Realistic take on war starting in 1938 ?

First of all the Czech would have their fortifications,which would mean a bloodier time for the German army. An armed uprising it the Studentland would be a flop most of the ethnic German population would not figh only a tiny pro-Nazi Minority.

1: Austrian Border
2: Hungaryan Border
3: Said fortifications are overated.
4: Poland want Teschen back.
5: Tiny nazi minority? Then why the ethnic cleansing and massacres back in 45?

Second France had a treaty with Czechoslovkia which required them to come to their aid. If the Czechs fought there is no guarantee that the French would stand by and do nothing.

LOL, the French would be even less likely to launch an offensive than historically.

Third I would expect that Britain and France would hault all sales to Germany and if they found that Italy was funneling supplies to Germany they would turn off the sale of materials to that country. No British coal to Italy meant thItalian factories would stop functioning and Italian home grow cold. Germany could not supply both Italy and itself with enough.

Again, why would these brilliant plans be executed in 38, when they where not in 39, when the allies where more willing to face war.

Fourth: any major setbacks and a military coup in Germany would take place. Hitler did not have the military might to stop a coup. The army could have crushed the small SS ,

Even the july coupists in 1944 lacked the organisation necessary to succede, the German army didn´t rise in their support, thus...

Some clarifications.

'Oxford companion to WW-II' reports the Germans got only 870,000 tons of oil in total from Russia during 1939-1941. Mean while the annual oil production/imports/Synthetic/war bootie, during each year was

1939= 10,428,000 tons
1940= 8,794,000 tons
1941= 11,696,000 tons

Russian oil imports @ 3% of the total were hardly critical.

German tank inventory
Jentz tells use that in 1939 Sept German tank inventory was

1445 x Pz-I
1223 x Pz-II
202 x Pz 35t
78 x Pz-38t
98 x Pz-III
211 x Pz-IV

Czech tanks at 8% out of 3257 tanks is important but also hardly critical, especially since German tank doctrine was tailored to a tank detachment that composed almost entirely of Panzer I & II and only a handful gun armed panzers.

Depending on how such a scenario plays out the Germans may end up with a slightly smaller tank inventory but with more gun panzers and less light tanks, thus making up any deficiency in Czech tanks. Again it was their doctrine & training, that set these combat division apart from their adversaries.

If we look at the mid 1940 numbers we have

1077 Pz-I [334 other Pz-I had been removed from the inventory to be converted to 15cm SiG , PzJager I , Flamm Pz I & muntions schleppers] In addition another 175 had been produced as command tanks]
1092 Pz-II
143 Pz-35t
237 Pz-38t
329 Pz-III [plus another 45 produced as command tanks and 30 produced as StuG-III in early 1940]
280 Pz-IV

In this case Czech tanks counted for 10% or 380 out of 3567 tanks in the inventory. Again important but not really war altering is it? Especially since the industrial labor and funding between 1939-1940, would have been redirected elsewhere.... perhaps to conduct many more conversions of the Panzer I chassis? More Panzer I command tanks so no Panzer III have to be built as command tanks. Improvised infantry gun tanks based on Panzer I chassis utilizing the large production of 75L11 infantry guns instead of Panzer Jager I [which relied on captured stocks of Czech 47mm guns] , so no StuG-III are built but solely Pz-III tanks are produced. Before invading France considerable effort could have been redirected to these tasks especially if the first clashes with Czech and later Polish forces , showed the vulnerability of the Panzer I & II when used as tanks

Luftwaffe plane inventories were indeed as high as were indicated. The fact remains that an air forces inventory of planes experiences a huge turnover each year, so individual inventory numbers shift only gradually unless there is a huge upswing in production.

Aircraft effectiveness in combat is mostly dependant on pilot training and doctrine. Due to experiences in the Spanish civil war, German air fighting & bombing doctrine was ahead of everyone else’s.


Wouhou, 38 myth busted!
 
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Krix

Banned
It should be remembered that the oil SU supplied to Germany was in great part provided from Polish oil fields in Drohobych and Boryslav.
 
A lot of cherrypicking data here.
The CZ tanks were HALF the effective tank strength. The Pz1 and 2 were pretty much useless except against troops with no tanks or anti-tank weaponry - they were very vulnerable even to the anti-tank guns of the time.

Russian oil imports were small IF you include the captured oil (whyso, after all they havn't captured it yet!!) The Germans got a lot of oil when they beat France. Without this massaging of figures, Russian oil becomes much more important. The fall of France also 'persuaded' Rumania to divert pretty much all their oil to Germany, before that much was going to France.


I think not. Read the post again and Jentz book. Its clear that German tactics were written for tank battalions that had 80-90% panzer I & II and that seemed to work well enough in Poland and with tinkering in France too. So they were hardly useless. Or maybe I should put it this way...it might have been useless to you guys but they figured out a way to use them.

I quoted the figures from Oxford C on WW-II, you can take the figures up with them , but even if we break it down into years its still not significant contribution.

1939 = 10,428,000 tons; 5,000 tons russian or [less than 1/4 %]
1940= 8,794,000 tons; 617,000 tons russian or [about 7 %]
1941= 11,696,000 tons; 248,000 tons russian or [about 2 %]


Again hardly war winning or losing !

As I said before on anothre thread, just changing a weapon system is hardly going to alter the course of history much. Its possible that a rougher german start would force Hitler to conceed he can't win by race alone and pay more mind to resource and mass production techniquies etc. If he empowered Todt like he empowered Speer, considerable improvements could have been installed earlier.
 
To begin with in 1938 Hitler and the SS did not have the same degree of control of Germany that they did in 1944. Himler had yet to get total control of the German Police and the Waffen SS were a lot weaker. Determined resistance by the Czech combined with action by the West and Russia to support the Czech might just have been enough to get a military coup to take place.

As regards the Pz kpf 1 and 2 they were of little value during the campaign in France. The only thing that helped asure the sucess of the Campaign of 1940 was the presence of the captured Czech taks armed with the 37mm gun. Without them there simply wasn't enough Pzkpf 3 and 4 to asure the sucess of the panzer thrust.

The French sponsor alliance system of the Post WW1 periord had Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania all in the same alliance system. If HUngary had entered the war in 1938 against Czechoslovakia then Yugoslavia and Romania might very well have attacked Hungary. Without a doubtil sypply would have dried up for Germany. Germany might have had enough stocks on hand to continue fighting for a time but the situtaation would have grown critical in 1939. The simply was not enough synthentic oil being produced to fuel the military and the German economy.
 
As regards the Pz kpf 1 and 2 they were of little value during the campaign in France. The only thing that helped asure the sucess of the Campaign of 1940 was the presence of the captured Czech taks armed with the 37mm gun. Without them there simply wasn't enough Pzkpf 3 and 4 to asure the sucess of the panzer thrust..


What secured success in France 1940 was , Mansteins maneuver , Tanks donot usually figure in such calculations. And as I pointed out the Germans knew how to used their tanks no matter what they were. To assume a alternative early WW-II start with out Czech tanks and not assume alternative emergency tank buiding programme is equally absurd.

More gun panzers and fewer light tanks is just redirecting existing labor resources and funding to alternative programme. Equally the labor & funding applied to Czech production would be redirected else were probably towards more modification of Panzer I production into self propelled guns, something that had been called for since the early 1930s.
 
A good chunk of Rommel's Panzer Division were the PZ-38T which stood some chance against the French armor.

If the French and Belgians had moved forces into the Ardeness region then this would be a moot point. If this war broke out in 1938 then the French would have had even more of an advantage. Suppose that the French had massively produce the 47mm ATG. It would have allowed them to crush the german tanks and SP guns.

Also the more mechanised an army is the greater will be the need for fuel.Germany would have had only so much gasoline and oil on hand. It could only produce so much synthenic oil and if imports from Romania were cut off then the game is up.

If Russia aided Czechoslovkia thenthere is the possibility that if the Romanians did not cut off oil supplies to Germany Russia might have launched a much wider war. Including bombing the Romanian oil works.
 
Again you are placing far too much faith the quality of armaments. Primarily these clashes are determined by troop leadership and tactics, not by tank armor thickness and gun penetration etc. Either way the basic operational dynamics have the French and British beaten by that “Sichelschnitt” maneuver in France.

The rest is just not good military analysis. You plan for the worst and hope for the best. Here your planning for the allied best and hoping for the German worst. A whole string of alliance match ups and results, that may or may not happen.
 

nbcman

Donor
@ esl

The quality of the Western Allies/SU armaments are immaterial. The lack of oil and other essential materials for the Germans and their minor allies would have crippled their ability to fight back for any substantial period. So without Polish oil, Rumanian oil and or captured French stocks of oil, what will the Germans run their tanks and airplanes with to demonstrate their superior troop leadership and tactics?

The Germans would have been forced to proceed with their original western attack plan (massed forces to the north of the Ardennes) due to their supply issues and thus would have been forced into the war that the Western Allies were anticipating. And Poland/Hungary could not hold off the SU plus Romania and Yugoslavia so the Germans couldn't send almost their full army and airforce to attack the west like in OTL.

So Germany will be defeated, and the iron curtain decends on the border of Rumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Germany-but at least Rumania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia will end up on the Western side of the iron curtain.
 

Markus

Banned
Those figures for the Luftwaffe in 1938 are as bogus as they get.

We're supposed to believe that by August 1940 the Luftwaffe had added a total of only 120 dive bombers and 400 other bombers from what they had two years earlier? The British and French only wish German production had been that poor.

They are IMO correct but we need to remember that those planes from 38 were very early versions that had to be replaced with combat worthy ones in the following two years.
 
When discussing the air forces, one should not forget that the best and brightest of the Luftwaffe are still in Spain perfecting the rotten/schwarm tactic. Much of the luftwaffe still flies with the old tactics and old vic formation

Also, the Czech airforce was a factor:

21 fighter squadrons (326 planes in the frontline, 124 in reserve).
22 recoinnasance/light bomber squadrons (320 planes in the frontline, 155 in reserve).
8 medium bomber squadrons (101 planes in the frontline, 39 in reserve).
6 heavy bomber suqadrons (54 planes in the frontline, 27 in reserve).

Also, the Czechs had a decent air industry able to produce more planes to replace losses.
 
In 1938 the German army was suffering from a considerable lack of weapons needed to equip its divisions. Industry could not produce the small arms, mortars, machine guns and artillery in enough quantities to equip the expanded army. Units were equipped with weapons that were often left over from World War I and even then there was a terrible shortage. A great part of the army was reservist and landwher that had little training. It wasn't until 1940 that these units had enough training ang equipment to fight. A war with the Czechs would mean that all of the tanks , rifles, LMG and artillery that was available in OTL would not be available in this one.

How well that German army would do against the Czechs is a matter of speculation as they did not actually fight but it is easy to assume that the Heer would suffer considerable loses and these loses would be in the best trained and equipped units of the German army.

You state that the Pzkpf I and II could be used as SP Gun platforms but where would the guns come from ? And where would the fuel come from to allow them to operate? If Germany was to lose the fuel Romania the war would be over fairly quickly,
.
 
In 1938 the German army was suffering from a considerable lack of weapons needed to equip its divisions. Industry could not produce the small arms, mortars, machine guns and artillery in enough quantities to equip the expanded army. Units were equipped with weapons that were often left over from World War I and even then there was a terrible shortage. A great part of the army was reservist and landwher that had little training. It wasn't until 1940 that these units had enough training ang equipment to fight. A war with the Czechs would mean that all of the tanks , rifles, LMG and artillery that was available in OTL would not be available in this one.

This is pretty much what I've read too. The Luftwaffe was in no better position apparently, some of the Stuka squadrons were short of trained rear gunners and a few of the fighters had no MGs... according to one of the pilots anyway. The dangers of taking supposed strengths at face value doesn't factor in the amount of aircraft u/s (for both sides), likewise with vehicles.

On a related note, I've noticed a tendency to think that a 'tank factory' can produce any tank. When production is shifted from one model to another a great deal of re-tooling and re-training takes place, which does take time. If it was simply a matter of saying 'build this now', then the Germans wouldn't have let the Skoda plant build Pz 38(t) when they took it over, they'd have them build PzIIIs. Remember that in 1938 The 38t had only just started production, so most of the ones Germany used were produced after the Germans took over.

Great discussion though... keep it up! :)
 
A point that must be stated that in the event that a war did break out in 1938 it is highly likely that most if not all of the Czech armament producing factories would have been destroyed or heavily damaged. Thus there would be no Cech made arms to help equip the German army. Thus should the war esclate in 1939 the German army would be worse off than it was in 1938. Equipment and personnel lost in 1938 could not easily be made up.

The Condor Legion in Spain would soon find that its planes would become non-operational as spare parts ran out.

The war would have also prove that the Pz 1 was useless and the Pz 2 was not much better. To retool would take time. Thus there would be fewer tanks available for the offensive he west. Its easy to say make SP platforms out of the Pz1 and PX2 but that requires one to have the guns to mount on them. In 1940 the Germans mounted the Czech 47mm guns on the tank bodies but that was with no German -Czech war.
 
They are IMO correct but we need to remember that those planes from 38 were very early versions that had to be replaced with combat worthy ones in the following two years.

Added to which the Germans lost c.500 aircraft during the invasion of Poland. In all the Germans did well to produce sufficient aircraft to exceed the original strength of the 1938 Luftwaffe.
 

Commissar

Banned
According to a study done on fortifications and written by the Kaufmans the Czech fortifications ( main forts) were tougher than the Maginot line.In fact the Germans experimented on them in an attempt to see how they could take the Maginot line and they received a major shock. They were so well built that they could take a pounding by the heaviest gun that the German army had in 1939-40 and survive.

Any insurgency by the ethnic germans would have been put down and not all ethnic Germans were willing to fight against the Czech government.

If the Czechs fought it is possible that the Yugoslavs might have fought the Hungarians if they entered the war on Germany's side. Romania might have done the same.

http://www.sturmvogel.orbat.com/Zorach.html

http://www.sturmvogel.orbat.com/Biermann.html

http://www.sturmvogel.orbat.com/CzechFortPhotos.html

Once again you demonstrate you don't know what you are talking about.
 

Commissar

Banned
That would be the ten regular, ten reserve, ten Landwehr divisions and the ten still being raised. This amounts to twenty combat ready divisions, not 25 and certainly not 34.

:rolleyes:

Your ignorance of the fact these are fully trained divisions is disturbing.

W.L. Shirer. E.R. May, R.D. Müller and H.E. Volkmann disagree. They also debunk your statement of the Siegfried-line being more or less complete. General von Leeb and the General in charge of building the SL deemed it a "facade". And that was in 1939, not 38!

I will take Brigadier Peter Young and Brigadier General James L. Collins, Jr over them as they one, actually revealed primary documents and visited the area.

The Siegfried Line was no facade and considering the blood bath the Allies suffered taking the line in 44/45, most of the line in dilapidated condition, and with the allies using far more powerful weapons than the French had available in 39/40. I find it laughable the notion the French were going to break through when the British and American Forces with superior engineering equipment took months to do.

Its also constructive that 3rd Army got massacred taking Metz, pre-WW1 fortifications against the dregs of the German Army. And Patton having fought at St. Mihiel should have known better.

E.R. May is especially interesting. He quotes General Gamelin putting the german strenght at the time of Munich at 120 divisions, 90 of which were ready for action. If one is generous Germany had reached that strenght in May 1940!

http://www.axishistory.com/index.php?id=7288

Ahem, you revealed that you know don't know what you are talking about.

Jeez, get the Illustrated Encyclopedia of WW2 from your local library and read it.
 
Commisar, I am basing what I said on the books that the Kaufman's wrote regarding European fortifications. According to the two books they spoke with experts and the Germans were impressed with the Czech works. It was stated in the book that even the French who had visited the fortifications were impressed.

The information that you have dug up is quite interesting. But the main fortifications were according to the two books stronger tham the Maginot Line forts.

Thus I could throw the same line back at you .
 

Markus

Banned
:rolleyes:

Your ignorance of the fact these are fully trained divisions is disturbing.


Sure, a Landwehr-division with 40+year old, barely trained WW1 veterans and a lack of heavy weapons is a fully combat ready unit. :D



http://www.axishistory.com/index.php?id=7288

Ahem, you revealed that you know don't know what you are talking about.

Jeez, get the Illustrated Encyclopedia of WW2 from your local library and read it.
Let´s see 29+15+114+ 7 makes 165 total. Now we compare than to data from the german military historian K-H Frieser -who by the way also used primary documents. He put the numerical strenght at 157 divisions. But there is quantity and there is quality!

10 divisions were armoured, 6 motorized and 127 infantry. Of the 127 infantry divisions 61 were rated by the WH as fully combat ready, 29 partially ready, 28 ready for defence only and 9 partially ready for defence.

So if one is generous, that gives the WH 106 (10+6+61+29) divisions for an offensive. In May 1940! As another user already pointed out the WH made a major effort to get the reservists into shape between the end of the Polish Campaign and the start of the French one.


And now I shall ignore you!
 
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