On September 3rd Göring called a meeting at The Hague with two of his commanders, Kesselring and Sperle. Kesselring proposed that the attacks on Britain should be switched from fighter airfields to the city of London, but Sperle did not agree stating that the RAF had more reserves than they were led to believe. Kesselring and Göring believed wrongly that fighter command had no more than 300 fighters available and Kesselring’s contention that one last push would see them crushed in the air, the obvious target London. From Berlin, Adolph Hitler, having a moment doubt decides to talk directly to Sperle about his concerns and then gave the order that the target of the attacks should not be changed immediately. However he did feel that one major raid might be enough, but a raid on the airfields not the British capital.
In between missions to England by day and by night during September 5th and the 6th, the Luftwaffe was busy in its preparations of strengthening all bomber units and moving Bf110 and Bf109 units to specific locations close to the French coast. An all-out raid on the airfields would force fighter command into submission … the planned date for the operation, September 7th 1940.
The 6th September 1940 was a day when extreme pressure was brought upon Fighter Command. Six of the seven sector airfields had suffered considerable damage and five of the advanced air bases along the Kent coast fared no better. Losses of aircraft again exceeded production and pilot strength was now down to about seven hundred in total due not only to those that were missing or killed but also those that had suffered burns and broken bones.
The Luftwaffe had pounded and pounded at the RAF and it appeared that victory was now within their grasp. It had taken the German war machine much longer than they had anticipated, mainly due to their own mistakes, but slowly they were grinding away at Fighter Command and slowly Fighter Command was weakening. Also on September 6th the heads at the War Office were ready to implement the order of 'Invasion Alert No.1' It had already been served as a warning to all RAF Commands, but as yet had not been released as 'official' to the public.
ACM Hugh Dowding knew the situation, he knew that if the RAF was at all to gain the upper hand, then his pilots would have to shoot down the German planes at a rate of three to one, a task which at this stage when his airfields were almost non-operational and his pilots were tired, many were near to exhaustion. Dowding said in his office at Bentley Priory "... all we can do is to pray to God, because only a miracle can save us now."
The position was grim in the extreme as from August 24th to September 6th. 295 fighters had been totally destroyed and 171 badly damaged, against a total output of 269 new and repaired Spitfires and Hurricanes. Worst of all, during the fortnight 103 pilots were killed or missing and 128 were wounded, which represented a total wastage of 120 pilots per week out of a fighting strength of just fewer than 1,000.
Experienced pilots were like gold dust, and each one lost had to be replaced by an untried man who for some time would be vulnerable, until he acquired battle know-how. Fresh squadrons, moved in to replace tired units, very often lost more aircraft and pilots than the formations they replaced. For instance, 616 Squadron lost twelve aircraft and five pilots between August 25th and September 2nd and had to be retired to Coltishall in No.12 Group.
No. 603 Squadron, newly arrived in 11 Group on August 28th, had by September 6th lost sixteen aircraft and twelve pilots, while 253 Squadron at Kenley lost thirteen Hurricanes and nine pilots in the seven days they were in battle, from August 30th.
7th September 1940
11:55 – The radar at Dover and Pevensey pick up the first blips of the day, a small formation just off the coast. They appear to be content on staying just within striking distance of the English coastline but make sure that they do not cross the coast.
66 Squadron Kenley (Spitfires) who were on a routine patrol were sent to intercept. It was a small formation of Bf109s possibly trying to draw the British fighters out just as they had done many times before back in July. As the enemy was content to stay out there Fighter Command decided that as long as they kept their distance from the coast, no other squadrons would be sent to intercept.
66 Squadron engaged in combat, but after two of its aircraft had to return to base, decided to break off the action. One of the Spitfires did not make it back to Kenley; instead the pilot P/O C.A.W. Bodie crash landed the aircraft close to Hawkinge when he was losing height rapidly. The other Spitfire also crash landed on its return to Kenley.
AVM Keith Park issues the statement to all his controllers and squadron commanders to obey the orders from Group Operations "exactly, and without any modification". This instruction was made because squadrons were often too high to successfully make an interception of enemy bombers without engaging combat with the escorting fighters. The instruction also ordered that two squadrons were to operate together and, that because of their better high altitude performance, the Spitfires should engage the escorting fighters while the Hurricanes make contact with the bombers. "We must harass and destroy as many bombers as possible" he said.
14:00 – Across the Channel Göring and a party of invited guests started to take their positions on the cliff edge overlooking the Channel. Everyone is relaxed, talking and smiling with an eager anticipation. It looked like a picnic day for the rich. Suddenly, in the distance the dull drone of engines could be heard, it was coming from the south. Shortly, the same sounds could be heard to the north, an eerie sort of sound yet you could not see anything. After about ten minutes, one of the Major's called and pointed to the south. The first of the huge formations could just barely be seen coming over the high ground behind them. All eyes were at straining point; some members of the party were on tip-toes stretching their necks to get the first glimpses of the great armada of bombers that were soon to fill the sky.
14:20 – As hundreds of bombers formed a sheet of black crosses in the sky above, the smile on Göring’s face went from cheek to cheek. He excitedly placed his hands on a Major's shoulder and shook it, pointing towards the mass of aircraft high above. The noise was deafening.
Göring stood up from his collapsible seat, settling his binoculars on the first spearhead of the Heinkels and Dorniers which were now circling some ten miles away before forming up with the twin-engine fighter screen on each flank and, almost invisible above, the little 109s, some from the airfield that they had recently inspected. As the bombers and their escort groaned deafeningly overhead, gaining altitude, to these senior officers it was as if the frustrating weeks of struggle in the air, with its distressing casualties, and the Phoenix-like reappearance of the Hurricanes and Spitfires when none should have survived, had been wiped clean. Now the real battle was about to begin and surely nothing on earth, or in the air, could prevail against this massive destructing power …
Other formations, again Heinkels, Dorniers and intermixed with Bf110s came in from the east and as the main formation passed over the French coastline high above Göring's head more formations could be seen way back over the mainland to the west. The total blanket of bombers and fighters now covered an area that was at least 800 square miles and still the excitable Göring could hardly control himself as the huge formation of droning bombers headed towards the English coast.
15:40 – The coastal radar stations that had been extra quiet all day suddenly could not believe their eyes. At first it was just a few blips off the French coast that slowly appeared to join and increase in size like a formidable cancer. The radar station at Foreness was the first to detect the appearance of the enemy on the CRT screen. A WAAF corporal could not explain the size of the formation and she called for one of her superior officers. Within moments Dover had also picked the giant build up as did Rye. Those that had been relaxing outside in the late afternoon sun were called in, cigarettes were stubbed out in the already full ashtrays as everybody's attention was turned to the armada that was crossing the Channel and coming towards them.
15:50 – All personnel at Bentley Priory were in the relaxed mood as they had been all day. It had been a day that had been a blessing to all as everyone took advantage of the peace and quiet of this late September day. The Officer-in-Charge even strolled about casually on the mezzanine level of the Operations Room known as the "Balcony". The WAAFs below sat casually round an empty map table as they had done since daybreak. Some sat sipping cups of tea some were reading newspapers or just casually chatting to one of the others. One could be forgiven in thinking that this was the nerve centre of Fighter Command. Even though most were indulging in this relaxed mood many of the WAAFs maintained their headsets on 'just in case'. Little did they know then, that within a couple of minutes the "Hole" as the Operations Room at headquarters was known, would take on a sudden transformation.
15:54 – The message came through from the radar stations. The Filter Room at 'the hole' was the first to receive such messages and one of the Tellers there passed the initial position sighting of the enemy to the plotters at the large map table below the balcony. One of the Plotters reached for her long rake, that had a battery powered magnetic tip, then reached into the tray at the edge of the table picking up one of the coloured arrows and placing it on the small plaque then placed on that a letter, either "H" for hostile, "X" for an unidentified aircraft, "F" for fighter aircraft or "C" for Coastal Command aircraft. A number was placed beside the letter which indicated the number of aircraft in the formation. Another number was placed below this to indicate the height of the enemy.
On the balcony seated in a prominent position would be the C-in-C alongside his aides and his guests if any. On both sides of him would be the Tellers. These fellows would have to look down on the huge map below and be able to "read" the action and operations. This called for good eyesight as they had to read the figures that were on the plaques being pushed across the map by the plotters. On the filter room wall was a colour coded clock with its face divided into five minute segments by the aid of colours. Each five minutes from the hour the colour was different, starting with red then yellow then blue and then the sequence was repeated over again.
One of the Plotters commenced placing a plaque just off the French coast, just alongside that another Plotter placed another plaque. At first, until confirmation of its identity could be made, the letter "X" was placed on the plaque together with the number of aircraft. An arrow would also be placed giving the direction of flight as well as the grid letter and the grid position.
16:00 – The plots on the large map showed that the build-up of enemy aircraft is increasing and covering a wider area. The information was passed on to each Group HQ, but at this stage no reports of squadrons being scrambled was recorded. The usual procedure of the Luftwaffe attacks was after the Channel crossing the formations would split up upon reaching the English coast and it was presumed that this would be no different.
16:15 – The huge armada of German aircraft were now over the coast and within the range of the Observer Corps posts. They reported in to the Maidstone HQ that "Enemy sighted, 100 plus, 20,000ft" within moments, they were on the telephone again, "Further to my last report … make that 200 plus …" and so it continued. In reality a total of some 1,100 aircraft were crossing the English coastline consisting of 300 medium-heavy bombers, 200 Bf110s with bomb loads and about 600 Bf109s flying as escorts.
As Park had chosen this quiet day to visit Dowding at Bentley Priory he was not at 11 Group HQ at Uxbridge and was not able to control squadron and fighter units. But in his absence this task was left to his senior controller John Willoughby de Broke with whom Keith Park had every confidence. Quite often he would let his controllers make the early decisions and he would act on these making the final decisions later based on his natural instinct. Immediately he ordered eleven squadrons to scramble; he is of the belief that once and for all the Luftwaffe is intent on completely destroying his airfields. Seeing the size of the approaching formation he orders every squadron covering London into the air. The dispersal's at Northolt, Kenley, Croydon, Hendon, North Weald and Hornchurch all become an immediate hub of activity …