Ready, Steady ... GOOOOOOO!!!!!

[Ian Hathaway]

When discussing Operation Sealion you hear the following statements so often …

• If it looks like the Luftwaffe is winning the battle for air superiority Fighter Command would retreat north and rebuild their strength ready for the invasion.
• Once the invasion is spotted there would be an avalanche of RAF aircraft pouring down from the north destroying the German aircraft and landing barges.
• All available RN ships would immediately set sail for the invasion area at full speed, they wouldn’t care about losses … this is do or die time.

It seems to me that there are quite a few people on this site that think the British would lose their heads to blood lust and commit everything they have in one mad dash to throw the Germans back into the sea or most likely prevent the landing from even taking place.

So here is a TL based on the first of those statements, Fighter Commands move north and we will see then if the other two statements are realistic options. Unfortunately to make it work you have to assume that somehow the Luftwaffe does slightly better than OTL during August 1940 hence forcing Dowding to remove 11 Group squadrons from the South of England. How this is achieved is irrelevant it’s what happens after this that is important.

However despite the POD being irrelevant I guess I’d best give one. OTL the main German attacks during the Battle of Britain began on 13th August 1940 with attacks on the vital airfields of 11 Group fighter command ending on 6th September. During this short time there was a period of unsettled weather from 19th-23rd August were German attacks were limited. This gave Fighter Command five days of relative peace to make vital repairs and undergo reorganisation that potentially allowed them to continue the fight from the South East of England in the way that they wanted to. So the POD her is that the weather remained good throughout August allowing the Luftwaffe raids to continue at the pace they had during the previous week.

Fighter Command losses between 19th-23rd August was just 12 Spitfires/Hurricanes, by moving the days forward (i.e. transposing the raids of 24th-28th August to 19th-23rd) this loss increases to 77 Spitfires/Hurricanes with a further 178 lost by the end of August (24th-31st). In addition a further 40 or so aircraft would have been damaged meaning that by advacing the Luftwaffe raids by just 5 days results in a weakening of Fighter Commands front line strength of close to 100 aircraft or 15% of its single engined fighters. These losses plus the continued attacks on the airfields may just be enough to push Air Marshal Dowding to abandon the South East corner of England.

More to Follow ...

 

[Derek Pullem]

Really, another one?

 

[Ian Hathaway]

Really, another one?

Another what?

 

[King Augeas]

When discussing Operation Sealion you hear the following statements so often …

• If it looks like the Luftwaffe is winning the battle for air superiority Fighter Command would retreat north and rebuild their strength ready for the invasion.
• Once the invasion is spotted there would be an avalanche of RAF aircraft pouring down from the north destroying the German aircraft and landing barges.
• All available RN ships would immediately set sail for the invasion area at full speed, they wouldn’t care about losses … this is do or die time.

I don't think any of this is true or sensible, so a TL based on it sounds slightly silly.

 

[Ian Hathaway]

[/LIST]
I don't think any of this is true or sensible, so a TL based on it sounds slightly silly.

Neither do I but people do say it all the time ... so in the timeline I'm trying to make sense of what COULD have happened if fighter command had withdrawn northwards to protect their assets for the expected invasion.

 

[Derek Pullem]

Another what?

Another Sealion thread rehashing all the old arguments.

Again.

You ask for a premise that gives Luftwaffe air superiority over the beaches. That premise has been done before many times which is why I'm not optimistic of any new insights being delivered.

 

[Ian Hathaway]

Another Sealion thread rehashing all the old arguments.

Again.

Well that's an assumption you have made ... this is not a Sealion thread as such more a Battle of Britain thread ... if it stretches further in time then so be it. And hopefully it will not rehash any arguments its just an exploration of what could have been ... in fact to be honest I hope there are no arguments. I guess we will just have to wait and see ...

 

[King Augeas]

Another Sealion thread rehashing all the old arguments.

Again.

It's a shame because there is a lot of room for a decent TL on BOB/SL. Often we get casual assumptions that the barges would immediately sink in a light sea or that the light forces in the Channel would annihilate convoys, when it's much more reasonable that the main effects of both would be more to utterly disrupt the invasion organisation,planning and logistics, resulting in barges being scattered across dozens of miles of English and French coast to the ruin of the original battle plan.

But the OP has similarly crude assumptions, it's just a different side of the same coin.

 

[Ian Hathaway]

You ask for a premise that gives Luftwaffe air superiority over the beaches. That premise has been done before many times which is why I'm not optimistic of any new insights being delivered.

And no I don't ask for a premise that would give the Luftwaffe air superiority over the beaches ... just one that would force Fighter Command to withdraw their forces northwards.

 

[Ian Hathaway]

Ready, steady GOOOOOO!!!

PART ONE

By the end of August Air Marshall Hugh Dowding’s concerns regarding the state of his precious Fighter Command were coming to a head. With increasing pressure from both the Air Ministry and even from Churchill himself Dowding was faced with a stark choice, risk losing the squadrons of 11 Group in the south east of England completely or move them to safer locations north of London. If only there had been the break in fine weather promised by the Met boys between 18th and 23rd of the month, instead the attacks continued on Air Vice Marshal Park’s operation centres of Tangmere, Kenley, Biggin Hill and Hornchurch for almost two weeks, rendering Biggin Hill inoperational and causing serious damage to the others. 11 Groups other bases north of London had also been attacked on occasion along with 10 Groups Middle Wallop and 12 Groups Duxford. With the Met boys telling him that the fine weather would continue for at least another week the situation looked untenable. And so on the 31st August 1940 Dowding issued his orders that as of that evening all squadrons still operating from the Tangmere, Kenley and Hornchurch sectors (those operating from Biggin Hill had already been dispersed) should be moved to safer locations. 11 Group now had only three of its original seven sectors available although in a surprise move the Duxford sector was transferred to 11 Group from 12 Group much to AVM Leigh-Mallory’s displeasure.

From the 1st September the Order of Battle for Fighter Command would be as follows.

10 Group

Pembrey Sector
92 (Spitfire) Squadron at Pembrey.

Filton Sector
213 (Hurricane) Squadron and 87 (Hurricane) Squadron at Exeter

St Eval Sector
238 (Hurricane) Squadron at St Eval.

Middle Wallop Sector
234 (Spitfire) Squadron at Middle Wallop,
56 (Hurricane) Squadron at Boscombe Down,
152 (Spitfire) Squadron and 609 (Spitfire) Squadron at Warmwell.

11 Group

Northolt Sector
1 (Hurricane) Squadron, 1 RCAF (Hurricane) Squadron and 303 (Hurricane) Squadron at Northolt,
616 (Spitfire) Squadron and 43 (Hurricane) Squadron at Hendon.

North Weald Sector
249 (Hurricane) Squadron, 222 (Spitfire) Squadron and 54 (Spitfire) Squadron at North Weald,
151 (Hurricane) Squadron and 46 (Hurricane) Squadron at Stapleford.

Debden Sector
257 (Hurricane) Squadron, 601 (Hurricane) Squadron and 85 (Hurricane) Squadron at Debden,
111 (Hurricane) Squadron and 17 (Hurricane) Squadron at Castle Camps.

Duxford Sector
79 (Hurricane) Squadron, 501 (Hurricane) Squadron and 253 (Hurricane) Squadron at Duxford,
72 (Spitfire) Squadron and 602 (Spitfire) Squadron at Fowlmere.

12 Group

Wittering Sector
229 (Hurricane) Squadron and 266 (Spitfire) Squadron at Wittering.

Coltishall Sector
242 (Hurricane) Squadron and 66 (Spitfire) Squadron at Coltishall.

Digby Sector
611 (Spitfire) Squadron and 310 (Hurricane) Squadron at Digby.

Kirton in Lindsey Sector
19 (Spitfire) Squadron and 74 (Spitfire) Squadron at Kirton in Lindsey.

Church Fenton Sector
13 (Spitfire) Squadron at Church Fenton,
64 (Spitfire) Squadron at Leconfield.

13 Group

Catterick Sector
41 (Spitfire) Squadron at Catterick.

Usworth Sector
607 (Hurricane) Squadron at Usworth.

Acklington Sector
32 (Hurricane) Squadron and 610 (Spitfire) Squadron at Acklington.

Turnhouse Sector
65 (Spitfire) Squadron at Turnhouse,
605 (Hurricane) Squadron at Drem,
615 (Hurricane) Squadron at Prestwick.

Dyce Sector
145 (Hurricane) Squadron at Dyce.

Wick Sector
3 (Hurricane) Squadron at Wick,
504 (Hurricane) Squadron at Castletown,
232 (Hurricane) Squadron at Sumburgh.

Air Ministry

245 (Hurricane) Squadron at Aldergrove, Ireland.

 

[Saphroneth]

Posts like that aren't so much "this would happen" as "This is an option, the most extreme easily explained option, and any plan which does not account for it is insufficient". It is likely that the ACTUAL plan would be more nuanced... but if the Germans don't plan for the "zerg rush" approach, then they are actually planning for the Brits to screw up and not apply their most potent weapons.


Also, you might want to tag the post title with "sealion" or something so people interested in this actually know to look at it.

 

[Ian Hathaway]

But the OP has similarly crude assumptions, it's just a different side of the same coin.

So that I can get this to run smoothly can you tell me what the crude assumptions are and I'll see if I can change them or at least explain them ... thanks.

 

[Ian Hathaway]

PART TWO

On receiving notification of the changes, AVM Keith Park, in charge of 11 Group sat for several hours trying to work out exactly what changes he would need to make to his tactics during this crucial phase of the battle.

The first problem he looked at was the obvious overcrowding of his bases; satellite stations such as Stapleford and Castle Camps were not designed for permanent occupation and his pilots would have to be under canvas for most of their stay. Even at the Sector stations accommodation would have to be found off-base for the new arrivals. There was also the question of aircraft dispersal with not enough blast pens for all aircraft but they would just have to muddle through.

With five squadrons in each of his four remaining Sectors Park’s next problem was with Operational Control. Effective control could only be maintained with three squadrons in each sector (four at a push) due mainly to the level of radio traffic and crossed orders when dealing with more squadrons at a time. Luckily Park had already been toying with the idea of forming small wings of two squadrons with one taking the lead thus meaning that both squadrons would act as a single unit for the purposes of control. With five squadrons Park had at his disposal two small wings and an independent squadron per Sector. There were two major disadvantages to this; the first was that it would take an additional five to ten minutes for the two squadrons to combine. The second was that 11 Group could now intercept fewer raids should the Luftwaffe chose to split larger formations into smaller groups as they had in the past. Park would have to make sure these disadvantages were minimised at all times. His first thought was to ensure that the small wings were always formed from like squadrons, either Hurricane or Spitfire wings. By doing this the performance of each squadron would be similar in speed and climb rate ensuring the formation of the wings took as little time as possible.

This led him to his biggest conundrum, interception times and trying to meet the enemy before they struck at vital targets, something Park had always strived to achieve. Typically German formations raiding from Northern France were first observed by British radar in the region of St Omer giving Fighter Command 25 minutes to prepare their defences before the first bombers had reached the centre of Kent. Even low flying Luftwaffe formations unobserved by the radar and only spotted by the Observer Corp would allow 10-15 minutes advanced warning for inland targets. Using rudimentary calculations (on average it took 5 minutes for a squadron at full readiness to leave the ground, 20 minutes to climb to 20,000 ft with a distance travelled of 35 miles whilst climbing and a further 25 miles for every 5 minutes after that at full throttle) Park calculated that only those squadrons stationed in the North Weald sector would be able to effectively intercept incoming raids. With this in mind he decided to utilise both Kenley and Biggin Hill as forward day bases for Hornchurch and North Weald respectively. Whilst Kenley and Biggin Hill were no longer viable as operational bases because of repeated attack they could still be utilised in this manner.

As his thought processes continued to unravel Park now had to determine which of the Luftwaffe’s primary targets could no longer be afforded Fighter Commands protection given that his battle lines had now been drawn back. His first thoughts were for Coastal Command who were still using the air fields of Detling and Manston for their operations, both of which were effectively beyond his line of interception. Immediately he put his hand on the telephone and after a brief discussion with his immediate superior Dowding it was decided that Dowding would contact the Air Ministry to inform them that it was no longer possible to guarantee either bases protection. Obviously the protection of any industrial targets in south east England would have to be abandoned beyond a line stretching from Gravesend through Maidstone and on to Brighton as would the ports of Dover, Folkestone and Ramsgate except in exceptional circumstances. Any shipping in the Straights of Dover would now be even more vulnerable than in the past few weeks. On reflection, with the exception of the two Coastal Command bases the withdrawal of Fighter Command would hopefully have very little effect on Britain’s ability to continue the war. There were few vital factories in the affected area; Dover was already unusable as a major naval base and shipping through the Channel restricted primarily to night time movements.

 

[Bernard Woolley]

Nitpick alert

Why has Hugh Dowding been demoted and lost his knighthood?

 

[Ian Hathaway]

Why has Hugh Dowding been demoted and lost his knighthood?

That's not a nitpick that is a very valid point ... so to make amends here goes ...

Dowding shall hence forth be known as:

Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Caswall Tremenheere Dowding, 1st Baron Dowding GCB, GCVO, CMG​

 

[sharlin]

And you must type that every time during this undoubted wank of your favorite baddies when his name gets said. In bold. Possibly italics so das Ubermensh know exactly what they are up against..

 

[Ian Hathaway]

And you must type that every time during this undoubted wank of your favorite baddies when his name gets said. In bold. Possibly italics so das Ubermensh know exactly what they are up against..

How do you know where this is going? Is there anything you disagree with thus far? Try to be constructive rather than outright critical and I might just listen ...

 

[King Augeas]

So that I can get this to run smoothly can you tell me what the crude assumptions are and I'll see if I can change them or at least explain them ... thanks.

These:

• If it looks like the Luftwaffe is winning the battle for air superiority Fighter Command would retreat north and rebuild their strength ready for the invasion.
• Once the invasion is spotted there would be an avalanche of RAF aircraft pouring down from the north destroying the German aircraft and landing barges.
• All available RN ships would immediately set sail for the invasion area at full speed, they wouldn’t care about losses … this is do or die time.

 

[sharlin]

How do you know where this is going? Is there anything you disagree with thus far? Try to be constructive rather than outright critical and I might just listen ...

Lets be honest here.

Its you. Lord Admiral of Splitting Hairs in favour of the germans.

Its going to be a wank, perhaps not a screamingly loud one but das Ubermensch will no doubt do well, not win but not do too badly either, probably enough to make Churchill break out in a cold sweat.

Your comments are always insightfully researched and well thought out but you do love to give Der Grofaz and friends a trouser job. Its as predictable as Wiking's 'The Germans develop X engine, what happens?'.

I'd be more supprised if you went off target and had the UK do well, that would be more interesting than 'Oh look, its another Sealion where the Germans do well.'

 

[Ian Hathaway]

Lets be honest here.

Its you. Lord Admiral of Splitting Hairs in favour of the germans.

Its going to be a wank, perhaps not a screamingly loud one but das Ubermensch will no doubt do well, not win but not do too badly either, probably enough to make Churchill break out in a cold sweat.

Your comments are always insightfully researched and well thought out but you do love to give Der Grofaz and friends a trouser job. Its as predictable as Wiking's 'The Germans develop X engine, what happens?'.

I'd be more supprised if you went off target and had the UK do well, that would be more interesting than 'Oh look, its another Sealion where the Germans do well.'

Actually I just want to explore what would happen if Fighter Command pulled back beyond the River Thames ... to be honest I have no preconceived idea of how this will turn out. At the beginning you have to have the Luftwaffe do better otherwise the whole premise would just fall apart but I've done that not by the Germans doing better than OTL just by changing the weather conditions and moving OTL raids forward by five days. For all I know the British may actually do better, after all, as I've said there really wasn't anything vital in the far South East of England that by not being able to protect it will cause the British any great harm.

I am very open to suggestions if you think either the reactions of the British or Germans seems unrealistic within this timeline ... and I will explore any contribution.