If Indonisia went Red would there not be a reason to retain a East of Suez presence for the British beyond 66?
Likely remaining in Singapore.
From my reading into it, there would definitely be "
more of a reason" but if Wilson and Healey are committed to reigning in overall defence expenditure as OTL, then cuts are going to have to come from somewhere else and there might still be a presence might still be severely reduced, especially if Red Indonesia walks the razors edge of heightened
konfrontasi without all out war.
True, but historically the KPI was booming in the early 60s and was brutally crushed in 1965.
Yeah I sort of plucked 1965 as potentially the most likely tipping point - but there have been a number of TLs here on the board about Indonesia going Red in the 1960s with different pods. That being said with butterflies flapping, the PKI could make a move earlier than 1965.
If Indonesia was Red I doubt we'd let them take East Timor in 1975.
That was actually my other wargaming scenario of a showdown over East Timor in the mid 1970s between a Red Indonesia and Commonwealth supported East Timor.
With a 64/65 point of department, I assume the army is re(re)organised as per OTL and selective national service is also introduced. Ditching the Pentropic organisation is abandoned in December 1964 and going back to the Tropical Establishment?
As OTL, to quote from the thesis below:
Australia's military resources at that time would have been severely stretched in performing two or more operational tasks in South-East Asia simultaneously. This was a cause for concern, as the government foresaw the possibility of significant problems with Indonesia in relation to Malaysia and West New Guinea. Furthermore, the conflict in Indochina was escalating, and it was becoming increasingly apparent that Australian combat troops might be sent in support of the United States' efforts there. Moreover, regarding our responsibilities in New Guinea itself, there was no guarantee of reciprocal military assistance from the United States.
I wonder as well what happens with the C.M.F in this scenario?
ORGANISING AN ARMY: THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE 1957- 1965 J. C. BLAXLAND, The Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University, Canberra, 1989
@Riain - that thesis has alot of comparison data, TOE and OOB for the Australian forces during this time in the appendixes.