The point of the 25 pounder is the British learned from WW1 that division artillery couldn't really destroy enemy defenses, you needed heavier artillery than a 105 or even 150mm gun and generally a lot of shells for destruction of a bunker. It was more effective to suppress with artillery and let the infantry overrun it and knock it out with grenades, so they choose a caliber that could suppress well enough and be cheap enough for mass use. Heavy corps or above level artillery was then only called in for counter battery or destruction work as needed, which was only a fraction of the missions called for.
Except the creation of AGRAs enabled heavy artillery to be employed in just such missions, in suppressing enemy positions, while the field regiments would also be needed for observed fire against German counter-attacks when the infantry finally dug in. So having better heavy guns, and developing systems to coordinate the fire of a variety of caliber pieces early on would be an advantage. Given the problems with accuracy that the RA experienced with indirect fire, which No. 2 ORS reported on in detail in 1944-45, being able to land heavier shells or a greater variety of shells across the German defense zones would again be an advantage for British infantry entering the war.
The main issue is that FSR Part II was actually quite good in terms of tactics and command and control at division or below, but the advancements in artillery tactics were largely the product of having to operate above that level. The RA very much had to rediscover methods that had been employed in WWI but that were discontinued due to the retraction in size of the BEF after 1918.
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