Realistic CSA victory timeline

Wellington's Legacy: The Reform of British Army 1830-1854 by Hew Strachen states on page 158 that..."Although effective musketry training had only just begun to be adopted, its impact in the Crimea was immediate. At the battle of Vittoria in 1813, one bullet in - at the best - 459 took effect; at the Alma and Inkerman one in sixteen."

That's a heck of an improvement but it leaves out some crucial information. Is that 1 - in - 16 of bullets fired? Or distributed to troops? If Tigers number of 199,820 bullets used or lost is correct than Britain alone inflicted 12,489 casualties. As British forces composed only 53% of the allied troops on the field this means they must have inflicted near 100% of the casualties suffered by the Russians at Inkerman. This must be news to the 7,500 French soldiers that fought there.

As per Tigers' own website the Union Army expended about 1,300,000 rounds of ammunition during the three days at Gettysburg (and also including some post battle skirmishing). Given that the Confederates took about 23,300 casualties this gives us an estimate of about 56 rounds fired per casualty inflicted.

A Slightly Odd View of the American Civil War

Neither set of numbers factors in lost ammunition, those who stack multiple rounds in their rifle, and other factors not accounting for rounds misused.

So even if we go with the high end Russian casualties (16,000) at Inkerman and assume that British troops inflicted 2/3 of those casualties ~10,700 than this means that the British expanded ~171,000 rounds (or hit with every 1 - in - 18.7 rounds expended per Tigers number of 199,820). If we go with the low end of about 11,000 Russian casualties and Britain inflicted ~55% of those casualties (6,050 casualties inflicted by the British) than we get a wholly different set of numbers (96,000 rounds expended or one casualty per 33 rounds fired). Furthermore I'm not taking into account artillery casualties so its likely both Union and British rifleman were worse shots than the numbers may say.

Either way if Union troops hit with 1 in 56 shots and the British with 1 in 16 than that's a huge difference but almost certainly an inaccurate simplification that ignores so many other factors and 1 in 33 is less of a difference. Too many of these arguments assume that neither side, but especially the Union it seems, can adapt and learn. Contemporaries in Britain greatly feared a war in the US. They feared loosing Canada. Despite grand plans by the RN, they feared how their deep draft ironclads would far in coastal waters against monitors. They feared the miserable affects of rifle fire against massed troops and charging cavalry. And they feared campaigning across vast tracks of land where in the past victory had previously been quite elusive.

In a Trent Affair sparked intervention Britain will almost certainly win, but it's not assured and it wouldn't be fun.

Benjamin
 
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Add in the limits of sending forces by sea, and it becomes clear that breaking the US blockade and blockading the US itself will likely be the main focus of the British war effort. Of course, this requires the British to actually care enough to launch a war over the affair, and despite the assertions made that they could, I fail to be convinced.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
I have issues with the Vittoria figure.

Gettysburg is interesting. Excluding captured unwounded you'd get 1 in 75 hit assuming all were musket wounds. However Gettysburg has a lot of very good artillery shoots for the Federals. From the graves we can estimate 2/3rds-3/4ths the *dead* in Pickett's charge were felled by artillery. Hunt claimed his artillery alone broke the charge, and I tend to agree with him.

The Federal artillery fired ~36,000 shots at the Confederates during the whole battle. To get an estimate of artillery effectiveness one had best look at the killed to wounded ratio, 1:2.7 at Gettysburg for the Confederates - a very high figure implying a lot of artillery hits (Stones River is about 1:6.1 and more typical, whereas even the artillery dominated Malvern Hill is 1:4.9). From this perspective the Federal artillery was incredibly effective and appears to dominate the causes of Confederate casualties.
 
Yet at Stones River Rosecrans reported only 1 musket/ rifle shot in 145 hit something and only 1 artillery round in 27 (common knowledge, but to prevent you simply going "cite" see pg 208 of Catton's "This Hallow Ground" - first google hit).

Grant was not a believer in marksmanship one iota. In April 1864 Meade (not Grant) found 10 rounds per man for practice. However the stress was not on marksmanship, but on drill. Large numbers of men were found to be unable to load and fire their muskets, and this needed rectifying. I suspect this is a case of "marksmanship = good" and "Grant = good" therefore "Grant = marksmanship" - but there is a complete lack of evidence Grant was in the slightest concerned about marksmanship.

Of course the most concerned about shooting was McClellan, because he'd seen what the British had done to the Russians. Indeed so much musketry practice was occurring that regiments in the areas of Balls Bluff did not intervene because the battle was taken as daily practice! See his first general order to the Army of the Potomac issued 4th August 1861 (pgs 76-8 of Sears' "Papers").

A slightly deceptive analysis, as parts of Stone's River were decided by the artillery, not small arms, meaning that in some cases when soldiers don't fire or hit anything it's because infantry wasn't needed: artillery sufficed. This analysis also applies to all other battles in all wars where these statistics exist, sometimes there may not be shots fired because battles are won by artillery. I expect, however, such nuance means nothing in these discussions which rely on falsehoods, opinions, and outright lies about events accepted by reputable historians at the expense of evidence.

I of course would like a citation that Meade had anything to do with this, given if he had done so it would have been earlier than 1864, as Meade was by all means competent but I expect no citations other than your say-so will be forthcoming.

Oh, and your use of Sears as a source given other statements about him is both interesting and revealing here. It seems you have a very selective use of what sources you consider acceptable or not-acceptable.
 
I have issues with the Vittoria figure.

Gettysburg is interesting. Excluding captured unwounded you'd get 1 in 75 hit assuming all were musket wounds. However Gettysburg has a lot of very good artillery shoots for the Federals. From the graves we can estimate 2/3rds-3/4ths the *dead* in Pickett's charge were felled by artillery. Hunt claimed his artillery alone broke the charge, and I tend to agree with him.

The Federal artillery fired ~36,000 shots at the Confederates during the whole battle. To get an estimate of artillery effectiveness one had best look at the killed to wounded ratio, 1:2.7 at Gettysburg for the Confederates - a very high figure implying a lot of artillery hits (Stones River is about 1:6.1 and more typical, whereas even the artillery dominated Malvern Hill is 1:4.9). From this perspective the Federal artillery was incredibly effective and appears to dominate the causes of Confederate casualties.

Only one Civil War battle was actually decided by artillery alone: Malvern Hill. Most Civil War battles were infantry fights, cavalry was not used well by either side, and artillery was seldom able to be employed due to both terrain and contingency, adding to this the usual poor use of it made by quite a few generals in the war, Lee included. However the other side of artillery dominating battles is that if artillery dominates battles, why does infantry *need* to shoot or hit anything?
 
Just to slightly distract from the debate and chuck my two cents in I have to say I can only see one scenario in which the Union is unable to put a crushing blow on the Confederacy and for the Confederacy to win the war and be recognized.

1. The Confederates must win the battle of Shiloh, this is an undeniable advantage in the West and will give them some breathing room in comparison to the Union who will then be reeling from losses in the East.

2. Lee's orders cannot fall into McClellans hands. Without these McClellan would have been taken by surprise and defeated. Worse, he would have still been in command of Union forces and probably be decisively defeated at a different battle of Gettysburg after the preceeding battle.

3. With these victories showing the Confederacy is able to hold their own both Britain and France would have the confidence to recognize the Confederacy as a sovereign nation. Britian would offer diplomatic support, which would most likely mean leaning on the Union to break the blockade. France is the only power I can see offering direct support (troops or attacking Union warships), if only because of its involvement in Mexico.

This would provide a Confederate 'victory' of sorts. But it is dependant on two factors, one is the overiding incompetance of the Union leadership (which up until 1863 it was a miracle that they had not lost the war) and a relatively unbroken string of Confederate victories.

If Lincoln is also defeated in the 1884 election then there will be nothing stopping an independent Confederacy as no Northen politician will want to lean on them for fear of reprisal from foreign powers.

EDIT: Yes the Confederacy is defeated in 1883 :p
 
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Just to slightly distract from the debate and chuck my two cents in I have to say I can only see one scenario in which the Union is unable to put a crushing blow on the Confederacy and for the Confederacy to win the war and be recognized.

1. The Confederates must win the battle of Shiloh, this is an undeniable advantage in the West and will give them some breathing room in comparison to the Union who will then be reeling from losses in the East.

2. Lee's orders cannot fall into McClellans hands. Without these McClellan would have been taken by surprise and defeated. Worse, he would have still been in command of Union forces and probably be decisively defeated at a different battle of Gettysburg after the preceeding battle.

3. With these victories showing the Confederacy is able to hold their own both Britain and France would have the confidence to recognize the Confederacy as a sovereign nation. Britian would offer diplomatic support, which would most likely mean leaning on the Union to break the blockade. France is the only power I can see offering direct support (troops or attacking Union warships), if only because of its involvement in Mexico.

This would provide a Confederate 'victory' of sorts. But it is dependant on two factors, one is the overiding incompetance of the Union leadership (which up until 1883 it was a miracle that they had not lost the war) and a relatively unbroken string of Confederate victories.

If Lincoln is also defeated in the 1884 election then there will be nothing stopping an independent Confederacy as no Northen politician will want to lean on them for fear of reprisal from foreign powers.

A better case for a relatively late war scenario victory is Chattanooga with just the right combination of ill-luck for the Union and Bragg keeping his army immobile on the high ground as the Army of the Cumberland starves. I think your dates need editing....;)
 
I have issues with the Vittoria figure.

Gettysburg is interesting. Excluding captured unwounded you'd get 1 in 75 hit assuming all were musket wounds. However Gettysburg has a lot of very good artillery shoots for the Federals. From the graves we can estimate 2/3rds-3/4ths the *dead* in Pickett's charge were felled by artillery. Hunt claimed his artillery alone broke the charge, and I tend to agree with him.

The Federal artillery fired ~36,000 shots at the Confederates during the whole battle. To get an estimate of artillery effectiveness one had best look at the killed to wounded ratio, 1:2.7 at Gettysburg for the Confederates - a very high figure implying a lot of artillery hits (Stones River is about 1:6.1 and more typical, whereas even the artillery dominated Malvern Hill is 1:4.9). From this perspective the Federal artillery was incredibly effective and appears to dominate the causes of Confederate casualties.

While I can't comment on the Vittoria figure one way or the other, I would say all of the statistics put forth by various sources (including official government sources) are questionable. Even now new evidence is pointing to the distinct possibility that Civil War casualties numbered as high as 200,000 more than previously thought. So really all of these old casualty lists and ammunition expenditure records may be completely false.

That being said I can buy that British soldiers had a hit ratio nearly twice as high as their Union counter parts. But really what good will that do them in the long run? As you've already said artillery is the key so that may not be as big of factor. Also I'd say Union cavalry would quickly become as good as British cavalry given the near uselessness of charges against prepared infantry. Furthermore the vast majority of the British force to both attack and defend with will be recently recruited Canadian militia. I'd say on a one-to-one basis they'd on par with the greenest of Union troops for a the first few battles. What does this give the British...a small force of regulars that have to move through hostile territory at the end of a very long supply line while trying to engage a veteran force backed by one of the world's most industrialized economies and arguably the most able logistical supply system yet seen in warfare.

Like I said...Britain will win, but it won't be pretty.

Benjamin
 
Only one Civil War battle was actually decided by artillery alone: Malvern Hill. Most Civil War battles were infantry fights, cavalry was not used well by either side, and artillery was seldom able to be employed due to both terrain and contingency, adding to this the usual poor use of it made by quite a few generals in the war, Lee included. However the other side of artillery dominating battles is that if artillery dominates battles, why does infantry *need* to shoot or hit anything?

2nd Spotsylvania, May 19th, 1864.

After the bloody angle affair of May 12, Grant spent a week trying to outsmart Lee and get around one or both of his flanks. Lee parries with Anderson and the 1st corps moving from Laurel Hill to the right flank to anchor on the Po River. Lee sends Ewell to counterstrike Grant's right flank behind the Ni River, Grant counters with the newly arrived heavy artillery units of the 2nd corps. It's a fascinating chess match and both Generals performed overall well but both with a few hitches.

Finally, Grant decides to "one more time" try a direct frontal attack. He sends in almost exactly the same force he did on the 12th (the 2nd and 6th corps), against almost exactly the same Conferate defensive force (Ewell's corps), in almost exactly the same place (Ewell's new line runs straight along the base of the Mule Shoe salient - not a salient so tactically better, but slightly lower ground).

But this time, Ewell has his artillery with him, unlike the 12th. In the pre-dawn assault he inflicts something like 2,000 casualties on the Federals, and they never come remotely close to breaking his line anywhere. (Source, To the North Anna River by Gordon C. Rhea) Grant then gave up frontal attacks for about 2 weeks until Cold Harbor.

So not only was this affair (perhaps not big enough to be called a "battle" but still big) decided by artillery alone, but conversely one can then argue that Spotsylvania proper was decided by lack of artillery alone.

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Then depending on how well/twisted-ly one wants to argue, any or all of the following were decided primarily by artillery and thus should be counted (since even Malvern Hill had infanty present): 1st Bull Run, 2nd Bull Run, Fredericksburg, Gettysburg day 3, Chickasaw Bluffs, Stone's River day 2, Chattanooga, Franklin, Fort Stedman.

I'm not going to argue for any of them, but they're something to consider.

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Oh, and wasn't this thread oringinally about how the Confederacy could win and the related question of with how late a PoD this could happen? Not "The British were this that and the other thing, and would/would not curbstomp the US if they attacked"?

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EDIT: Thank you recent posts.

My own view is that by Chattanooga proper the Confederates have already lost their momentum, and Bragg will never ever EVER get it back if left to his own devices. Either he strikes for the city on the 21st of September, or more likely, does better at Chickamauga and thus actually can effectively starve/otherwise defeat the AotC by expending no more effort than what he did OTL.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
While I can't comment on the Vittoria figure one way or the other, I would say all of the statistics put forth by various sources (including official government sources) are questionable. Even now new evidence is pointing to the distinct possibility that Civil War casualties numbered as high as 200,000 more than previously thought. So really all of these old casualty lists and ammunition expenditure records may be completely false.

That being said I can buy that British soldiers had a hit ratio nearly twice as high as their Union counter parts. But really what good will that do them in the long run? As you've already said artillery is the key so that may not be as big of factor. Also I'd say Union cavalry would quickly become as good as British cavalry given the near uselessness of charges against prepared infantry. Furthermore the vast majority of the British force to both attack and defend with will be recently recruited Canadian militia. I'd say on a one-to-one basis they'd on par with the greenest of Union troops for a the first few battles. What does this give the British...a small force of regulars that have to move through hostile territory at the end of a very long supply line while trying to engage a veteran force backed by one of the world's most industrialized economies and arguably the most able logistical supply system yet seen in warfare.

Like I said...Britain will win, but it won't be pretty.

Benjamin

Actually the story of the Union cavalry is the other way. They actually became far more capable during the war and by 1864-5 were delivering shock charges to rival most European nations (except maybe Austria with their superb cavalry arm). Earlier Minty's Brigade was famous for their ability to deliver sabre charges where no other Union formation could, but Minty was an ex-British regular and knew it worked whilst many other commanders doctrinally rejected as "suicidal".

The reason the Confederate cavalry dominated the Union cavalry until ~1864 was that neither side was truly "cavalry". The Confederates with proper infantry weapons could simply outshoot the Federals, even if they had repeaters (the increased effect of the repeater being vastly overstated because there were no detachable magazines and rounds were fed in as slowly as a normal breechloader). By 1864 the spread of sabres in the Federal army had a serious effect on the Confederates whose cavalry generally never was much good at the shock charge.

See the short discussion on pgs 276-280 of Nosworthy's Roll Call to Destiny, which repeats Starr's findings.

As to artillery, the real issue is that the British infantry outrange the Union artillery - and the British have much more advanced artillery in service.
 
A better case for a relatively late war scenario victory is Chattanooga with just the right combination of ill-luck for the Union and Bragg keeping his army immobile on the high ground as the Army of the Cumberland starves. I think your dates need editing....;)

Ha ha perhaps a wee bit :p

I do stand by the idea that McClellan could just as easily have lost the war for the Union however.
 
The fighting was very heavily weighted on the British, which is hardly surprising. Helps if you actually look at what occurred in the action.

You aren't assuming that the fighting was heavily weighted on the British; you are assuming that absolutely none of the 7,500 French soldiers involved hit a single Russian soldier. You are also assuming that none of the 38 British and 18 French guns involved killed or wounded any Russians.

Estimates show 40-50% of casualties in the Crimean War were caused by artillery. The French were engaged enough at Inkerman to take 929 casualties. The British took 70% of the Allied casualties. If they gave as good as they got, that means they inflicted about 8400 Russian casualties. If we further assume only 40% of Russian casualties came from artillery, then 5040 Russians were killed by British infantry. That's one hit in every 40 shots if we use your unsupported claim, one hit in every 80 shots if we use the sources I cited.

Still waiting to see if you know ought on the subject, because this is pretty basic stuff, and I've pointed it out to you repeatedly over the years....

You certainly have made claims over the years, claims you have yet to support from published sources.

BTW, I did some rough calculations for the Battle of Majuba Hill. If we use your claim of the British typically having a hits rate of 1 in 20 and the Boers having a hit rate of one in 500, then 40% of the British troops must have gotten off 1 shot and 60% of the British troops never fired their guns while the Boers fired about 200 rounds apiece at the British.

I find your numbers a bit unlikely unless the Boers were all equipped with machine guns.:D

The Battle of Majuba Hill does seem to indicate a hit rate of about 1 in 500 for the British and a hit rate of about 1 in 20 for the Boers.
 

67th Tigers

Banned
You aren't assuming that the fighting was heavily weighted on the British; you are assuming that absolutely none of the 7,500 French soldiers involved hit a single Russian soldier. You are also assuming that none of the 38 British and 18 French guns involved killed or wounded any Russians.

The numbers are known. 91% of Russian wounded were victims of Minie bullets. Now, the French, most of the British 4th Division and the artillery are outside this.

We know that at Inkerman 176,670 Minie rounds were issued (~fired) and 23,150 smoothbore rounds (to 4th Division).

Now, 1 in 28 shots with a Minie left a wounded man, excluding these killed.

Of the remainder, if all wounds were due to the 4th Divisions musketry then 1 in 37 would have caused a wound, but this excludes some desultory French fire and any wounds caused by artillery (although these are few, almost all fire was solid shot, and a 9 or 18 lb ball kills outright).

This is interesting because, except for 4 British regiments dispersing to engage the Russian artillery at 800 yds, the shooting at Inkerman was all done within smoothbore range because visibility was so poor. At such short ranges the high energy weapons (vs the low energy .577/ .58/ .54 small Minies that were used in the ACW) were lethal, with between 1 in 3 and 1 in 4 killing outright (vs. ~ 1 in 10 with low energy rifle-muskets).

Thus you can estimate between 1,732 and 2,309 of the killed outright were by small arms, leaving the artillery hitting between 5,196 and 4,619 (93-82 hit per gun, or ca. ~1 hit per round fired, inc. the French guns which fired considerably less rpg being on the field a much shorter time).

Thus we arrive at a middling number, after abstracting out artillery, of 1 in 22 musket shots hitting, with rifled muskets being ~ 1 in 21 and ~ 1 in 29 smoothbore muskets having an effect.

Note the lack of difference between smoothbores and rifles. At ranges below about 200 yards there is very little difference in effect against regimental targets. The shooters ability makes a lot more difference than the weapon carried, and Hythe did not yet exist - the British infantry of 1854 had not been through a rifle training program yet.

BTW, I did some rough calculations for the Battle of Majuba Hill. If we use your claim of the British typically having a hits rate of 1 in 20 and the Boers having a hit rate of one in 500, then 40% of the British troops must have gotten off 1 shot and 60% of the British troops never fired their guns while the Boers fired about 200 rounds apiece at the British.

I find your numbers a bit unlikely unless the Boers were all equipped with machine guns.:D

The Battle of Majuba Hill does seem to indicate a hit rate of about 1 in 500 for the British and a hit rate of about 1 in 20 for the Boers.

Ignoring the smile due to a couple of hundred Englishmen getting shot your calculations are way off.

The 554 Boer riflemen who climbed Majuba had ~38,780 rounds and prettymuch shot the lot. They were supported by a base of fire 900 yards from the British position who also fired off a large quantity of ammunition. 204 men were hit on Majuba itself (the subsequent action on Prospect Hill is separate, but the casualties usually collated). The Boers had expended at least 30,000 rounds for these hits = 1 in 147. If the base of fire is included then rounds per hit go way north of 200.

Of course the British did worse, but the Boer base of fire very effectively suppressed the British. The sheer weight of 1,000 riflemen firing at 100 stopped the British (92nd Regiment) moving up to aim their weapons.

The Boer was not a good shot. He was an average shot and hit rates were totally in line with middling European armies. What he was good at was fieldcraft, and hence not getting shot himself. This counts for a lot.
 
The numbers are known. 91% of Russian wounded were victims of Minie bullets. Now, the French, most of the British 4th Division and the artillery are outside this.

For someone who keeps claiming the numbers are known, you sure seem reluctant to provide any sources. There's a surprise.:rolleyes:

I doubt the Russian surgeons were taking the time to check whether the bits of metal they pulled from their wounded were minie balls. And your number completely ignores what killed the dead Russians.

Ignoring the smile due to a couple of hundred Englishmen getting shot your calculations are way off.

The smile is due to your numbers being ridiculous. The Boers took one killed and six wounded from the about 400 British soldiers atop Majuba Hill. The British took 96 killed and 132 wounded from the about 450 to 550 Boers who attacked the Hill.

That means if your numbers are accurate, each Boer fired 200 to 400 shots in the same time it took the British to fire less than half a shot each. I find your numbers a bit unlikely unless the Boers were all equipped with machine guns.:D

They were supported by a base of fire 900 yards from the British position who also fired off a large quantity of ammunition.

How can troops 900 yards away be providing supporting fire if they're bad shots?

204 men were hit on Majuba itself (the subsequent action on Prospect Hill is separate, but the casualties usually collated).

Prospect Hill was the British base camp. It was 8 km from Majuba Hill. You're claiming the Boers were picking off British soldiers from 8 kilometers?

Of course the British did worse, but the Boer base of fire very effectively suppressed the British. The sheer weight of 1,000 riflemen firing at 100 stopped the British (92nd Regiment) moving up to aim their weapons.

"It is once again difficult to estimate the strength of the Boer forces but a great deal of research has left me with a firm impression that the Boer force at no time exceeded 350 - nothing like the figure of 1 000 or more, often quoted." - The South African Military History Society

The Boer was not a good shot.

The numbers say otherwise.

But we do accept you claim that that the British soldier was better at hitting unmoving easily visible targets that weren't firing back.:D
 
Yet at Stones River Rosecrans reported only 1 musket/ rifle shot in 145 hit something and only 1 artillery round in 27 (common knowledge, but to prevent you simply going "cite" see pg 208 of Catton's "This Hallow Ground" - first google hit).

See, that wasn't so hard. :) What actual figures are available so we can tell whether Rosecrans numbers were an accurate assessment or if he was just trying to encourage more target practice among the troops.

Grant was not a believer in marksmanship one iota. In April 1864 Meade (not Grant) found 10 rounds per man for practice. However the stress was not on marksmanship, but on drill.

Meade became commander of the Army of the Potomac in June 1863. Grant became commander of all Union Forces in March 1864. In April, after both had reviewed the Army, target practice was added to the schedule of the Army of the Potomac.

If Meade was the one concerned about target practice, why hadn't the order come down months before Grant saw the Army?
 
Don’t be silly when everything goes to hell in a country they always come to the negotiating table. There are a few exceptions to this a good example is Paraguay. Do you really think Lincoln or Seward or any of those sensible, realist, politicians is going to fight on for national honour when the nation is suffering to no good effect?

The only major player in the Trent Incident who wasn’t a sensible realist was Commodore Wilkes, the man who stopped the Trent. We only get an Anglo-American War out of it if several more men on both sides of the Atlantic are not sensible realists.

1) At the end of the American Civil War the Confederate railway systems was in a bad state. In early 1862 which is the period immediate after the Trent Affair and the most likely time for a Fanco-Anglo-Union war, it is not significantly worse than the Union system (neither of which was well built by British, European or Indian standard but then there was a lot more track in North America).

Confederate railroads were forced by their own government to carry government cargoes at a loss. Loss of coastal and riverine shipping meant the overburdened Confederate railroad network was wearing out at a greatly accelerated rate. By spring of 1863 there were Bread Riots across the South, since they could not properly transport food to all of their own people.

The Union had none of these problems. Their railroads were allowed to run at a profit so they had the capital to replace worn out rails and rolling stock. They also could have done it far more cheaply than the Confederacy, since the Union had ample domestic production of rails and rolling stock.

2) Ending the Union blockade will take slightly less than two weeks. The time it takes the flotilla based at Vera Cruz to sweep the Confederate coast from Texas to Nassau and the time it takes the flotilla at either Jamaica or Bermuda (depending where Admiral Milne is) to sort out the defence of the West Indies and sail up the coast of the Confederacy to the mouth of the Chesapeake.

I suggest you spend more time studying the topics of operational planning, logistics, and the concept Clauswitz calls friction. The British will be lucky to sail from their home ports within two weeks. They should start clearing the blockade in a couple months and probably finish it within six months.

in the Gulf and of Florida they are most unlikely to be aware of the war before it falls on them,

Due to plain old logistics, Union forces should have forewarning unless the British deliberately hold back a declaration of war for a few weeks after they launch offensive operations. If the British do resort to sneak attacks, Union forces on the Pacific Coast will know weeks before they know in western Canada. California is connected to the east by telegraph; Vancouver won’t know till someone sails a ship around South America.

· The Union enclaves with be cut off and most will need to surrender due to lack of water and/or food (the forts may not be so unlucky)

They’ll certainly be cut off if not already evacuated, but taking most of these will require siege. Joint Army-Navy operations tend to be complicated. They’ll be even more complicated if it’s joint Confederate Army-British Navy operations.

3) The Confederacy never had much trouble selling bonds in OTL they will find it even easier in TTL especially if the English government decides to give them loans at low interest to encourage them in the war against the Union.

IIRC, the Confederacy didn’t start selling bonds on foreign markets until late in 1863. The cotton-backed bonds did well, the unbacked junk bonds did not, but neither traded at near face value. I’m sure the British will offer loans to the Confederacy, but see no reason why those loans would be low interest.

4) The OTL Union’s rate of spending dwarfed its revenues and it worked out OK why should the Confederates who have a much more export focused economy not do well in TTL?

Exports were a tiny fraction of the total economy. Per capita, the Confederates were spending about 2 ½ times as much with lower per capita government revenues.

Mines would not be a problem; the British know how to deal with them.

The British had dealt with mines before. That doesn’t make them invulnerable.

I think that the shoals on the Potomac had been dredged between the war of 1812 and 1862. Certainly some quite large ships made use of Washington Naval Yard in the ACW. If you know differently please let me know, a reference would be smashing.

I’ll see if I can find anything.

Mmm I wonder, I would suggest quite the contrary there would be quite a significant amount of desertion from the Union army by the large number of experienced NCOs of British, BNA and Irish extraction that had fought for the British Army or Navy earlier in their lives. It would also cause a great deal of soul searching among many of the British born and second generation Britons living in the USA. Many of them will fight for their Queen, many will fight for the Union and most I suspect will want nothing to do with either side.

In 1812, a far higher percentage of the population was British born and second generation Britons, but that did not undercut the US war effort in any significant manner. The USA has fought many wars against foreign powers. In all cases the majority of people from the ethic background of those foreign powers supported the US. NCOs of British, BNA and Irish extraction that had previously severed in the British military were only a small number of the total military.

This is the same for the majority of the Irish, most of those in the Fenians are already fighting for one side or another. Those that have not volunteered don’t want to volunteer and a fight between the English and the Yankees is nothing to do with them.

Many Irish-Americans felt a war between the Union and the Confederacy had nothing to do with them. That changes when the British declare war. Irishmen unwilling to fight to end slavery or keep the South in the Union, would take up arms to repel British invaders. The same is true of native-born Americans. The Copperhead movement would be just as dead upon British declaration of war as the America First movement was when Hitler declared war on the US.

In this scenario where France is allied with Britain and at war with the Union, things would be very different to OTL. First, nobody in Texas is going to help the rebel Juaristas. It will also be very difficult for the British to deny the French the right to charter British merchant ships as troop transports and supply ships as they did in OTL. As a result of this it is reasonable to expect far more French troops in Mexico and that they are very well supplied. In this scenario not only is it much harder for the Union to supply the rebels but they have nothing at all to supply them with.

France has no reason to go to war with the US. They may recognize the Confederacy, but they gain nothing from declaring war on the US. The US and Britain being at war will in no way increase French commitment to the war in Mexico. A British blockade may encourage USA support of the Juaristas – the Union might cut a deal where the Juaristas import nitre on the Pacific coast, which the Union processes into gunpowder for both of them. (It won't be enough for Union needs, of course.)


I see no chance of beating the British. If you think there is perhaps you would be so kind as to explain what the Union strategy would be in order to achieve this victory?

The Union’s best chance, like Confederacy’s in OTL would be to outlast the opponent’s will to fight while focusing more on international politics. Militarily, the US should go on the defensive against the British. Invasion of Canada or the British [FONT=&quot]Caribbean might lead to the British public deciding the war wasn’t worth the cost, but it could also make them more willing to fight. A few failed or inconsequential attacks might leave the British wondering why they’re even fighting.[/FONT]

And the first few British land-based attacks have a good chance of being failures or inconsequential. The ACW clearly showed there was a learning curve for the changes in technology and commanding larger units. Most British high command is too old for field command and have never held an independent combat command. Many of those who have served in combat command weren’t that impressive.

If they initially stick to removing the Union blockade, the Royal Navy probably won’t have significant problems. Attempting to blockade Union territory will require joint Army-Navy operations, which could be problematic. Plus there’s a risk of one of the shiny new British ironclads grounding in the shallows, hitting a mine, or being struck in a lightly armored area, such as the steering gear.

In Britain, there will be opposition to buying Confederate cotton with British blood. The Lincoln administration would have been informing the world they did not want a war and asking for international arbitration long before the British declared war. Between that and the distaste much of the British public for slavery, there will be little enthusiasm for the war. The odds are still on Britain winning, but history is full of wars where worse underdogs won. Palmerston is one vote of confidence away from Britain pulling out of the war.

Who described Williams as ‘a worn out old roué’? What was the context?

Edward William Watkin described him in 1861. Not sure of the original context, but I got the quote from the Dictionary of Canadian Biography Online.

It is clear you don’t think much of him as a general, your analysis has ‘something of the night about’ but then I don’t have a strong opinion on the matter so feel free to denigrate the old chap.

I don’t have to denigrate Williams, some of his contemporaries did a splendid job of that. His performance in the Crimean war was certainly nothing spectacular and he is probably too old for field command. Not saying he couldn’t perform well, a couple British Admirals gave sterling performances in the Napoleonic Wars after unspectacular earlier careers, but odds are Williams is not up to the task.

What I do know is that Williams won’t be the wartime commander in BNA and that in response to the Trent Affair they sent out an excellent staff ahead of choosing the theatre commander. In 1861 Williams’s actual post was Administrator of the Government. Pennyfather was the Governor General’s Secretary, Irvine, and Duchesuay were both Provincial Aides de-Camp. Monck as Governor General would have had final authority over any theatre commander.

That wasn't the impression I had gotten from other sources. So who was the chief military commander in BNA at the time?

I also note that nobody was planning to invade the USA with an army of 30,000 men. What was planned was for a number of small detachments, and I do mean small, of line infantry would take up forward defensive positions in the Union to delay any advance on the province of Canada one of these positions was to be at Rouse Point, others opposite the Niagara peninsula. We are talking detachments of a few hundred to maybe a thousand men.

I note this directly contradicts 67th Tigers, who has repeatedly asserted there British plan if war was declared was preemptive strikes across the border. Doesn't surprise me 67th is wrong again.

I don’t agree with your characterisation of the Russian Army. Only in the areas of general equipment and supply am I aware that the Union army was in anyway superior to the Russian. If you want me to believe this you are going to have to show me some evidence of some kind.

Perhaps you should read my reply to Snake several days ago in this thread. I gave sources there.


How? Show me where the boots, socks and uniforms are going to come from? They had to use substandard boots and shoddy and mungo for uniforms in the OTL ACW and that was when they could import cloth and wool yarn from England.

You are mistaking the first months of the war for the whole of it. When Simon Cameron was Secretary of War, many military contractors fleeced the government, perhaps with Cameron's collusion. A senator from Cameron's home state once said of Cameron that "I don't think that he would steal a red hot stove". This changed dramatically with Stanton as Secretary of War and Montgomery Meigs as Quartermaster General.

Just google Meigs and quartemaster any you'll find a lot of sources.



No, the murrain made people want to leave Ireland any way they could. They wanted a better standard of life not independence.

If they merely wanted to leave Ireland any way they could, most Irish would have chosen the shortest and cheapest route and gone to England. Instead, the vast majority of Irish emigrants went to where they would no longer be ruled by the British.

Actually when the army of the HEIC was integrated into the British Army a large number of Europeans left and there was a significant reduction in the number of European troops in India.

And the largest expeditionary force sent from India between the Mutiny and the Great War sent into Afghanistan in 1878 to help secure the borders of India. India was the “jewel of the crown” – the British were not going to send a significant force away from it across an ocean unless their national surival was at stake.

Are you sure that the numbers you quoted are not for ‘track laid’ which would include repairs?

[FONT=&quot]All sources I have found that refer to “track laid’ mean “new track laid” and do not include repairs. Even if we assume the numbers quoted include repairs, they clearly show the Union was capable of maintaining and expanding its rail network solely with domestic resources.[/FONT]
 

67th Tigers

Banned
[FONT=&quot]All sources I have found that refer to “track laid’ mean “new track laid” and do not include repairs. Even if we assume the numbers quoted include repairs, they clearly show the Union was capable of maintaining and expanding its rail network solely with domestic resources.[/FONT]

Source spotted immediately: http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=dqIBqiNoB9wC&pg=PA107

You do know that wrought iron rails needed replacing every two years? This is why bessemer steel was so successful (the rails lasted ten years).

You also don't note that your figures include the Confederacy as well as the Union.

The Union increased production from ca. 189,000 tons to 358,000 tons of rails per annum during the civil war, and still had to import 2-300,000 tons of rails from Britain.

In any intervention the Confederate States can import as much railroad iron as it wants, whilst the US has lost about half its' supply by the passive means of the British no longer selling it to them.
 
The Union increased production from ca. 189,000 tons to 358,000 tons of rails per annum during the civil war, and still had to import 2-300,000 tons of rails from Britain.

In any intervention the Confederate States can import as much railroad iron as it wants, whilst the US has lost about half its' supply by the passive means of the British no longer selling it to them.

Note, too, that even at the time of the Transcontinental Railway, a few years later, US rail cost twice as much as British rail. It was only due to US protectionism that they used US rail.
 
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