Realistic CSA victory timeline

amphibulous

Banned
Amphibulous,
I would have thought that given the number of ships and bases available to the English this would be self evident, but fair go, you tell me as clearly as possible what you think has to be demonstrated in order to make a convincing argument.


For the third time, the ability to enforce a blockade would have depended on ironclads - because the Union would have used such weapons to break the blockade. The British had two that they felt confident using in blue water against Monitor class or better opponents. The US demonstrated an ability to build competing ships with the New Ironsides and would have the advantage of being able to deploy ships designed for short range (but blue water operations) against vessels with trans-Atlantic range.

So, no, not self-evident.


In OTL Union industry was converting or already had converted to war production by early 1862. We know that they were experiencing a short fall of iron production


Bad logic. A shortfall is less than you want. Not less than you can get by with. The first limits operations, the second is required to end a war.

Opium was a British controlled trade too so it would reasonable to assume that there would be no analgesia of any sort for Union soldiers’ once domestic stocks ran out. There would also be a huge shortfall in arms production in 1862 but as that has been discussed several times on this site I won’t mention it further.

This is not something that ends wars in the C19th.

[quote[
The British don’t need Union grain there are two reasons for this. First Russian production and sales have recovered from the Crimean war and the Baltic trade is back up and running again. So the British traders can simply buy there instead.
[/quote]

This is the same Russia that is so pro-Union that it takes over the USN Pacific patrol duties for it, yes?

There is no single source for the information on nitrates, it is a synthesis of every thing I have picked up.


Well, you've obviously researched this seriously - but not quite completely. The use of synthetic nitrates was so routine that the trade for the "vital" Indian nitrate fields was rapidly dying in the 1860's - it declined even during the period when the US was buying for the war! So its pretty clear that the Indian nitrate was not essential - being deprived of it would have created difficulties, a hiatus in offensive operations, and extra costs subsequently. No more. See "The Financial Foundations Of The British Raj" at:

http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=...=onepage&q=indian saltpetre civil war&f=false

I do not accept that the claim that a lack of gunpowder would have driven the Union to surrender is an extra-ordinary claim. The phenomena was seen in earlier wars.


Yes, but the points I made - even before the above - were specific to this one. Ignoring the above (which settles matters completely) if you were right then Washington would have had to be insane to provoke London in any way at all, and London pointlessly neurotic to worry about Canada!

In reality, both sets of statesmen pursued a realistic course. They each needed the other - just not absolutely.


The Province of Canada is at risk in any war with the USA. Chances are the whole of Canada West (modern Ontario) would fall to Union forces as the British simply do not have enough assets in position to defend the place.


But you've claimed the US couldn't conduct operations without Indian nitrates. This is not consistent!

In any case the occupation of parts of the Province of Canada is of relevance only to those that live there because once the British have destroyed the USA ‘s navy and coastal fortifications they can start on destroying naval yards, ports warehouses and heavy industry which all on the water front.


You're awfully confident that a few gun sloops - because a lot of targets will require bombarding from shallow water - will be a lot more effective than thousands of bombers over Germany in the 1940s. And that the US will be less resistant and ingenious than e.g. Octavian and Agrippa fighting Sextus Pompey (they built their warships in a lake to keep them safe and then dug a canal.) The British can't touch iron production significantly and new slipways can be built - Agrippa style if need be. (Although, once again, there were things called "mines" - well they called them "torpedoes".)

Lincoln isn’t Stalin or even Churchill; he does not have a command economy and the means to wage 20th century total war.

This meaningless rhetoric. Lincoln deploys a million men at arms. This effort has no precedent in British history. The resources to field 10 or 20 New Ironsides class ship against the RN are a minuscule fraction of this - they're comparable, in fact, to the almost whimsically motivated investment the US makes in over-producing Monitors!

So Mr Reality says, "No." The US can field a meaningful counter-blockade force for a modicum of effort by OTL standards. This isn't opinion justified with questionable analogies, it's fact. 50 Monitors convert quite nicely to 10 New Ironsides - and from there the only way is up.

The Union government will yield to the British before they destroy their country, they may be patriots but they are not fools.


Wait - the British can "destroy America"??? Using two (admittedly Godzilla like and completely awe inspiring) ironclads, a possible field force of 25,000 troops, and gun sloops??? Ok, they can build more ironclads, but the US has a relatively autarkal economy. The UK has a bigger navy, but she relies utterly on trade to stay alive. Union commerce raiding will be painful for her. (And please, no more "But there is a blockade!" - this didn't stop French commerce raiding in the Napoleonic Wars. Blockades are imperfect and stopping fast raiders that depart when conditions are optimal has a poor success rate.)

Realistically:

- The British are going to be able to a minute fraction of the damage that the Union to the CSA - especially considered pro rata to population

- You therefore either believe that Northerners are comparative cowards or that their will to fight the war is weak. Neither of these is sustainable when compared to Union casualty lists.

What would really happen (if the British had a reason to do something so contrary to their principals and interest) is:

- The British would have more firepower at sea

- The US would have a realistic chance of concentrating more firepower at a point and thus be able to create very severe pain for the RN on occasion.

- The US would be able to raid; the RN would have to convoy. This makes British exports less flexible and more expensive; business is lost.

- Northern offensive operations on land would stop for a year or so and then re-start at a lower tempo. Northern casualties would be higher.

- British land and sea forces throughout the Empire would be overstretched; grain prices in the UK would soar; depending on the Tsar's bunions there might be a real scarcity of bread in the UK. The UK can't count on getting grain from the Russians and, with no other source they can count on, will be extremely vulnerable to pressure from him. Why should they put themselves in this position?

Quite simply, the two sides would be in a contest to create each other pain until the war wasn't worth fighting for one of them anymore. And you can't say who that would be, because that worth depends on the motive for war - and the UK doesn't have one. In fact, it has a string of motives for avoiding one!

A lot of your logic seems to predicate that the US would fight a limited war against the UK, but that the UK would be fighting an unlimited one - i.e. one where it gave the Anti-Northern War priority over every need regardless of cost. This makes no sense at all - the UK has no motive for war, it goes against its interest and principals, and the US is defending itself - but the UK commits more than the US? This doesn't make any sense at all.
 
How much damage did Confederate raiders do to Union trade? What did the US primarily import and export, and how much did they bring in in income.
 

amphibulous

Banned
How much damage did Confederate raiders do to Union trade?

The damage to the US shipping industry was quite massive. This is a fair summary:

http://www.usmm.org/civilwar.html

[FONT=Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Besides the 200 ships destroyed by Confederate raiders, 1,600 ships were reflagged as foreign vessels to avoid their danger, resulting in a long-term loss to the U.S. merchant marine, since they were not allowed to return to United States registry thereafter.


After the War ended, the United States sued England in connection with losses caused by the raiders, because as bitter ship owners put it, these raiders were: "built of English oak, in an English yard, armed with English guns, manned by an English crew, and sunk in the English Channel."


An international commission ruled damages of $15,000,000 against England-- a small price to pay for the long term damage to the American merchant marine to the benefit of British shipping.
[/FONT]

This wasn't a sign of British partiality to the South - they supplied more arms to the North - but the political/legal system of the day allowed British businesses to sell weapons to anyone who wasn't actually at war with the UK. It was considered morally unacceptable to interfere with the Briton's natural right to take money from foreigners who wanted to kill each other.
 

frlmerrin

Banned
Response IV

amphibulous,

I would have thought that given the number of ships and bases available to the English this would be self evident, but fair go, you tell me as clearly as possible what you think has to be demonstrated in order to make a convincing argument.

For the third time, the ability to enforce a blockade would have depended on ironclads - because the Union would have used such weapons to break the blockade. The British had two that they felt confident using in blue water against Monitor class or better opponents. The US demonstrated an ability to build competing ships with the New Ironsides and would have the advantage of being able to deploy ships designed for short range (but blue water operations) against vessels with trans-Atlantic range.


So, no, not self-evident.

If you have to repeat yourself for the third time perhaps it was because you were not sufficiently clear the first two times?


I think you are fundamentally failing to understand several factors.
First, monitors are very poor sea boats, they are very slow, and they have almost no reserve buoyancy. They cannot fight even in tiny waves, they cannot sail in modest waves. They are completely vulnerable to the larger Royal Navy ships which certainly don’t need an ironclad to defeat her. If you doubt me consider the action of the Huascar against Shah and Amethyst, a frigate and corvette respectively. Huascar was a formidable ad successful breast work ironclad brilliantly commanded, she was better armed and armoured and had better engines than a monitor. She spent the whole of the engagement seeking shoal water and trying to escape because she could not match the guns of the British. So in conclusion no monitor is going to be a serious threat to the British wooden steam ships. As a second example you will note how well the Kaiser did at the battle of Lissa fighting far better ironclads than a monitor. Ironclad vs steam warships does not mean an automatic win for the ironclads
Second, New Ironsides, she is a far better vessel than a monitor but all she really is, is a slightly larger version of the French designed floating batteries of the Crimean war. She is a match for the British floating battery at Bermuda, perhaps she slightly overmatches her but again she is not going to be able to defeat two or three larger wooden steam vessels firing broadsides. One, oh yes she may well defeat one, if she can pin her, because New Ironsides is slow and in a bad situation the British ship could break off the engagement but against several ships she is lost. The British navy, knowing the capabilities of a floating battery are unlikely to give her the opportunity of a one on one duel. Note too that New Ironsides would not be available for the start of hostilities and any sister ships will be later still.

Third, the British will not even send any ironclads until April as I have already mentioned it is too cold. When they do however they will send not less than four and probably seven or eight. Those in commission and those in the 1st class reserve probably less Royal Sovereign.

In OTL Union industry was converting or already had converted to war production by early 1862. We know that they were experiencing a short fall of iron production.

Bad logic. A shortfall is less than you want. Not less than you can get by with. The first limits operations, the second is required to end a war

I find the phrase ‘Bad logic’ inappropriate as I have simply made a statement, there is no logical deduction of any sort at all going on.
I note that the Union built almost no railway miles during the ACW and had problems finding enough rail stock to repair the track they did have. This was at a time when they could import British iron rails. How much worse would it be when they cannot even do that? This is just one example. Is this what you mean by ‘get by with?’

Opium was a British controlled trade too so it would reasonable to assume that there would be no analgesia of any sort for Union soldiers’ once domestic stocks ran out. There would also be a huge shortfall in arms production in 1862 but as that has been discussed several times on this site I won’t mention it further

This is not something that ends wars in the C19th.

Well I agree lack of opium for analgesia would not end the war. What it would do is make running away a lot more attractive to some of the men on the battlefield. On the other hand a big enough shortfall in arms production would. However, the USA has lots of muskets in store, its soldiers can use them in the first instance. This will be unfortunate for those soldiers when the trained parts of the Canadian and New Brunswick militias start opening up at around 600 yards with rifle-muskets from defensive positions.

The British don’t need Union grain there are two reasons for this. First Russian production and sales have recovered from the Crimean war and the Baltic trade is back up and running again. So the British traders can simply buy there instead.
This is the same Russia that is so pro-Union that it takes over the USN Pacific patrol duties for it, yes?
This is the Russia that is in serious debt from the Crimean war and needs to produce export lots of export earnings. This is the Russia that may loath the British but is at peace with them because they are so terrified of having to fight a war with them again. This is the Russia that has unrest in Poland and Lithuania and an invasion on the Steppe to deal with. This is the Russia that has just abolished private serfdom and is soon to abolish Imperial Serfdom as a result of which it has major internal unrest to deal with. This is the Russia still ‘mopping’ after a war in the Caucasus.

Of course the Russian merchants will sell grain to the British merchants and even if they didn’t they still need to sell to someone who will sell it to the British, who thanks to Union dumping in 1861 have a year or two’s grace as they brought much of the surplus.
In 1863 two small Russian flotillas visited New York and San Francisco to overwinter in an ice free port so that they would be available for commerce raiding should Britain elect to declare war on Russia over the Polish uprising. However, remember for a war over the Trent Affair things kick-off in 1862.

I would be most happy to see any evidence you may have that the Russian flotilla took over any patrol duties from the USN as I do not believe it to be the case.
Well, you've obviously researched this seriously - but not quite completely. The use of synthetic nitrates was so routine that the trade for the "vital" Indian nitrate fields was rapidly dying in the 1860's - it declined even during the period when the US was buying for the war! So its pretty clear that the Indian nitrate was not essential - being deprived of it would have created difficulties, a hiatus in offensive operations, and extra costs subsequently. No more. See "The Financial Foundations Of The British Raj" at:

http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=B...%20war&f=false

Actually I am aware of this phenomenon if you are referring to mixing Sodium salts and potash, you can see it very clearly in the British statistical abstracts of this period. However, you will notice that I discussed the Union’s rather unsuccessful attempts to produce Potassium Nitrate from this feed stock. What I did not mention was that only one chemical company felt technically able to respond to the Union government’s request for tenders to do the pilot work. The chemistry/chemical engineering in the USA at this time was not up to the task. You will also have appreciated that the USA does not have large enough deposits of these stock domestically and the supply from Chile and South American will be blockaded.
If on the other hand you are referring to gun cotton, you should be aware that in the early 1860 no-one had managed to stabilise it yet.

I do not accept that the claim that a lack of gunpowder would have driven the Union to surrender is an extra-ordinary claim. The phenomena was seen in earlier wars. ]


Yes, but the points I made - even before the above - were specific to this one. Ignoring the above (which settles matters completely) if you were right then Washington would have had to be insane to provoke London in any way at all, and London pointlessly neurotic to worry about Canada!

In reality, both sets of statesmen pursued a realistic course. They each needed the other - just not absolutely.

In reality, the Union provoked London repeatedly and its government was often unaware it was doing so. Britain remained placid about this provocation for a great many different reasons which I do not propose to discuss as the subject is off-topic. During the Trent Affair the Union came far closer to war than Lincoln and most of his Cabinet realised. The British were deadly serious and the once accepted argument that they were simply posturing has largely shown to be false in recent years.

The Province of Canada is at risk in any war with the USA. Chances are the whole of Canada West (modern Ontario) would fall to Union forces as the British simply do not have enough assets in position to defend the place.

But you've claimed the US couldn't conduct operations without Indian nitrates. This is not consistent!

No. Stop putting your words on to my page! I claimed that the Union would run out of gunpowder and the evidence supports the claim. I did not say that because of this they would not invade the Province of Canada, after all what else can they do to hurt the British. If the Union is not going to march north it may just as well surrender, it hurts less.

In any case the occupation of parts of the Province of Canada is of relevance only to those that live there because once the British have destroyed the USA ‘s navy and coastal fortifications they can start on destroying naval yards, ports warehouses and heavy industry which all on the water front.

You're awfully confident that a few gun sloops - because a lot of targets will require bombarding from shallow water - will be a lot more effective than thousands of bombers over Germany in the 1940s. And that the US will be less resistant and ingenious than e.g. Octavian and Agrippa fighting Sextus Pompey (they built their warships in a lake to keep them safe and then dug a canal.) The British can't touch iron production significantly and new slipways can be built - Agrippa style if need be. (Although, once again, there were things called "mines" - well they called them "torpedoes".)

No I am really confident that financial collapse, depression, widespread poverty and an increasingly well funded and armed Confederacy will do for the Union. Burning the wealth of the nation that is located on the seaboard is just icing on the cake.

You do know that the Russians used better mines in the Crimean than anybody did in the American Civil War? You do know that the British developed a mine sweeping doctrine?

Lincoln isn’t Stalin or even Churchill; he does not have a command economy and the means to wage 20th century total war.
This meaningless rhetoric. Lincoln deploys a million men at arms. This effort has no precedent in British history. The resources to field 10 or 20 New Ironsides class ship against the RN are a minuscule fraction of this - they're comparable, in fact, to the almost whimsically motivated investment the US makes in over-producing Monitors!

So Mr Reality says, "No." The US can field a meaningful counter-blockade force for a modicum of effort by OTL standards. This isn't opinion justified with questionable analogies, it's fact. 50 Monitors convert quite nicely to 10 New Ironsides - and from there the only way is up.

Peak enrolment in the Union army was just over a million in May 1863 and over 300,000 of those troops were absent in March the last date of record in my reference. The figure is enrolments and not actual men so the union army was smaller than this figure, I’m not sure how much smaller, it is an argument for experts. So say 650,000 – 700,000 troops at the end of the war. About two thirds of these men at best are front line troops. The OTL Union army never had to man the coastal defences, fight in California or fight on the Canadian border. By 1865 in this scenario over 800,000 fewer immigrants will have reached the Union than in OTL many of them recruited into the army. In 1862 of course the army was much much smaller, my reference says 530,000ish again these are enrolments and real numbers are smaller and at most 2/3 are front line troops. From this perspective 80,000 troops to fight on the border with BNA is I would think a very generous estimate.

The idea that Union’s efforts to put a modestly sized army into the field against the Confederacy is in anyway comparable to the effort expended by Britain, a very wealthy country in fighting the Napoleonic wars is laughable. What is of note is that the effort as a fraction of national wealth required of the Union just to defeat the confederacy was enormous far greater than the fraction of British national wealth expended on fighting Napoleon. The USA stayed in debt over the American Civil War until the first world war.

Anyway. Men are not iron. They are different types of resource. You cannot expect the Union to be able to put 20 New Ironsides to sea just because they can field 430,000men with five years run -up. I would think five or six would be right at the limit of what could be achieved and the British have enough steam battleships to make sure each New Ironsides fights three of them. That is without using any British ironclads at all.

20 New Ironsides including guns would take something like 90,000 tons of good iron minimum. Tell me where the Union would take it from? How would the Union make do? Where will they save 90,0000 tons of iron?

The Union will not fight a total war, not in 1862 and that is neither rhetoric nor meaningless.

The Union government will yield to the British before they destroy their country, they may be patriots but they are not fools.

Wait - the British can "destroy America"??? Using two (admittedly Godzilla like and completely awe inspiring) ironclads, a possible field force of 25,000 troops, and gun sloops??? Ok, they can build more ironclads, but the US has a relatively autarkal economy. The UK has a bigger navy, but she relies utterly on trade to stay alive. Union commerce raiding will be painful for her. (And please, no more "But there is a blockade!" - this didn't stop French commerce raiding in the Napoleonic Wars. Blockades are imperfect and stopping fast raiders that depart when conditions are optimal has a poor success rate.)

By destroy I mean wreck the economy, cause a depression, cause famine, wreck the personal fortunes of the merchant classes, destroy waterside fortifications, warehouses and factories, take the government gold and silver from California, take the American whaling fleet and reflag or take the American merchant fleet. Maybe capture Nantucket and Martha’s Vineyard.

I think your suggestion that Lincoln would fight on to the utter destitution of his country rather unfair, he may have been a fanatic to keep the Union whole but he was also a realist.


I have already discussed commerce raiding as a complete non-starter for the Union once the war has started. Where do you propose the raiders take their prizes? Where will they coal and provision? These are not rhetorical questions I want to tell me because I can see nowhere at all.

Realistically:
- The British are going to be able to a minute fraction of the damage that the Union to the CSA - especially considered pro rata to population

- You therefore either believe that Northerners are comparative cowards or that their will to fight the war is weak. Neither of these is sustainable when compared to Union casualty lists.

This is an emotive unsupported argument.

What would really happen (if the British had a reason to do something so contrary to their principals and interest) is:
- The British would have more firepower at sea

- The US would have a realistic chance of concentrating more firepower at a point and thus be able to create very severe pain for the RN on occasion.

If the USN were very lucky and got most of their big assets into a safe port (the only place worth doing this is at Fort Monroe) then for the first few weeks of the war they have a chance of hurting the local squadron once the home fleets have arrived off the coast they may just as well scuttle the ships and use the guns on the coastal forts because the Union Navy is dead. What can five steam frigates and a couple of handfuls of steam sloops and gunboats do to a fleet of steam battleships?

This has already been discussed.

- The US would be able to raid; the RN would have to convoy. This makes British exports less flexible and more expensive; business is lost.

Already discussed and you have not offered any credible counter argument. The USA cannot raid.

- Northern offensive operations on land would stop for a year or so and then re-start at a lower tempo. Northern casualties would be higher.

The Union does not have a year, really it has about six months.

- British land and sea forces throughout the Empire would be overstretched; grain prices in the UK would soar; depending on the Tsar's bunions there might be a real scarcity of bread in the UK. The UK can't count on getting grain from the Russians and, with no other source they can count on, will be extremely vulnerable to pressure from him. Why should they put themselves in this position?

The British are not going to be stretched by a war with the Union it is an affordable war that won’t even require all of the steam reserve never mind converting the sailing vessels in reserve. The logistics are easier than the Crimea. You do realise that the colonial forces in India (not part of the Royal Navy) operate more steam frigates than the USN?

I have already demonstrated that the grain market is full of cheap Union wheat from 1861 and the Russians would have no problems selling to the British, they cannot afford not to. The price of bread might rise a little.

Quite simply, the two sides would be in a contest to create each other pain until the war wasn't worth fighting for one of them anymore. And you can't say who that would be, because that worth depends on the motive for war - and the UK doesn't have one. In fact, it has a string of motives for avoiding one!

Over the Trent Affair Britain has very good reasons for fighting. This has been discussed in other threads on this board.

A lot of your logic seems to predicate that the US would fight a limited war against the UK, but that the UK would be fighting an unlimited one - i.e. one where it gave the Anti-Northern War priority over every need regardless of cost. This makes no sense at all - the UK has no motive for war, it goes against its interest and principals, and the US is defending itself - but the UK commits more than the US? This doesn't make any sense at all.

For Britain this would be a limited war broadly comparable to the Crimea, less of an effort than the Napoleonic wars. For the Union the war is self limiting, the more it fights the British the better the situation for the Confederacy and the worse for themselves.
 

frlmerrin

Banned
Response to M79 II

M79,

The British Navy is formidable but even if they could hold New Orleans, there are two problems. The CSA can not hold its largest banking/financial center without international assistance and the Cajun population is likely to have concerns about British domination, one wrong move and we get a commander loathed by the locals.

Why would the British want New Orleans if they went to war over Trent? The easiest thing for them to do, if they have to take the place is to give it to the Confederates and station a few gunboats there. In a war over the Trent Affair they are unlikely to have to do this as it will have remained in Confederate hands; the British would catch the Union in the middle of their build up for the attack. What would be interesting is the British might end up with 8-10,000 Union prisoners on Ship Island with no way of getting off. What they would do with this many prisoners I have no idea.

HOW will the USA control the CSA? The USA will be short of weapons, powder and finance half of her troops will be using muskets! Her only advantage will be in manpower but that will fade as the quality of army life fades. The CSA will have access to powder, rifle muskets, rail stock, locomotives and good artillery. So how are the Union going to go about controlling the CSA?
CSA rail infrastructure is *very* limited in 1860, and in fact one of the reasons they were so dieihard about protecting Eastern Tennessee is that only three rail links at the time connect the upper south and lower south. Nashville-Louisville, Knoxville-Virginia, and another on the Virginia side. Northern rails link as far west as the Missouri river north of Kansas City and thoroughly connect the northern states east of the Mississippi. Union rifle production will improve as the economy turns for wartime priorities, and I wonder if we do not see an earlier introduction of the Spencer rifle on a larger basis. Civilian manufacturers will be horrified and yes there will be serious concerns about what happens but there is a war on, and this is the same UK that will have battered our door three times in a century. As for locomotives, do you think the UK is simply going to provide the CSA with trains? They do not have that many when the war started and many were wood-burning 4-4-0s...

I don’t really see how this addresses my question.

I also do not see how the USA can up production of the Spencer rifle to anything like the numbers the Union army need when upping the production of the Springfield, a much simpler design took so long in OTL and they had far greater access to resources than they would have had if the Union were fighting the British. I am sure however that they would at least try.
If the blockade of the southern coast is raised, which it will be at the start of any Union war with Britain the South can sell cotton and raise bonds against it in a way they never could in OTL. They can buy locomotives from Britain, they can buy rail stock, they can buy guns and gunpowder.


There is a good chance in a Britain intervenes scenario where as people are telling me the USA refuses to yield that Washinton ends up in the CSA.

Southerners are as proud of independence as anyone else. If they find themselves under the boot of London with redcoats on the ground and having to fight their battles London *will* extract a pound of flesh in exchange. Also, remember that several areas of the South are home to pro-Union populations (Arkansas, Eastern Tennessee, Northern Georgia, parts of North Carolina/Texas, northern Western Virginia, etc.). A concerted Union effort down from LExington KY to Knoxville TN would liberate a large area and put a pro-Union state in a position to deal serious damage to the interior of the Confederacy. Sherman actually was put in a position to do just this in 1862 and I think it went wrong somewhere around Moore's Mill, KY. Reinforce that position, use the forts in western TN to occupy Confederat strategists, then take Nashville and Knoxville away.


I’m not quite sure what you are getting at here but what I was getting at is that in 1862 the defences of Washington are not that formidable. The British can send some quite large vessels up river to threaten it once they have reduced fort Monroe. There is one very well sited fort in the way but it is not that large and whilst I would expect the British to lose a couple of ships perhaps they could certainly reduce it, especially with the support of Confederate troops on the ground. Once the river is open Washington is essentially indefensible and it would fall to the Confederacy with British naval support.

There is serious coal and saltpetre in the hills along with a publication from about this time noting how to make it artificially anyway.

I’d like some reference for this if you have them.

Yes as I have discussed in some of my previous posts to amphibulous but it not nearly enough to met Union saltpetre needs.

Are you sure about that? Take Nashville TN and the largest Confederate supplier of the early war falls into Union hands. Just as it did in 1862 OTL.

Yes I am sure. The Union got through vast quantities of powder and they still had to ration it in certain respects.

It is in Georgia isn’t it? How do the Union forces get there in Feb. 1862?
Not that tough, northern GA, eastern TN, and northern AL are home to some serious pro-union populations. There is also a pocket in south-central GA not far from Augusta. See above for moving people into those areas. It also puts them within striking distance of Jackson, Montgomery, Atlanta, Memphis (assuming they have not already been taken by a Union offensive down the river). Augusta will be hotly defended but will not be invulnerable to defeat.

I don’t understand this a sympathetic civilian population is not an army?


If the French are in the war then the Union needs to worry about Plonguer a far more serious submarine than Huntly (have not checked names)

If the French are in a position to deploy the Plonger in wartime under this scenario, we've already made it to at least early 1863 and that is before sea trials. I doubt the French are also going to rush an experimental weapon into open combat, especially in the presence of the world's strongest navy and likely the major target it was designed for anyway. Either way it means the war has not ended quickly for anybody...


Fair point.


Where are all these troops coming from the Union simply does not have that many men. The Union and the British both estimated that the Union could field around 80,000 men in BNA and sustain them. How many of those do you want to send across the American Desert all the way to Mexico through hostile territory because that is all you have got?

Mexico can be dealt with later and via supplying insurgents, just as the UK can be irritated and distracted in much the same way. I've read letters from Palmerston et al who worried that the quality of UK troops in Canada was at best abysmal. Not to say that they would lack for courage, but that they were disorganized, fortifications were in dangerous states of disrepair, and there were problems with even basic logistics. The UK would probably be able to field about 10,000 troops initially, and though Halifax and Montreal might hold out, the rest of the area is like going to come under US control at least temporarily.



No I really can’t see how the Union can ‘deal with’ Mexico later unless they win against the British. Even if they win against the British (hypothetically) by the time the war is over the French will be in complete control of Mexico and it is too late.
Most of what you say regarding troops in the Province of Canada was indeed said. The local militia troops were indeed poor compared to veteran Imperial line infantry, compared to the majority of troops in the Union army in Feb 1862 those of them in the volunteers and Flank Cos. of the militia were well trained (but not as experienced of course). The forts were in poor repair the key ones were being worked on. Logistics in the end turned out to be excellent far better than expected, the British army really learned from the Crimea. Montreal is the most powerful fortification in North America, Halifax cannot be taken unless the Union controls the New England and New Brunswick coasts (look at it on a map). As I said in my post to amphibulous the Union would be insane advancing beyond Kingston as it would be too easy for the Royal Navy to cut the expedition off from the Union.


No, they burn something important and go back to their ships for tea, did it all the time in European wars


The UK recognized that the US would be a unique enemy for them to deal with because we could supply a lot of our own needs internally. This means their naval blockade will be able to do damage but not bring us to our knees the way it can with almost any other country. Yes, the British can burn down buildings or raid cities or even mints, but inevitably they will have to put *large* numbers of people on the ground in order to hold territory and ultimately win the war. Ireland, India, and other Imperial subject will be watching, and if London is amassing manpower in one place look for trouble to start elsewhere.


The USA was by no means a unique enemy, it was just like the Russian Empire during the Crimean war but fortunately smaller. The Union domestic economy can no longer supply her internal needs during the ACW. Your statement was true in 1812 but certainly not in 1862.

It would not be difficult to send plans for designs or technical assistance elsewhere during the war via spies and saboteurs. Bahadur Shah II is still alive in Burma, the crowned Mughal Emporer and a figure for leadership in the Indian Mutiny which id *very* fresh in the minds of India. Ireland is not terribly far away and terror-driven attacks will be problematic, especially after the very poor treatment recieved by the Irish over the last two decades with plenty of Irish living in Northern cities at the time. The (Boer) South African Republic is tired of British interference and would like its lands around the Cape Colony back, or if nothing else to be left alone. They are also sitting on one of the world's richest diamond deposits though that will not be known for another few years. Again, when the cat is away...

Technical assistance? What army officers, cannon founders? It would even be hard to get spies and saboteurs out of the blockade. I think this one is unworkable. You forget that in the mid 19th Irish nationalism was a completely middle class pass-time most of the country wanted no part of it. That the Indian mutiny only happened in part of one of the three administrative regions of Indian and that the British response was so savage that no one is yet thinking about another. Cape colony has a big Royal Navy station, not much is going to happen there.
 
If you doubt me consider the action of the Huascar against Shah and Amethyst, a frigate and corvette respectively. Huascar was a formidable ad successful breast work ironclad brilliantly commanded, she was better armed and armoured and had better engines than a monitor. She spent the whole of the engagement seeking shoal water and trying to escape because she could not match the guns of the British.


The British expended 16 tons of ammunition and killed 1 Peruvian. The battle was a draw. The Huascar tried to move into shoal water due to her opponent's deeper draft. She did not spend the whole battle running and made multiple attempts to ram the British ships.[/quote]


 

frlmerrin

Banned
Fiver,

Your second reference is the best acount of the action I have seen but unfortunately Google books won't let me see all of it. Thank you for bringing it to my attention.

I have seen nothing in the account to suggest that she did not spend most of the engagment running for the shoals. Indeed there are references to protecting her stern from British gunfire. However there are several pages you may have seen that I have not.

I have seen nothing in your reference to suggest that my claims about how the British would engage Monitor/a monitor. Remember also that Huascar was a fast ram and monitors were slow rafts so the opposing forces would feel more comfortable in closing the range.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
The British expended 16 tons of ammunition and killed 1 Peruvian. The battle was a draw. The Huascar tried to move into shoal water due to her opponent's deeper draft. She did not spend the whole battle running and made multiple attempts to ram the British ships.

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Not quite.

It's important to note this is a well built (breastwork monitor taken on by two unarmoured cruisers. She should have smashed them. She was a very powerful ship for her size.

Shah expended 32 9" RML (2 common shell, 11 palliser shell and 19 palliser shot), 149 7" (4 common shell, remainder palliser shot) and 56 64 pdr common shell. Amethyst fired 190 64 pdr common shell.

Huascar ran for her life, which saved her. The British shooting, most at ranges of ~ 1 mile was deadly (against a target maneuvring violently at 11 kts) and about a quarter of the 427 rounds expended hit Huascar. Her upperworks were utterly riddled - so much so that the number of hits there need to be estimated as the structure was so utterly shredded. Six rounds hit the armour belt (a very small target, the hull presented only a 3 feet target out of the waterline) at the stern, but all at oblique angles. Only one of these six (a 9" common shell fired in the first salvo to clear the guns) penetrated, creating four casualties.

Huascar herself was practically unfightable and certainly no longer a viable unit after the encounter.

Huascar has a far more powerful fighting unit that any Monitor the US ever Commissioned. She is faster, better protected and better armed than any of them, combined with much better seakeeping and being a much steadier gun platform (and not being handicapped by an Ericcson turret but a much better Coles type).

What is clear is that the Huascar ran away and surrendered to the authorities rather than fight the British again. It was a British victory, albeit less of one than the Admiralty would have liked - at least as much as the Battle of the River Plate was a British victory.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
For a start, the ones I linked - e.g. Lt Colonel Freemantle's book. If I failed to provide a source for eg the size of the British expeditionary force to the Crimea, google should take care of that for you.

Unfortunately you don't have a grounding in the period.

In 1854 the British Army has just starting to come out of a long period of decline brought about by the long peace. The Army had dwindled to about 80,000 infantry and cavalry (sans India), and after other commitments it was able to send 32,000 (inc. ordnance) immediately. Note Grant's claim that at Shiloh he only had 33,000 effectives (and only 25,000 after a number ran away). By the standards of the ACW this is a respectable force.

However, this was not by any means "it". The British cycled over 100,000 infantry and cavalry through the Crimea by means of further units and individual reinforcements.

The initial landings were by 34 infantry regiments, 10 cavalry regiments all at 2 sqn strength and leaving only 8 line and 4 guards battalions in the UK. The expeditionary force is reinforced over the winter of 1854-5 by 7 of the 8 line battalions in the UK (the 51st is still recruiting back to strength) and 12 of the 18 regiments in the Med stations. Their stations are taken by mobilisation of Militia units (which are "part time regulars" in UK service*, not like US militia). With reinforcements from depots in the three months late September-December 1854 (and the 18th from India) ~ 60,000 infantry are landed in the Crimea. 54 infantry battalions and 14 cavalry regiments served in the Eastern Army.

In 1861 the British simply have a much larger army. Nearly 160,000 (exc/ India) in the same state as the 80,000 that provided ~60,000 within a few months in 1854. Foreign commitments have not changed, excluding India the British need 20,000 regulars plus the mobilised militia. The British have nearly 140,000 men, or about 120,000 after China and NZ are accounted for (those force can't really be moved). The plan was for 75,000 men to deploy to defend Canada (in five army corps of the organisation created after the Crimean) which would raised ~100,000 militia immediately. After the thaw the US invader is facing an army of 175,000 on her northern border. Along the Maine-NB border are another 20,000 regulars and the NS and NB militia (~40,000 strong). In sheer numbers the army they are facing has more men in the field than the Confederacy.

* Of the 120,000 militia, 40,000 volunteered for the regular army and were posted accordingly. The same would happen again in 1861-5.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
One thing to remember about New Ironsides - the steering didn't work at speed.

After her debacle at Charleston New Ironsides was always anchored in position ahead of time and used as a floating battery in the classical rather than early ironclad (because that word doesn't exist until 1861) sense. Impressive on paper. Useless as an actual man-o-war because of a fatal flaw.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
3. Green troops are green, they aren't useless... the trained core of the British army is tiny AND there are US troops who are gaining experience on how to shoot forward in the already ongoing war against the CSA, experience that will work on ANY battlefield when facing an army equipped similarly. Anyways the Brits from Canada are already traveling through virgin wilderness, their logistical train is going to be a nightmare and a half and they are going to be fighting an offensive against doubtlessly well prepared positions. This isn't Sevastopol, where supplies can come in through shipping for the Brits... they can for the Union though.

The "trained core" is about 360,000 regulars, militia (trained as per regulars and released back to do 1 month refresher training every year) and reservists.

The British will supply by sea or river. They aren't fighting in the backwoods of Alberta....

5. Easy... are we seriously going back to 67th Tigers land here!? But if you're seriously going to assert that the UK would have an easy task I'm just going to have to reply with "Yeah sure, whatever." But here's a hint, the side that is defending their homes is going to be a whole lot less casualty averse than the side that has to try and justify EVERY body bag since it is fighting on behalf of a nation that practices a morally repugnant system to the vast majority of its populace.

Easy in the way the Iraqis were easy in 1991.

Take musketry. In typical ACW battles it takes 200 rounds fired to inflict one casualty, normally at below 100 yards. In the Crimea we find the British achieving hit rates as high as 1 in 16, and hitting targets at 800 yards sometimes.

US brigade of 1,000 muskets faces a British regiment of 1,000 muskets at 100 yards. The British hit with say 1 in 20 and the US say 1 in 200. Assume equal RoF.

After the 22nd volley 958 British troops look over 1,000 US casualties.

More realistically the US will break after 4 or 5 volleys with 2-300 casualties while the Brits have suffered ~25.

That's Lanchester's Square Law.

7. And everything we'ree debating is ignoring the huge elephant in the room, whose name is disease, the fact that every army at war suffered greater losses to it than direct casualties. The CSA inflicted 30% of the Union's casualties, disease killed the other 70%... For the Brits in the Crimean, if the internet is to be believed, they suffered 77% of their casualties from disease... and that's with an open supply line across the Black Sea! So... yeah... if a soldier comes down with the flu, or cholera, or tuberculosis and dies it really doesn't matter how well trained he is. And if you aree going to put forth the supposition that the Brits were so superior in quality as compared to the Union that a small 'limited war' force could decisively beat a much larger Union force such that attrition from disease and exposure are overcome, a Union force that is on the defensive, as it would be in an invasion from Canada scenario, you're really going to have to back that up with solid and convincing evidence.

The problem with the Crimean as fighting in an area with endemic cholera. Canada is one of the healthiest stations the British have troops in with a 1% annual death rate. So 75,000 men can expect for 750 to die from disease annually. See http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=ECmD6GQNk8oC&pg=PA123

What is true is that long service regulars get sick only half as much as new troops (i.e. Americans, Canadian militia etc.). The US death rate from disease was around 10% annually of their actual strength.
 
If the blockade of the southern coast is raised, which it will be at the start of any Union war with Britain the South can sell cotton and raise bonds against it in a way they never could in OTL. They can buy locomotives from Britain, they can buy rail stock, they can buy guns and gunpowder.

Confederate infrastructure was already so stressed it couldn’t properly get food to all of its population. Ending the Union blockade will take time. Breaking it at one point will help that part of the Confederacy, but not the whole country. Selling cotton helps plantation owners, but tariffs are on imports, not exports. It’s going to take a while for that money to start trickling into their coffers, and even then it will be dwarfed by their rate of spending.

I’m not quite sure what you are getting at here but what I was getting at is that in 1862 the defences of Washington are not that formidable. The British can send some quite large vessels up river to threaten it once they have reduced fort Monroe.

Keep in mind British ships will have to have shallow enough draft to make it over Kettle Bottom shoals. And risk mines. A coordinated advance with Confederate troops could take Washington, but the Confederates are going to need supplies, especially if it becomes a siege.

The Union got through vast quantities of powder and they still had to ration it in certain respects.

I haven’t seen any evidence of the Union needing to ration powder. They certainly would if the British got involved, of course.

I don’t understand this a sympathetic civilian population is not an army?

I think his point is Union war commitment will be much higher if the British intervene. That translates into more recruiting, less desertion. The Copperheads evaporate as a movement. Most Irish back the war.

No I really can’t see how the Union can ‘deal with’ Mexico later unless they win against the British. Even if they win against the British (hypothetically) by the time the war is over the French will be in complete control of Mexico and it is too late.

I doubt French control in Mexico would be secure for a long time. That said, the Union having to fight the Confederacy and Britain guarantees they will be far too war weary at the end of the ACW to consider intervening in Mexico.

There is a chance of beating the British, though. During the Trent Crisis the British commander in North America was William Fenwick Williams. His largest independent combat command was less than 20,000 at the Siege of Kars. Cholera and famine finished off about 1/3rd of William's force and he surrendered the rest. This failure was so far above average British performance in the Crimean War that Williams received a title, a pension, a promotion, a seat in Parliament, an honorary degree from Oxford, and several medals.

Williams appears to have been eager for a fight with the Union, though at the same time he also appears to have believed the South would win without British intervention. In 1861, Williams was already being described as “a worn out old roué who might get the 10,000 men the Iron Duke spoke of into Hyde Park, but who never could get them out again.” Garnet Wolseley, then on the quartermaster’s staff for Canada thought the task was well beyond Williams’ ability.

Between Williams eagerness and inadequacy for the task I can see him leading a force of about 30,000 (half of it ill-equipped and untrained militia) in an invasion of the US. The Union should easily be able to meet them with a force of comparable size, and presuming the Union commander is equal or better than Ambrose Burnside, the British should fare about as well as the Confederates did in New Mexico.

British chances improve if the rigors of the campaign prove too much for the old man, but his best subordinates appear to be on the quartermaster’s staff and none seem to have commanded a force of this size, let alone in combat.

Most of what you say regarding troops in the Province of Canada was indeed said. The local militia troops were indeed poor compared to veteran Imperial line infantry, compared to the majority of troops in the Union army in Feb 1862 those of them in the volunteers and Flank Cos. of the militia were well trained (but not as experienced of course).

General Doyle complained much of the Canadian militia existed only on paper and the legislatures refused to provide proper funding. Thanks to persistent efforts by Doyle the Canadian militia finally received a week of training in summer of 1864.

The USA was by no means a unique enemy, it was just like the Russian Empire during the Crimean war but fortunately smaller.

Just like the Russian Army – except the Union had better strategy, tactics, training, morale, leadership, command, intelligence, arms, equipment, supply, medicine, and sanitation. ;)

The Union domestic economy can no longer supply her internal needs during the ACW.

The Union can easily continue to support its domestic economy even if blockaded by Britain. It can still support most of its military needs as well, but powder would be a serious problem.

You forget that in the mid 19th Irish nationalism was a completely middle class pass-time most of the country wanted no part of it.

The potato famine made it a good deal more than a “middle class pass-time”.

That the Indian mutiny only happened in part of one of the three administrative regions of Indian and that the British response was so savage that no one is yet thinking about another.

And the memory is so fresh that the British only pulled significant troops out of India during the Great War and even then they kept a lot more there than they did pre-Mutiny.

I note that the Union built almost no railway miles during the ACW and had problems finding enough rail stock to repair the track they did have.

You note incorrectly. In 1861 the Union built 651 miles of track, 1831 miles in 1862, 1450 miles in 1863, 738 miles in 1864, and 1177 miles in 1865. Some of this was the world's first transcontinental railroad, which by law. had to be built only with American-made rails. This was not a problem - the Union produced 190,000 tons of rails just in 1861.
 
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Easy in the way the Iraqis were easy in 1991.

Take musketry. In typical ACW battles it takes 200 rounds fired to inflict one casualty, normally at below 100 yards. In the Crimea we find the British achieving hit rates as high as 1 in 16, and hitting targets at 800 yards sometimes.

US brigade of 1,000 muskets faces a British regiment of 1,000 muskets at 100 yards. The British hit with say 1 in 20 and the US say 1 in 200. Assume equal RoF.

After the 22nd volley 958 British troops look over 1,000 US casualties.

More realistically the US will break after 4 or 5 volleys with 2-300 casualties while the Brits have suffered ~25.

That's Lanchester's Square Law.

That's a vast overstatement. The UK will defeat the USA when it's forced to fight it and the CSA at the same time with ease, but it won't be a simple or quick process. The idea that US armies would break like this also is a bit frankly untrue and insulting. CS armies were willing to attack by throwing stones at the Union in the West, US Armies will be no *less* willing to attack than the CS armies were.
 
The "trained core" is about 360,000 regulars, militia (trained as per regulars and released back to do 1 month refresher training every year) and reservists.

Does that count the estimated 20,000 desertions per year?:D

US brigade of 1,000 muskets faces a British regiment of 1,000 muskets at 100 yards. The British hit with say 1 in 20 and the US say 1 in 200. Assume equal RoF.

After the 22nd volley 958 British troops look over 1,000 US casualties.

Even if we accept your completely unsupported accuracy numbers, it takes a lot less than 22 volleys to close 100 yards.:rolleyes:

The problem with the Crimean as fighting in an area with endemic cholera. Canada is one of the healthiest stations the British have troops in with a 1% annual death rate. So 75,000 men can expect for 750 to die from disease annually. See http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=ECmD6GQNk8oC&pg=PA123

Thanks for the link. While the death rate was certainly low, it shows hospitalization rates of about 59% each year. And once you have more than tens of thousands of troops (instead of a couple thousand) in the same location (instead of the whole of Canada) and on campaign (instead of barracks), they'll lose a lot more to illness.[/QUOTE]
 

The idea that Union’s efforts to put a modestly sized army into the field against the Confederacy is in anyway comparable to the effort expended by Britain, a very wealthy country in fighting the Napoleonic wars is laughable. What is of note is that the effort as a fraction of national wealth required of the Union just to defeat the confederacy was enormous far greater than the fraction of British national wealth expended on fighting Napoleon. The USA stayed in debt over the American Civil War until the first world war.


The Confederacy was the size of Western Europe. When it came to serious fighting in Europe as in both world wars, the UK left it to other societies to raise large armies for mobile operations. It did not have the capability to do so, nor the necessity so long as Russia, Prussia, and Austria were willing to do the bleeding and dying for it. The force sent in 1914 was equivalent in size to the force in 1814, so so much for British progress in 100 years. /snerk.

By destroy I mean wreck the economy, cause a depression, cause famine, wreck the personal fortunes of the merchant classes, destroy waterside fortifications, warehouses and factories, take the government gold and silver from California, take the American whaling fleet and reflag or take the American merchant fleet. Maybe capture Nantucket and Martha’s Vineyard.

I think your suggestion that Lincoln would fight on to the utter destitution of his country rather unfair, he may have been a fanatic to keep the Union whole but he was also a realist.


If such is the British concept of a "limited war", why does the Union *want* to surrender? This is the approach that leads to Sino-Japanese War scenarios as the losing side has no reason whatsoever to seriously surrender. The UK anticipating the IJA in China against white people will be as bad for it as the Second Boer War was. Victorian Double-Standards tie the British as much as fighting the CSA does the USA.

The British are not going to be stretched by a war with the Union it is an affordable war that won’t even require all of the steam reserve never mind converting the sailing vessels in reserve. The logistics are easier than the Crimea. You do realise that the colonial forces in India (not part of the Royal Navy) operate more steam frigates than the USN?

I have already demonstrated that the grain market is full of cheap Union wheat from 1861 and the Russians would have no problems selling to the British, they cannot afford not to. The price of bread might rise a little.


This would be the war in the Crimea where the British showed abysmal logistics against a Russia armed with 18th Century weaponry? The Union army's not the latter-day Mongol-style Marty Tzus its apologists rhapsodize it as, but let's hardly say that Inkerman indicates the British are extremely good here, either. And if London does what you and Tigger say it will, then the UK will never get a negotiated peace signed by any self-respecting US government.

For Britain this would be a limited war broadly comparable to the Crimea, less of an effort than the Napoleonic wars. For the Union the war is self limiting, the more it fights the British the better the situation for the Confederacy and the worse for themselves.

To be sure, yes. But to claim that burning entire cities in the Victorian Age with those cities inhabited by white people will be acceptable is blinkered stupidity. This would be seen as the Second Boer War on steroids.
 
M79,


The USA was by no means a unique enemy, it was just like the Russian Empire during the Crimean war but fortunately smaller. The Union domestic economy can no longer supply her internal needs during the ACW. Your statement was true in 1812 but certainly not in 1862.



This would be the Russian enemy who had real fights from the French of Napoleon III, and a dreary litany of incompetence and logistics failures from the British? Inkerman and Baklava are not great testaments to British strengths. The Union Army doesn't gain the ability to conquer the world from defeating the CSA the way people put it as doing and the British are more grounded in a proper war than it is, but I fail to see where the Crimea shows the British army as anything strong in itself.

As with the USA against the CSA defeating the Union would be relatively unimpressive and be a triumph of professional soldiers against raw armies of inexperienced troops, no more and no less.
 
I might note for those that use the British in the Crimea and Zulu War as an example that the one war the British fought against a European-style army in this timeframe, the First Boer War, ended in an inglorious defeat. While against Russia most of the biggest and most effective fighting on land was done by the future victors of Solferino, who also had by far superior medical-logistical features, to the point of actually compensating for British failings in both. It's one thing to claim that the British did well against tribesmen with oxhide shields (and in fact they had to revive the concept of squares to defeat them, not use more modern tactics), it's another to claim against armies in the style of linear warfare that they'd do well.

The Union admittedly loses the war when the CSA is recognized as an independent country without a shot being fired, and is in the position of Imperial Japan in 1941, but Imperial Japan still had to be fought in some bloody and unpleasant processes. And if we go by the *Second* Boer War that indicates again that against European-style armies the UK was not exactly the greatest and most efficient army of all time.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
This would be the Russian enemy who had real fights from the French of Napoleon III, and a dreary litany of incompetence and logistics failures from the British? Inkerman and Baklava are not great testaments to British strengths. The Union Army doesn't gain the ability to conquer the world from defeating the CSA the way people put it as doing and the British are more grounded in a proper war than it is, but I fail to see where the Crimea shows the British army as anything strong in itself.

As with the USA against the CSA defeating the Union would be relatively unimpressive and be a triumph of professional soldiers against raw armies of inexperienced troops, no more and no less.

This is the same Inkerman where 7,000 British troops and 2,000 French, reinforced late in the battle by another 6,000 French held off some 60,000 Russians?

It's an interesting battle for another reason. It is the first battle where riflemen suppress artillery at long range (800 yds).

Balaklava? The battle where 25,000 Russians could not make headway against 1,000 British cavalry, 500 infantry and a couple of thousand Turks?

The Russians were armed with modern weapons for 1854-6. The general issue infantry weapon in 1853 was the M1845 (or a variant) percussion musket and issued the Nessler ball as standard which gave no effective difference from the 1st gen rifle-musket at 200 yds. By the time of the Crimean war the M1854 Minie rifle-musket was already being issued. Their artillery arm was modern for the time, and the breechloading Dreyse rifle was also on issue to rifle units.

The British Army was probably man for man the best army in the world. The Crimean War exposed the failings that had developed during the long peace and none of these applied in the early 1860's.

Boer Wars? The first Boer war a minor police action in which the Boers possessed all the advantages of position, entrenchment and strength (they outnumbered the British in all engagements). The second was a disaster for the Boers - after their initial numerical advantage failed to make an impact the British banged up 14 divisions and took the Boer republics in a few months. After that it was pacification rather than war.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
Even if we accept your completely unsupported accuracy numbers, it takes a lot less than 22 volleys to close 100 yards.:rolleyes:
[/QUOTE]

Because the Union infantry was really good at making attaques du preste? :eek:

The accuracy numbers are well known. Strachan reports 1 in 16 hits (ref) with rifles. Various calculations for the ACW estimate between 1 in 1,000 and 1 in 68 (the former being Sherman's army in the Atlanta campaign and the latter being Gaines Mill where the fighting was very close).

In fact if a Union infantry brigade attacked a British infantry regiment I imagine that they be forced to go to ground 3-400 yds off the objective and simply soak up casualties. The Union simply didn't indulge in rifle training, and neither did the Confederacy until 1863-4.
 
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