Realistic Territory of a surviving Duchy/Kingdom of Burgundy

So it's been established through multiple threads that, for the most part, it was unlikely that Burgundy would be able to retain the extensive degree of territories that it had even if Charles was not so bold.

So my question is, what would the Burgundian Valois retain, at least at the short term and assuming that they will not inherit the French throne anytime soon?
 
The duchy of Brabant (with Antwerpen) and the counties of Flanders and Holland were the economic core of territories of Valois-Burgundy, I suspect that the Burgundian Netherlands (the duchies of Brabant, Limburg, Luxembourg (,Gelre)*; the counties of Artois, Flanders, Hainaut, Holland, Zeeland (,Zutphen)* ,the margraviate of Namur, and the lordship of Mechelen (Malines)) would be rather safe. Even the county palatine of Burgundy as an imperial fief will be relatively safe, though not as safe as the Burgundian Netherlands. Ironically the duchy of Burgundy (proper) might be the hardest to retain, the house of Valois-Burgundy disputed Burgundy was an appanage with their liege for the duchy of Burgundy proper, the king of France. Keeping other territories which were gained by treaty and/or were under Burgundian suzerainty would be the first a weak ruler of Burgundy would lose.

(*= depends a bit on the point of divergence)
 
As Janprimus said, it depends a lot from the Point of Divergence.
Assuming a relatively unchanged France, tough, I agree that Burgundy proper and Somme basin would probably be the first to go : strategically, these regions were more a matter of focus for Valois than they were for Valois-Burgundy, and the former had and the means and the reasons to go for these.

That said, apanages were considered a bit differently that the post of Janprimus may imply : the custom that made them turning back to the main royal branch in case of disparition of the apanagiere line didn't just included the territories whom French king was suzerain, but everything the apanagiere line gathered so far.
Now, I wholeheartedly agree that this claim would be unreachable by France, even if it somehow becomes more strong than IOTL. As said Janprimus, again, Netherlands were the core of Burgundian strength, and beneficied from a certain (if unequal and conditional) support from the local population.

At term in the case of a maintain of Valois-Burgundy line, Valois could probably take the Duchy of Burgundy, Boulogne, Vermandois and Somme relatively easily, possibly the County of Burgundy, Artois, and various enclaves in France (as Charolais) as well (tough I doubt France could get all of these last ones).
Anything more would need exceptionally good circumstances for France.

There is a long debate between Janprimus and I about how much a surviving Burgundy could keep, so there's both versions.
Janprimus' take
LSCatilina's take (admittedly you could exclude the North of Artois and include the County of Burgundy)

As for Valois-Burgundy inheriting France, this is a meme that pops strangely often on this board, in spite of having few chances to happen with a XVth century POD. You had many other sub-houses of Valois still alive in France, even if they worn out in a quite strange display of events in the XVIth.
 
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Well it gives me a good idea on what to look for. Perhaps it is possible that the Valois-Burgundy could keep Artois, but are the Picard Counties really a bridge too far?
 
I'm not too sure that using "Picard Counties" is still representative by the late XVth : they weren't, as Netherland, a coherent but complex ensemble of communauties, but rather a territorial ensemble of Boulogne, Somme and Vermandois (roughly).

Which helped a lot Valois (and especially Louis XI) to focus relatively easily on them, conquering back the region at least 3 or 4 times IOTL until it held out.
It was indeed a very strategically important place for Valois, as they were a buffer region leaning to Paris : giving that France had the ressources and the means to do take it back, and that Burgundy didn't as much (mostly being stuck with several fronts and issues).

Artois is more of a grey zone to me, as France would still have a vested interest controlling at least a part of it (basically every French king a bit powerful had to meddle with the region since Philipp Augustus in the 1180's). That said, it does have the same strategical role for Netherlands that Picardy had for France, so it would probably be more of a challenge to Valois to swallow it up : even if France does conquers Artois in a first time (which I think, depending of the TL, is rather likely) at short term Valois would have to cede at least half of it (on a North-West/South-East line, meaning giving up, at least Lille and Saint-Omer) because it would be a strategical burden if they can't take back at least part of Flanders (and I don't think they would be able to do so at this point).
 
I'm not too sure that using "Picard Counties" is still representative by the late XVth : they weren't, as Netherland, a coherent but complex ensemble of communauties, but rather a territorial ensemble of Boulogne, Somme and Vermandois (roughly).

Which helped a lot Valois (and especially Louis XI) to focus relatively easily on them, conquering back the region at least 3 or 4 times IOTL until it held out.
It was indeed a very strategically important place for Valois, as they were a buffer region leaning to Paris : giving that France had the ressources and the means to do take it back, and that Burgundy didn't as much (mostly being stuck with several fronts and issues).

Artois is more of a grey zone to me, as France would still have a vested interest controlling at least a part of it (basically every French king a bit powerful had to meddle with the region since Philipp Augustus in the 1180's). That said, it does have the same strategical role for Netherlands that Picardy had for France, so it would probably be more of a challenge to Valois to swallow it up : even if France does conquers Artois in a first time (which I think, depending of the TL, is rather likely) at short term Valois would have to cede at least half of it (on a North-West/South-East line, meaning giving up, at least Lille and Saint-Omer) because it would be a strategical burden if they can't take back at least part of Flanders (and I don't think they would be able to do so at this point).

I think you need to remember Artois and Calaisis were regrouped in the Pas-de Calais département in great majority. Lille is a Flemish city, and the Nord département consists mostly of French Flanders and Hainaut.
 
Wait, I'm not sure I follow. Are you arguing that because some towns are regrouped in one département, and some towns in another, it should influe on how a border mostly depending on power balance centuries before?
Because we're talking of a really undefined border at this period : I think you need to remember that Lille, contrary to Calaisis, was part of the royal demesne under Philipp IV for exemple. It really goes down to whoever have the means to push the border more at some places when it comes to the XIVth/XVth centuries : sort of political rugby, if you prefer.
 
The Picard territories under Valois-Burgundy control and the county of Artois were two different things. The Valois duke of Burgundy was also count of Artois, but most of these Picard territories were ceded to Philip the Good as vassals as part of the treaty of Arras (1435), which resulted in Burgundy abandoning England and rejoining France. This was done in a situation were Burgundy was relatively strong and France was relatively weak. Reversing such a treaty would the easier, than to seize back fiefs, which should have a very good and clear reason in order to prevent other vassals getting too nervous.
As for the possessions of the Apanagerie, in practice there will be a distinction between: are there other legal claimants around according to succession law/tradition and are these French or non-French, in this case Imperial, fiefs. In case of the latter a foreign liege will get involved and diplomatically there can arise foreign opposition against too much gains. Which view or position is right, will most likely be determined by who is the most powerful. France might even be content in having a local dynasty in place in non French fiefs, if it would break down a powerful collection of possessions on their doorstep, this could very well apply to places such as Guelders & Zutphen.

However this is a scenario were the house of Valois-Burgundy survives, in which case Valois-Burgundy losing a personal possession (duchy, county palatine, county, margraviate or lordship) will require a serious conflict, reversing some of concessions France made in the treaty of Arras (1435) will be easier to achieve. This would be painful diplomatic loss for Valois-Burgundy, but losing* the duchy of Burgundy; the county palatine of Burgundy, the county of Artois; the county of Flanders; or even their other** imperial fiefs (the duchies of Brabant, Limburg, Luxembourg and Guelders; the counties of Hainaut, Holland, Zeeland and Zutphen; the margraviate of Namur; and the lordship of Mechelen/Malines) would an actual painful defeat. (*= IMHO roughly in order of likelihood Valois-Burgundy is threatened they will lose it to France; **= the county palatine of Burgundy was also an imperial fief)
 
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I would even think that France attempting to go for anything more than Duchy of Burgundy, Somme (both of these are IMO, bound to be carved off Valois-Burgundy), Artois and County of Burgundy (and probably not both the whole Artois and Free County in same time) would be met with firm refusal : it would be an existential threat to their dominions and their rule.

Other than that, basically what Janprimus said.
 
Legally speaking, the lands of the dukes of Burgundy fell into four categories :

1. Apanages : lands from the royal french demesne conceded to a younger son of a king. Here, the duchy of Burgundy. Normally, the concession of the apanage has a clause in which the apanage comes back to the king in case the male line of the first grantee comes extinct. The Burgundian concession had no such clause, but the kings' lawyers can always argue it is a non-written rule. The Picardian cities are very close to this category, as it is a part of the royal demesne given by treaty to the Duke, with restricting clauses regarding the succession.
2. Territories held in fief from the french king. Here, the counties of Rethel, Nevers, Artois, Flanders, Charolais, Maconnais, Eu, Boulogne, Vermandois. They follow their own inheritance laws (usually male-preference primogeniture), but the king can always declare the duke a felon and confiscate his fiefs. This is known as the "commise féodale" or "Philip Augustus' method of management".
3. Territories held in fief from the Emperor. The Duchies of Brabant, Luxembourg, Limburg, counties of Hainaut, Burgundy, Namur, Holland, Zealand. The emperor's intervention, while possible in theory, is very unlikely.
4. Territories under influence. The Duke does not own them, but he have enough influence on the local lord to rule them. Bishoprics of Liege, Utrecht, Toul, Metz, Verdun and Duchy of Guelders.

Historically, no french king ever confiscated the apanage of one of the princes when the line of succession is unbroken. The closest example is the Artois case, in the 1310', when the male-heir (but not the son of his predecessor) of the Artois line, Robert, was deprived of the major part of his inheritance to a closer, female heir, who happened to be Philip V's mother-in-law ! Same for the Bourbon case in the 1520'. If the King sees an opening (for example, a duke being sonless, but with a nephew as designated heir), he might confiscate ducal Burgundy and Picardy cities, but with a continuing line of Valois in Burgundy, he simply cannot act.

The more useful example could be Louis of Orléans (Louis XII), after his rebellion in 1488 in the "Mad War", his lands (apanage+fiefs) were confiscated as he was kept in prison awaiting formal trial. In 1491, he was granted a pardon, and his lands restored to him. ITTL, the King of France could kept a duke of Burgundy in prison the longest time possible and kept his lands under his arm "awaiting trial", but depriving a legal heir of his birthright is the red line for the aristocracy.
 
Given the proclivity of Louis XIV to take bites out of any territory he liked to the East of France, I really don't see Burgundy surviving, frankly.
 
@Cornelis: Charles the Bold was invested as duke of Guelders/Gelre and count of Zutphen in 1473 by Holy Roman Emperor Frederick III (of Austria).
The duchy of Burgundy under the Capetian house of Burgundy followed male line preference primogeniture, though inheritance could be decided through proximity of the blood. King John II the Good of France inherited Burgundy from the Capetian house of Burgundy through the claim he had from his mother by proximity of the blood, king Charles II the Bad of Navarre arguably had a better claim by primogeniture. Due to all this the duchy of Burgundy was not an ordinary fief, which had reverted to the crown, and the Estates of Burgundy insisted on being kept separate, so in their view their duke was also the king, whereas the king initially had attempted to make it a part of the French Royal Demesne. By granting the valuably duchy to his favourite and youngest son Philip the Bold, this was resolved. You could say the king conceded and choose the next best thing, since his eldest son would meet similar objections, so he's out, which only left his younger sons as candidates.

The Artois case is rather interesting, there an appanage arguably became an ordinary fief, whether that was legal in 1310 is another story, but by allowing it, it was more or less sanctioned.
Still a scenario where a male line nephew inherits all the possessions of Valois-Burgundy, except the territory of the duchy of Burgundy (will keep the title duke of Burgundy in pretence) is a good possibility, which can't be excluded down the road.
The Emperor, but more importantly the Empire, but also other countries do have an incentive to intervene, since a too powerful France goes against their interests. Not only against the interests of the Emperor. However it will also mean Valois-Burgundy has to pay a price, they won't be able to keep their de facto independence of France and the Empire. Not to elaborate and derail this, but in the negotiations* Valois-Burgundy had with the Emperor about a Royal Crown, they stubbornly and unreasonably kept insisting on being an independent kingdom, whereas the best the Emperor could do with a kingdom mostly carved out of Imperial Fiefs, was creating a kingdom, which would be an imperial fief (*=both Philip the Good and Charles the Bold had talks). Now it was even unlikely that this would happen, when Burgundy was powerful IOTL, but under a scenario were they would need help for the Empire. Emperor and others, they will end up being tied much closer to the Empire for their Imperial Fiefs without the consolation price of a Royal Crown.

@Cymraeg: there are many things, which can butterfly away Louis XIV as we know it. However once France becomes more unified and powerful, the territories of Valois-Burgundy will be threatened by this. Still IOTL the Republic of the Seven United Netherlands and the Southern (Spanish and later Austrian) Netherlands managed to survive, but the Southern Netherlands gradually lost some territories due to French expansionism and/or being on the losing side against France (it depends on which country started the conflict). So IMHO a 'Burgundy' in the shape of (most) the Burgundian Netherlands can survive, I do agree that Burgundy proper is in more danger though.

Edit: moreover let's not forget the Burgundian territories were wealthy, and since now they are threatened by a foreign power, the Estates General will grant their duke the funds to defend them. Probably not enough to go on a counter offensive, but defending the economic core is possible. France can only divert a certain amount to pay for an offensive.
 
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but depriving a legal heir of his birthright is the red line for the aristocracy.
Louis XI crossed the red line when it came to aristocracy several times at this point.
Would it be trough more or less blunt murder (Jean d'Armagnac), political trials (as it happened with Jacques d'Armagnac in 1477, and the temporary loss of Nemours and Pardiac) or huge jury-rigging of inheritence customs (death of René d'Anjou), Louis XI demonstrated that he didn't have much issues with using as much means to end a troublesome house : we don't need all the black legend that grew out of its character to admit he was a ruthless king.

Now I don't think Louis XI would be as inane that attempting the exact same treatment on Valois-Burgundy, at least the physical things, but you'd have enough means to deal with them more or less legally : commise (probably a bit archaising at this point, but it's how you can take lands of a vassal accused of felony. It's basically how Capetians claimed back, legally-wise, Plantagenets and Lancaster lands in France), cessation of appanage (as it did happened to his brother Charles in 1466, when he lost the Duchy of Berry), inheritenty captation (Angevine inheritage), or simply trough treaties, you name it.
 
@Cornelis: Charles the Bold was invested as duke of Guelders/Gelre and count of Zutphen in 1473 by Holy Roman Emperor Frederick III (of Austria).
The duchy of Burgundy under the Capetian house of Burgundy followed male line preference primogeniture, though inheritance could be decided through proximity of the blood. King John II the Good of France inherited Burgundy from the Capetian house of Burgundy through the claim he had from his mother by proximity of the blood, king Charles II the Bad of Navarre arguably had a better claim by primogeniture. Due to all this the duchy of Burgundy was not an ordinary fief, which had reverted to the crown, and the Estates of Burgundy insisted on being kept separate, so in their view their duke was also the king, whereas the king initially had attempted to make it a part of the French Royal Demesne. By granting the valuably duchy to his favourite and youngest son Philip the Bold, this was resolved. You could say the king conceded and choose the next best thing, since his eldest son would meet similar objections, so he's out, which only left his younger sons as candidates.

The Artois case is rather interesting, there an appanage arguably became an ordinary fief, whether that was legal in 1310 is another story, but by allowing it, it was more or less sanctioned.
Yeah, I forgot about the fief concession of Guelders. On the apanage, legal historians have highlighted the turn of the apanages made to Louis IX's brothers, which were the first with a clause of reversion to the royal demesne in absence of a male heir (or rather, to be considered having a clause of reversion by the kings' lawyers). Ancient concessions to princes, like the first Capetians in Burgundy, were not different from any other fief. The Artois case, as you pointed out, is an interesting exception, in which the local custom of succession has taken superiority over the king's one.

Louis XI crossed the red line when it came to aristocracy several times at this point.
Would it be trough more or less blunt murder (Jean d'Armagnac), political trials (as it happened with Jacques d'Armagnac in 1477, and the temporary loss of Nemours and Pardiac) or huge jury-rigging of inheritence customs (death of René d'Anjou), Louis XI demonstrated that he didn't have much issues with using as much means to end a troublesome house : we don't need all the black legend that grew out of its character to admit he was a ruthless king.

Louis XI was effectively ruthless and even cruel, but in all these cases the inheritance went to the legal heir eventually. When René d'Anjou died, his (male-line) nephew inherited Anjou and Provence. He kept in prison Charles of Armagnac and Jean of Armagnac-Nemours, because he had a legal reason to do so (even if unfounded in fact), but eventually they went free and had their lands restored.
 
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