Yeah I think Gallipolli was a failure of competence rather than concept. The other ‘plans’ are so flawed in concept they be hard to pull off with perfect competence and the enemy’s active cooperation.
 
Churchill's folly

Blaming Churchill for Gallipoli is like the Pizza take away shop blaming me for delivering the wrong pizza to the one I ordered to the wrong address

As mad Amphibious plans go this one at least had a reasonable chance of working had it been conducted earlier and with some alacrity once carried out (and/or with greek troops?)

I don't think it was unthinkable that once the Peninsula (which was originally undefended) was taken the Ottoman government would collapse and that CP power would be kicked out of the war and the principle Logistical route to Russia was opened
 
Ok, so I hear you...the Gallipoli amphibious and naval campaign shouldn't be included because it was "capable" of being successful (not that I agree with you due to leadership incompetence and tactical failures).

I'll raise you one, how about the Falklands. The way the Argentinian leadership conducted the campaign truly meant there was not a reasonable chance of working.
 
@sdgottsch : Have to agree with you about the Falklands. The Argentinians had the advantage of playing much closer to home, but if Britain wants them back they get them back. Basically the Argies have from the day it starts to however long it takes the first British nuclear sub to arrive in the area to substantially reinforce, after that, and if a couple more arrive, nothing moves by sea. They can bring in more infantry by air, but their ability to transport artillery and armor that way is almost nil. The capabilities of the RN mean that between subs and surface forces, any naval vessels the Argentinian Navy sends forth become artificial reefs. Sure better tactics could make it somewhat more expensive, although the almost suicidal courage of the pilots probably made the cost to the RN and shipping as much as it could be. The vast bulk of the Argentinian forces were poorly trained and motivated conscripts, and most of the equipment was second line/obsolescent with some exceptions and the good stuff like exocets was in limited supply.

This whole exercise was yet another example of the "we kick them in the balls straight off, and they won't be willing to hit back" thinking. I don't think the general staff in Argentina really thought they could beat the UK on their own. The Falklands war is a classic example of "the only way to win is not to play".
 

SsgtC

Banned
This whole exercise was yet another example of the "we kick them in the balls straight off, and they won't be willing to hit back" thinking. I don't think the general staff in Argentina really thought they could beat the UK on their own. The Falklands war is a classic example of "the only way to win is not to play".
Keep in mind the Defense Review that had just been completed. That review essentially gutted British Power Projection capability. Had Argentina waited just a little longer, the UK wouldn't have been able to retake the islands. Hell, even in OTL the UK had already agreed to sell Invincible to Australia. If the Junta waited till the transfer had already happened, they would have had unquestioned air supremacy. Plus, I've read (don't know how accurate it is) that Argentina halfway expected the US to side with them over the UK and "encourage" the UK to back down and let them have the islands.
 
@sdgottsch[snip]Sure better tactics could make it somewhat more expensive, although the almost suicidal courage of the pilots probably made the cost to the RN and shipping as much as it could be. The vast bulk of the Argentinian forces were poorly trained and motivated conscripts, and most of the equipment was second line/obsolescent with some exceptions and the good stuff like exocets was in limited supply.

If more Argentine bombs had exploded that would have caused serious trouble for the RN. Likewise if Argentina had obtained more Exocet's prior to the outbreak of war and had some more time to work the crews up.
 
@SsgtC : IMHO the junta moved when it did because of internal reasons, they felt that their power was being threatened and an external enemy/military victory would cement their control at home. I agree had the Argentines waited a year or two, things could have worked in their favor. Non-military concerns seem to have forced heir hand.
 

SsgtC

Banned
@SsgtC : IMHO the junta moved when it did because of internal reasons, they felt that their power was being threatened and an external enemy/military victory would cement their control at home. I agree had the Argentines waited a year or two, things could have worked in their favor. Non-military concerns seem to have forced heir hand.
Yeah, that seems to be the main reason they moved when they did. It's just a little odd seeing it mentioned here. Because of all the plans listed, this one could have actually worked had the Junta not been forced by domestic affairs into moving early.
 
To make that work the Japanese would need a major change in submarine tactics

Plus the distances are much bigger in the Pacific.
The change in submarine tactics is what I was getting at, that is, doing this would have been more practical than their elaborate encirclement plan. As for the distances, they are far from insurmountable and the Japanese already control territory relatively well very near Australia. Japanese and American submarine nes had no trouble reaching one another's coasts and German subs were able to reach the Indian Ocean.
 
Those bombing came from Sri Lanka. Darwin is blocked by New Guinea

Borneo is beyond the max range of a B-17 and a B-24 from Sri Lanka and all sources state the raids came from the Darwin area; this is, after all, where the airfields for doing exactly this were built.

Most of the Australian shipping was west to Britain, it would certainly have had some impact of Australian trade with USA but hardly a significant war changing event.

The distance from either Miami or London to Perth through the Cape of Good Hope is over 9,000 miles; from there to Sydney on the southeast coast is another 2,000 miles. From Los Angeles to Sydney would be 7,500 miles, meaning that the "Perth" route would be at least 50% longer. Other issues, besides sheer distance, were also afoot and the Atlantic route was never viable in the early and middle war phases for Australia.
 
Ok, so I hear you...the Gallipoli amphibious and naval campaign shouldn't be included because it was "capable" of being successful (not that I agree with you due to leadership incompetence and tactical failures).

I'll raise you one, how about the Falklands. The way the Argentinian leadership conducted the campaign truly meant there was not a reasonable chance of working.

For those of us - particularly in one of the 'English speaking' Five eyes nations the invasion made no sense, it was an act of lunacy, crazier than a shit house rat, the juntas 'lift is not going all the way to the top floor', they are 2 cans short of a six pack and so on.

We are incapable of going through the looking glass and following the Argentine Juntas thought process down the rabbit hole.

To the Argentine leadership it made perfect sense however- the British after all were done, finished. Their MPs busy being caught buggering each other on some common or another. They after all had not fought in any wars since 1945 (unlike the mighty Argentine armed forces which had been fighting the dirty war for the good of mankind), a nation who where were gelding their military - particularly the Royal Navy, being run into the ground by a militant trade union movement and lastly......were being led by a 'weak' woman.

So the time was ripe for Argentina to conduct a 'Goa', occupy the Falklands wait for the international community to calm down, the British to do nothing and effectively annex the islands into Argentine control.

What could possibly go wrong?
 
For those of us - particularly in one of the 'English speaking' Five eyes nations the invasion made no sense, it was an act of lunacy, crazier than a shit house rat, the juntas 'lift is not going all the way to the top floor', they are 2 cans short of a six pack and so on.

We are incapable of going through the looking glass and following the Argentine Juntas thought process down the rabbit hole.

To the Argentine leadership it made perfect sense however- the British after all were done, finished. Their MPs busy being caught buggering each other on some common or another. They after all had not fought in any wars since 1945 (unlike the mighty Argentine armed forces which had been fighting the dirty war for the good of mankind), a nation who where were gelding their military - particularly the Royal Navy, being run into the ground by a militant trade union movement and lastly......were being led by a 'weak' woman.

So the time was ripe for Argentina to conduct a 'Goa', occupy the Falklands wait for the international community to calm down, the British to do nothing and effectively annex the islands into Argentine control.

What could possibly go wrong?

Well, for the worst that could happen? The UK to decide that it wasn't going to be pushed around by some two bit band of dictators and 15 minutes after a submarine receives launch authorization BA disappears off the map in a blast of light? Followed shortly afterwards by every other Argentinian city?
 
Well, for the worst that could happen? The UK to decide that it wasn't going to be pushed around by some two bit band of dictators and 15 minutes after a submarine receives launch authorization BA disappears off the map in a blast of light? Followed shortly afterwards by every other Argentinian city?

Not with that old lady in charge - never going to happen
 
As for the distances, they are far from insurmountable and the Japanese already control territory relatively well very near Australia. Japanese and American submarine nes had no trouble reaching one another's coasts and German subs were able to reach the Indian Ocean.

Where would you put the Japanese submarine bases, Australia would have two main sea routes that need to be blocked, one thru Melbourne and Sydney to the US and the other from Perth to Britain both these routes can be diverted south without many problems. When would you start constructing them? It takes about 6 to 12 months to build them.

The other issue is that Australia is mainly an exporter with a developed economy. Much of what was imported can be locally produced although at a higher cost. As the war progressed more and more was produced locally. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Australian_military_equipment_of_World_War_II Oil would be a problem.
 
Borneo is beyond the max range of a B-17 and a B-24 from Sri Lanka and all sources state the raids came from the Darwin area; this is, after all, where the airfields for doing exactly this were built.

B-29 was not very successful.



The distance from either Miami or London to Perth through the Cape of Good Hope is over 9,000 miles; from there to Sydney on the southeast coast is another 2,000 miles. From Los Angeles to Sydney would be 7,500 miles, meaning that the "Perth" route would be at least 50% longer. Other issues, besides sheer distance, were also afoot and the Atlantic route was never viable in the early and middle war phases for Australia.

Round the Cape is where most of the Australian exports went in WW2 and in the early stages of the war, most war equipment came from the UK. The US and Australian trade were secondary. Having said that, the convoy routes could be made so from Melbourne and Sydney a ship goes more south and then to the US. I do accept that the longer route and the possible requirement for convoys would reduce the tonnage that could be carried.

The other issue is that as time went on, as Australian industry switched to wartime production, the local armament industry grew massively.
 
The Japanese submarines have plenty of range, so if used in a anti-shipping role could cover most any practical deviations in shipping lanes - and ever day you extend a journey is actually two, and exacerbates shipping shortages - this is for the US-Australia routes, the UK-Australia routes could have been covered by territories conquered OTL. This, of course, presupposes the Japanese rethink their submarine force doctrine and tactics. This they did not do, even when looking at the early successes of the U-boats in the Battle of the Atlantic. Because of the minimal submarine threat to merchant traffic in the Pacific, convoying and escorts was much less of a strain than in the Atlantic. Had the Japanese used their submarines like the Germans, the USN would have had to devote more resources to convoying and ASW escorts for convoys in the Pacific and even US resources were not infinite meaning the pinch would be felt elsewhere, and such as system would have slowed down the flow of supplies (not just to Australia but to and beyond Hawaii) as convoys were slower on average than independent sailings. Additionally, the Japanese had a fair number of excellent long range seaplanes which could operate from Fiji/Samoa meaning you now need escort carriers not only for the air ASW they provide but also to deal with snoopers - another drain on resources. The IJN had submarine tenders and seaplane tenders and could operate from a newly captured island like Fiji before more permanent/extensive shore facilities were constructed.

Expecting a mind shift with such a change in doctrine is almost ASB, however the cost of this strategy compared to a land invasion or series of same in Australia is much lower and the chance of achieving anything meaningful is higher.
 
The Japanese submarines have plenty of range, so if used in a anti-shipping role could cover most any practical deviations in shipping lanes - and ever day you extend a journey is actually two, and exacerbates shipping shortages - this is for the US-Australia routes, the UK-Australia routes could have been covered by territories conquered OTL. This, of course, presupposes the Japanese rethink their submarine force doctrine and tactics. This they did not do, even when looking at the early successes of the U-boats in the Battle of the Atlantic. Because of the minimal submarine threat to merchant traffic in the Pacific, convoying and escorts was much less of a strain than in the Atlantic. Had the Japanese used their submarines like the Germans, the USN would have had to devote more resources to convoying and ASW escorts for convoys in the Pacific and even US resources were not infinite meaning the pinch would be felt elsewhere, and such as system would have slowed down the flow of supplies (not just to Australia but to and beyond Hawaii) as convoys were slower on average than independent sailings. Additionally, the Japanese had a fair number of excellent long range seaplanes which could operate from Fiji/Samoa meaning you now need escort carriers not only for the air ASW they provide but also to deal with snoopers - another drain on resources. The IJN had submarine tenders and seaplane tenders and could operate from a newly captured island like Fiji before more permanent/extensive shore facilities were constructed.

Expecting a mind shift with such a change in doctrine is almost ASB, however the cost of this strategy compared to a land invasion or series of same in Australia is much lower and the chance of achieving anything meaningful is higher.

The initial Japanese plan was to get a sizeable area and defend that, as it was they would have done better with this plan then what they did. Such an enhanced Japanese submarine program would fit in well with your proposal. The Japnese though would need to start building something like a type 7c much early then Dec 1941. It took Germany about 3 years to get into full production.
 
The Japanese submarines have plenty of range, so if used in a anti-shipping role could cover most any practical deviations in shipping lanes - and ever day you extend a journey is actually two, and exacerbates shipping shortages - this is for the US-Australia routes, the UK-Australia routes could have been covered by territories conquered OTL. This, of course, presupposes the Japanese rethink their submarine force doctrine and tactics. This they did not do, even when looking at the early successes of the U-boats in the Battle of the Atlantic. Because of the minimal submarine threat to merchant traffic in the Pacific, convoying and escorts was much less of a strain than in the Atlantic. Had the Japanese used their submarines like the Germans, the USN would have had to devote more resources to convoying and ASW escorts for convoys in the Pacific and even US resources were not infinite meaning the pinch would be felt elsewhere, and such as system would have slowed down the flow of supplies (not just to Australia but to and beyond Hawaii) as convoys were slower on average than independent sailings. Additionally, the Japanese had a fair number of excellent long range seaplanes which could operate from Fiji/Samoa meaning you now need escort carriers not only for the air ASW they provide but also to deal with snoopers - another drain on resources. The IJN had submarine tenders and seaplane tenders and could operate from a newly captured island like Fiji before more permanent/extensive shore facilities were constructed.

Expecting a mind shift with such a change in doctrine is almost ASB, however the cost of this strategy compared to a land invasion or series of same in Australia is much lower and the chance of achieving anything meaningful is higher.

The Japanese did use their submarines for commerce raiding. They used them in that at manner in the Indian Ocean and they enjoyed some success and they even sank a few ships off the US west coast so it is not ASB to suggest the Japanese adopt a broader commerce raiding strategy for their submarines. The problem is they had too few of them (as in fewer than 200). The Germans by contrast built over 1000 to cover a much smaller ocean. So if you want a Japanese submarine fleet that is big enough to execute a serious commerce raiding strategy against the USN and RN in the Pacific and Indian Oceans they are going to have to build a lot more submarines meaning they don't build a whole lot of something else.
 
BTW, invading the Falklands was not a crazy invasion idea. The invasion worked just fine. Holding them, that was the problem.

BTW2, the idea that the US might side with or at least be more less neutral in the conflict and pressure the British to settle it without war is not totally out of bounds. Reagan's UN Ambassador Jean Kirkpatrick was openly pro-Argentina because she saw the junta as the bulwark of an anti-Communist block in Latin America. Fortunately, Reagan listened to his pro-British Secretary of State Al Haig who subsequently main Kirkpatrick shut up and sit in a corner with a dunce cap on her head.

Of course this is the problem when thugs don't understand the messy nature of US politics. Just because somebody of some relative importance on the US political scene is sympathetic to you, doesn't mean the president is and in the end, he is the only one that matters.
 
The Japanese did use their submarines for commerce raiding. They used them in that at manner in the Indian Ocean and they enjoyed some success and they even sank a few ships off the US west coast so it is not ASB to suggest the Japanese adopt a broader commerce raiding strategy for their submarines. The problem is they had too few of them (as in fewer than 200). The Germans by contrast built over 1000 to cover a much smaller ocean. So if you want a Japanese submarine fleet that is big enough to execute a serious commerce raiding strategy against the USN and RN in the Pacific and Indian Oceans they are going to have to build a lot more submarines meaning they don't build a whole lot of something else.

Germany pretty well dropped its entire surface fleet to concentrate on U-boats.
 
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