Churchill's folly
Keep in mind the Defense Review that had just been completed. That review essentially gutted British Power Projection capability. Had Argentina waited just a little longer, the UK wouldn't have been able to retake the islands. Hell, even in OTL the UK had already agreed to sell Invincible to Australia. If the Junta waited till the transfer had already happened, they would have had unquestioned air supremacy. Plus, I've read (don't know how accurate it is) that Argentina halfway expected the US to side with them over the UK and "encourage" the UK to back down and let them have the islands.This whole exercise was yet another example of the "we kick them in the balls straight off, and they won't be willing to hit back" thinking. I don't think the general staff in Argentina really thought they could beat the UK on their own. The Falklands war is a classic example of "the only way to win is not to play".
@sdgottsch[snip]Sure better tactics could make it somewhat more expensive, although the almost suicidal courage of the pilots probably made the cost to the RN and shipping as much as it could be. The vast bulk of the Argentinian forces were poorly trained and motivated conscripts, and most of the equipment was second line/obsolescent with some exceptions and the good stuff like exocets was in limited supply.
Yeah, that seems to be the main reason they moved when they did. It's just a little odd seeing it mentioned here. Because of all the plans listed, this one could have actually worked had the Junta not been forced by domestic affairs into moving early.@SsgtC : IMHO the junta moved when it did because of internal reasons, they felt that their power was being threatened and an external enemy/military victory would cement their control at home. I agree had the Argentines waited a year or two, things could have worked in their favor. Non-military concerns seem to have forced heir hand.
The change in submarine tactics is what I was getting at, that is, doing this would have been more practical than their elaborate encirclement plan. As for the distances, they are far from insurmountable and the Japanese already control territory relatively well very near Australia. Japanese and American submarine nes had no trouble reaching one another's coasts and German subs were able to reach the Indian Ocean.To make that work the Japanese would need a major change in submarine tactics
Plus the distances are much bigger in the Pacific.
Those bombing came from Sri Lanka. Darwin is blocked by New Guinea
Most of the Australian shipping was west to Britain, it would certainly have had some impact of Australian trade with USA but hardly a significant war changing event.
Ok, so I hear you...the Gallipoli amphibious and naval campaign shouldn't be included because it was "capable" of being successful (not that I agree with you due to leadership incompetence and tactical failures).
I'll raise you one, how about the Falklands. The way the Argentinian leadership conducted the campaign truly meant there was not a reasonable chance of working.
For those of us - particularly in one of the 'English speaking' Five eyes nations the invasion made no sense, it was an act of lunacy, crazier than a shit house rat, the juntas 'lift is not going all the way to the top floor', they are 2 cans short of a six pack and so on.
We are incapable of going through the looking glass and following the Argentine Juntas thought process down the rabbit hole.
To the Argentine leadership it made perfect sense however- the British after all were done, finished. Their MPs busy being caught buggering each other on some common or another. They after all had not fought in any wars since 1945 (unlike the mighty Argentine armed forces which had been fighting the dirty war for the good of mankind), a nation who where were gelding their military - particularly the Royal Navy, being run into the ground by a militant trade union movement and lastly......were being led by a 'weak' woman.
So the time was ripe for Argentina to conduct a 'Goa', occupy the Falklands wait for the international community to calm down, the British to do nothing and effectively annex the islands into Argentine control.
What could possibly go wrong?
Well, for the worst that could happen? The UK to decide that it wasn't going to be pushed around by some two bit band of dictators and 15 minutes after a submarine receives launch authorization BA disappears off the map in a blast of light? Followed shortly afterwards by every other Argentinian city?
As for the distances, they are far from insurmountable and the Japanese already control territory relatively well very near Australia. Japanese and American submarine nes had no trouble reaching one another's coasts and German subs were able to reach the Indian Ocean.
Borneo is beyond the max range of a B-17 and a B-24 from Sri Lanka and all sources state the raids came from the Darwin area; this is, after all, where the airfields for doing exactly this were built.
The distance from either Miami or London to Perth through the Cape of Good Hope is over 9,000 miles; from there to Sydney on the southeast coast is another 2,000 miles. From Los Angeles to Sydney would be 7,500 miles, meaning that the "Perth" route would be at least 50% longer. Other issues, besides sheer distance, were also afoot and the Atlantic route was never viable in the early and middle war phases for Australia.
The Japanese submarines have plenty of range, so if used in a anti-shipping role could cover most any practical deviations in shipping lanes - and ever day you extend a journey is actually two, and exacerbates shipping shortages - this is for the US-Australia routes, the UK-Australia routes could have been covered by territories conquered OTL. This, of course, presupposes the Japanese rethink their submarine force doctrine and tactics. This they did not do, even when looking at the early successes of the U-boats in the Battle of the Atlantic. Because of the minimal submarine threat to merchant traffic in the Pacific, convoying and escorts was much less of a strain than in the Atlantic. Had the Japanese used their submarines like the Germans, the USN would have had to devote more resources to convoying and ASW escorts for convoys in the Pacific and even US resources were not infinite meaning the pinch would be felt elsewhere, and such as system would have slowed down the flow of supplies (not just to Australia but to and beyond Hawaii) as convoys were slower on average than independent sailings. Additionally, the Japanese had a fair number of excellent long range seaplanes which could operate from Fiji/Samoa meaning you now need escort carriers not only for the air ASW they provide but also to deal with snoopers - another drain on resources. The IJN had submarine tenders and seaplane tenders and could operate from a newly captured island like Fiji before more permanent/extensive shore facilities were constructed.
Expecting a mind shift with such a change in doctrine is almost ASB, however the cost of this strategy compared to a land invasion or series of same in Australia is much lower and the chance of achieving anything meaningful is higher.
The Japanese submarines have plenty of range, so if used in a anti-shipping role could cover most any practical deviations in shipping lanes - and ever day you extend a journey is actually two, and exacerbates shipping shortages - this is for the US-Australia routes, the UK-Australia routes could have been covered by territories conquered OTL. This, of course, presupposes the Japanese rethink their submarine force doctrine and tactics. This they did not do, even when looking at the early successes of the U-boats in the Battle of the Atlantic. Because of the minimal submarine threat to merchant traffic in the Pacific, convoying and escorts was much less of a strain than in the Atlantic. Had the Japanese used their submarines like the Germans, the USN would have had to devote more resources to convoying and ASW escorts for convoys in the Pacific and even US resources were not infinite meaning the pinch would be felt elsewhere, and such as system would have slowed down the flow of supplies (not just to Australia but to and beyond Hawaii) as convoys were slower on average than independent sailings. Additionally, the Japanese had a fair number of excellent long range seaplanes which could operate from Fiji/Samoa meaning you now need escort carriers not only for the air ASW they provide but also to deal with snoopers - another drain on resources. The IJN had submarine tenders and seaplane tenders and could operate from a newly captured island like Fiji before more permanent/extensive shore facilities were constructed.
Expecting a mind shift with such a change in doctrine is almost ASB, however the cost of this strategy compared to a land invasion or series of same in Australia is much lower and the chance of achieving anything meaningful is higher.
The Japanese did use their submarines for commerce raiding. They used them in that at manner in the Indian Ocean and they enjoyed some success and they even sank a few ships off the US west coast so it is not ASB to suggest the Japanese adopt a broader commerce raiding strategy for their submarines. The problem is they had too few of them (as in fewer than 200). The Germans by contrast built over 1000 to cover a much smaller ocean. So if you want a Japanese submarine fleet that is big enough to execute a serious commerce raiding strategy against the USN and RN in the Pacific and Indian Oceans they are going to have to build a lot more submarines meaning they don't build a whole lot of something else.