Reduce the US logistical tail in Vietnam ?

During the Vietnam War, only 1 in every 7 American servicemen sent to the Nam was a frontline combat grunt, the remainder being rear echeclon support troops (REMFs). Now, how could this issue have been addressed so that MACV had less of a massive logistical chain, & with what (better) effect on the conduct of the war ? More combat troops available for what Westmoreland thought was needed to finish the job ?
 
To what extent was this a geature rather than a bug? Military *Advisory* Command Viet Nam is, after all, theoretically supposed to be heavy on the support side. The South Vietnamese military was - again, in theory - supposed to do much of the legwork IIRC. How much of Washington's credibility was invested in that particular idea? If it is less than I think, it may be as simple as sending over a few extra infantry units. The fact that so much US presence was in air power probably accounts for a lot of the imbalance. A single combat pilot (even if he isn't carrierborne) requires support personnel far in excess of 1:7, and the support personnel also need support personnel every bit as much as infantrymen and tankers do.
 
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