Reading these TLs, Germany has to invade Soviet Union in 1941

Deleted member 1487

AFAIK a land reform was more or less impossible for the Nazis. While needed it was against their very core philosophy of Blut und Boden. Just with glancing on some numbers, the Nazis could have resettled the entirity of occupied Poland with German farmers if they'd conducted a land reform. But they couldn't if they wanted to retain the loyalty of their core supporters.
Except the Nazis did land reform as part of Blut and Boden. It was just incomplete by the time the war started. They parceled out 20 acre plots to a bunch of farming families because that was the max one family could actually work It would have taken more time to get it complete than was allotted to it, given that they then mobilized so many men and dedicated so much nitrate production to war production. Can't have farmers work land if they are in the army...but given that they released over 1 million men upon completing the French campaign to work in farming and industry and then mobilized something like 1.5 million men for Barbarossa, they could have had a lot more men working in agriculture and in industry had they not invaded the USSR in 1941. That's not even counting the impact of foreign labor they brought in from occupied countries and even neutrals and allies on contract. Italian and contract neutral labor was a huge part of German agricultural and even industry labor for most of the war.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reichserbhofgesetz
A lot of issues with German farming before and during the war was lack of mechanization, use of horses for the military, and of course conscription of farmers to serve in the army. Again the Nazis were not well organized.
 
Only a poorly researched belief in Soviet weakness (which we now know to be false) and a rather optimistic view of the industrial benefits to be gained from conquest made the campaign seem sane to German planners. Had they known the truth, the General Staff would have shat itself.

It was certainly within German power to dominate the Med if they put their minds to it. A land campaign around the eastern shores along historical invasion routes through Turkey, Syria and then on to Egypt and Iraq might have done the trick. The Libyan-Egyptians Desert, for it's part, was never going to be a profitable invasion route.

In a serious campaign against the British Empire, which presupposes no invasion of Russia, the Germans won't just commit more resources trying to do the near-impossible from Libya. They'd use those additional resources to open up entirely new fronts in the eastern Med, where the logistic spaces of the Western Desert weren't a factor.

However, it needs to be observed that this course of action hopes that faced with the threat of losing their Empire, the British will come to terms. It's not an unreasonable hope but it does have to be pointed out that it's not a surefire scenario either. The decision whether to fight on or not still rests in London. If London decides to say "fuck it!" and fight on, then the Germans need a new plan.
 
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raharris1973

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as well they could have encouraged Soviet entry into Med (a 1940's not 1960's base at Tartus?)

That would have been quite generous to the Soviets to give them Syria, and anathema to Italy and the Vichy French. Could have been forced through I guess though.


It was certainly within German power to dominate the Med if they put their minds to it. A land campaign around the eastern shores along historical invasion routes through Turkey, Syria and then on to Egypt and Iraq might have done the trick. The Libyan-Egyptians Desert, for it's part, was never going to be a profitable invasion route.

In a serious campaign against the British Empire, which presupposes no invasion of Russia, the Germans won't just commit more resources trying to do the near-impossible from Libya. They'd use those additional resources to open up entirely new fronts in the eastern Med, where the logistic spaces of the Western Desert weren't a factor.

That's an interesting interpretation, and it may be correct, but I suspect it will be controversial. Don't post that on soc.history.what-if or Phil McGregor would scream to the heavens about the impossible logistics.

There's another potential complication with a Turkey and Middle East campaign. That starts to impinge on Soviet interests, even more than anything else done to date. Even if Stalin was going to carefully calculate whether or not to attack the Germans and wait till the odds were favorable, a major German presence at the straits and at his southern border will be upsetting. It could move the Soviets closer to going to the preemptive option in 1942 or 1943 than otherwise.

I don't think a German campaign in Turkey and the Levant in 1941 would cause Soviet preemption that year, or necessarily guarantee Soviet preemption in 1942. However, especially if there is German campaigning and alliances as far east as Iran, it really could leave Stalin thinking, "well where else can Hitler send his army against after this besides us?"
 
Don't post that on soc.history.what-if or Phil McGregor would scream to the heavens about the impossible logistics.

Eh, I can't speak to whether it's outright impossible in an absolute sense but in a relative sense we're comparing the barren wasteland of the Libyan-Egyptian desert to the actually somewhat developed transport networks of Anatolia, Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. Pretty easy to see which ones logistically easier to move over. One could raise more objections about having to fight over repeated mountain ranges in the face of British and maybe Turkish resistance.

There's another potential complication with a Turkey and Middle East campaign. That starts to impinge on Soviet interests, even more than anything else done to date. Even if Stalin was going to carefully calculate whether or not to attack the Germans and wait till the odds were favorable, a major German presence at the straits and at his southern border will be upsetting. It could move the Soviets closer to going to the preemptive option in 1942 or 1943 than otherwise.

I don't think a German campaign in Turkey and the Levant in 1941 would cause Soviet preemption that year, or necessarily guarantee Soviet preemption in 1942. However, especially if there is German campaigning and alliances as far east as Iran, it really could leave Stalin thinking, "well where else can Hitler send his army against after this besides us?"

Agreed. There's also be the fact that by '42, the Red Army would be almost done with much of it's reform and rearmament program and so a whole lot more able to halt any subsequent German attack. The Soviets aren't ever going to be inclined to attack the Germans but their ability to actually fight the Germans only grows stronger as time goes on. A Germany which manages to knock Britain out of the war during the course of '41 only to stall out on the Red Army in '42 from the get-go is in some trouble.
 
Germany's best move in 1940 was to do nothing. Make peace with France and the Benelux countries while remaining at war with Britain.

But if they make peace with France etc. this obviously means that Germany would have to pull all its troops, aircraft and submarines out of the occupied countries. To think otherwise is an exercise in wishful thinking along the lines of "Franco enters the war so Germany can take Gibraltar" or "Japan attacks the Soviet Union to help the Germans". Basically it's the belief that other countries would cut their own throats because it benefits Hitler.
 
That would have been quite generous to the Soviets to give them Syria, and anathema to Italy and the Vichy French. Could have been forced through I guess though.

There's another potential complication with a Turkey and Middle East campaign. That starts to impinge on Soviet interests, even more than anything else done to date. Even if Stalin was going to carefully calculate whether or not to attack the Germans and wait till the odds were favorable, a major German presence at the straits and at his southern border will be upsetting. It could move the Soviets closer to going to the preemptive option in 1942 or 1943 than otherwise.

you are probably correct about my flip comment about Soviet base at Tartus, was a mash up of 1940's desire for unimpeded passage thru straits and 1960's acquisition of base there.

historically Germany did use Syria as staging area to aid Iraqi coup AND were negotiating Paris Protocols with Vichy regime around same time, both of those efforts eclipsed by Barbarossa.

entrenched in the Levant, an agreement might have been forced on Turkey similar to Romania? (Kars and Hatay to Axis?)

(bottle of anathema for France and Italy? but maybe Iraqi oil makes it more palatable)
 
But if they make peace with France etc. this obviously means that Germany would have to pull all its troops, aircraft and submarines out of the occupied countries. To think otherwise is an exercise in wishful thinking along the lines of "Franco enters the war so Germany can take Gibraltar" or "Japan attacks the Soviet Union to help the Germans". Basically it's the belief that other countries would cut their own throats because it benefits Hitler.

A peace treaty with France would mean the full evacuation of France and the Low Countries, more like a Napoleonic War (pre-1812) than WW2. Most of France's stocks of war materials, (tanks, artillery, munitions, aircraft) would be held in Germany, to be returned when Britain made peace. The Maginot Line would remain occupied by Germany, but the rest of the country would as free as it had been in September 1939.

The disadvantage would be that the coast of France would not be available for prosecuting the war against Britain. The advantage is that politically the Germans would better be able to keep the Americans neutral, (which vastly outweighed the disadvantage).
 
A peace treaty with France would mean the full evacuation of France and the Low Countries, more like a Napoleonic War (pre-1812) than WW2. The Maginot Line would remain occupied by Germany, but the rest of the country would as free as it had been in September 1939.

The disadvantage would be that the coast of France would not be available for prosecuting the war against Britain. The advantage is that politically the Germans would better be able to keep the Americans neutral, (which vastly outweighed the disadvantage).

you think they would return Alsace? Strasbourg IS east of the Maginot Line though.

not convinced about the Low Countries unless some type of puppet regimes remained.
 
you think they would return Alsace? Strasbourg IS east of the Maginot Line though.

France gets every square inch of territory it had back on September 1st, 1939; the occupation of the Maginot Line would end the moment Britain made peace.

To be clear, we're talking about two things. First, what Germany's actual best next move was after the defeat of France. Second, what captain coo coo banazi-bananas would actually have been willing to do. The OP suggested that the 'best' move was invading Russia - sure, he'd do that because he did that. But I think Germany trying repeat the outcome to the 1809 war with Austria was the way to go - but he'd not have done that.

The OP's bullet point is,

The alternative is to continue to piddle around with Britain, all the time the British strength grows and the Germans can't do or take anything of strategic importance, the USA gets more involved all the time and by 1942 or 1943 the Soviets attack anyway.

So, he's saying that Germany must fear a long war, (which is, BTW, actually the EXACT PRECISE argument for why Sealion was strategically the correct move. But I rather doubt the OP is willing to follow his own logic to its logical conclusion, the closer that logic gets to the English Channel). Anyways, he's right that Germany should fear a long war, because the longer it went on, the more likely the Americans would join it and the Russians could pile on. But other than Sealion - which was by any measure an operational long shot - there were no military means for Germany to ensure a short war. So we're looking at a long war scenario, and his long war assumptions are; (1) British strength will "grow"; (2) The US will get "more involved"; (3) The Soviets will attack. Let's examine the two solutions within that context

(1) Growth of British power - this will increase militarily more if Germany evacuations its western conquests than if it doesn't, but on the home front Churchill should have a harder time keeping a war coalition going. Why exactly is Britain still at war? Point - OP, but British power will never grow enough to defeat Germany..
(2) US intervention - this is more likely if Germany invades the USSR, less likely if Germany makes peace with France and evacuates Western Europe. Point - me.
(3) Soviet War - the chances of the OP's strategy having a war with the Soviets is 100%, because he would start it. The chances of that happening if Germany does not attack are unknown, but they were less than 100%. Probably less than 50%. Playing Russian Roulette with 3 bullets in the chamber is better than playing it with six bullets. Point - me.

not convinced about the Low Countries unless some type of puppet regimes remained.

Britain has the power of a long war, but Germany has a power too - to try and make Britain's long war look ridiculous even in the eyes of the Americans. What's clearer to me is that Germany's occupation of France was its death knell with the United States. Germany needs to get out of France because it's toxic to its relations to the US. Even if France didn't make peace, it would need to get out. Nothing was more important than keeping the US (and Russia) neutral. The same logic, IMO, held for the Low Countries - these would put the US on a collision course in a way that the partition of Poland might not.
 
you think they would return Alsace? Strasbourg IS east of the Maginot Line though.

not convinced about the Low Countries unless some type of puppet regimes remained.

France gets every square inch of territory it had back on September 1st, 1939; the occupation of the Maginot Line would end the moment Britain made peace.

To be clear, we're talking about two things. First, what Germany's actual best next move was after the defeat of France. Second, what captain coo coo banazi-bananas would actually have been willing to do. The OP suggested that the 'best' move was invading Russia - sure, he'd do that because he did that. But I think Germany trying repeat the outcome to the 1809 war with Austria was the way to go - but he'd not have done that.

Britain has the power of a long war, but Germany has a power too - to try and make Britain's long war look ridiculous even in the eyes of the Americans. What's clearer to me is that Germany's occupation of France was its death knell with the United States. Germany needs to get out of France because it's toxic to its relations to the US. Even if France didn't make peace, it would need to get out. Nothing was more important than keeping the US (and Russia) neutral. The same logic, IMO, held for the Low Countries - these would put the US on a collision course in a way that the partition of Poland might not.

agree with your logic if not every particular. my idea is there will never be any agreement with GB because they cannot be invaded, but an agreement with Vichy regime would have been relatively easy and that would at least stall US entry into European theater.

just examine way Vichy regime funneled Belgian gold back to Germany hording their own? do not think they would sacrifice Belgium and Congo for their own sovereignty?
 
Taking Moscow is not just a matter of logistic realities. The USSR used a defense in depth approach at Moscow. Just like with the Molotov line with fortified regions that had depth of 30-50 km of echeloned pepared, defensive zones. The inner defense of Moscow appear to be some 30 km. Barbarossa has these examples such as the Vitebsk Gate including Polotsk, Vitebsk, Orsha, Mogilev fortified regions of the Stalin line and Smolensk itself fortified to Brest levels and all of this stretching some 225 km it seems. Even Kiev (protected by Iziaslavl, Ostropol, Shepetovka, Starokonstantinov, Korosten, Novgrad-Volynski, Letichev, Kamenets-Podolski, plus seven other fortified regions as part of the defenses) or Leningrad (Kingisepp, Ostrov/Pskov, Sebrzh fortified regions) A nodal point in the rail network like Smolensk before it, Moscow was guarded by a group of fronts, two strategic level echelons but included the Rzhev-Viaz'ma Defensive line and the Mozhaisk Defensive Line which had been started sometime during the advance on Smolensk. In the case of Moscow there was the West Front, Reserve Front, Kalinin Front, etc. The field deployments into the Moscow area of course benefited from rail, the value of which saw the mobilization and regrouping of twelve armies during the first two months made possible by rail. The first operational echelon consisting of Soviet armies of the first strategic echelon would be the first hit by the German advance and appears to be comprised of the Western Front and were responsible for the first defensive operations as such. Meanewhile operational second echeloned or reserve divisions or corps would be what is directed against the German armor attack groups and other strike elements for example on German axes of advance in waiting for strategic reserves to make their move. Very similar to Kurskr, where the Voronezh Front had to rely on the strategic reserves to finally stop the German advance. This was a situation like where the forward deployed groupings of fronts had to endure in the western military districts at the onset of Barbarossa. German advances broke through the operational first echelon and it fell on second echeloned and reserve forces to stop the the German advance. It failed at Barbarossa probably for a variety of reasons least of which was peacetime readiness, possibly operational training, and even availability and density of forces regarding the second strategic echelon due in no small part to mobilization. Deep operations into the depth of Soviet defense by the Germans also targetes command and control as well as reserves and logistic units. The quantity of forces needed to balance German breakthroughs may have been met by general mobilization and deployment but this may be ignoring logistic realities. Soviet offensive doctrine extended to defensive doctrine as well as aggressive operations in the force deployments having an in depth defense zone, or a operational echelon consisting of echeloned forces.
 

Deleted member 97083

Just with glancing on some numbers, the Nazis could have resettled the entirity of occupied Poland with German farmers if they'd conducted a land reform. But they couldn't if they wanted to retain the loyalty of their core supporters.
Can you elaborate some more?

Depends on how long the war last, but the Germans spent FAR more resources fighting the Russians than they ever got out of Russia during the occupation, so it was a huge net resource drain. What's ironic is that West Germany ended up being able to feed itself post-war just on it's own agricultural production by rationalizing it's farm layout (the Flurbereinigung of the 1950s) even with the massive lost of its major farm lands in the East. They could have saved FAR more had they not invaded the USSR (not even counting the lives of their men). Even cut loose from the USSR, as they were IOTL from 1941-45, they were still able to run their war effort and fight a HUGE conflict for years.
But the Soviet Union also would have had more resources had they not been invaded. So Germany could still become a satellite of the USSR.
 

Deleted member 1487

But the Soviet Union also would have had more resources had they not been invaded. So Germany could still become a satellite of the USSR.
Depends how long the war goes on, whether the US gets involved, and how well the Germans manage their resource stocks. They were doing decently IOTL until early 1944.
 

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Both. Also, what kind of land reform are you referring to? Identical to the Flurbereinigung?
Kind of. The Westelbian farms were small, something like 7-9 acres per family farm on average (of my head, so don't quote me on the exact numbers), while the maximum size of a one-family farm would be 20 acres.
East of Elbe the farms were dominated by the junker estates. A land reform where the westelbian farms were reformed into 20 acre farms would ensure enough farmers to resettle the General Gouvernant with German farmers (and possible also be enough to split up the East elbian estates, but not sure, again from memory).

But you don't anger a large portion of your officer corps by taking their family estates in the middle of a war, that would just be stupid, like say invading the USSR and declaring war on the USA while still att war with the UK.

The other part is that the farmers were the core of Nazi supporters, mostly because the entire Nazi ideolgy stems from Blut und Boden and the support and status Nazi-Germany gave to its farmers, understand Blut und Boden and you understand the thinking of Nazi-Germany (and I mean everything, Lebensraum, Endlösung all of it). In essence the German farmers didn't want to do a land reform, they were quite happy with their small family farms and had no inclination of moving their family to Poland and start all over there. So the Nazis never seriously tried, maybe if they won the war they would have.
 
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