'Red' Indonesia - Australian military procurement options?

Australia and New Zealand will get a lot more US investment and military aid at helping “contain” communism. Australia would be a more vital or important ally to US. They will be more involved in pacific.

But if they go red couldn’t you easily see a situation where civil war and separatist rise up when revolution takes place? Australia might seize or help prop up independence of islands more East. Probably playing on ethnic and religious lines. More non Muslims areas could possibly break away and Australians with US backing could seize more underpopulated or unpopulated islands directly. Borneo island could be united into one country with British/Australian/US backing.
 
If Indonesia goes communist then I don't see them being allowed to take over West Papua so there's likely to be an Australian/Commonwealth military presence there.
 

Riain

Banned
If Indonesia goes communist then I don't see them being allowed to take over West Papua so there's likely to be an Australian/Commonwealth military presence there.

That was already done in 1962 with American support against the wishes of the Australians, Dutch and West Papuans. Indeed the anti Malaysian confrontation was a continuation of the successful policy in West Papua.
 
During any fleet maneuver the Aircraft carrier can do no wrong

This was the attitude of the USN towards fleet maneuvers in WW2 and rapidly adopted by the RN

So any collision involving an Aircraft carrier is the other vessels fault

Where could I read up on the thought process behind this policy? Did it have to do with the unfeasibility of adjusting the carrier’s movements, with “politics” over how amazing the carriers must be and how they can’t be permitted to look like the source of any problems, or something else?
 
That was already done in 1962 with American support against the wishes of the Australians, Dutch and West Papuans. Indeed the anti Malaysian confrontation was a continuation of the successful policy in West Papua.
It depends on when Indonesia goes communist, if it's during the 50's then they're not getting West Papua.
 
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Where could I read up on the thought process behind this policy? Did it have to do with the unfeasibility of adjusting the carrier’s movements, with “politics” over how amazing the carriers must be and how they can’t be permitted to look like the source of any problems, or something else?

I'm sure I read it on the Armoured Carriers Website - the Bit on the Aircraft carrier ''USS Robin" or "When Sara met Robin" when it talks of "USS Robins" Captain embracing all things USN and this being cascaded to the rest of the RN

The British had been conforming to fleet maneuver doctrine early war - what with running flags up and down masts etc but after war time experience showed that carriers would suddenly, and often and with very little warning, do something daft and unseman like such as breaking rank and accelerate into the wind in order to launch some of them there new fangled aeroplane thingys with no shits given to what other vessels in the fleet were doing - and having seen the USN working on the Carrier having right of way in all things and this making sense, adopted the process.
 

Riain

Banned
True, but historically the KPI was booming in the early 60s and was brutally crushed in 1965.
 
If Indonisia went Red would there not be a reason to retain a East of Suez presence for the British beyond 66?

Likely remaining in Singapore.
 

Riain

Banned
Would the Aussies benefit from F-14’s along with their F-111’s?

Australia selected the F111 in 1963 to enter service by 1969, alongside the Mirage III fleet that was entering service from 1964. The F14 didn't enter USN service until 1973, so won't enter service alongside the F111.

That's not to say that in a Red Indonesia scenario the Mirage replacement would be in the early 80s. One option was to replace the fleet in the late 70s, which was why the RAAF rejected a proposal to keep the leased F4Es. The F14 was pretty new in thr mid 70s when such a decision would be made, but it lacked a ground attack capability which makes it limited and less attractive .

Sure, but can they pay for them?

Of course, we buy state of the art aircraft early in their production cycle. 116 Mirages is expensive, as was 24 F111s and F/A18 cost as much as an F14 in 1983, we got 75 of those. The problem is if the F14 is value for money, and I'd suggest in its 70s and 80s spec it isn't without expensive development work.
 
If Indonisia went Red would there not be a reason to retain a East of Suez presence for the British beyond 66?

Likely remaining in Singapore.
From my reading into it, there would definitely be "more of a reason" but if Wilson and Healey are committed to reigning in overall defence expenditure as OTL, then cuts are going to have to come from somewhere else and there might still be a presence might still be severely reduced, especially if Red Indonesia walks the razors edge of heightened konfrontasi without all out war.

True, but historically the KPI was booming in the early 60s and was brutally crushed in 1965.
Yeah I sort of plucked 1965 as potentially the most likely tipping point - but there have been a number of TLs here on the board about Indonesia going Red in the 1960s with different pods. That being said with butterflies flapping, the PKI could make a move earlier than 1965.

If Indonesia was Red I doubt we'd let them take East Timor in 1975.
That was actually my other wargaming scenario of a showdown over East Timor in the mid 1970s between a Red Indonesia and Commonwealth supported East Timor.

With a 64/65 point of department, I assume the army is re(re)organised as per OTL and selective national service is also introduced. Ditching the Pentropic organisation is abandoned in December 1964 and going back to the Tropical Establishment?
As OTL, to quote from the thesis below:
Australia's military resources at that time would have been severely stretched in performing two or more operational tasks in South-East Asia simultaneously. This was a cause for concern, as the government foresaw the possibility of significant problems with Indonesia in relation to Malaysia and West New Guinea. Furthermore, the conflict in Indochina was escalating, and it was becoming increasingly apparent that Australian combat troops might be sent in support of the United States' efforts there. Moreover, regarding our responsibilities in New Guinea itself, there was no guarantee of reciprocal military assistance from the United States.
I wonder as well what happens with the C.M.F in this scenario?
ORGANISING AN ARMY: THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE 1957- 1965 J. C. BLAXLAND, The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University, Canberra, 1989
@Riain - that thesis has alot of comparison data, TOE and OOB for the Australian forces during this time in the appendixes.
 

Riain

Banned
I'd point out that a lack of equipment wasn't a problem as much as a willingness to use it. The government/forces rejected 2 requests for the HMAS Melbourne to operate off Vietnam , agonized about sending the Vendetta to Vietnam and didn't send the new River class either. Similarly the govt/army agonized about sending tanks to Vietnam and the RAAF sending helicopters and they only sent Canberra because they didn't have room for them at home. The army didnt send wheeled afvs or medium artillery either, nor the RAAF sabre or mirage fighters.

However they did institute socially divisive conscription in order to have a lot of Infantry battalions.
 
I wonder if Australia would look to running HMAS Sydney as a Commando Carrier, perhaps replacing her in the late 70's with a US Iwo Jima class ship, or even go all in when she wears out and opt for a Tarawa?
 

Riain

Banned
I wonder if Australia would look to running HMAS Sydney as a Commando Carrier, perhaps replacing her in the late 70's with a US Iwo Jima class ship, or even go all in when she wears out and opt for a Tarawa?

In about 1972 an exercise was conducted doing just that, RAAF UH1 and RAR troops doing a ship to shore movement . I don't know if the scenario was for a permissive, passive or contested threat environment.

In the post Vietnam security environment the concept was dropped.
 

Riain

Banned
With a communist Indonesia they might well decide to continue with it.

Maybe, along with the LST Mk II rather than the Balikpapan LCHs.

Here's that exercise, in 1973.

HMAS%20Sydney%20conducting%20training%20exercises.jpg
 
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