Now we must return to Central Asian developments, where the geopolitical situation was growing tenser by the day.
Finding allies in the Muslim Regions
With an enemy as powerful as Ahmad Shah Durrani, Sultan Shah - ruler of Badakhshan - was right to be worried. And not only were the Afghans troublesome enough on their own, but now Khoqand and perhaps even the Qazaqs were their allies…..All this was dutifully transmitted to the Qing authorities in Yarkand and Ili, and in 1762 Mingrui, the leading representative of Beijing in northern Xinjiang, requested 20,000 soldiers to be sent to the area as reinforcement. He also asked permission to seek out allies in the “Muslim Regions.” The emperor responded positively to both demands.
Mingrui first sought to assure Qazaq loyalty to the Qing primarily by using Chinese commercial clout; the price of Chinese products, including coveted silk and cotton, would be lowered by 5% for as long as the Qazaqs maintained their neutrality. All who joined the Qing in any Central Asian campaign would receive Chinese goods for free, depending on their rank. The Qazaq khans were swayed, but Ahmad Shah immediately responded in a letter that if the Qazaqs did not accept “the obligation of holy war” in return for infidel trinkets they would be no better than apostates and called for a pan-Islamic trade embargo. After arduous negotiations both Qazaq hordes finally announced their neutrality in 1763, although their true loyalties remained unknown. The Qazaqs had been able to negotiate even better trade deals - the prices of Chinese goods would be cut by 8% until 1763 then by 6% for perpetuity unless they supported Qing enemies. Beijing was displeased by this deal, but the support of the Qazaq hordes was too important to neglect.
Similar negotiations were carried with Khoqand, another Islamic khanate - if more settled than the Qazaqs - that was interested in Chinese goods. But there was also a territorial element to the relationship with Khoqand.. Recently Irdana of Khoqand had invaded and annexed the city of Osh and ousted its Qirghiz ruler, Hajji Bi. But Hajji Bi was a Qing tributary, and he appealed to the Chinese to pressure Khoqand to give up its conquests. Realizing that Irdana was far more important than Hajji Bi, Mingrui accepted his demands and also conceded to a clarification of the Qing border that favored Khoqand. But this may have weakened the perceived authority of Beijing in Islamic Central Asia in the long term, and despite these concessions Irdana made no promise one way or another. Still, Ahmad Shah could not afford to ignore the Qing courting of Khoqand.
Bukhara was a formidable khanate in the center of Central Asia and another nominal tributary which, however, did not border the empire directly. Mingrui still managed to send an envoy to it, hoping that its many and bitter territorial disputes with Ahmad Shah would make it a loyal ally of Beijing. However, Abu’l Ghazi Khan, khan of Bukhara, refused to give a definite answer in public. “I am Abu’l Ghazi, so how should I join with infidels” he would say, punning on the meaning of
ghazi as ‘holy warrior.’ But in 1763 Mingrui reported that “Bukhara [.....] is mostly reliable,” so it appears that there was some clandestine communication that Islamic sources do not report.
Ahmad Shah was greatly disturbed by Qing activity and moved around 30,000 soldiers north in 1762, forcing him to take a light hand in India. To his annoyance, the menace the Qing posed made him unable to launch a large-scale campaign in the Punjab and the Sikh revolts continued. In 1763 Nasir Khan, the most powerful chieftain in Baluchistan, took advantage of the chaos in the north to revolt from Afghan suzerainty and invade Sindh. The Afghans’ grip on India seemed to be crumbling. So events in India may have, in fact, motivated Ahmad Shah to finally go to war.
The path to Irkeshtam
In August 1764, the stench of death rose high above the snow-topped mountains of the Pamirs. The swift waters had not, as of yet, managed to cleanse the Kirzlesu River of its tinge of red, and tens of thousands of corpses - the representatives of two great empires - lay prone in the hills. This was the first legacy of the Battle of Irkeshtam, one of the great battles of Central Asian history. But could it have been avoided?
Perhaps not. By 1764 the rulers of both sides wanted war. Ahmad Shah felt constrained by the menace of Chinese invasion and feared doing nothing would only cost him allies, and he appears to have been preparing for war as early as 1762. As for Beijing, the story was somewhat more complex. In late 1762 Niyas Beg, a Kashmiri, announced to the Qing authorities in Xinjiang that “if [the Qing] gave him a few troops, he would consult with the ruler of Ladakh and the people of Kashmir, take Kashmir, and offer it to the emperor.” The Qianlong emperor was enamoured with this plan to conquer Kashmir, unlike almost the entirety of his government. One official memorialized that there were “five insurmountable issues with the conquest of Kashmir.” First, Ahmad Shah had already dispatched a tributary envoy, so Kashmir had already seen the light of imperial grace even without having been conquered. Second, Ahmad Shah had displayed restraint and not deposed the Mughals, suggesting he was, in fact, a righteous ruler. Third, Niyas Beg was an untrustworthy men with untrustworthy credentials. Four, Kashmir was far from the Chinese administrative centers in either Xinjiang or Tibet, but close to potential enemies in Hindustan. Fifth, it would drain the treasury for nothing but prestige. The emperor should therefore show restraint worthy of a sage ruler. The emperor could find nothing of fault in the memorial, and the conquest of Kashmir was discounted. But Kashmir seems to have been always in his mind; in response to Mingrui’s memorial, he sent 5,000 more men than Mingrui had requested and in 1764 he sent 10,000 soldiers for unknown reasons.
This finally convinced Ahmad Shah to move, and in the early spring of 1765 Irdana and he overran Badakhshan and killed Sultan Shah. Since Badakhshan had a defense alliance with the Qing, Mingrui was bound to act. After filing a report to Beijing, he moved west with around 30,000 soldiers he could call from throughout Xinjiang as General of Ili. The Afghan-Khoqandi army was camped in the north of Badakhshan, just west of Kashgar. When they heard news of Mingrui’s march they began to advance east as well. By mid-July the Afghan army of some 40,000 troops, of whom about two-thirds were Ahmad Shah’s men, were camped in the village of Nura on the Kirzlesu River. A few days later the Qing troops camped further along the Kirzlesu about ten kilometers east. In between the two armies was the lakeside village of Irkeshtam.
It is said, according to oral histories from Badakhshani villagers, that Ahmad Shah made a speech the day before battle began:
All must perish, save God - all beings in this transitory world of matter is mortal, and to be immortal is to be God. One day your flesh shall rot and be meat for the worms and the rats, and in this world there shall remain of all of you naught but a name. It is better to perish with a good name than to live with a bad one.
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Tomorrow we adjoin battle against the armies of the infidel realm. It has been set by Him so that the dead tomorrow will be martyrs of the gardens of Paradise, and the living will be holy warriors in the forest of courage. Tomorrow we shall surely achieve victory, as victory was achieved against the Hindus at Panipat, as victory was achieved against the idolaters of Mecca many centuries ago. Take God's Word in your hand. By it, by the Holy Qu'ran, swear you shall not desert, that you shall live or die with your faces to the east. And remember that he who seeks to die shall live, and he who seeks to live shall die.