You have such a poor opinion of soldier's abilities. Obviously you have never served...
Rearm the British Infantry for WWII
- Thread starter Peg Leg Pom
- Start date
You have such a poor opinion of soldier's abilities. Obviously you have never served...
enjoy
Italian shoulder-fired anti-tank weapon from 1943. Uses high-low pressure system and a 70mm diameter barrel to fire a HEAT shell.
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Ah, the 60mm Lanciabombe
tanks-encyclopedia.com
60mm Lanciabombe - Tank Encyclopedia
The Lanciabombe was an experimental design for an infantry operable, shoulder-fired anti-tank gun, able to penetrate 70mm of armor.
tanks-encyclopedia.com
In No particular order.
Whats your problem with the Beret. Instead of a helmet bad idea, but what possible use is a slouch had in NW Europe on the third day of snow. Or anything with a brim getting in and out of a vehicle? Its basically a workingman’s flat cap smartened up. And a lot easier for the majority of troops driving stuff, fixing things that are driven, building bridges, roads etc unless you are in a sunny place, in which case issue the slouch hat.
They are carriers. There are a few occasions when they are used as light armour, one being a successful attack vs Italians resulted in total victory and the O/C being ripped a new one by the adjutant for being a dick. You do not pander to morons you correct them. The manual is perfectly clear, IF IN DOUBT DISMOUNT. The reason they re armoured is protection from random bullets and shell spliners as it crosses the danger zones to move forward.
Why this obsession with a couple of mortars. Bloke, radio ‘ fire mission’ and you get anything from a battery through to army group on the target in about 2 minutes. As to using the mortars that means you have a bloke with a radio anyway. The USSR and Germans don’t have the responsiveness of artillery fire the Anglo Americans do. The 4.2’s are introduced ( well used) because they are there as chemical weapons not needed, by light AA units, again not needed and in mountains or jungly terrain where they are much easier to move around than howitzers, and work.
Plastic explosive is Nobel 808 and pre war, so available although the volume of production may be an issue , Claymore though limited utility the Germans not being noted for human wave attacks more likely to involve, tanks, and its use by SF or resistance types likely to get 10 random local peasants executed for every German casualty.
The USAAC does not have a staff, until during WW2. What it does have is a split between the AAC responsible for training, aircraft development, doctrine, and supply; GHQ Air Forces responsible for combat units within CONUS and the corps area commanders responsible for bases and base personnel. With overseas Air Corps units responsible to local army commanders. The Staff being the army general staff and the doctrine adopted being the one dictated by the Army not the one the AAC wanted. Arnold does create an informal air staff that does not impress during the expansion from 38 – 40 which is hardly surprising as it’s a few dozen guys trying to deal with a rapid expansion from a near zero base. Also their desired doctrine is level bombing of the IJN and strategic bombing. On the bombing the IJNthey were wrong, on the strategic bombing, I would be inclined to say right but the weapons and munitions used were totally useless for the job AS THEY ENVISAGED IT, perfectly fine for the job as it turned out btw.
The British do have a REMF rifle, its called the sten. And most of the time it sits in the cab of the vehicle. You may not want the rear area troops (that’s 1/3rd the bn manpower btw) but they do get caught up. Further back its normally a Bren and AT weapon combo cos if something is going to get that far its likely to be a tank. And part of the point of the Sten is not that BSA can make it cheaply its that the Slumberland bed spring company and Raleigh Bicycles can make it cheaply.
AT mines, fine if you are in a fixed position but unless covered by fire will be lifted. Also Germans, the whole point of what they are doing is to avoid fixed positions. Also you guys hate infantry. 10 kg per item the AT mine, someone has to carry it
Whats your problem with the Beret. Instead of a helmet bad idea, but what possible use is a slouch had in NW Europe on the third day of snow. Or anything with a brim getting in and out of a vehicle? Its basically a workingman’s flat cap smartened up. And a lot easier for the majority of troops driving stuff, fixing things that are driven, building bridges, roads etc unless you are in a sunny place, in which case issue the slouch hat.
They are carriers. There are a few occasions when they are used as light armour, one being a successful attack vs Italians resulted in total victory and the O/C being ripped a new one by the adjutant for being a dick. You do not pander to morons you correct them. The manual is perfectly clear, IF IN DOUBT DISMOUNT. The reason they re armoured is protection from random bullets and shell spliners as it crosses the danger zones to move forward.
Why this obsession with a couple of mortars. Bloke, radio ‘ fire mission’ and you get anything from a battery through to army group on the target in about 2 minutes. As to using the mortars that means you have a bloke with a radio anyway. The USSR and Germans don’t have the responsiveness of artillery fire the Anglo Americans do. The 4.2’s are introduced ( well used) because they are there as chemical weapons not needed, by light AA units, again not needed and in mountains or jungly terrain where they are much easier to move around than howitzers, and work.
Plastic explosive is Nobel 808 and pre war, so available although the volume of production may be an issue , Claymore though limited utility the Germans not being noted for human wave attacks more likely to involve, tanks, and its use by SF or resistance types likely to get 10 random local peasants executed for every German casualty.
The USAAC does not have a staff, until during WW2. What it does have is a split between the AAC responsible for training, aircraft development, doctrine, and supply; GHQ Air Forces responsible for combat units within CONUS and the corps area commanders responsible for bases and base personnel. With overseas Air Corps units responsible to local army commanders. The Staff being the army general staff and the doctrine adopted being the one dictated by the Army not the one the AAC wanted. Arnold does create an informal air staff that does not impress during the expansion from 38 – 40 which is hardly surprising as it’s a few dozen guys trying to deal with a rapid expansion from a near zero base. Also their desired doctrine is level bombing of the IJN and strategic bombing. On the bombing the IJNthey were wrong, on the strategic bombing, I would be inclined to say right but the weapons and munitions used were totally useless for the job AS THEY ENVISAGED IT, perfectly fine for the job as it turned out btw.
The British do have a REMF rifle, its called the sten. And most of the time it sits in the cab of the vehicle. You may not want the rear area troops (that’s 1/3rd the bn manpower btw) but they do get caught up. Further back its normally a Bren and AT weapon combo cos if something is going to get that far its likely to be a tank. And part of the point of the Sten is not that BSA can make it cheaply its that the Slumberland bed spring company and Raleigh Bicycles can make it cheaply.
AT mines, fine if you are in a fixed position but unless covered by fire will be lifted. Also Germans, the whole point of what they are doing is to avoid fixed positions. Also you guys hate infantry. 10 kg per item the AT mine, someone has to carry it
McPherson
Banned
In the order given.
Most combat until France 1944 is in a hot sunny place, or in the rain. As to getting in and out of a vehicle, the brim is not that much of an obstacle, And most of the people who will be wearing it are Rear Area Troop Service (RATS), infantry, engineers, gunners, or people who are not in immediate need of helmets to protect their noggins, but who do not need a case of sunstroke or wet water running down their necks. BTW, a Stetson does keep snow off your neck, too.
Bren gun carriers... and by extension... kangaroos.
I tend to agree. There is little practical use in trying to fight mounted in an infantry brawl, where the other side has AT weapons and is happy to kill you in your weak slow tin can. A Bren carrier full of Tommies cannot outrun Herman's Panzerschreck. You have to get Herman on foot.
On call fires is not guaranteed. Organic mortars is attached and local. That does not mean you cannot call Rupert, Terry and Arty on the line and invite them to the party, but they can be anywhere from two to fifteen minutes away depending on the army. Mortars are right now. And as battle records show, they proved to be a primary infantry killer, even among the assorted artillery systems available. Or to put it another way, before the Red Army learned to LOVE mortars, the Germans could guarantee panzer grenadier bodyguards for their tanks. After the Red Army began their love affair with mortars, it was usually not certain at all that the panzer grenadiers would survive approach to contact with Ivan's infantry as soon as the mortars went to work. The panzers would, but then the Russian infantry would find as the USMC does, "hunting tanks is fun and easy" especially without infantry bodyguards.
Mister Claymore is most useful as an anti-infiltration and dumb stay behind mine anti-patrol weapon. Stick it on its legs into the dirt along a jungle trail under foliage or in dense scrub forest, run that trip wire provided across the path, or approach lane and remember where you put it, or you will be the one who trips it.
As to the description above, it was an air staff with sections task oriented, which is more than the ADA, the Luftwaffe, or the Gentlemen's Flying Club had. I would point out that this staff was the one that organized and fought strategic daylight bombing and that they figured out how to kill the Luftwaffe.
Now they took too long and their tools had to be evolved to do something which had never been done before to attack, dislocate and disrupt enemy industrial production and transportation systems and they HAD to conform to the overall ground-oriented offensive means determined to be the only way to effectively liberate German occupied western Europe. But the staff was there and they did the air campaign planning. An air force, not an army staff. It was the air force staff which determined how to remove the Luftwaffe, not the army.
RATS and rifles...
Flip a coin. Do you want Fumbles to have a STEN or an M1 carbine?
Fumbles 1 and Fumbles 2 can pull the trailer. (Save the mule for the important stuff.) It will boost their morale. Also, the whole point of the mine is to make Gustav Panzerguy in his PZKWIV nervous. Why not lay ambush weapons in his path. Why should Herman Footsoldier be the only one with the jitters?
My father's experience of the sten (post war, national service) was that when a shot came out of the distance at your lorry it was very comforting to place the barrel shroud on the the wound down window, lod down the trigger and spray. May have kept someone's head down and probably discouraged people from coming closer, which is what you want to do when you are RASC.
The average soldier is damn fine at what he does but a significant percentage will have an adrenal reaction when they see combat (larger percentage for the first time).
Coming down from a major adrenaline spike is a major issue and the average soldier in ww2 didn't have the support for that. They had to pick themselves up and keep buggering on rather than taking an hour to eat, calm down, deal with the shakes or whatever.
I've never served in a military but I've had someone try to stab me and had to defend myself. This provoked a major adrenal reaction. I had shakes for an hour after the incident. I've talked with veterans about the physiological effects of adrenaline.
I have no problem with his categorisation of a solider as fumbles. I dont think anyone who has had to deal with combat and adrenaline would.
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McPherson
Banned
Exactly. I have been in that situation. I would characterize ME as "Fumbles". It is normal for a human being addressed with a surprise high stress situation to be awkward and unsure. Plus I will note, that WWII combat training was kind of unrealistic. And I will add that through no fault of their own (McNamara's 100,000 is the cursed example.) a great many incapable unfortunates were assigned to the line infantry after the elite forces and those military services who needed the best and the brightest to fly, man the ships, crew the tanks, man the guns, and fix the machines, and handle logistics, took the best of the draft and left the remnant for the infantry.
This creature should have been prosecuted for murder as that's what sending mentally retarded men into combat is.
Soldiers undergo training. Now, I know the Australian Army was very different to the American one. Our diggers were all professional and most, the overwhelming number were trained well enough that they were thinkers and doers. Our diggers were nearly all high school graduates.
Australian soldiers in Vietnam, Cambodia, East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq invariably dominated the battlefield and the enemy. Often they did it with worse weapons than the enemy. In Vietnam, they also had a high percentage of conscripts as well. In the book, "The Search for Tactical Success in Vietnam: An Analysis of Australian Task Force Operations" by Ross, A., Hall, R., Griffin, A. much is detailed about what happened and how the NLF and PAVN was defeated. They weren't supersoldiers they were merely well trained. Very well trained.
Calling all diggers "fumbles" is insulting to them. Yes, there were some foolish diggers but they were in the minority. It seems they are in the majority in the US military from the way you describe them. You should be ashamed of calling your soldiers stupid. It is demeaning and insulting.
I have sat in weapons' pits and had long and interesting conversations about various subjects with my fellow diggers. No, not just sports but politics, science-fiction, history, etc.
Australian soldiers in Vietnam, Cambodia, East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq invariably dominated the battlefield and the enemy. Often they did it with worse weapons than the enemy. In Vietnam, they also had a high percentage of conscripts as well. In the book, "The Search for Tactical Success in Vietnam: An Analysis of Australian Task Force Operations" by Ross, A., Hall, R., Griffin, A. much is detailed about what happened and how the NLF and PAVN was defeated. They weren't supersoldiers they were merely well trained. Very well trained.
Calling all diggers "fumbles" is insulting to them. Yes, there were some foolish diggers but they were in the minority. It seems they are in the majority in the US military from the way you describe them. You should be ashamed of calling your soldiers stupid. It is demeaning and insulting.
I have sat in weapons' pits and had long and interesting conversations about various subjects with my fellow diggers. No, not just sports but politics, science-fiction, history, etc.
Lest the PBI be looked down upon. The craft of infantry soldiering is a complicated one beyond belief to one who has not experienced it.
That craft needs to be both learned and practiced so that under stress the soldier reverts to his training and that training be relevant and realistic. There are many skills way beyond musketry etc. Receiving an underslung helicopter load, calling in strikes, digging defences with dry trenches and overhead cover, setting machine guns on fixed lines, map reading in the dark, fusing grenades, maintaining vehicles, dealing with prisoners, first aid, effectively firing anti tank weapons, anti air weapons, laying barbed wire, making a hot meal clandestinely, understand, participate and expect to lead at least a section in an assault and literally hundreds of other skills which have to be at the infantryman's fingertips even though he has no room or carrying capacity to call on aide memoires.
It is as demanding, if done well, as any other military trade and requires as much intelligence and initiative as any other branch.
It is a much undervalued trade, but confident well trained infantry are the army. All else is support for them.
That craft needs to be both learned and practiced so that under stress the soldier reverts to his training and that training be relevant and realistic. There are many skills way beyond musketry etc. Receiving an underslung helicopter load, calling in strikes, digging defences with dry trenches and overhead cover, setting machine guns on fixed lines, map reading in the dark, fusing grenades, maintaining vehicles, dealing with prisoners, first aid, effectively firing anti tank weapons, anti air weapons, laying barbed wire, making a hot meal clandestinely, understand, participate and expect to lead at least a section in an assault and literally hundreds of other skills which have to be at the infantryman's fingertips even though he has no room or carrying capacity to call on aide memoires.
It is as demanding, if done well, as any other military trade and requires as much intelligence and initiative as any other branch.
It is a much undervalued trade, but confident well trained infantry are the army. All else is support for them.
I fully agree,
The infantry trade is unique. His skill set is as much staying alive, reasonably healthy, being fit, tactical thinking, etc...so they can do their tasks.
“Just killing ‘em”, comments show no understanding of conflict. Taking life becomes a secondary task, especially if you cannot do the above first.
Getting back to topic,
A major improvement in 1930’s BA, is the integration of support weapons and arms with the infantry battalions.
The RA field Bty with 2 troops, only gave 2 rifle coys a FO (the troop cdr). RA needed 4 FO Capts to have one per rifle coy and OP numbers with wire (later radio).
BA bns only had 2 3” mortars at this stage. As the Soviets demonstrated mortars are CHEAP. Smoothbore tubes and cast iron bombs are as cheap as it gets! Bns needed 8 tubes in ‘35.
The 2” mortar was a mixed asset. In BA used it as a big rifle grenade launcher (7-800m), rather than a light 60mm light mortar, al la French/USA. In forest (Borneo past war), the 2” was found useless. In ME 2” was centralised, due to lack of range in the desert. The Soviets found the 50mm bomb to small and stopped issuing it mid war.
I would prefer a central coy 60mm / 2.5” mortars (2). It can deploy in clearings to get enough crest / tree line clearance. Not in the wrong place with the plts. A coy mortar section of 10 can carry the weapons, kit and 1st line bombs. The rest of the coy can carry bombs, at a lot less mass than 3”. USMC raiders carried 60mm over 81mm for this reason.
Similar to RA FOs, BA only added MFCs (mobile fire controller, ie mortar FO) until mid war. BA bns need 4 MFCs (Sgts). It also needs a MG officer from the division MG bn, to advise the CO on MG assets.
PS I know this is nothing radical to a commonwealth soldier trained post war, but back in ‘35, is was not even thought about.
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Well it’s not the Gentleman’s Flying Club it’s the RAF and its had a Staff since 1917 and a Staff College since 1921, with for the whole of the interwar period Directorates of Ops and Intelligence Under the DCAS, and separate functions ( organisation varies from time to time) for Personnel, R&D, Organisation, Supply and Production. It is in fact the only professional Air Force in the world throughout the interwar period.
And the US air force got just about everything wrong about fighting WW2 first time out.
One of the unfortunate things is Portal never wrote his memoirs so his thinking which is both incisive and decisive is lost until the various memoranda he wrote were released many years later and the history of the air war is provided by USAF bomber generals recounting how clever they were and asking for SAC and more bombers post war and the USSBS which is entirely about the US effort. So the RAF has focused on transportation from 1940 (Portal comments re Harris that he does not mind as long as its hitting transport targets as well).
The RAF had identified pre war that bombs below 2000lb will not damage industrial infrastructure – as in machine tools hence designing the bomb bays the way they do from Stirling on. That there are no silver bullet targets to hit, too many too easily dispersed of easy to concentrate defences, and you will never really know how close you are to succeeding. Transports hits everything and attrits everything from raw materials to finished product.
EATS which is copied by the USAAC for its expansion – eventually. 20mm armament determined as optimal pre war and for all the comments about lack of ALI ( air Land Interface) in 40 the RAF trained staff officers then invent it three times independently in e UK, DAF and Far East based on what they already knew would work from 1918.
Until the mid/late 1930s the Bomber will always get through is a statement of fact. The only detection methodology is eyesight ( or possibly acoustic mirrors). So any approaching bomber has to traverse a significant bit of your own territory before it can be intercepted, and as the relative speed of the fighter and bomber are close unless you can by luck pre position fighters, which have a crappy armament btw, along the path of attack you are bombed – specifically your cities are bombed with chemical weapons causing mass civilian casualties etc etc – before you can respond, except by your bomber force acting as a deterrent.
Ofc the Luftwaffe attacking in support of a ground offensive on a very limited front can do this because they know where their own troops are and what is decisive. Its also got a high non combat loss rate and generally low serviceability rate which increases the accident rate. If its forced to fly a lot the Luftwaffe will eventually kill itself anyway faster than the RAF of USAAF. Being blunt an RAF, RAAF USAAF USMC station commander flying off an airstrip in a mangrove swamp it Buttfuckawak will have a higher serviceability rate ( subject to rampaging waterbuffalo obviously) that the base commander at Hanover.
That changes with the introduction of types like the ME109 and Hurricane which stand some sort of a chance of effecting an intercept and the sort of armament that can damage a bomber. Problem being if they are flying a standing patrol their fuel state may not allow for this or a long engagement time. What you want is a system of keeping the planes on the ground as long as possible but receiving raid warnings which can then be analysed and a suitable sized force sent up to intercept. The UK alone is working on this from about 1935, initially with acoustic mirrors later radar.
The defeat of the Luftwaffe is simple attrition and game over by late 43 yes the P51 damages the twitching corpse but it’s a corpse already. .As designed (like the Heer) its intended to fight short campaigns with a break to refit. The RAF is designed to fight a continual war, as is the USAAF.
What the Luftwaffe can do until maybe mid 42 ( there are comments from Galland and others that the process below is already happening around the time of Dieppe, is cut its losses at a time of its choosing. It does not have to fight unless it wants to. It voluntarily comes out to fight for Blue and is forced to fight by Alamein and Torch and Sicily and the redirection of bombing raids and the start of POINTBLANK in mid 43. Stalingrad and especially the Tunisian airlifts gut not only the transport fleet (which is needed to move spares around) but multi engine training, Come May June July 43 the Lufwaffe single engine loss rate goes 14%, 10%, 34% with an all year loss of 42%. Up from 29% from the preceeding two years.
By Autumn Sperrle is describing his staffel as having one veteran, 2 guys with three months experience and the rest as between 4 and 20 days with the Unit. Same issue reported elsewhere in January 44 after a lull – that’s before Big Week and invasion prep.
The combination of years of attrition then the sudden jump to a higher level of engagement in 43 is something the Luftwaffe never recovers from. The solution they adopt is to graduate aircrew early ( nothing to do with lack of fuel Avgas stocks continue to rise until the last 3 months of the war) its to do with dead aircrew needing to be replaced now. As an operational force in the west by Feb 44 the Luftwaffe is putting up targets for whatever allied fighters are in the vicinity. And hitting ridiculous loss levels 82% in 44.
And the US air force got just about everything wrong about fighting WW2 first time out.
One of the unfortunate things is Portal never wrote his memoirs so his thinking which is both incisive and decisive is lost until the various memoranda he wrote were released many years later and the history of the air war is provided by USAF bomber generals recounting how clever they were and asking for SAC and more bombers post war and the USSBS which is entirely about the US effort. So the RAF has focused on transportation from 1940 (Portal comments re Harris that he does not mind as long as its hitting transport targets as well).
The RAF had identified pre war that bombs below 2000lb will not damage industrial infrastructure – as in machine tools hence designing the bomb bays the way they do from Stirling on. That there are no silver bullet targets to hit, too many too easily dispersed of easy to concentrate defences, and you will never really know how close you are to succeeding. Transports hits everything and attrits everything from raw materials to finished product.
EATS which is copied by the USAAC for its expansion – eventually. 20mm armament determined as optimal pre war and for all the comments about lack of ALI ( air Land Interface) in 40 the RAF trained staff officers then invent it three times independently in e UK, DAF and Far East based on what they already knew would work from 1918.
Until the mid/late 1930s the Bomber will always get through is a statement of fact. The only detection methodology is eyesight ( or possibly acoustic mirrors). So any approaching bomber has to traverse a significant bit of your own territory before it can be intercepted, and as the relative speed of the fighter and bomber are close unless you can by luck pre position fighters, which have a crappy armament btw, along the path of attack you are bombed – specifically your cities are bombed with chemical weapons causing mass civilian casualties etc etc – before you can respond, except by your bomber force acting as a deterrent.
Ofc the Luftwaffe attacking in support of a ground offensive on a very limited front can do this because they know where their own troops are and what is decisive. Its also got a high non combat loss rate and generally low serviceability rate which increases the accident rate. If its forced to fly a lot the Luftwaffe will eventually kill itself anyway faster than the RAF of USAAF. Being blunt an RAF, RAAF USAAF USMC station commander flying off an airstrip in a mangrove swamp it Buttfuckawak will have a higher serviceability rate ( subject to rampaging waterbuffalo obviously) that the base commander at Hanover.
That changes with the introduction of types like the ME109 and Hurricane which stand some sort of a chance of effecting an intercept and the sort of armament that can damage a bomber. Problem being if they are flying a standing patrol their fuel state may not allow for this or a long engagement time. What you want is a system of keeping the planes on the ground as long as possible but receiving raid warnings which can then be analysed and a suitable sized force sent up to intercept. The UK alone is working on this from about 1935, initially with acoustic mirrors later radar.
The defeat of the Luftwaffe is simple attrition and game over by late 43 yes the P51 damages the twitching corpse but it’s a corpse already. .As designed (like the Heer) its intended to fight short campaigns with a break to refit. The RAF is designed to fight a continual war, as is the USAAF.
What the Luftwaffe can do until maybe mid 42 ( there are comments from Galland and others that the process below is already happening around the time of Dieppe, is cut its losses at a time of its choosing. It does not have to fight unless it wants to. It voluntarily comes out to fight for Blue and is forced to fight by Alamein and Torch and Sicily and the redirection of bombing raids and the start of POINTBLANK in mid 43. Stalingrad and especially the Tunisian airlifts gut not only the transport fleet (which is needed to move spares around) but multi engine training, Come May June July 43 the Lufwaffe single engine loss rate goes 14%, 10%, 34% with an all year loss of 42%. Up from 29% from the preceeding two years.
By Autumn Sperrle is describing his staffel as having one veteran, 2 guys with three months experience and the rest as between 4 and 20 days with the Unit. Same issue reported elsewhere in January 44 after a lull – that’s before Big Week and invasion prep.
The combination of years of attrition then the sudden jump to a higher level of engagement in 43 is something the Luftwaffe never recovers from. The solution they adopt is to graduate aircrew early ( nothing to do with lack of fuel Avgas stocks continue to rise until the last 3 months of the war) its to do with dead aircrew needing to be replaced now. As an operational force in the west by Feb 44 the Luftwaffe is putting up targets for whatever allied fighters are in the vicinity. And hitting ridiculous loss levels 82% in 44.
My only issue with it is the weight
For that reason alone I would prefer a Bazooka type weapon
Personally I'd prefer a recoilless rifle that can also act as a light artillery piece.
But you cant easily say ( a la Anthony Hopkins):
Bring up the recoilless rifle that can also act as a light artillery piece
The German tank is well over the bridge and into Arnhem by the time you have done that ;-)
Being serious: British anti tank guns were very decent but some form of light weight anti armour weapon is surely needed.