundless culture in all fields including the history of art. also helped by an out of the ordinary memory (he recited the Divine Comedy by heart); he spoke French as well as Italian. He loved the mountains and knew the whole front line which he had also painted in various watercolors.When he was appointed in place of his predecessor Pollio, he was on the threshold of sixty-one years, he had not yet received any operational command on the theater of war. So, I have experience, he found himself catapulted into the middle of the Great War.

The first problem he had to face was politics: unlike France, Russia and Germany, where his reasons were subordinate to those of the generals, which precipitated events in 1914, the opposite happened in Italy. Cadorna knew that he would have to fight, but not against whom and when. Thus, he who since 1912, when he was put at the head of the second army, stationed in Genoa, had dedicated himself to preparing the fortifications of the border with France and to the study of cooperation between infantry and artillery, in order to stop the advanced enemies, in a few months he had to redesign all war plans from scratch.In particular, the negotiations with the Entente, which began on March 4, the negotiations lasted until April 26, while the uncertainty that reigned at the time in political-diplomatic circles, a consequence of a conduct based on similar opportunistic criteria, determined a significant delay in issuing the first mobilization orders

After the first provisions for a partial and purely precautionary mobilization, only on May 5 Cadorna was explicitly informed by Salandra of the need for a general mobilization, with a view to going to war against Austria-Hungary by the 26th of the same month.Article 2 of the Pact of London, signed by Salandra (but guarantor of the King) without Cadorna's knowledge, obliged Italy to keep the Austrians busy with all its resources. In fact, it therefore placed the Italian army under the allied command which requested its commitment every time the Germans attacked the French front, which greatly limited Cadorna's operational freedom, as happened on the occasion of Caporetto.

The second problem was tactical-organizational: Pollio's Prussian approach, with its enveloping and pincer maneuvers, presupposed a high level of training of soldiers and non-commissioned officers, officers of considerable preparation and a suitable terrain: due to the chronic lack of funds , the first two requirements had never been met, leading to petty figures in Libya. For the second, the Alps and the Karst did not allow the same mobility and tactical flexibility as the Polish plains and northern France.To find an alternative, he needed genius: Cadorna, despite his flashes of creativity, did not have one, as on the other hand Joffre, Haig and Nivelle. His ideas were no different from those of his contemporaries generals: from the French doctrine essentially centered on elan, to the Austrian maxim of "Vorwärts bis in den Feind" ("Always and in any case forward to the enemy").

Cadorna in his "red book" said he was convinced that an offensive movement would always result in a frontal attack, made very expensive by modern weapons if not well prepared and conducted; he believed, however, that the coordination of the various weapons, the exploitation of the land by the chains of advancing shooters and a cold determination of the commander would have made it possible to carry out a successful frontal attack as well. However, authoritative commanders, close-knit cadres, disciplined troops were needed: and precisely the last part was dedicated to the education of the departments, in whichthey recommended exercises of cadres to opposing parties on the ground and on paper.

The same conclusions that the German generals had reached: only that they had these things, the Italians did not. To get them, Cadorna started with the easiest things: knowing the chickens and mindful of the figures of chocolatiers made in previous years due to generals engaged in bickering among themselves, he centered his command on himself; moreover, not having this great charisma, he became convinced that the best way not to cause his troops to fall into chaos was to impose an iron discipline.

And the objective situation did not help him: Pollio had left an operetta army in his hands, on paper modern and efficient, in practice a madhouse: the lack of education of the third category recruits forced the recall of 13 enlisted classes to find the staff of soldiers to be sent to the front line, with an increase in times all in favor of the enemy; the mobile militia, provided for in the Army system, had not even been constituted; the fortress artillery was not in sufficient number to arm all the works completed and declared operational; in case of mobilization
general only some army corps had updated the list of quadrupeds to be ordered; of the 36 field artillery regiments envisaged on the map, 5 were not yet constituted and 5 were in the completion phase; of the 86 batteries of 75mm guns model 1911 - Deport - which were expected to enter service as early as 1913, only 12 were built in 1914; for the mountain batteries the material had not yet been foreseen, while the heavy field regiments had the howitzers but not the guns.

For the type of war that was taking shape, the situation of the machine gun sections was also serious: the equipment on paper was one section of machine guns per infantry battalion of the standing Army, one for each regiment of mobile militia and for each Regiment. cavalry, and there should also have been two sections for each Alpine battalion; in reality, in the event of mobilization, one could only count on 150 sections of machine guns for the entire Army.

Military education was also lacking due to the scarcity of shooting ranges and training camps, which made it difficult for already discharged soldiers to be recalled for education. The icing on the cake, given that for the Triple Alliance we had to make war on France, the geographical maps of the Austrian territory were old and of a very large scale, and there were no detailed ones. In addition, there were no railway connections dedicated to military transports and in the border stations the number of tracks for the stop of arriving and departing trains was inadequate.

Cadorna, with an unexpected organizational talent, managed to make this brothel a dignified instrument of war. And he did this with relentless energy, cleaning up, exonerating 206 generals and 255 colonels, organizing dignified logistics, and expanding the staff: the 548 infantry battalions of 1915 became 867 in 1917, with immensely superior armament, with 3,000 pieces of medium caliber instead of 246 and 5,000 of small caliber instead of 1,772.

The third problem was strategic and here Cadorna could do very little: the Alps are what they are and despite the good will of the Duke of Abruzzi, planning the landing on the French coasts is one thing, the Dalmatian coasts are one thing.At the same time, clashing with both Italian politics, anchored to a Risorgimento perspective, and allied commands, which were unable to look beyond Flanders, had a global perspective on the conflict. He would have liked to reduce the Italian forces in Libya and Albania and increase them in Macedonia, where they could represent a real danger to the enemy. He was also in favor of closer coordination with the allied armies, seeking the support of the Russians and Serbs in 1915, unleashing more than one agreed offensive with the Anglo-French, proposing in 1917 the concentration of the efforts of the Entente against Austria. -Hungary, weak point of the enemy coalition.

Cadorna, unlike what is said, was one of the few generals of World War I to have understood modern warfare, the Materialschlacht, a natural consequence of the war of attrition induced by the advent of the trenches. Also in this case the reasoning underlying Cadorna's decisions followed a simple quantitative logic (in relation to the quality of the troops, the characteristics of the terrain, the logistical situation and the alliances), based on the approach that required greater firepower to undermine entrenchments. more and more extensive and profound.

A strategy that, however, to be effectively implemented, needed an industrial base that Italy did not have: having to marry with dried figs, at the beginning it had to rely cynically on the human mass, counting on the greater Italian capacity to bear the losses.

Over time, as already mentioned, it was gradually replaced by firepower: this approach was leading Austria-Hungary to defeat by virtue of the simple disparity of the forces involved: already at the time of the conquest of Gorizia, Cadorna had just started to affect their human reserves, while the Austro-Hungarians had at that moment to face the first serious crisis since the beginning of the operations.

In the aftermath of the eleventh battle of the Isonzo, the Austrian situation had become desperate, with only Mount Ermada now remaining to block the passage of the Italian advance across the Karst towards Trieste: the resistance had reached a breaking point , and precisely this evidence induced the German High Command to finally grant the coveted reinforcements that led to the constitution of the XIV Army in view of that planned offensive of lightening.

In fact, Caporetto was the unexpected consequence of his strategic vision ... ITL Cadorna is aware that the battle of numbers is in favor of France: therefore, while waiting to modernize the Italian army with German help, it will maintain a delayed attitude. He will organize an expeditionary force in the Balkans, which given the difficulties in coordinating with the Austro-Hungarians, will not do much and will probably open an African front: this implies that the Italian attempt to find a compromise with Senussia, which due to both OTL shares failed, here could have a positive outcome
This might be the first nuanced take on Cadorna I’ve ever read and I am glad you took the time to write it out
 
I think you underestimate Venizelos, but he might not be able to drag everyone else with him if Italy goes for Albania.
 
Nice chapter and the story is really interesting… but I found just a couple of issues with some spellings as you have written inghlesi instead of inglesi and Bolanzo instead of Bolzano
 
Great reading. Only one thing, UK territorial waters back then were 3 nautical miles ie little over 5 and half kilometers (5.556 km) from coast line, and same goes for France too. The OTL expansion of terrtorial waters from 3 to 12 miles was for most countries in the second half of 20th century, UK did it in the late mid 1980-s (precisely 1987), France's 1967 straight baselines study says recent legislation of 12 miles. When the Italian ship was forced from the mid channel to British waters by British laid minefelds, then a good lawer could present it as a act of piracy. Or alternatively British commander did lie and Italians were not in UK waters. So or so, the orders from UK commander to Italians were probably illegal. It could end up quite nasty for the personell of UK-s Royal Navy.
 
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I really hope to do the man justice here, even if his career will still probably end similar to OTL's.

Now my question is: what books have you read on Cadorna, as well as WWI Italy more generally, which have informed your view? I'd be interested to do some more research on the topic myself and any pointers would be much appreciated.

First of all, to understand what he thought and his logic, it is necessary to read the books of Cadorna himself, starting with his Little Red Book, in which he outlined his tactical and strategic vision

Luigi Cadorna - Comando del Corpo di Stato Maggiore, Attacco frontale e ammaestramento tattico, Circolare 191 del 25 febbraio 1915, Roma 1915;

Even if you can't find pdfs on the net, if you read Italian, there are excellent summaries and comments on military history sites and forums in that language.

Then there are Cadorna's tales of the First World War

Luigi Cadorna - Altre pagine sulla grande guerra - 1926. Milano, Arnoldo Mondadori editore Milano

publicly available on Google Books at the following link


In particular, the first chapter is certainly very useful to you, because Cadorna explains what he would have done in the event of a war against France and his need to be bound to the plans drawn up by Cosenz.

Another book by Cadorna on his experience as a general is

Luigi Cadorna - La guerra alla fronte italiana. Fino all'arresto sulla linea della Piave e del Grappa (24 maggio 1915-9 novembre 1917)
di Luigi Cadorna, BastogoLibri, 2019


Equally interesting is his testimony on the commission of inquiry on the battle of Caporetto

Luigi Cadorna - Le argomentazioni del Generale Luigi Cadorna in risposta alla commissione d'inchiesta BastogiLibri, 2019

Always as primary sources, the memoirs of an exceptional witness, General Angelo Gatti, all published by Mondadori and Treves, are very useful to read, however the latest reprints date back to the 1960s, but can be found on Google Books, which was the official reporter of the Supreme Command

Uomini e folle di guerra (1921), Nel tempo della tormenta (1923), Tre anni di vita militare italiana (1924), Uomini e folle rappresentative (1925), La parte dell’Italia (1925)

Although dated, the studies of the Historical Office of the Italian General Staff are very detailed

L’esercito italiano nella grande guerra (1915- 1918), vol. VI, tomo I, Le istruzioni tattiche del capo di stato maggiore dell’esercito degli anni 1914-1915-1916, Ufficio storico dello Stato Maggiore Esercito, Roma 1932;
P. Pieri, L’Italia nella prima guerra mondiale (1915- 1918), Einaudi, Torino 1973


If you have patience, in the link there is a very complete list of works on the First World War in Italy (some are very specialized)


Here instead are the books on the trails to discover the trenches in the snow at 2000 meters high, on the Dolomites and on the Karst

 
Personally, I'm hoping Italy still gets amply compensated for all her losses, much like in the first version of this TL. Trentino and Trieste for starters, then Albania, Nice, Savoy, Corsica, plus Tunisia and Djibouti. Oh, and getting Eritrea and Italian Somaliland back, the British will almost certainly occupy that colony in the war. Maybe no border revisions in Libya, or getting British Somaliland, I'll admit in hindsight Italy getting Britain to give them those was somewhat far-fetched, likewise for being able to buy Malta.

Still, everything else was fine. If nothing else, it binds Italy closer to their allies in the north...and that maybe someday, there'll be a timeline where the victorious CPs get ISOT to OTL just as the Entente are patting each other on the back...and Orlando, on seeing CP Italy drunk on the spoils of war - and more to the point, the Triple Alliance actually kept its word on promised gains - compared to OTL's mutilated peace, proceeds to rip his shirt off before punching Wilson twice, turns him around, and finishes him with a German suplex.

Okay, maybe that's too crazy...well, not really, imagining Wilson getting sucker-punched before Clemenceau gets a kick in the balls before the bodyguards manage to drag Orlando off (but still giving Lloyd-George the one-finger salute) is just darling.
Of course the reaction of OTL Clemenceau, Wilson and Lloyd-George as well as their Central Powers counterparts toward Italy being seemingly the MVP of that timeline if the Redux follows the first version narrative would also be priceless.

OTL German and Austian delegates "We won thanks to those Cheating Tomatoes!?"

OTL Entente Delegates and Commanders "Where was all that competence and success when they were on OUR side!?"

Skip to German and Austrian delegates returning to their now victorious nations, along with their new Italian "best friends, while Clemenceau screamed in rage of a defeat snatched from the jaws of victory and even more French territories being lost to Germany AND Italy. Llyod George banging his head against the wall and an unconcious Wilson with both Britain and the USA public being just done with this shit. They already gone through hell for 4 years, no way they are going to try it again against a stronger Central Power.

Would be funny if TTL Japan also comes along with territories in Southeast Asia stolen from France. Clemenceaus rage would be apocalyptic in response to Japan smug reply of " French Colonies? What French Colonies? There are only independent asian nations under our " protection"."
 
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Of course the reaction of OTL Clemenceau, Wilson and Lloyd-George as well as their Central Powers counterparts toward Italy being seemingly the MVP of that timeline if the Redux follows the first version narrative.

OTL German and Austian delegates "We won thanks to those Cheating Tomatoes!?"

OTL Entente Delegates and Commanders "Where was all that competence and success when they were on OUR side!?"

Cheaters never prosper, lol :p

And since CP Italy technically didn't cheat - I mean they had to be bribed to be loyal, but still - they prospered XDXDXD

Skip to German and Austrian delegates returning to their now victorious nations, along with their new Italian "best friends, while screamed in rage of a defeat snatched from the jaws of victory and even more French territories being lost to Germany AND Italy. Llyod George banging his head against the wall and an unconcious Wilson with both Britain and the USA public being just done with this shit. They already gone through hell for 4 years, no way they are going to try it again against a stronger Central Power.

Here's to hoping Wilson never wakes up again, for all that it'll tarnish American-Italian relations if Orlando punching him turned out to have given him a stroke.

Would be funny if TTL Japan also comes along with territories in Southeast Asia stolen from France. Clemenceaus rage would be apocalyptic in response to Japan smug reply of " French Colonies? What French Colonies? There are only independent asian nations under our " protection"."

Later, during the Imperial Conference...

Australia and Canada: We can't trust the Japs! They're sneaky little backstabbers! Look at what they did to France once they saw the opportunity! Besides, they're just yellow monkeys! We shouldn't have to lower ourselves to consort with them.
Britain: *raises hands placatingly* Okay, okay...I'll see what I can do.

...then when the topic of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance comes up...

Britain: Sorry, Japan, we can't be allies with you anymore. Rule, Britannia, and all that. Good luck, though, it was great while it lasted.
Japan: Okay.
Britain: Wait, really?
Japan: We saw this coming, you know. I mean, you are Perfidious Albion, after all.
Britain: :mad:
Japan: U mad, bro?

...and finally, CP and Japanese delegates announce the formation of the new Quintuple Alliance.

Britain: FUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU-!
The CPs: :cool::cool::cool::cool::cool:
 
Also, @AndreaConti or anybody else: do you have any information on French war plans for fighting Italy? Something historical to base coming chapters on would be handy.

Let's start with a couple of data, both geographical and historical. In geographical and military terms, the border between Italy and France favors France. The theater of operations from the border to the Rhone has a depth of 200 km of mountainous terrain with multiple dams. The Italian side is shorter, all the valleys descend directly to the Po Valley, with different lengths. The greatest depth in the north with the Aosta valley; it decreases with the Susa and Chisone valleys (the route between France and Italy most traveled by armies); it becomes minimal between the Monviso and the Turin plain (less than 20 km as the crow flies); it grows again going down towards Cuneo and then the sea. There are five passes that can be traveled by vehicles: the Piccolo San Bernardo to the north, towards the Aosta valley. Mont Cenis and Montgenèvre in the center, towards Turin. Colle della Maddalena (col de Larche for the French) and Colle di Tenda to the south, towards Cuneo. Plus the narrow road along the coast. The other passes were accessible only on foot and by mules. so they were not practicable for any offensive.

Historical fact: in 1904 the Deuxième Bureau, the secret service of the French army, learns of the fundamental lines of the war plan adopted by the enemy general staff, thanks to the sensational revelations of the German spy Le Vengeur, an officer of the Germanic army of which has never been able to discover the identity that during a series of daring meetings with French emissaries, presents, upon payment of a large sum of money, an important documentation that revealed the first version of the so-called Schlieffen Plan: which then they didn't believe you, it was one of the great mistakes of World War I. However, the French had no knowledge of Cosenz's plans.

They knew neither of the occupation of Corsica, nor of the hypotheses of landing on the mouth of the Rhone: they only knew that the Italians would be on the defensive in the Alps and that they would transfer an expeditionary force to Alsace. Therefore, in a much less detailed way than Plan XVII, they had hypothesized the following strategy, based on three lines of attack: Cuneo via Col di Tenda, Turin via Moncenisio and from Nice towards Liguria, all supported by an action by the fleet on Genoa and Livorno ...

All based on the principle that the positive characteristics of the French soldier, according to the General Staff of Paris naturally led to the attack and endowed with momentum (elan) and courage (cran) superior to the soldiers of any enemies, would have allowed to overwhelm the Italians and occupy Piedmont in 21 days ... Obviously, with the occupation of Turin, Paris believed that Italy was asking for a separate peace. Then, that the Italians, starting with Cosenz, had a clear idea of the enemy strategy and were fortifying and organizing the defense of those passes, would have been a different matter ...
 
All based on the principle that the positive characteristics of the French soldier, according to the General Staff of Paris naturally led to the attack and endowed with momentum (elan) and courage (cran) superior to the soldiers of any enemies, would have allowed to overwhelm the Italians and occupy Piedmont in 21 days ... Obviously, with the occupation of Turin, Paris believed that Italy was asking for a separate peace. Then, that the Italians, starting with Cosenz, had a clear idea of the enemy strategy and were fortifying and organizing the defense of those passes, would have been a different matter ...
Wow and i always thought that was the japanese military leadership in WW2 that have such adversial relationship with reality but the French planning staff is giving them a serious challenge. 21 days to pass through the alps and occupy Piedmont? If they can do that they can march directly towards Berlin
 
Wow and i always thought that was the japanese military leadership in WW2 that have such adversial relationship with reality but the French planning staff is giving them a serious challenge. 21 days to pass through the alps and occupy Piedmont? If they can do that they can march directly towards Berlin
Just think that Joffre and Michel accused La Croux, who had formulated the hypothesis of 21 days, of defeatism: but among other things, they are the same ones who hypothesized, thanks to the XVII plan, to march through the streets of Berlin by Christmas ... But the Germans too were convinced of a short war. The only skeptic on the rapid war was the Italian General Staff: Cosenz, Pollio and Cadorna had hypothesized in their scenarios a war of two or three years, with a rate of losses which, although lower than what actually took place, was far higher than that hypothesized by the French and Germans ... This is because they were based on the analyzes that Caviglia had made on the Russian-Japanese war ...
 
That'll be the Italians' one bright spot: France thinking élan makes them bulletproof.

The first stages of the war could go this way
1) The Italians without too many problems will occupy Corsica, which in Rome will be passed off as a great victory, while it will cause some stomach ache in Paris
2) The French offensive in the Alps will be a second battle of the borders, a useless and inconclusive bloodshed
3) Cadorna with his stubbornness and his organizational spirit, manages to transfer the Italian expeditionary force to Alsace (although no one had talked about it since 1892 in Rome and Berlin, the problem was posed of how to move the allied troops)
4) In Ligurian waters there will be a sort of battle of Mediterranean Jutland, between the Italian and French fleets, without a clear prevalence of one of the two sides (and both will boast victory)
 
The first stages of the war could go this way
1) The Italians without too many problems will occupy Corsica, which in Rome will be passed off as a great victory, while it will cause some stomach ache in Paris
2) The French offensive in the Alps will be a second battle of the borders, a useless and inconclusive bloodshed
3) Cadorna with his stubbornness and his organizational spirit, manages to transfer the Italian expeditionary force to Alsace (although no one had talked about it since 1892 in Rome and Berlin, the problem was posed of how to move the allied troops)
4) In Ligurian waters there will be a sort of battle of Mediterranean Jutland, between the Italian and French fleets, without a clear prevalence of one of the two sides (and both will boast victory)
Two of these are definitely happening.
 
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