Red Sun Rising: The Reverse-Russo-Japanese War

That would be awesome thanks :). It's just some research from th Russo-Japanese war suggested that th Korean government and populace preferred the Japanese to the Russians at the time due to less religious/ethnic differences and better treatment.
 
And that's exactly what you'll get ;)

The Republic’s Early Days: 1917-1921


Greg Peterson, Japan’s Rise on the Global Scene, pp.12-17

With the matter of the civil war over once and for all, the Japanese nation was now free to consolidate itself as a force to be reckoned with on the global frontier. It would no longer be held back by the ineptitude of the imperialists and would be free to the work of the people, at least in theory. However, the new nation would need to develop on the flaws that the country was having, with these being covered in several different ways, with the first of these being political in nature.

A coalition of several different socialist parties, major and minor had overthrown the imperialists, along with anarchists, pro-shogun revival elements, and other more obscure groups. However, bickering did exist between the main groups, despite the de-facto dominance of the Radical Proletarian Front, and the Democratic Union for Progress’s numbers. The Radical Proletarian Front made the decision to amalgamate itself with smaller ‘compatible’ socialist parties and individuals to form the ‘Communist Party of Japan’, with an expanded membership and reach over the country as a result. Soon, there was dissidence from those in the DUP who were not willing to accept the new order of an authoritarian state, and thus drastic action was necessary. The Spring Purge of 1917 was such a move to eliminate more liberal or ‘counterrevolutionary’ socialist movements from the country, killing, firing or exiling different members of the group. It is estimated that over 2000 people lost their lives as sympathisers were found and executed, while over 30,000 fled the country, either by force or voluntarily. Many of these democratic socialists moved into sympathetic countries such as the newly established Philippines, or the west coast of the United States, where the local Japanese communities would experience a strong anti-communist atmosphere, even stronger in fact than that of the average American. [1] A number of refugees though, ended up going southwards into the Nauru Free Territory, boosting the small population of this anarchist attempt at utopia. [2] As time went on, anarchist idealists from around the world would visit this strange little island.

With opposition effectively silenced, the People’s Shogun Sakai set about organising the nation into a relatively centralised system, eliminating the need for local lords to rule over particular areas. Instead, councils would be set up in local areas, primarily in the cities, but also in the countryside to some extent, allowing the local workers’ concerns and needs to be organised and directed efficiently and quickly. These councils would of course answer to the government, though they would be separate from the independent trade unions that allowed the workers their rights. Within the cities, the industrial centres, already well established from Japan’s capitalist stage, would be similarly put under the control of trade unions, though these would most often answer to the state in general affairs. Even General Secretary Katayama, who was more cynical on Japan’s progress before the revolution, admitted that Japan’s pre-existing industry made the urban transitions “a shrunken giant.” Feedback regarding conditions would be encouraged, but any anti-socialist thought would be met with hostility immediately. Factories and mines would have their own militias who would be put there to ‘protect the people’ from revisionists and to minimise the risk of mutinies, which was something the leadership of the country was worried might happen. Katayama’s development of the council with regard to this made the nation better able to both prevent and deal with rebellion, as tightening authority would be able to root out dissent and act quickly, while improving working and living conditions would mean there would be less incitement to revolt; he had gained the best of both worlds. This would not be perfect however; the Hiroshima Bread Riot of 1918 was an example of when this system turned out to be flawed, as the decision decided upon by the Hiroshima People’s Council was not one popular with the average worker in regard to how much bread would need to be produced, as well as the wages for those bakers. Protests occurred outside the factories with workers boycotting the industry, leading to food shortages across southern Japan lasting from February till June. The police forces moved in swiftly, arresting about 400 workers and making the ringleaders ‘disappear’. The damage had been done though, and so Katayama implemented the Baker Act, which would allow the bakers themselves to have direct say upon their wages and production quotas with the officials. This however dissatisfied many of the other industrial workers, who viewed this as favouritism. Those in industry saw it as particularly humiliating, as those who were preparing to fuel and modernise the country felt marginalised. On the other hand, there were those voices such as Yamakawa who felt the country wasn’t going far enough, and if the authorities held a tighter leash on the nation, the riots and ones like them would never have happened. This pressure led to increased disapproval of Katayama from the rest of the People's’ Council, and so increased decisions were made to reduce his power and influence in the nation.

In the countryside, the situation was significantly different. Here, the people faced a less radical turnover of their lives. They were no longer made to have fealty to local nobles and forced to pay taxes to these, and the amounts of their labours they would be allowed to keep would be increased. This showed some favourable responses from many of the farming communities, especially the poorest among them. Schemes were set up to make sure that collections of resources would not involve abuse of the common people and their needs, particularly providing benefits to those in search of jobs, hoping to encourage them to find new work. However, many among these communities were still dissatisfied, still having to pay significant taxes towards the city peoples as well as large amounts of their grain and meat. Any riots by such workers would be put down, with many being arrested as a result. The biggest problem however, was that many were sympathetic towards the old regime, and in favour of the Emperor over this new communist system. Those in the government, particularly Yamakawa, felt frustration with such a reactionary influence within such a major proportion of the working class. [3] As a result, he called a meeting of the Kyoto Council to discuss the matter of how to root out reactionary elements within the former peasantry. A happy rural workforce would eliminate the risk of revolution against the state, and unify the nation towards the goal of true communism and equality, while also allowing for more food and resources to be available for the cities, improving the nation’s well being. Drastic measures would need to be taken though, and a group made for the specific purpose of rooting out ideological enemies would need to be put in place, both for the countryside, and for the cities. Ironically, an old feudal element would return in the form of the ninja, a highly skilled class of warrior, trained in stealth, discipline and efficiency. With the reestablishment and modernisation of such a guild, they could prove a formidable secret police force which would make the nation more stable and give the Party a greater level of control by which they could guide the common people towards their goal. In September 1918, the Ninja were officially and secretly re-established under the wardenship of Sanzo Nosaka, a communist agent and organizer, working separately to the normal police force, employing informers who would listen in on the conversations of people in the markets to note if anything suspicious would occur.[4] A further degree of arrests and purges would occur in the next couple of years. One of the victims of the movement would be Sakuzo Yoshino, who had been a member of the DUP and wanted a socialist-rooted democracy rather than this ‘dictatorship of the proletarian’ that the Communist Party had established. This did of course become the source of significant criticism from many others in the government, including Sakai himself, who thought the solution should instead be done with a use of propaganda and tokens of good will that would win the people over to his side, arguing that violence should only be a last resort. Additional criticisms were made to the hypocrisy of Katayama, who himself had been a member of the DUP before defecting to the RPF, and so was often distrusted and seen of as paranoid. Despite these criticisms, it was too late for Yoshino.

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Sakuzo Yoshino, one of those purged in the winter of 1918/1919 following the reestablishment of the Ninja guild.

He and hundreds of others, including fellow democrat Tokuzo Fukada, were arrested, put on trial for ‘compromising the Revolution’ and summarily executed under Katayama’s orders, though Fukada did manage to escape on the way to his death sentence and find refuge in Nanking, where he told the people living there what was happening under the communist regime. China’s then leader Sun Yat-Sen was not as invested in the use of such propaganda, as while he was by no means friendly towards communism, he saw the formation of a republic as the primary goal, even if socialists of more moderate varieties would be involved in the system as well. Others however, particularly Chiang Kai Shek, commander of the Republic’s armed forces, wished to use this to isolate Japan by bringing out news of the atrocities under the regime. [5] News of his escape and welcoming into China led to Sino-Japanese relationships deteriorating on a national level, as the two started to become almost hostile to one another. Chiang went as far as to conduct his own set of purges in the autumn of 1919 to root out communists and sympathisers, with many rounded up and executed, while a minority made their way to Japan and secretly to Korea.
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Sakai was optimistic for the progress of Japan towards being a modern socialist nation, and his moderate and populistic methods of obtaining the people’s support were successful, if criticised by other voices in the Party.

Meanwhile, the exiled communist groups from around the world started moving into Japan as a safe haven for them to express their viewpoints and contribute to a society. Sakai and Katayama had created a new type of society run by the people, and they would want to find refuge from reactionary assassins and learn how to spread the revolution to the global stage. Sakai was very egalitarian in his viewpoints, and his promotion of Esperanto as a second language, to be taught in schools across the country as a mandatory lesson, would in his view help destroy the gaps between different languages and cultures, rejecting the pseudo-scientific racism that other nations were using. Sakai’s idealism was welcomed by many of these immigrant socialists, particularly exile Leon Trotsky, who saw internationalism as an excellent pursuit for the nation, even taking on Sakai’s Esperanto. As a former Menshevik, he also favoured the more moderate stance of social policy, with a diplomatic approach to solving problems within the country, while hoping to fund revolutionary movements elsewhere as soon as possible. Sakai considered appointing Trotsky as the country’s foreign minister, though in hindsight this would put him at risk of assassination, so he instead promoted him in January 1920 with a seat within the People’s Council and put him in charge of the ideological board, which would check the ideological purity of proposed new acts, communicating with Arahata who would make this into propaganda. Rosa Luxembourg, a German communist, also supported Sakai’s democratic and semi-syndicalist manner of leadership, while denouncing Katayama’s purges as ‘a travesty’. However, several of the international immigrants did not favour the relatively moderate stance shown by Sakai, and sided with Katayama in his view of development and of the propositions for Japan’s future. Vladimir Lenin, the former leader of Russia’s fledgling Bolsheviks, was even strongly sympathetic with Yamakawa and his call for a ‘total’ model of socialism, where the entire state would push forward towards its common goal, rather than bickering under different leaders in a council. While disagreeing about the treatment and emphasis of the rural classes, they agreed that a more authoritarian state would be a necessary act of progress for the nation’s well being, considering the official position too lenient, with even Katayama’s actions not being satisfactory to organise the state of society. Always a supporter of decent international relations for the sake of the country’s development, Lenin was willing to work with the Japanese towards this common goal of world revolution regardless, even if he fell out with Trotksy as a result of factional differences.
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Russian refugee Vladimir Lenin became an important member of Yamakawa’s ‘Total Revolution’ faction within the party.

As the Proletarian Republic of Japan entered a new decade, the country’s efforts to mend itself from civil war had been mostly successful. Many thousands had lost their lives in this conflict, but now it was possible for veterans to move on with their lives and find a stable place within society. The military was built up to an impressive form, with the People’s Navy being one of the most powerful and respectable on the planet, even if not enough to challenge the Royal Navy or US Navy in manpower. One of the early projects suggested by Katayama was the construction of many destroyer ships that would intimidate Japan's enemies and provide devastation on the seas. However, these early destroyers tended to not be particularly efficient in their performance, with many in the government thinking this was yet another waste of resources from Katayama. Instead research went into building new types of submersible which could be used to ambush enemy ships. A change in tactics in the navy was the abolition of the 'Bushido Honor' method, or the doctrine that only explicitly military ships could be attacked, leaving trading and civilian ships ignored. For pragmatic reasons, this was dropped, as it would allow breathing space for any enemy fleets, and given the 'rational' mindset the new atheistic leadership had, it would be dropped in favour of an indiscriminate attitude towards enemy ships.
IJN_Shimakaze_(Minekaze_class)_Taisho_11.jpg

One of the country's many ships built during the early post-establishment period, the 'Revolutionary Sword' was just one of the first of Japan's growing People's Navy, that would make their navy a force to be reckoned with.

Unemployment figures were also dropping dramatically as Japan opened up new work opportunities, making sure that people were fed and able to work in factories, farms or mines. Japan’s limited resources naturally made this somewhat difficult, but the country’s leadership remained optimistic for the restoration of the nation. With most new policies sorted out, finishing off the recovery from the war, militarily and economically was the new priority that would allow the nation to prosper. Not only would their military and economy be restored, but would be improved over their old forms, with production of steel, timber, oil and various cottons being of great value, particularly in the natural resources of Formosa. In addition, Sakai and Katayama were beginning to plan something that would change the course of Japan- the Five Year Plans. These would help build the nation’s industrial power, upgrade its military to a maximum level, and moralise its population in the name of liberating the peoples of East Asia and eventually the world, either through force or through diplomacy. Japan couldn’t fund a global revolution on its own, so it would need allies in the form of other nations in Asia and the world, perhaps even satellite states if a war with China or Russia was to go favourably. [6] With a Japan willing to fund revolutions in Asia, the western powers looked on warily.

Hope this is a good update for you. :)

[1] While Japan has a dramatically smaller pool of influence than Russia generally, the United States would always be wary of a significant Pacific nation turning communist, especially one not far from their military bases such as Guam and Hawaii.

[2] More on them soon.

[3] With a more authoritarian and agrarian bend to his ideology, Yamakawa gives off semi-Maoist vibes, and while he doesn't fall to corruption as easily as Stalin or Mao, his ideals for the future would indeed involve much violence.

[4] While effectively functioning as a secret police force, with maximum training in their art and secrecy, they would not be used nearly as frequently as the NKVD, and tended to be directly submitted to the Party rather than a force in their own right.

[5] Throughout the decades of their coexistence, China and Japan continued to remain in hostility to one another on governmental levels, despite Japanese attempts at reconciling the two. However, both nations would eventually become involved together in the ‘Eastern Campaign’ of the Second Great War, both supported anti-colonial forces in the Indonesian War for Independence, and both denounced the atrocities of ‘Bepul Xiva’ in the Central Asian Wars.

[6] A not so subtle taster for things to come.
 
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trurle

Banned
With a Russian economy ruined by defeat in Europe and a approximately year-long Japanese occupation of trans-Amur area, i think the Khabarovsk Bridge project is postponed indefinitely. It will mean lagging development and rampaging separatism on the Far East of Russia.
Also, without clear victor in your equivalent of WWI, the League of Nations (formed 1920 IOTL) is not going to appear, because it would not include the Germany - currently the most powerful state in continental Europe. It mean also no Washington Naval Treaty (1922 IOTL).

I expect most national leaders in Forbiddenparadise64 world in 1916 to feel insecure, threatened or even scared to death - therefore pushing the arms race to the limits.

Outline of arms race:
1) Continuation of capital ship buildup by Britain, Germany and United States and may be Italy (expect like 100+ dreadnought battleships on each side by beginning of 1919)
2) Impoverished nations like Japan, Russia, Spain, Ottoman empire etc. will be clearly unable to compete, therefore investment would be made into asymmetric warfare. It mean espionage, sabotage, unusual coastal artillery, rockets, torpedoes, naval mines and aircraft.

In particular:
a) Russians are going to push the idea of heavy/torpedo bomber https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sikorsky_Ilya_Muromets to the extreme and with much rigour. Japanese are likely to acquire the idea, downed sample or even blueprints (through communist underground channels) very soon. I expect Ilya Muromets - derived torpedo bombers capable to carry 450mm (1-ton) torpedoes to be produced in Russia and Japan by 1924, followed shortly after by British. IOTL torpedo bomber development was much delayed interwar due lack of funds despite clear perspectives, with first effective torpedo bombers (Fairey Swordfish) flying in 1934.
b) Base bleed coastal artillery. It was nearly ASB such a simple and effective solution to extend an artillery range was overlooked until 1969. Would be a closely-held state secret of one or few cornered nations though. Very easy to conceal in plain sight unlike the heavy bomber.
c) Early "Multiple Launch Rocket System" in coastal installations (similar to WWII British Z battery) to provide some deterrent against long-range naval bombardment (have a shorter production cycle time compared to ultra-heavy artillery and may be considered as a viable stopgap coastal defence weapon).
d) Earlier development of magnetic and acoustic mines/ torpedoes (1931 IOTL) The premature versions would be very imprecise though, due reliability and noise issues in their highly-complicated detonators and mechanical guidance systems.
e) Heavy investment in the sabotage tactics. Imagine suicidal agents of Japanese Revolutionary Army with sacks of explosive in their stomachs infiltrating the British or US ports. It is not really going to work on large scale, but few top-notch targets can be destroyed, and tightened security will reduce productivity more than saboteurs can achieve.
f) Early fast torpedo boats (the Kitty Hawk hydroplane was developed in 1911 IOTL, but idea was shelved for decades)
g) More emphasis on submarine warfare (British, Germany and Japan are likely pioneers)
h) Tanks development approximately in line with OTL (ideas for armoured vehicles were too straightforward and widespread by 1914 IOTL)

P.S. I disagree with Forbiddenparadise64 placing Kotoku`s anarchists initally to Hokkaido. With land policy of the Meiji government (encouraging ex-soldiers to settle on free land lots in Hokkaido) the Hokkaido is going to be one of the most loyal regions of the crumpling Japanese Empire. Ainu did not have neither political power nor dense population in 1915, therefore their efforts on revolution would be negligible. Instead, i would place anarchists`s hotbed to Kobe-Osaka-Shiga-Kyoto quadrangle (roughly Kansai region) which had a social stress far exceeding average due local impoverishment and also have a well-established organized crime network (the Yamaguchi-gumi, the largest Japanese Yakuza syndicate, can be traced back to 1915 in Kobe IOTL)

P.P.S. The new post by Forbiddenparadise64 is generally ok, but some points are messed up:
a) Is is strange to find "oppression by local lords" in Japan about 1915. The local self-government system (councils etc.) was established in 1888-1890 (see book
Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period
by Carol Gluck , p. 192 for the reference). I.m.h.o., if rural social tension should exist in rural Japan, it would be dominated by recent social stratification among peasants, due ongoing mechanization and advances in fertilizers for agriculture. Simply, the more conservative peasants will find their vegetables too expensive to be competitive, and anyway the food prices would be falling rapidly forcing mass migration to the cities.
b) The national fleet around 1920 cannot be built around destroyers. Destroyers according to doctrine of the epoch had a very limited role - to protect the capital ships (battleships) from torpedo boats attack. Only after advances in submarine warfare the destroyers has become useful as commercial fleet protectors - but only against weaker opponents who can not afford cruisers. Otherwise, the cruisers were considered more effective shipping lane protectors against advanced enemy. So Japan may opt for cruiser fleet (implemented IOTL, but clearly untenable in this ATL given abundance of enemy battleships in sea due ongoing British- German confrontation), or submarines + torpedo boats + aircraft as a low-cost asymmetric alternative.
By the way, of 15 Minekaze-class destroyers you pictured as exemplar, 9 were sunk by submarines and 2 by airstrikes. In return, all 15 Minekaze-class destroyers have managed to sunk 1/2 of minesweeper and 1/3 of submarine (all in joint action with newer destroyers). Of course, Minekaze-class was obsolete by WWII, but even for obsolete ship the performance was abysmal.
 
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a) Is is strange to find "oppression by local lords" in Japan about 1915. The local self-government system (councils etc.) was established in 1888-1890 (see book
Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period
by Carol Gluck , p. 192 for the reference). I.m.h.o., if rural social tension should exist in rural Japan, it would be dominated by recent social stratification among peasants, due ongoing mechanization and advances in fertilizers for agriculture. Simply, the more conservative peasants will find their vegetables too expensive to be competitive, and anyway the food prices would be falling rapidly forcing mass migration to the cities.

Sounds like Japan might end up with its own brand of Kulaks.
 
Regarding aircraft, I think this ATL 1920s with the Great War outcome in Western Europe largely a push would tend to favor a brief but significant era of airships.

In general, the "age of the airship" never seems to dawn, in part because the same technological advances that make a dirigible practical also tend to enable airplanes to become more competitive.

However in this period there is a definite advantage that a medium to large size airship enjoys, and that is the matter of range and endurance. Although even the rather primitive airplanes of the era are already three or more times faster than the sky whales, they are of rather haphazard reliability and cannot stay airborne long nor achieve long ranges except as extreme stunts. The first transAtlantic crossing--the easy way, flying with prevailing winds from west to east from Newfoundland to Ireland--was achieved by Alcock and Brown in a Vickers Vimy bomber plane in 1919, but just weeks later, the British R-34 made the second crossing, the hard way against the winds over a much greater distance--starting from RAF East Fortune in Scotland somewhat east of A&B's crash-landing in western Ireland, and flying much farther west than Newfoundland. A&B covered 3040 kilometers in just under 16 hours, but reading about their flight it is evident that their survival was a bit of a miracle, whereas the R-34 made it all the way to Minneola on Long Island, New York. It took them over 4 days, but they covered 4800 kilometers--admittedly they were very nearly out of fuel when they arrived! (But obviously they'd have been fine if they had gone to Nova Scotia, or even Massachusetts, instead. And they did make it to a safe mooring, though just barely). Unlike the near-frozen and miserable pair of A&B, crash-landing in a field in Ireland, they made their goal--I forget just how large the complement aboard was but the article above names at least 5 people aboard, including one stowaway with a dog, and I believe the total was 9 or so. Furthermore upon refueling, the R-34 was well able to return to RNAS Pulham in just 75 hours with ample fuel, going faster and more easily with the prevailing winds.

Now in this ATL, both Britain and Germany are considerably better off than OTL, due to the war ending earlier. The USA never formally took sides. The Zeppelin firm is not trying to operate in a Germany with a collapsed economy nor are they under the ax of a Versailles Treaty regime with the agenda of banning all German aviation.* Neither Britain nor Germany need suffer the extreme stringency of the OTL post-war era though surely both economies will suffer something of a hangover. The rival design firm Schuette-Lanz might also be able to continue in business; with two competing German firms, the chances that airship technology secrets would be dispersed seems more likely. Germany has lost East Africa and all holdings in the Pacific but retains holdings in west Africa, and has gained a vast hegemony in the east of Europe. IIRC German satellites border on the Black Sea and the odds are fairly good that the Kaiserreich enjoys good relations with Turkey. Thus there are potential markets for a German airline even if they find both the French and British firmly opposed to letting them service their colonial holdings or fly over them. The Suez Canal airspace at least ought to remain open; if not passage over the Black sea, over Anatolia and possibly still Ottoman held Mesopotamia might be an option to reach the Indian Ocean--too bad they don't still have East Africa! Nor are there any destinations on the Indian Ocean or beyond that might welcome them--Japan or China being possible destinations but too damn far away going over the sea, whereas Russian airspace is surely closed.

At any rate, I'd think the Germans would want, for reasons of prestige as well as possible revenue opportunities, to establish a regular transAtlantic service. A direct air route to the United States (assuming they are unwelcome in Canada of course) would require diverting around Britain, either south through the Channel in sight of both a hostile Britain and France, or north of Scotland. In summer the northerly route would serve well enough; airships are unlikely to want to operate in stormy seasons (although OTL, in 1960 the USN's Operation Whole Gale demonstrated that blimps could operate and carry out missions in the worst storm season, remaining airborne in weather that grounded airplanes and demonstrating superior endurance and range while detecting all submarines attempting to slip past the gauntlet--it is of course open to question whether 1920s rigids could accomplish the same thing!) They probably could get access to the Azores but unlike airplanes, this would merely be a convenience, not a necessity.

A Zeppelin design postwar, with adequate funding, would be far superior to R-34 (which was not designed as a passenger carrier) and could surely be ready to fly as early or earlier. Despite a longer flight path it ought to be able to take on paying passengers in at least similar numbers to Hindenburg, albeit probably in notably less comfort. But still their comfort would be vastly superior to any possible airplane that could make the crossing by any route. Considering the many stops for refueling a realistic ocean-crossing airplane of the 1920s (if this could be done at all on any scale beyond Alcock and Brown or Lindbergh's near fatal stunts) the speed advantage of the airplane would be largely nullified by long delays waiting for daylight and safe flying weather. The airship just plows on, slowly but majestically, for the most part. I therefore think that in this ATL regular service from Bremen to New York, taking some 4-5 days each way, would be established by say 1922.

In these circumstances, with Britain's finances somewhat less badly off, one would expect both the RN and the RAF to be supported in developing British airships. Great things might be expected from the firms of Vickers, and Shorts, based on OTL efforts. Unlike Germany, Britain has a vast web of imperial holdings to link together. It is technically possible already in the 1920s to do this with airplanes, but they are not on the average faster or safer than possible airships of the decade. With more consistent and heavier support than OTL, I'd think an Empire scheme reaching on its major trunk route from Britain, over France and the Mediterranean to Egypt and thence either over Arabia or around it to India, and on via Singapore to Australia and ultimately New Zealand would be fully implemented before 1930, with other branches competing with the Germans for the American/transAtlantic market, a spur down to South Africa and connecting most of British Africa in between, and possibly a satellite network in the Caribbean

In turn, American investors might get in on the game. The USA is poor terrain for a transcontinental airship line, what with the Rocky Mountain range being in the way--but Zeppelins, lifted with hydrogen, were able to clear high mountains, including the Rockies on the Graf Zeppelin's world circumnavigation--more routinely, the Alps. American railroads however can come close to matching airship top speeds; the airships would only enjoy a partial advantage in being able fly more directly--but between contrary winds and the need to seek out relatively low spots in the central mountain range, not all that much so. But a large set of over-water markets does exist--West coast to Hawaii, for instance, or on from there to the Philippines. Anglo-American cooperation can create a closed loop network, and other services might run down to South America on either side of the Andes and just possibly (with difficulty and risk) over them. The South American market, particularly on the Atlantic side, is liable to European competition of course.

Would this be enough to bring in the French and Russians too? Russia could use some airships for domestic purposes--even if the Trans-Siberian RR is finished, it is still far from reaching all points of interest in the east.

And in the perspective of the 1920s right after a Great War cut somewhat short relative to OTL, the airships might look like game changers on the high seas for navies too.

The big role serious advocates such as the USN's Charles Rosendahl suggested was that of naval scout, a function traditionally done by cruisers. Airplanes operating off aircraft carriers could greatly expand the vision of fleets of course, as could seaplanes--but in the 1920s these remained limited and risky. Note that much development of carriers in the interwar years was favored by the fleet limitation treaties aimed at traditional Great War era warship types; converting cruisers or cargo ships over to carriers sidestepped some of the treaty limits. We anticipate no such treaties in this TL so the admiralties will presumably remain more focused on battleships and cruisers--surely some carriers will also be developed, but the airship alternative will also remain attractive. It is an obvious opportunity for the Germans to leapfrog the RN, and the RN must surely respond by seeking to have British airships developed for its own purposes. An airship cruising a kilometer or two up in the air can survey a vast sweep of ocean, and moves two or three times faster than any surface ship. Airplanes operating off of carriers, or seaplane tenders, are tied to their ships, whereas it is possible for airplanes (light ones, in modest numbers, to be sure) to operate off of airships by hook-on methods. In the 1920s state of the art airplanes could easily match speeds with a cruising airship. Any arguments that a carrier-based airplane could fly faster and higher could be answered with hook-on aircraft, and its base moves a lot faster, so that an airship operating a few scout planes could sweep out vast swathes of ocean, searching for enemy fleet elements or squadrons. To locate enemy subs instead might require different practices, but the British demonstrated the utility of small coastal blimps for such purposes during the Great War OTL; to secure a fleet on the high seas might require a fair number of big airships, say two really big ones as light carrier/scouts with the option of launching strike missions, and two or three moderate sized small rigids or large blimps to more meticulously and slowly probe the seas on the fleet or task force's projected course for submarines.

(As the state of the art advances in the 1930s and minimum airspeeds of high-performance warplanes rises above sustainable LTA cruise or even dash speeds, something more elaborate must be done--but I think it would be feasible for a fast airplane to intercept a trapeze slung many tens or hundreds of meters below, and use it as a pendulum to absorb excess forward speed, and be winched up quickly to the mother airship--take-off from the sky carrier would be easy of course, just rev up the engine, and drop the plane--it quickly and effortlessly gains necessary airspeed by diving. These operations would be rather daredevil for the planes, especially snagging a swinging hook at many tens of knots relative speed, but pretty safe for the airship, and even the planes are at less risk than one attempting to land on a carrier deck on the sea).

I envision yet more less glorious but useful roles for airships of various sizes on a high seas fleet--to serve as cargo delivery vehicles for instance, running vital items or couriering messengers or high ranking officers to fleet flagships far out at sea, ferrying wounded men back to shore hospitals. An airship can match speeds with any surface element (or surfaced submarine) and transfer goods either way. There are some tricks to master but I can think of how to do it.

The development of the helicopter has eclipsed many possible functions for airships, but if there were a major investment in them in the 1920s I'd think we'd see more examples of these in operation before the choppers could take over. Helicopter rotor technology could probably be well fostered by using them interim as improved, steerable props for advanced airship designs, and airships incorporating these would be of moderately more use than those without.

Other advances that can stretch the competitiveness of airships, albeit being driven into farther niche roles, would be the development of aeronautical diesel engines, improved and lightened/strengthened materials (such as synthetic gas cell materials, developed OTL in the 1930s, to replace "goldbeater's skin" gas cells which is essentially cow guts (the membranes used for sausage skins) glued onto cotton--the synthetic cellulose cells developed for the Akron and Macon were lighter, stronger, less leak, wear and rot prone, and cheaper too, for instance) for rigid members, lines, and skin material. I've mentioned some pet ideas of mine such as dynamic pendulum fast airplane hook-on, diesel engines (which were tentatively developed partially OTL, and by the way can be adjusted easily to burn mostly hydrogen), self-steering, larger area helicopter type rotors--and I have yet more in mind such as variable buoyancy without throwing away either lift gas or ballast, by using steam or ammonia as lift gases that can be converted back into condensed form.

By the early 1930s, airplanes will at last be demonstrating an approach to more or less reliable transoceanic ranges, and with their superior speed which not only gratifies travelers but allows a given number of seat/berths to serve more customers in a given time, the airships will definitely be eclipsed as major passenger carriers. But by then the investment in them might be so tremendous, that they are favored for auxiliary roles as they would not be if none had ever been built in the first place. Hook-on capabilities may extend the useful commercial lives considerably or even indefinitely--in lieu of developing massive, land hungry heavy concrete runways, heavy fast airplanes might operate off of very big airships as hook-ons, that proceed down chains of airships spotted along routes within airplane range of each other, to refuel the fast express airplanes quickly, while slow short-take-off and landing planes rise from numerous small simple airfields to join the airships in progress. Heavy cargoes can fly slowly and economically; passengers exhausted by loud and cramped fast airplanes can take berths aboard relatively quiet, steady and spacious airships to rest and dodge jet lag. The existence of the hook-on mother ship option might accelerate the commercial introduction of very fast prop planes (designed without compromise for high airspeeds, landing on the ground only occasionally at maintenance sites situated on desert salt lakes for huge natural airfields unfortunately located nowhere convenient. Eventually early jet aircraft, with short legs, can still lend their phenomenal speed to passengers in a hurry, even though the runway network does not yet exist.

Between the development of jets, turboprops, and helicopters especially with turbine engines, the airships will definitely have to retreat into the background, but I don't think they will be eclipsed completely ever. A big war might either sweep most if not quite all of them from the sky, or actually diversify their uses even more, at least for the duration.

OTL, between WWI and sometime after WWII, only the United States could boast any known economical source of the gas helium, and even for limited purposes the supply was scanty, unreliable, and not very pure. During WWII it was quite adequate to operate a large fleet of hundreds of "small" blimps on coastal patrol (or eventualy more ambitious missions such as minesweeping, another unglamorous but vital service). In this ATL, only the Americans would have the option of experimenting with helium. This will remain true until and unless the handful of other sites known OTL by now--I know of somewhere (don't know just where) in Siberia, somewhere in Algeria, and perhaps one or two other locations I forget--are stumbled upon. All are natural gas wells with a small percentage of helium trapped.

Assuming these are found no faster than OTL, the USA does not have any spare to sell to anyone, no matter how friendly. Germans, Britons, French, Russians, and lest the point be lost--possibly Japanese--must use either hydrogen or gases inferior to helium in most ways (though with some interesting compensating options) such as steam, methane, "town gas," ammonia, or even hot air. The latter, and town gas, strike me as terribly impractical; methane is as flammable as hydrogen and much worse at lifting. Steam and ammonia can be converted back and forth between liquid and gas states to achieve variable lift without venting or dropping anything. But as main lift gases they are mediocre and risky. The game is pretty much going to be all hydrogen, at least as the main lifting material.

This means they are of course vulnerable to accidents. I am not one of those people who wishes to scoff at the risks, but I will suggest that people will accept some degree of risk while traveling. And in peaceful, civil applications the risks can be managed. For military applications, much service will be in an auxiliary, back of the lines role, and even near the fronts the actual weapons will be carried by airplanes the last couple hundred miles. Airship strike carrier/scout cruisers will, like aircraft carriers of the surface which are also terribly vulnerable to enemy action, rely mainly on distance and evasion, and only as a last resort the defensive capability of their warplanes for their defense. Submarine hunter "destroyers" will not be invulnerable to the subs they seek to ferret out--OTL at least one U-boat was able to down an American blimp with its surface guns, and that blimp used helium for lift too--but they will enjoy the high ground, and have a good option of standing off far enough to be able to dodge and run. Anyway their role, as with other warships, is to go in harm's way as part of an operational fleet they serve; even if shot down, the crew might survive and anyway had a duty to alert their fellow seamen of a threat and take measures to neutralize it. A WWII era sub once spotted by an airship, even one the sub could then take out, is probably dead meat as the fleet elements converge on it.

The postwar era may push all airships back into strictly noncombatant, auxiliary roles by the 1960s, but even then OTL uses were imagined for them and in a TL where they have been extensively developed and flown, I think they'd think of yet others.
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Now, does any of this have anything to do with Red Japan?

I say, yes obviously. OTL the Japanese were moderately interested in airship tech and were given some reparation German airships, as well as having some airship sheds disassembled and shipped there (the reparation rigids were also shipped in cut-up form and never reassembled).

Here however, they face the vast Pacific with no friends. Unlike the IJN whose initial buildup was covered by alliance with Britain, the Japanese People's Navy or whatever it is called has no cover except what they can manage themselves.

I'd think, under the circumstances, they must manage to use every trick they can think of. Rosendahl's OTL notion of airship scouting must occur to them as well. In tentatively and partially backing helium-heads like Rosendahl the USN brass was thinking mainly of a war in the Pacific, mainly against Japan. The Japanese aren't distracted by a second ocean (unless they get ambitious enough to think of going beyond Indonesia)--they have mainly the Pacific to worry about. That and of course attecks from the mainland--but the coastal powers there are technologically and industrially weak; even in the case of the Russian threat, their main industrial centers are on the far end of Eurasia and what they can build up on the Pacific, with its poor ports they hold, is only a fraction. With work and access to resources Japan can hold off anything the Russians, Chinese or Koreans can threaten them with in this era--provided they don't get help from Britain, France, Germany, or the USA.

I'd think Japanese designers would do some very ingenious if risky things with their airships; they might make them lighter if flimsier than anyone else dares do, and economize on expensive industrial materials in favor of ones their islands actually have, such as bamboo, silk and fine papers. Where they need a high-tech part, or it is clearly cost-effective, they will sacrifice to get it and use it, but they can stretch their limited resources and multiply the numbers of effective aircraft they can deploy beyond what a given budget would accomplish in one of the richer developed nations. Of course this means their crews are either very clever and meticulous, or dead quickly and often. In war, they'd have to hope to strike quickly and evade, or face certain death--but of course that is a cultural feature of Japan that the Communists are probably not going to undermine, that they are fatalistically willing to risk or even accept as certain in the course of serving the higher cause.

I've often thought that airships, which serve well to hunt submarines, can also serve well cooperating with them. A quiet airship, properly camouflaged, might spot a target for a submarine, convey a signal to it without being detected (say by shaded blink code or semaphore) to guide the sub to a lurking spot to strike an unsuspecting target. Once the enemy vessel or convoy is stricken, the airship might convey replacement ammunition to it. Vice versa submarines can operate as supply dumps for aggressively patrolling airships, that might launch aircraft or even radio-guided line of sight missiles against targets, and while the airships can't lift huge stocks of ammo, the subs can--the airship repairs to one when depleted and reloads.

OTL of course Japanese submarines were famous for their effectiveness--though unlike German, British, or American ones, they tended to stick to targeting only warships and not effectively engaging in commerce raiding--not so much for humanitarian reasons the European-derived peoples all claimed to value but immediately tossed aside once the war was on, but for reasons of bushido honor--which in a left-handed way can be viewed as a sort of harsh humanitarianism. Anyway wise or foolish, they stuck to it, reserving their often effective fire for actual enemy war ships. Suppose the Red regime "cures" them of that and Red Navy subs and dirigibles working together go all out to sink as much enemy tonnage as they can, regardless of whether it is a warship or just a tramp steamer? Might not the defense of the Home Islands of revolution be more grimly effective then, if even the USN cannot stem completely really high levels of attrition as they attempt to reach all across the Pacific? Might strike forces including such auxiliary elements have a punch out of proportion to the tonnage of the surface units, taking even a unified US/RN/French/Russian fleet by surprise?

Japan's terrible liability is its shortness of resources; once cut off from global commerce, there is only so much hardware the islanders can manufacture and expend.

I trust its revolutionary leaders, even the more fanatical among them, will be more prudent and deliberate than the militarists of OTL. They probably can and will use Banzai spirit (and ninjas!) to effect, but will not rely solely on it but rather have a plan to gain something from their sacrifices that lets them fight on. I suppose they have cards to play in inciting native uprisings against European and American colonialists, perhaps enlisting Koreans and/or Manchurians on a voluntary rather than coerced basis? Will they be smarter politicians in general? They'd better be or they are ultimately doomed.

I imagine you have some clever plans in store for them, and I hope my entirely serious plea on behalf of an airship age is useful and inspirational.


*OTL the Zeppelin firm was able to parley a deal with the United States Navy to deliver a modern Zeppelin design, ultimately the USS Los Angeles, into a stay of execution for its main plant at Friedreichshafen, though all the other airship hangars built during the war were demolished, and by the time the Los Angeles was delivered--in yet another transAtlantic flight, not to be sure without mishap, long before Lindbergh's crossing--the international situation had relaxed into the Locarno era and the Zeppelin works were left alone, to build the Graf Zeppelin, the Hindenburg, and finally Graf Zeppelin "II." But it was definitely a near-run thing for the works and a number of Zeppelin designers and workers were hired by Goodyear to come over to America to form Goodyear-Zeppelin company which built the USN's final two rigid airships, and wearing other divisional hats in the Goodyear empire, patented the modern standard blimp design with internal suspension curtain-line arrangements.
 
Airships for Luxury travel and aircraft for speed and business.
Bumper sticker. I don't agree. People who can afford luxury would usually rather spend their time and wealth in more places sooner than lounge around a nice comfortable airship; besides they often rationalize their desire to travel by the pretense of business. The Empire air scheme that R-101 was supposed to inaugurate was not supposed to be comfort first though efforts were made to make it posh--the main idea was, there was no faster way to get to India than aboard a well-built airship. (Too bad that did not describe poor R101!) Among those dead was the new appointed Viceroy to India, in a hurry to get there--and indeed even in 1930, there was no faster way. Obviously you assume an airplane would have been faster, but as I said, even that late in the game, the dang things had to land frequently. With minimum navigational aids and primitive weather forecasting, an air flight HTA over such a distance was an adventure. Graf Zeppelin on the other hand had already proven by this time that a good airship could get you there faster than any practical method short of being a daredevil pilot yourself, and with the necessary luggage you could never get into an airplane of the time.

Same was true of Hindenburg's passengers. They weren't choosing a more comfortable option for getting across the Atlantic quickly--they were choosing the quickest way,a and the only airborne way one could just pay a ticket for. Everyone else who had ever flown over the Atlantic either went in an earlier airship, or had taken their life into their hands--and many of those who tried did not make it.

I've already admitted that once the airplane can get you there faster, it will take all the air passengers with it--the first class passenger, paying twice or three times as much for a much more comfortable seat (not than on the airship, but than on airplanes), the business traveler who really does need to get there ASAP, and the tourist traveler who cannot afford to take too much time away from home nor can afford the hotel expenses inherent in a ticket on a craft that takes several days to get there. They will all choose the fastest route--though my wacky notion of airships as airports does allow a traveler overwhelmed by the consequences of their smart seeming choice the temptation of paying extra and delaying a bit for some painfully craved sack time, or the experienced one to mix and match very rapid travel with strategically chosen down time to beat jet lag and arrive at their business (or pleasure) refreshed and ready to make the best of it.

A relative handful of people will choose airships (assuming other factors and niches keep them viable) for the sentiment and luxury of it; most of these, like passengers on modern cruise ships, would be making the ship itself their prime vacation destination. That might be a niche--though since it is possible OTL and yet no one does it, obviously not an adequate one. The scenario I aim for is to have an era in which the airship is everything the airplane is later, as much as possible--the fastest way to go, that is--and then hope that between having caused a lot of infrastructure to be developed and having caused a lot of people to have spent professional time invested in building, maintaining and operating the things, that these people get creative securing every lingering niche they can. Which might make room for the skyborne cruise ship. But no, I don't think actual airship passenger liners as such will survive long, unless as I suggest passengers hopping from airship to airship on jets sometimes hop off for a comfortable nap or leisurely meal at a stable table bigger than a lap tray. But then they'll be hopping off again, either onto another jet taking them to the last airship in the chain approaching their destination--or having taken their rest on that airship, they now have to finally get off the system, flying down to the surface on a STOL plane with their luggage aboard too.

Without the prior era proving out airships and getting the infrastructure put in, it seems evident that LTA passenger flight must be bypassed. If it were as you say, we'd have luxury sky yachts for the very rich today, and air cruise ships for the upper middle classes. We have none of this.
 

trurle

Banned
Airships for military applications were obsolete as soon as fixed-wind fighter effective ceiling exceeded 6000m. It happened in 1916. So for ATL WWI in 1913-1915 the airships were likely prominent, but phased out (and may be converted to civilian long-range transports) after the war in Europe petered out with the defeat of Russia and Japan.
I agree would be civilian airships for a decade or two, but this thread`s history do not change much the factor (unfavorable trade-off between payload and drag ) which spelled the doom for the airships IOTL. As early fixed-wing aircraft have increased the wing load, and parted with biplane/triplane configurations, they become ultimately more heavy-lifting than airships. Even all-metal ZMC-2 airship was not enough. Robust enough to be survivable, but too small payload compared to fixed-wing aircraft.

Basically, fixed-wing aircraft relation between drag and payload is linear (because lift-to-drag is constant in first approximation for scaling any shape), making both small and large aircraft attractive to end users.
For airship, the drag=payload^(2/3) Therefore, competitive airships evolved be extremely large (Zeppelins). It is an evolution deadlock of gigantism. Therefore, airships, too large and expensive, were extinct in Great Depression.

P.S. Same apply for modern space-launch rockets. Fortunately, they reached diminishing returns point (where drag become negligible) around 1000 tons weight. For airships, the diminishing returns point would lie at may be ~30-300 thousands tons. It mean 200 meters diameter and 1200 meters long gas container. Well, it may become a sort of "airship carrier" - something OTL people tried to design (Akron-class airships you mentioned), but were unable to make them large enough due materials and resources limitations. IOTL, airships went extinct well before reaching optimal size (at 260 tons lift of LZ-129 or Akron).

P.P.S. Akrons did generate ballast from their motor exhaust gases and did not need venting. This advanced feature was useful, but simply far from enough.
 
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Airships for military applications were obsolete as soon as fixed-wind fighter effective ceiling exceeded 6000m. It happened in 1916. So for ATL WWI in 1913-1915 the airships were likely prominent, but phased out (and may be converted to civilian long-range transports) after the war in Europe petered out with the defeat of Russia and Japan.
My, what an interesting and sweepingly absolute claim! It must have come as quite a surprise to the crews of over a hundred modern blimps constructed by Goodyear Aviation for the US Navy, operated as coastal anti-sub patrols, mainly along the US coasts but eventually deployed to the Caribbean, Panama (I believe), Brazil, then crossing over the Atlantic via West Africa to service in the Mediterranean where in addition to anti-sub patrol they served other functions including minesweeping. How strange then that the USN went on employing airships, in the form of these blimps which eventually included the largest nonrigids ever built and flown, for purposes such as radar pickets!

It is a fact that many in the Navy and outside it argued that the blimps were obsolete and should be discontinued, and Naval LTA was eventually shut down in the early '60s. But your assertion appears to apply to one of dozens of suggested role, namely international ranged bomber, which in my opinion is one of the least useful potential missions to send an airship on. It's like saying that high capacity intercontinental ranged turbofan jetliners make poor crop dusters, and therefore jet engines should be abandoned.

The Zeppelin bombers were actually not so easy to shoot down; with enough effort the interceptor models the British attempted to develop were sometimes able to get a shot in, only to find the hydrogen-filled hulls did not automatically burst into flames with every tracer bullet or incendiary fired at it, despite the target being easy to hit. Sometimes they did catch fire and crash with all hands aboard doomed to either ride it down and burn or jump out and fall to their deaths, but by and large even stricken Zeppelins (not all of which were Zeppelins; a few Schuette-Lanz designs took part in the raids too) tended to make their way out over the sea or even back to Europe before coming down, generally due to loss of lift from hydrogen leaking out of numerous bullet holes--without catching fire. One that came down in England had to be deliberately set on fire in an attempt to "scuttle" and deny the British its technical secrets--this was only partially successful.

The reason the Zeppelin raids were not effective in terms of direct military cost-effectiveness was that their navigation, hence targeting, was rather terrible. They generally had no idea where they were and believed they were bombing London when actually far out in the countryside.

It was argued at the time that even though their bombs might not be reaching the intended targets, the very fact that they forced the British to develop an extensive array of newfangled high altitude interceptors, experimental munitions intended to set the ships on fire, ground artillery scattered all over England, and skywatches represented a major diversion of British resources and men away from the actual war fronts. If your 6000 foot interceptor and artillery squads had been very cheap, it would be a stronger argument.

Meanwhile Zeppelins continued to serve in other roles on other fronts. Airships were apparently more effective and less vulnerable even over land on the Eastern front, and operated out of Central Powers allies like Bulgaria over the Mediterranean; this included the famous "Afrika-schiff" that was intended to assist General Paul von Lettrow-Vorbeck in East Africa--the craft was to fly there one way, rendezvous with his forces and be scavenged, using all its parts to supply his guerilla campaign. We don't know how successful this scheme might have been; its captain was fooled by a British black operation purporting to be an announcement of Lettrow-Vorbeck's surrender into turning around around the latitude of Khartoum, Sudan, flying back over Turkey to Jamboli, Bulgaria. This flight covered a grand total of 6800 kilometers in 95 hours, and had consumed only 60 percent of the fuel aboard, while carrying 15 tons of dedicated supplies in addition to the intended utility of repurposing the structure (including, I suppose, the excess petrol).

Now that is much more relevant; clearly already by 1917 German-designed airships were more than capable of transAtlantic service, if this airship could make this journey with that sort of payload. Note that flying over the complex thermal environment of Africa was much more difficult and problematic than over the relatively cool and stable environment of the North Atlantic.

Airships become obsolete when other kinds of aircraft, or other approaches to a given problem, are more cost-effective than using an airship. When invalidated for one role, that does not show they are useless for all others, nor even that modifying their use might not put them back in the game for the allegedly denied role. Using them as bombers was always a harebrained scheme--except that when they were first used, no other aircraft could carry out that mission at all. This soon changed, with both sides developing large multi-engine bomber aircraft of fairly long range and payloads comparable to a wartime Zeppelin's feasible bomb load--indeed the Zeppelin works were among the designers for Germany, and the Count Zeppelin himself turned away from the airships he had fostered to favor the airplanes.

But for both civil and military purposes, other uses of airships big and small would remain relevant for decades to come, and arguably could be of great use today.
I agree would be civilian airships for a decade or two, but this thread`s history do not change much the factor (unfavorable trade-off between payload and drag ) which spelled the doom for the airships IOTL. As early fixed-wing aircraft have increased the wing load, and parted with biplane/triplane configurations, they become ultimately more heavy-lifting than airships. Even all-metal ZMC-2 airship was not enough. Robust enough to be survivable, but too small payload compared to fixed-wing aircraft.

Basically, fixed-wing aircraft relation between drag and payload is linear (because lift-to-drag is constant in first approximation for scaling any shape), making both small and large aircraft attractive to end users.
For airship, the drag=payload^(2/3) Therefore, competitive airships evolved be extremely large (Zeppelins). It is an evolution deadlock of gigantism. Therefore, airships, too large and expensive, were extinct in Great Depression.
Again, you are a couple decades off considering the success of the American blimp fleet in WWII, and note that these small airships were an order of magnitude smaller than the gigantic Zeppelins.

However it is quite true that I am talking about an era of really big airships, in addition to also using blimps for what they are good for. It is a fact that in order for there to have been many dozens, or perhaps a couple hundred, big rigid passenger and naval cruisers in service by say 1935, there would have to be a big investment in infrastructure, notably gigantic hangars to construct, service and house the airships in. In the OTL British Empire line scheme, the plan was to evolve from the prototypes R-100 and R-101 to "thousand footers," that is 300 meters long, which would be 25 percent larger than such actually flown airships as USS Akron and Macon or Hindenburg and its final successor, LZ-130 Graf Zeppelin "II". (I put scare quotes on the Roman numeral because officially the final Zeppelin was simply the new Graf Zeppelin, the old one having been grounded after the loss of Hindenburg; they never called it number two). At 25 percent longer, if they had been designed to be similarly 1/6 the diameter of their length for optimal streamlining (bearing in mind the necessity of tail fins which bias the ideal length to longer than the theoretical optimum around 4.5 for just the bare hull alone) they would have a volume nearly twice as great as the American and German rivals, with a drag area just 50 percent greater.

The idea here is that these schemes all get put into action considerably earlier, with better resources and intensified by a three or four sided competition, due to the better circumstances the earlier end of the war leaves the world in in this TL. Clearly the LZ-104 demonstrated a minimum adequate capability for passenger service across the Atlantic already by 1917.

When talking about the need for more infrastructure we should remember that OTL quite a lot of infrastructure was actually constructed for big rigids that was then not much used. The big Hangar 1 at Lakehurst NAS did get good use. But in general quite a few hangars and mooring masts were built that were used once or twice, or in some cases as with the Imperial airship scheme facilities at Karachi in what is now Pakistan--not at all. If these facilities were simply used to capacity, this would imply nearly an order of magnitude more operations than actually happened OTL. So the scale of operations I would guess would be reasonable might be something like 100 times the number of flight miles flown OTL, using say 10-30 times the number of hulls and two or three times the number and scale of facilities built as of say 1930.

By 1935, the writing would be on the wall regarding passenger dirigibles operating in the traditional way. I've suggested other modes of operation that might allow the trend of larger and larger airships to be extended farther, but my guess the 300 meter long ships are near the maximum size that they'd reach with traditional operations in mind. Naval warcraft such as carrier operations might go on being procured and used until 1950, and probably for some niches indefinitely after that.

For airships being kept busy on operational runs, minimizing down time moored or hangared would become a goal; the British-American "high mast" schemes would probably dominate the decade and Zeppelins would perforce have to adopt nose mooring accommodations, as the Los Angeles, Graf Zeppelin, and the final two giants did. A ship would come in to a high mast in New York or Karachi, be moored there, the passengers and their cargo brought off through a gangway in the nose, then the outbound pax and baggage would board, all while fuel and ballast is being replenished through lines and lifting gas is being topped off too. Then the airship would slip moorings, automatically backing away in the wind since it weathervanes around to face into the wind, and then with full power to the props assume full airspeed and turn toward its course to its next destination. Eventually it will get back to its home port where a big hangar exists for it and it would be put in for major checkups and maintenance, then taken out and launched on another cycle of service, where it might touch at a dozen ports before being hangared again.

For various reasons the Americans were disappointed with the high masts and evolved low mast alternatives, where a short mast out in the middle of a huge mooring circle would keep the ship level on the ground, its tail firmly secured on a heavy wheeled dolly--still free to weathervane in the wind, but not to kite up and down, and with its whole length, not just its nose, accessible from the ground. The Germans didn't like high masts but did accept this American compromise, which was also integrated with schemes to line the ship up with a hangar and draw it straight into it, by making the stub mast mobile; this is how the smaller scale methods for handling blimps with tractor "mules" were evolved.

Since my hope is that ample investment funds, early successes motivating heavy investment in competitive commercial schemes and underwriting large naval procurement budgets, will establish both commercial and naval big airship operations by the middle of the 1920s, I expect airships of a given size to be somewhat less advanced than their OTL counterparts. Insofar as Americans insist on using helium, they will be much held back, since there was damn little of it available in the 1920s and improving the extraction and processing machinery would be a matter of time. With bigger Naval LTA budgets, the supply would be somewhat improved, but not by any orders of magnitude--maybe doubled by say 1929. Perforce, I think the Americans will accept that developing helium is an experimental sideline of some high priority, but also construct and use current state of the art hydrogen lifted airships for the mainstream services.

If similar ambitions to OTL are being realized a decade earlier, as would have been technically possible, commercial airship travel would become a conventional and routine investment by the late 1920s and vested interests would keep capital available even when serious competition from airplanes could be easily anticipated. Also as i've said, it is possible to combine the operations of airplanes with airships for useful synergies.

In its aggressive military role of naval scout and strike light aircraft carrier, a naval big rigid airship, even one lifted by hydrogen, would be at risks comparable to surface based aircraft carriers. A seaborne carrier is an explosion waiting to happen, being packed to the gunwales with fuel and munitions for the warplanes, while attempting to armor it against enemy strikes is costly in terms of its capacity. The British, anticipating operations in relatively narrow waters like the Mediterranean where enemies would have many airbases on land within striking distance, perforce paid penalties in restricted numbers of aircraft for their armored deck carriers, but the Americans and Japanese, anticipating battle in the wide open Pacific, opted to maximize the punch of their vessels at the cost of leaving them terribly vulnerable to an enemy attack--in the hope that with more aircraft embarked, their side would get the blows in first, before the enemy had time to locate the vulnerable carriers and launch an attack on them. This is exactly the same way a big rigid, 300 meters or somewhat longer, in the 400-600 ton range, might hope to operate--get to within striking range of its embarked attack planes, launch them while jinking around far over the horizon, then recover the planes and run for it while possible enemy retaliation following the strike force home is drawn far toward the limits of their range, and would be obligated either to turn back to base soon or continue on a suicide mission. OTL the Japanese had the superior range with their Zero-Sen fighters at the beginning of the war, but it is possible to take advantage of certain operational features of launching aircraft from another airborne aircraft to improve the characteristics of a given design over a version that must take off and land at sea level.

Even if the enemy in a given state of the art has the advantage in terms of range, still they'd have to locate a strike carrier before they could attack it. And the bigger the airship, the larger a complement of aircraft it could embark. If in addition to attack planes there are some defensive fighter/scouts, these could cover the landing of the returning strike force, fending off the handful of enemies that might dog the heels of that force, then the airship can run for it--much slower than enemy fighters but again these are being held off by defenders, while perhaps the airship can also fire some sort of radio-guided missiles at its attackers, or strafe them with AA guns.

If the enemy does close within range, they can surely do some damage, and with hydrogen lifted airships a lucky shot can destroy the whole thing. But even if this happens the airship will have got its strike in first. Many American aircraft carriers were sunk by the Japanese during WWII; does this prove the carriers were useless or not cost/effective? Of course not! A war craft is only useless and absurd if it cannot accomplish something useful to the war effort before being destroyed. i'd suggest that as late as 1945 OTL a big rigid carrying an airborne strike force would still be a valuable weapon in any naval air service.

And they can also be used in less aggressive roles--as scouts as originally intended; if the goal is not to strike at the enemy but merely identify them, count them and keep an eye on them, it is much easier to keep the airship itself out of sight and at extreme ranges against hostile enemy attempts to interdict it. Or as logistics, resupplying ships at sea at rates of tens or even hundreds of tons of material exchanged, brought out to ships in the middle of vast oceans in a matter of days rather than weeks. Troops by the thousands could be transported this way, as could the heaviest items of equipment. With the development of radar, airships would take on a new role, being large and able to carry arrays that are both massive and bulky, an airship cruising over a task force could provide very powerful and far-seeing coverage.

I personally think some of these auxiliary functions would be worth instituting today. Airships to serve most of these purposes would hardly need to be supergiants.
 
Wow, a lot of comments. And yes, I've been editing things from past posts to remove contradictions (not that any of you picked them out, but I saw them and got embarrassed :/) and change details to be more plausible. Here we go...

trurle said:
With a Russian economy ruined by defeat in Europe and a approximately year-long Japanese occupation of trans-Amur area, i think the Khabarovsk Bridge project is postponed indefinitely. It will mean lagging development and rampaging separatism on the Far East of Russia.
Also, without clear victor in your equivalent of WWI, the League of Nations (formed 1920 IOTL) is not going to appear, because it would not include the Germany - currently the most powerful state in continental Europe. It mean also no Washington Naval Treaty (1922 IOTL).

I expect most national leaders in Forbiddenparadise64 world in 1916 to feel insecure, threatened or even scared to death - therefore pushing the arms race to the limits.

Very true. While Russia will be trying to go further into China as its new Duma (this will be a future update) under guess-who becomes increasingly ambitious, it will take years for them to pacify the annexed regions of Manchuria (and even then, not entirely), while its protectorates and puppets in Mongolia, Xinjiang, Qinghai and Korea aren't exactly the most secure internally. And of course, they will also be wanting revenge on Germany and Turkey.
Yes, this world will be much more multi-polar than OTL, and without that treaty, there will certainly be more arms races with weapons, both before and after the Second Great War.
Additionally, the use of espionage (through the Ninja), submarine warfare, ballistics, etc. would indeed be areas pursued by the Japs, and the base-bleed artillery does seem likely to appear earlier than otl given how simple it was, though who should 'discover it' is hard to say at this point. So overall, military technology, especially naval, will be a significantly bigger source for funding than OTL generally, at the expense of commercial tech.
As for your other points, I'm going back and editing. The council act you mentioned would likely make the socialist transition even smaller and easier than before if taken into account, so I imagine it could help preserve some democratic elements in the new regime. I do want this to be distinct from Russian Bolshevism after all, so this should help. And thanks regarding sources of discontent as well.

Shevek said:

Damn, that's a lot to take in. Yes, Germany's economy despite the war will be much greater than OTL, especially with new territory in Europe. Funding for an airforce, including airships would be pretty high, especially as a part of the arms race. However, the role of airships, while higher than OTL by a significant margin wouldn't be enormous in impact as you say.
Regarding politics, yes the commies will have to play it cautiously on an international basis, at least as they build themselves up. While not quite as badly off as Russia was in the early 20s, they've still got a long way to go to modernise themselves and fix their economy, and gain the popularity of the people in their own country and others. ITTL, the US's Red and Yellow scares will kind of become intertwined with one another to some extent or another, something the Japanese Americans will deeply resent. While determined to spread the revolution globally, the leadership know their limits and would prefer either funding revolutions abroard in the colonies, or diplomatically bringing about socialist governments, as opposed to going on direct 'liberation' sprees. The Russians aren't particularly popular in their new Chinese territories, and there are plenty of anti-Russians in the populations, including those of socialist and even communist sympathies. This is especially true in Korea and southern Manchuria, where communists form large amounts of the underground resistance. In the wars to come, these will have a particularly significant role to play.
 
Will the Russian Empire be falling during the interwar period? I honestly don't see them maintaining such a massive eastasian empire.
 
Will the Russian Empire be falling during the interwar period? I honestly don't see them maintaining such a massive eastasian empire.
The Russian regime has friends. Presumably anyway; the TL could do with a comprehensive political survey of the Great powers, the medium-sized ones (like say the Netherlands) and the situation in their colonial holdings--the Dutch are probably keenly relevant to the story of Japan at some point in the next few decades for instance.

The author has mentioned going back and revising various points, and meanwhile I am forgetting crucial details--just why did the Great War end early, did the French ever get Alsace back or (unless I'm mixing up with another TL, I think this is the case) actually lose a little bit more of Lorraine; do the Germans have hegemony over eastern Europe as I assumed in my airship polemics, etc? I'm going to read over it all again, well skim anyway, to get a better orientation as to what differs from OTL and what carries over, and who is likely to like or hate whom.

But it seems a safe bet even as confused as I am right now, that Russia is being propped up by one or more major power, and one motive for this that might actually cause the Russians to enjoy broad support from parties that otherwise are rivals of each other is that Russia is one of the pre-war great powers that projects near enough Japan to be engage with her. To an extent so do other powers--the USA has Alaska and Hawaii not to mention the Philippines of course, but the Yankees are inclined to neutrality. Except in the case of China and Japan, if OTL is any guide! Britain of course has several major bases in striking distance of the Home Islands, the nearer of which (Shanghai and other Chinese concessions, including of course Hong Kong but OTL anyway HK in this era didn't matter much since Shanghai was a bigger deal in every sense) are there to cover British interests in China and east Asia as a whole. Behind these are the Australian colonies including New Zealand, and Singapore, standing guard over Burma and the Indian Raj. I don't recall any notice of the French losing Indochina--which might be me overlooking it, or might be an oversight on the part of the author since if the Germans could extort that set of possessions from France they'd be back in the game in east Asia, in a better position in fact than before the war; they can write off the islands lost to Japan if they had Indochina. So really Russia is just another colonial power that does project into range of Japanese interaction, but if Russia is especially weak, then the other powers, some of them anyway, have some interest in propping them up--not only because the threat they pose to Japan is useful in containing or perhaps attempting to overthrow the Communists there, but also because if the stronger powers were to become indifferent and let Russia sink or swim on her own, and then the Japanese were able to get control of some or all of the Russian Pacific territories, it might greatly strengthen the Red adversary. It would be the same if the Japanese swept up the European concessions in China of course, or made a cordial alliance with a strong Chinese republic that could terminate all the concessions and extraterritoriality and so forth, or took control of Indochina or the Philippines--but these things are much less likely to happen than Russia dropping the ball.

Therefore I figure Russia has the support, almost certainly of Britain, probably France for what that is worth, possibly the Americans if they can be bothered to get involved beyond simply beefing up their own regional strength. Probably not the Germans, who probably don't have any presence in the Pacific anyway. The Dutch might be slow to align with anyone with any strong conflict with Germany, seeing how vulnerable their homeland is to German aggression--and probably they reframe a policy based on fear to be one based on friendliness to Germany, since they haven't had the experience of OTL WWII of harsh hostile occupation. Of course the Dutch don't want to go crosswise of the British either so I would guess their policy is vaguely like the US--neutralist, isolationist, with as strong a defense as they can afford without it costing too much.

Now just because the leading single great power in the world, and possibly a sheaf of others as well, support the Russian regime, does not guarantee its success or its survival even. Just ask (via crystal ball) the late Shah of Iran; he had the USA's very staunch support from the 1950s all the way to the day he had to flee into exile again.

But such support can help explain how and why a rickety, dubious regime can manage to hold on to assets one would guess they must surely lose--if we pay no attention to the man behind the curtain!
 
Rereadiing your tL more carefully, here are some reflections I have on the general political setting:

Given the greater displeasure against Russia among the other Great Powers (versus OTL in the 1900s), it is a bit surprising that the British nevertheless allied with them, via their ties to France--that France remains allied to Russia no matter what is less surprising though. I suppose the decisive factor was British alarm at German drives for naval competitiveness and colonial ambitions, offsetting traditional aversion to France and Russia and the fact that French colonial claims conflicted with British far more than German ones did. I suppose that on the whole the British believed their conflicts with France were generally settled and manageable, and that the experience of the 19th Century, particularly in the latter half when Napoleon III tended to seek better relations, tended to defuse the old tradition of Anglo-French rivalry despite the frequent occasion of new conflicts in the colonies as the end of century land grabs partitioned the whole world into colonial holdings. Germany with its strong and growing economy combined with Wilhelm II's bombast, materially demonstrated by the High Seas Fleet as well as lately reinforced colonies, was scary, enough so to stampede the UK into the Franco-Russian alliance.

One thing I don't notice any mention of one way or the other in the western European theatre of the Great War is gas warfare. I suppose that is because the Germans, having managed to break the trench stalemates by more conventional means, never introduced it. OTL there was already precedent for use of poison gases before the Great War of 1914, enough so that first the Germans and then the Entente was violating Geneva conventions against it; presumably those conventions exist here too. Certainly if either side had crossed that line, the chemical technology existed to escalate quickly into heavy use of more effective gases than the chlorine the Germans started with OTL. So I suppose the Germans never judged they needed to cross that line, having more acceptable and adequately effective means available, and while I'd think the French might have been desperate enough to consider trying it, they probably had little time before their industrial system was disrupted and the writing of defeat was on the wall.

I see that one thing I overlooked was the incorporation of German-speaking Austria-Hungary into the German Empire. Squinting at the world maps it looks like in addition to Tyrolia they retained a salient south toward the Adriatic, but alas not all the way to the coast. I'd think that given their strong position at the end of the war and the fact that the "German" empire also incorporates OTL Czechoslovakia and other Slavic lands, they'd have been able to hang on to one port anyway, but apparently not.

On the whole the pattern of settlement seems to make the most sense if I assume that although the Germans essentially won, they had enough fear the British might enable the French to fight on, or anyway keep up a technical state of war that would terribly disrupt important overseas commerce (and maybe keep Russia if not France in the fight, thus possibly reversing their good position of late 1913 in Eastern Europe due to the disintegration of the Hapsburg empire) that they settled with an eye to conciliating the British, concentrating on holding continental assets at the expense of maritime or colonial ambitions. Thus no push to retain any Adriatic port; no colonial lands recovered beyond Kamerun and Togo (I'd have thought if they held out for a single colony, it would be East Africa, but that would need to be extorted from British control, whereas the west African lands would come from French. And are easier to reach by a shorter high seas route less easily interdicted by the RN--in open war the British of course could completely bottle up Germany aside from what U-boats could accomplish, but in a state of tension short of open war, the shorter route to East Africa via the Med and Suez canal would be more problematic, while the safer route around South Africa would be very long. I questioned the choice of West Africa over East Africa but thinking it through I suppose it makes more sense).

Considering the degree to which Germany has France at its mercy, with a vast demilitarized zone imposed and grabbing a little bit more of Lorraine as well, I'd have thought the French would seek to barter pretty much all of their colonial empire for an improved situation in Europe. But clearly the Germans are going to want to hang on to the strong position they have seized with such heavy bloodshed there, whereas the British don't want to see the Germans gaining territories like Indochina or a bigger swathe of West Africa. So France's hands were effectively tied, which might lead to cooler Anglo-French relations after the Great War--but the French are of course legally forbidden a British alliance any time before 1944. Vice versa, I'd think a legal ban on an alliance is something of a dead letter, if two countries separated on paper by such a treaty provision have common interests; there is no reason they could not coordinate in secret, with plausible deniability. The reason France can't effectively ally with Britain is the German Army of course, her weakness with that vast demilitarized zone presumably enforced by German inspectors on the ground; any demonstration of hostile intent toward Germany, such as a vast buildup in the technically free territory to the southwest, would be met with German demands they cease and desist, and threats of war before France can be ready if they don't comply, war in which German forces would be at the gates of Paris again in a matter of weeks if not days.

Interestingly the summaries of the treaties don't mention a ban on French alliance with Russia! I daresay that the German negotiators overlooked this because they figured they had their thumb on the jugular of both former Great Powers, and so an open alliance, with political fanfare and bombast, is off. But there is nothing standing in the way of the French quietly encouraging the Romanovs to stand firm in east Asia, with money, trade incentives, technical aid, perhaps even some quiet lending of special forces personnel. As long as they don't seem to be orchestrating revenge strings on the German hegemony, I suppose the German Kaiser rather favors the French helping the Russians turn their attentions far east, especially since the German deference to British supremacy on the high seas and outside of Europe means that Germany has now lost its own interests and ambitions in East Asia. They probably fear Japan's ideological threat as much as anyone, and while Germany itself is very unlikely to have any pretext or opportunity to act directly against Japan they have little reason to oppose the other Great Powers doing so--their main reservation being of course that if Russia is too successful there, it might change the balance of power on the European front. But it probably wouldn't do that very much; Germany still has them by the throat and even a massive buildup in Maritime Siberia and other Eastern holdings would not change the equation much.

So--"Russia has Friends!" indeed. France for one. Britain surely sees Russia as a valuable check on Japan for another.

I did notice that William Jennings Bryan, presumably elected in 1908, was President during the Great War (at any rate if his election waited to 1912, presiding over the last year of it) but failed to take proper note of all the implications, even those you spelled out clearly. As a pacifist neutral (albeit with more sympathy to the Entente than the Central Powers) many developments and interests I assumed would be in place for the Americans are rather different. I would guess that he was under some political pressure to maintain and perhaps increase the strength of the US Navy, despite his inclinations toward disarmament, but compared to Woodrow Wilson's high-handed regional imperialism (in Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean) and stronger temptation to enter the Great War OTL, surely the US military across the board is less built up and ready for war than OTL even before we entered the war, let alone afterward.

Perhaps, although U-boats were technically already deployed by 1910, they are technically backward compared to OTL 1914 and after, and so the Germans are not as tempted to attempt to strangle Britain by heavy commerce raiding, therefore in addition to Bryan's firmer commitment to neutrality, there is less or perhaps no provocation of outrage in the USA by lives being lost due to unrestricted sub warfare. So animosity to the Central powers would be less, in a USA that after all had a substantial degree of German immigration. As you the author have mentioned, the organized attempts to repress all signs of Germanic presence in the USA have not happened and there would be less occasion for informal hostility as well.

One thing I overlooked was Bryan's plan to turn the Philippines loose; note how in prior posts I assumed that American interest against Japan would be engaged by this holding. Bryan's plan was more in line with what I wish we'd done in the Spanish-American war from the beginning--foster a pro-American independent republic that has some specific legal ties, such as USN basing rights at Manila, and make it clear to other Great powers that we would not tolerate invasion or colonial poaching from our ally, with that USN base right there to deter such moves. It also seems that the administrations after Bryan, finding Philippine independence a done deal, fail to follow through and maintain the base or other projections of softer power there, thereby I suppose exposing the Philippines to falling into the Japanese "Red" sphere instead. Which might not be worse for the Filipinos anyway! Anyhow, that particular tripwire and power base appears to be neutralized. The Yankees still have concerns about Japan, both because of ongoing ambitions regarding China and because of the proximity of Alaska, anyway just the Aleutian Islands, to Japan. But if the Japanese have the good sense to avoid aggression toward these largely useless and difficult to live on islands, the US will lack many pretexts to get involved against Japan.

I also assumed that Britain and perhaps other European powers would still have concessions in China. This was certainly true OTL right up to the Second World War, but it might not be true here now. Although the Chinese Republic is still weak, it might anyway be strong enough to terminate the special deals Britain and others had extorted from the extinct Qing dynasty, and if they try to press the issue it might drive China into the arms of the Red Japanese, so if Sun Yatsen declares the concessions null and void and demands that European interests deal in China on the more normal basis of recognizing complete Chinese sovereignty, it becomes more the European interest to accept and back the Republic, seek to persuade its leaders to enact laws favorable to mutually beneficial development, and thus try to set the Republic up as a bulwark against Japan. Meanwhile although there is some bad blood between the Kuomintang regime in China and Red Japan, you have also alluded to common interests. Thus the Chinese Republic can benefit to some extent by playing the rival interests off against each other, which probably also makes it easier for the central government to rein in warlordism. China at any rate seems to be distinctly better off than OTL in this period; I wish the more liberal wing of the KMT good luck in playing its stronger hand!

Assuming a Chinese Republic that can enforce a more regular order, at least in its southeastern heartland, than OTL, the peculiar American interest in Chinese affairs is also a bit defused; Americans will presumably retain a strong interest in China trade but like the Europeans circumstances force them to back the Nanking government (I presume this is the KMT capital?) and have fewer or no pretexts for conflict with Japanese forces--the Japanese are not present, in the form of armies or naval units anyway, though perhaps there are state-directed commercial ventures there, which the Nanking government has oversight over. Nor are American naval gunboats given any pretext to operate in Chinese rivers or waters. Hence any confrontations with Japan would have to be amid the far-flung Pacific Island claims, which Americans have no pretext to intrude among except insofar as these islands straddle important steamer routes.

All this tends to insulate Japan from the worst direct confrontations with the European and American Great powers, and strengthens these parties' interest in instead shoring up Russia as the point man in their ideological conflict.

Again as I said in the prior post, this is no guarantee the Romanovs won't drop the ball even so! But it helps explain how they can perhaps hold together and prevail despite their many liabilities, including the humiliation of their losses to Germany. Even the Germans wish them some success in the far east after all.

Looking at the latest map, it seems that some time or other, Thailand lost its northeast lobe, centered on Chiang Mai, to French Indochina; coloring seems to indicate that rather than being incorporated into Cambodia these gains are a fourth province of the French holding. It is unclear, from the coloring, whether western Thailand has also been absorbed into the British Raj or whether it remains as a nominally independent buffer state.

It is hard for me to get a bead on the domestic politics of the European powers, great and middling. Germany's position is overbearing; surely the Scandinavian states and the Netherlands are very conciliatory regardless of their emotional inclinations--bad blood exists between the Danes and Germans, but they have to just swallow it; the Dutch, despite the chilling example of what happened to Belgium, probably fancy themselves natural friends and allies of the mighty German Reich. Spain is of course an ally though that might gradually change due to domestic political evolutions. The British doubtless have some lingering hostility and keep a wary eye on this near or even worse than Napoleonic continental hegemony.

The position of the Italians is very unclear to me; did they start the war as neutrals professing friendship to the CPs and then declare war as Entente allies despite prior treaty obligations as per OTL? If so, how come they didn't suffer more in the peace? Or did they instead start the war as active central powers, but then negotiate a way out into neutrality with a separate peace with Britain and France--and if so, again, why wasn't Italy completely stripped of colonies--not only does she retain western Libya, but also Eritrea and much of Somalia? Surely if Italy ever was at cross purposes with Britain and France, these Red Sea/Indian Ocean African holdings would be forfeit? Had Italy ended the war a German ally the Germans might extort their return, but then why not eastern Libya as well? If as OTL Italy never acted against the Entente but eventually supported it, why would the British have taken eastern Libya, and why not return it if Italy proved to be an Entente ally after first trying to act as a CP one?

Most puzzling of all is why Italy gets to control Dalmatia if Germany is essentially the victor. To be sure, the Austro-Hungarian Empire is disintegrating, but surely the Germans could detach some troops south to reinforce a nominally independent Dalmatia with special ties to the CP system. If they are deterred from this by unrest among the Slavic peoples against German hegemony combined with British frowning on German indirect claims on the Med coast, why reward a defeated Italy when the alternative might be a British-backed independence for the coast instead? Did the British resolve to reward Italy, compensating her for either not gaining Tyrol or losing east Libya (or both) in the hope that Italian control would favor their interests, and at any rate check the CP most effectively?

The politics of France takes some guesswork. Having been defeated by the Germans on their own soil once again, I suppose revanchism gets another shot in the arm. Her position resembles Germany's OTL after Versailles--but there are crucial differences:

1) Germany OTL despite decimation, defeat and dismemberment was inherently stronger than France; Versailles restrictions were of course meant to try to neutralize this natural advantage. In the reverse situation, for France alone to dream of turning the tables is a much more vain self-torment, nor do the Germans need to impose so man artificial restrictions.

2) OTL France was terribly exhausted by the Great War and so despite a generation of recovery defeatism haunted her. Thus, the resolve to enforce the Versailles restrictions, notably demilitarization of the Rhineland, ebbed away despite a large investment in a substantial Army and Navy. The Germans seem unlikely to suffer the same demoralization, and should some French version of a Hitler arise they won't hesitate to enforce extorted treaty rights to keep continental France down.

3) on the other hand, Germany was completely shorn of all colonies OTL. By a strange turn of fate victorious Germany here also lacks many entanglements overseas. Whereas France, despite her abject defeat in her motherland, still retains as large and extensive a colonial empire as before. Restricted from a strong military at home, the Kaiserreich has little leverage to prevent the French from looking south and east for new opportunities and resources from her vast imperial holdings.

I am pretty much an anti-imperialist although I'm always open to the idea of vast empires moderating, liberalizing and coming to be confederations that the formerly conquered peoples identify with and support. Realistically a "good Empire" seems to be a chimera although with the alternative the squabbling, disorganized, individually weak and generally Balkanized creatures we find today, plumping for one seems less silly--though perhaps no less quixotic. The French probably won't do better ITTL at winning over the hearts and minds of their scattered subjects, and neither will the British, so although it may not look it in 1914, the writing is on the wall and the empires will someday, in the lifetimes of people living in 1914, collapse. But the clear signs of unstoppable disintegration may not manifest for a generation or more (though harbingers clearly prophetic in retrospect no doubt already exist) and the actual final collapse may not be for decades hence after that.

For now, the French colonial empire is a reliable resource, and the only power currently in a position to disrupt it (Britain) will instead probably act to shore it up. To a certain extent, disgruntled Frenchmen will have an outlet overseas, and the revanchists among them will no doubt construe just about anything they do as being aimed at the righteous defeat of the Boche. Someday. For now, the sorts of divisions that paralyzed Weimar Germany and sent her on a path toward fanatical dictatorship OTL have different outlets and channels in overshadowed France, and on the whole I think these will tend away from yet another direct confrontation and more toward stealing marches "around" Germany, as it were. In real life, the sort of strength that French colonials might muster overseas would do well to serve as a deterrent to the Germans attempting to finish the job and subjugate France completely; it will be all too plain that more grandiose schemes to focus imperial power back onto Europe and offset the great power of Germany on her own soil are mere fantasies. "Someday" will be their mantra, not "ten years hence, according to my plan!"

And what about Germany's own domestic development? On one hand the aristocratic order would appear to be vindicated and traditional authoritarianism strengthened. But I think that German victory would never be won without the loyalty of the vast majority of German subjects--and many of these loyal subjects, who did answer the call and served well, are nevertheless of the working classes, many of them class-conscious Socialists. Many others are Catholics adhering to the Zentrum party, who were also on the outs according to the dominant Hohenzollern Protestants and their partisans. Not all of these, especially among the SD Reds, were loyal--I would think as OTL the most radical Marxists split from the patriotic stand of the mainstream SD party and formed outlaw Independent Socialist leagues, openly and frankly defeatist and anti-patriotic. But if this TL substitutes a revolutionary Japan for Russia, the promise and threat of Red Revolution will both seem far more remote and alien. Diehards like Rosa Luxemberg might be assassinated, executed or locked away in prisons, or possibly roam loose as gadflies, but by and large the German Left and Center will be strong and legitimate parties and have some say in policy.

Americans in particular will find relations with the distended Reich hegemony profitable and comfortable, despite American sentiment for France. Via rising American soft power as much as via the Reich's own, German influence will be diffused throughout the world--just as American influences will "infect, if one so views it, Europe especially via Germany (as well as Britain, via the common language).

It is this sort of a world then that will be challenged by Japanese radicalism.
 
Thanks for the responses :).

The next update (which will come eventually) will be focussed on the early post-war politics of Germany. I shall indeed cover the states of the major and medium powers following the war.

Italy was allowed to get Dalmatia partly due to compensation for not gaining South Tyrol and in order to cool relations, and partly because Germany was too exhausted from the war to carry out its will further south. Italy started neutral but like in OTL ended up betraying the Central Powers. They took part in the partition of Ottoman Libya (the war takes place before the OTL Italo-Ottoman War, with the POD a while earlier) with the British which is why they only get Tripoltania. It's less the 'near total victory' the Entente had in OTL and more of a 'mixed victory and defeat' scenario ITTL. And besides, who's to say Italy will stay in that position?

Germany is now trying to use more soft power as the leadership democratises and win nations such as Serbia and Romania onto its side. After all, while Germany appears all-powerful on the surface, they still feel threatened by their neighbours, which is why they were so harsh on the French and wanted buffers against Russia. Germany is powerful, but insecure and it wishes to mask that illusion through trade and diplomacy.

You're basically right about diplomatic relations with France, Britain and Russia. France will secretly maintain ties with the British for revenge, while Russia will receive backing from both those powers as a stalwart against both Germany and Japan. Both for historical alliance purposes and to protect their interests in Europe and Asia. Russia will try liberalising after the war, but things won't be straight forward with all the revanchists around. As Xianfeng said, there's *a lot* of revanchism in a number of countries to take into account of course. In terms of how France will cope differently to the Nazis in OTL, they don't have Germany's industry sure, but they do have resources and manpower from their colonies (though of course some such as Indochina aren't the most stable or enthusiastic followers), and a place to move to if war does break out. They could theoretically camp in the colonies until Russia comes in and attacks, allowing France to swoop back in and take what is theirs. At least in theory. And while there is demilitarised territory, that didn't stop the Nazis in OTL. If fascism does take place in France, it may involve more of an imperial federation with its empire, wanting to settle the colonies with French people and spread their culture. Of course you will get some nuts who want to relive the Napoleonic glory days as well.

Again you're right about China. Without a devastating warlord period, and with disloyal elements like Yuan eliminated, Sun has greater control over his territory and can get more involved in fixing the country and building industry. Chiang and his authoritarian anti-communist rhetoric will still be fairly popular, and a political force in the country, they likely won't end up taking over as in OTL. Sun wants to make China into a genuine democracy after all. China and Japan aren't exactly on the best of terms for years, especially as Japan funds left wing elements both within and outside of the KMT, realpolitik will likely force them to improve relations, particularly as Japan isn't run by genocidal warriors. Of course, they still have a problem with Russia enroaching on their territory and wanting to take over, but at least they are for the most part aimed at the relatively underpopulated inland rather than the coasts. Nanking is the capital as Beijing is too close to Russian Manchuria for comfort. Japan won't immediately enter TTL's next major war, but developments will take place as it eventually gets dragged in, just as the USSR was in our world.

Any more questions?
 
I'm not sure Sun will be a goodd leader, he's just a plain idealist. He didn't have any experience in politics, and his rule would drive China into the ground. Not that there was anyone else fit for rule in China at the time...
 
I'm not sure Sun will be a goodd leader, he's just a plain idealist. He didn't have any experience in politics, and his rule would drive China into the ground. Not that there was anyone else fit for rule in China at the time...
Hope he can learn on the job. Sun Yatsen always gets a good press OTL; that might be because he's something of a tragic martyr, bypassed by people more "practical" on some levels--though clearly not comprehensively competent, from their legacy.

My hope for Sun is that he stays in nominal charge, and has some good people he can supervise and get advice from and trust to keep the Republic more or less stable and growing in strength. China needs some kind of strength. I'd guess that with the civil wars they've had there has been some relief of overpopulation, at to be sure a terrible cost, but the more successful the Republic is at keeping some peace and avoiding the fratricidal bloodletting of OTL, the more they have to face the problem of making ends meet for the greater number who survive. There's no way the KMT has the power even if it had the will to enforce a "One child family" policy, nor even a more relaxed "Two child per family" rule, so China's surviving population will continue to rise sharply.

IMHO, the best and most ethical as well as effective population control policy is to achieve prosperity, and with it a liberal order of individual empowerment including women, and let the new generation of women decide how many babies are in their interest. This generally works fine but the trick is to get rich first--and the first generation or so responds with a baby boom too. So it's Catch-22 for China, and while I can't love the draconian force the OTL PRC used, I have to wonder what other alternatives could have stabilized the situation realistically. Still waiting on individual empowerment in the PRC....

ITTL, China and whoever runs it has a tough row to hoe no matter what they do. I take some comfort in the left-handed, schizophrenically denied de facto truce/alliance with Japan. If the Japanese can limit themselves to only helpful interventions China may have chances not given them OTL, and Japan may have accesses to resources they don't have to fight for.

I'd have to defer to someone more in the know about the people of the KMT OTL to guess if there is anyone either more likely to take and hold power than Sun, or who would be a better leader if they could. I suppose a lot of good people OTL got shoved aside by the greedy and ruthless; if Sun can check that process somewhat he will have accomplished something important.
 
James Herman, 20th Century Germany, 2012, pp.17

Following a great but pyrrhic victory in the Great War, Germany was left the unquestionable master of continental Europe, with allies in most of the Balkans, Turkey and the resurgent Spain, though at the cost of most of their colonies and two major allies. The country also suffered from debt from the war, and so solutions were necessary for the transformation of the country. One of Wilhelm’s first ideas was to simply bribe the common people with more money and use plunder from the conquered nations to feed the people. However, his advisers proposed a better solution. A freer government and economy would allow people to vote on what matters they wanted and needed, while still allowing the Kaiser to retain his throne and titles. The transition from an authoritarian monarchy to a constitutional one had begun.

The man behind this change would be Gustav Stresemann, who made substantial changes to Germany’s economic layout through the reformation of the markets. Through advising Wilhelm, he managed to get him to reduce his own political powers, without undermining his wealth, and transferred it to the country’s chancellor, Hindenburg, who had been elected for his popularity and efforts in helping win the war. The cabinet granted political freedom to most major parties, allowing them to participate in the rebuilding of the nation from war. The only parties that were banned were the communist party, due to relations collapsing with the new Japanese government, anarchists and separatists. The communist leaders such as Luxembourg knew they had no chance of gaining ground in a victorious Germany and so fled elsewhere, including to Japan. With veterans from the war making their way home again, many found it difficult to settle back into their former jobs, and so a government act was necessary. The Veteran’s Act of 1919 allowed a benefit scheme to be given to unemployed veterans to help them get back on their feet and be working members of society once again. An additional move by Stresemann was to help promote the social democrats, who would go about reforming the nation’s welfare for the poor, while offering increased taxes to the rich. This move was of course not popular for the aristocracy, but it was a step in the democratic direction the country needed. A more important one would help give non-German ethnic groups rest. The Czechs, Sorbians, Poles and Slovenians, all Slavic peoples found themselves frustrated from the German domination, even more so than under Austria, and there were protests in those regions which were at times dealt with quite harshly. Chancellor Hindenburg suggested the use of military force to crush these groups and ‘germanise’ the populace there. Stresemann however proposed a more peaceful solution, that being to provide these local groups autonomy, while also granting more rights to the princes of Austria and Bavaria in local rule. As a result, in December 1919, the Homelands Autonomy Act was brought into position, resulting in a more stable nation that would not deal with major uprisings. With these attempts to fix the war-torn economy, Germany could move quickly on its ascension as a major world power.

Former ambassador John Heinrich von Bernstorff, desperate for forgiveness over the disastrous Ethiopian affair, became heavily involved with the more democratic German society, and became rehired as the foreign minister of the country, wishing to help represent the empowered nation to the other parts of Europe, hoping to enrich the Mitteleuropa Pact with added trade opportunities. Increased political bonds were made with Spain, who following its own autonomy acts, were resurgent as an economic power, and were hoping to have allies in order to fit in with the new state of the world. As well as Germany, Romania and Hungary were on considerably good terms with Germany, and wishing to continue relations. However, issues would arise over the settlement of Transylvania, which both nations claimed the entirety of. The Bucharest crisis of 1920 almost led the two nations to go to war with one another, until Bernstoff stepped in with border arrangements based on the primary ethnic boundaries, rather than a simple 50/50 compromise. While delaying conflict, this did not end it, as Bernstorff tried as hard as possible not to play favours. This would finally spark in the 1928 Fourth Balkan War, which would eventually end in Germany stepping in to return order. Nevertheless, Germany’s diplomatic efforts in the Balkans were fairly successful overall besides this issue, managing to even restore ties with Bulgaria and Serbia, as their main opponent of Austria was gone, while the Turks were taken back quite significantly. Many of those living in Turkey wanted to take vengeance upon the nations that had either defeated or betrayed them, accusing the Ottoman government of being incompetent, and so the Turkish affair of 1920-1923 began, during which the nation transitioned towards a more democratic state, albeit a highly corrupt one at that. This now constitutional monarchy, with Kemal Ataturk as the Prime Minister established more ties with Germany initially, but they were not nearly as warm as the old imperials were, and many in the populace still considered Germany as traitors for selling them out to British attacks. This would have significant implications on the alliance systems of Europe and the Middle East.

The only profitable colony the Germans had remaining was Togo, which was extensively mined for minerals and encouraged for German settlement, and before the HAA was established, ethnic minorities were often deported there. The presence of this colony helped align German interests colonially with those of the other nations, as it allowed their trade to improve. This, along with Cameroon was a point of border conflict with France, with several skirmishes taking place along this region, particularly the Pama dispute of 1921, which resulted in a minor German defeat, the Dagomba Skirmish of 1926, which was a major German victory, and the 1931 Slave Coast Stand Off, where a draw between German and French ships nearly ended in an all out fight. All of these were ultimately resolved, but they didn’t help in terms of bringing the two nations closer together. Britain however started to become closer to Germany, respecting its continental power while fearing the rise of extremism in France, especially as mobilising forces were seen near the Channel Islands in 1923. Mutual fears of the instability of France, as well as increasing reconciliation diplomatically led to a dramatic change, some would even say reversal of Anglo-German relations. With neither nation being on good terms with the revolutionary government of Japan, and wanting to have a stable order in Europe, it is hoped that change will be positive in this region. However, this would not be enough to allow a formal alliance between the two nations, and instead Britain moved towards a more neutral standpoint, simply wishing to ensure stability throughout Europe for its own trade interests. Germany’s relations to the Scandinavian nations were quite reasonable, particularly Finland and Sweden. It indeed decided to back Finland over a dispute regarding the Aaland Islands, a controversial move considering the Swedish majority who inhabited the region. Mitteleuropa was going from strength to strength, and although certain nations such as the UK, the Netherlands and Turkey were rejecting entry, the system was building itself up to be a powerful one at that.

And that I hope is an adequate (if somewhat brief) update on the status of German in the late 1910’s and early 1920s, with hints on later events as well. I had difficulty coming up with solid ideas with this one, so I wanted to create one that was a bit conservative for now, and hopefully plausible.
 
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