Ramifications of a world with a CP U.S. + CP victory?

So ... no mater what germany and the germans go fascist and Nazi ...
Thank You
Not quite.

Highest probability scenario in OTL was probably something like franco's regime -- a conservative authoritarianism led by the army with foreign policy goals mostly confined to reversing versailles restrictions, getting austria and doing something about the corridor. This is with the loss, Weimar and everything.

a victorious Kaiser's germany would have similar dynamics at play culturally but minus the loss. Difference is I think even more likely to end up following the conservative-authoritarian path, given 1) it'd be an army regime 2) the kind of loopholes existing in the constitution that'd enable amy takeovers that we saw in Japan's constituoon being open options.
 

CalBear

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There's a potential for Germany to go fascist in the 20s or 30s even with a CP win given the intellectual currents floating around.
Thdere was potential for damned near every country not named the Soviet Union to go fascist in the 20s & 30s. Also more than a bit of possibility that many would go true socialist/Communist Lite.

Singling out Germany, especially a Germany absent the issues present IOTL seems rather... odd.
 
Thdere was potential for damned near every country not named the Soviet Union to go fascist in the 20s & 30s. Also more than a bit of possibility that many would go true socialist/Communist Lite.

Singling out Germany, especially a Germany absent the issues present IOTL seems rather... odd.
The Soviet Union is butterflied because the Germans wouldn't allow them to exist.
 
The Soviet Union is butterflied because the Germans wouldn't allow them to exist.
You really can't just do that. World War I might itself be butterflied if the United States was in a position diplomatically and culturally to join the Central Powers. Expecting World War I to go off as scheduled is just foolish.
 
There's a potential for Germany to go fascist in the 20s or 30s even with a CP win given the intellectual currents floating around.
I doubt it... most of those "intellectual currents" (loosely used) were present in spades in other nations as well, and only came to the fore in Germany BECAUSE of the loss in WWI...
 
The Soviet Union is butterflied because the Germans wouldn't allow them to exist.
Imperial Germany certainly wasn't a fan of communism, but they did lean more towards the Reds as the party more likely to sign/adhere to Brest-Litovsk. You could have them intervene, but then there's the issue that Germany was war weary. They sent out peace feelers in OTL because they didn't want to continue the war (they also didn't want a treaty akin to OTL Versailles). So although it's a possibility they'd help the whites win, I wouldn't call it a certainty.

You really can't just do that. World War I might itself be butterflied if the United States was in a position diplomatically and culturally to join the Central Powers. Expecting World War I to go off as scheduled is just foolish.
Depends on what the POD is. If you want Britain and the USA on opposite sides, I think the most likely PODs are either the Alabama Claims or the 1895 Venezuela Crisis. It would have to be something that would butterfly away the Great Rapprochement. I guess you could also somehow have William Randolph Hearst become POTUS, since he was a real Anglophobe, but I don't know what the POD for that would be. If you go with the Alabama Claims, it's hard to say what form ATL WWI would take other than that France and Germany would presumably be on opposite sides, given the Franco-Prussian War and the USA if it entered would be on the side opposing Britain. I think the system of alliances would still build up and lead to a world war, but it's hard to predict what form that would take. Perhaps it could be combined with having Bismark not thumb his nose at the Monroe Doctrine, since that only served to piss the USA off, if Bullmoose wants Germany and the USA on the same side.

If the POD is the 1895 Venezuela crisis, I can see something a lot like OTL WWI go off, except with the USA eventually entering on the side of the CP, probably over something involving British colonies in the Americas colliding with some expanded more aggressive form of the Monroe Doctrine. You could also have war break out between the USA and Japan over spheres of influence in the Asia-Pacific, but I think in that case Britain would just throw Japan under the bus, even if they were allies. The issue is that given how much the Entente depended on bank loans and supplies from the USA, you have to have the USA join before the lack (or loss) of that sort of thing makes them sue for peace. I think that's doable. Germany was blockaded and still held out until 1918 (with its peace feelers rejected). But it does need to be addressed.
 
The Soviet Union is butterflied because the Germans wouldn't allow them to exist.
They'd definitely try. Dunno if they succeed. A long, messy guerilla war to either attempt to prevent the USSR from existing or keeping them east of the urals/volga could put enough strain on the system to justify some kind of radical shift. Up to whoever does the timeline if that means "Franco's spain Germany" a british-type constutional monarchy or some other outcome.
 

Thomas1195

Banned
The army had every opportunity to stage a coup from the early 20's to the late 30's, in Germany. They had the veteran manpower pool, the secret weapons cache and even a significant portion of dissatisfied people that would aid in such process - yet they never did it. Therefore, the argument "they can, thus they will" is terribly flawed.
That would mean Allied intervention, especially in the 1920s. And there was a Beer Hall Putsch IOTL as well.

ITTL, the victory would embolden the Kaiser, the Junkers and the right-wing factions who were no fans of democracy even more - the people who would eventually become the DNVP you know - these guys either held democracy at a contempt or openly despised it. And there is a factor that these folks held substantial influence in German universities and schools - they accounted for a disproportionately large share of professors and teachers. Also, the Heer ITTL would be a 1-million man force, not the OTL Weimar military.
 
it. And there is a factor that these folks held substantial influence in German universities and schools - they accounted for a disproportionately large share of professors and teachers. Also, the Heer ITTL would be a 1-million man force, not the OTL Weimar military.
The thing is..they feared the opposite, the nobles called the army an' armed rable' would side with both left and wing radical at ease and not able to keep public order, even the ability to dismiss kanzlern means nothing as the emperor rarelly have any power, if anything the right know if they won the war, they loss the old order forever
 

Thomas1195

Banned
If the POD is the 1895 Venezuela crisis, I can see something a lot like OTL WWI go off, except with the USA eventually entering on the side of the CP, probably over something involving British colonies in the Americas colliding with some expanded more aggressive form of the Monroe Doctrine
I think Britain's long-term policy was always respecting Monroe Doctrine since it also benefited them (there were exceptions, but I am talking about the big picture). In addition, it's hard to see a foreign policy grandmaster like Lord Salisbury bungle this affair. And a few years later, we have another Venezuelan Crisis, this time Germany bungled thanks to Kaiser Wilhelm's imbecilic behaviour, but it was not just the Kaiser. I mean, German contemporary press and political circles also frequently talked tough on the Monroe Doctrine if not openly dismiss it.

The thing is..they feared the opposite, the nobles called the army an' armed rable' would side with both left and wing radical at ease and not able to keep public order, even the ability to dismiss kanzlern means nothing as the emperor rarelly have any power, if anything the right know if they won the war, they loss the old order forever
And the left also feared the stuffs I mentioned above. There was a SD politician who eventually committed treason for such belief.
 
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That would mean Allied intervention, especially in the 1920s. And there was a Beer Hall Putsch IOTL as well.

ITTL, the victory would embolden the Kaiser, the Junkers and the right-wing factions who were no fans of democracy even more - the people who would eventually become the DNVP you know - these guys either held democracy at a contempt or openly despised it. And there is a factor that these folks held substantial influence in German universities and schools - they accounted for a disproportionately large share of professors and teachers. Also, the Heer ITTL would be a 1-million man force, not the OTL Weimar military.
Well, there was also the attempted "Kapp Putsch" in, what, 1923? But a similar event would be highly unlikely to happen in a CP victory scenario unless a handful of Generals were reeeaaally unhappy with the peace settlement - and it would be suppressed quickly.
The DNVP formed from a coalescence of smaller rightist parties, including a few far-right wingnut elements, after the massive disruption to the constitutional system that the collapse of the Empire wrought. Doubt this would've happened ITTL. Further, many of the enlisted inductees into the Army were SPD supporters. Presumably they would resume their old voting habits once discharged.
 
Well, there was also the attempted "Kapp Putsch" in, what, 1923? But a similar event would be highly unlikely to happen in a CP victory scenario unless a handful of Generals were reeeaaally unhappy with the peace settlement - and it would be suppressed quickly.
The DNVP formed from a coalescence of smaller rightist parties, including a few far-right wingnut elements, after the massive disruption to the constitutional system that the collapse of the Empire wrought. Doubt this would've happened ITTL. Further, many of the enlisted inductees into the Army were SPD supporters. Presumably they would resume their old voting habits once discharged.
Excatly, the scenario is not there, is more pausable a left wing revolution than a right wing one. That would be something, CP wins but all Europe goes Red(and maybe hating more each other), USA would be like WTF
 
I think Britain's long-term policy was always respecting Monroe Doctrine since it also benefited them (there were exceptions, but I am talking about the big picture). In addition, it's hard to see a foreign policy grandmaster like Lord Salisbury bungle this affair. And a few years later, we have another Venezuelan Crisis, this time Germany bungled thanks to Kaiser Wilhelm's imbecilic behaviour, but it was not just the Kaiser. I mean, German contemporary press and political circles also frequently talked tough on the Monroe Doctrine if not openly dismiss it.
Britain wasn't always super respectful of the Monroe Doctrine, and for much of the Venezuela crisis they (and yes, I'm including Salisbury) greatly underestimated the depth of American opposition to the British position on the issue. It wasn't going to lead to a war between the USA and the UK in 1895; that was all bluster on Cleveland's part, but it could absolutely have led to soured relations and a USA determined to be more assertive of the Monroe doctrine in the future. Although they did want to prevent other European powers from colonizing the Americas, and there was talk of a joint statement in the 1820s, the British decision to back down in 1895 is generally seen as when they accepted Monroe Doctrine, or at least accepted that it applied to them. Those "exceptions" you point out might have been considered minor by the British, but they were (with some exceptions) generally not seen as minor by the Americans. Britain mostly saw Venezuela-British Guyana dispute as something that didn't concern the USA. The USA saw the British boundary claims as Britain bullying a smaller, less powerful nation, and one of the USA's neighbors. There is a reason the Great Rapprochement, which laid the grounds for the special relationship, is generally seen as beginning in 1895. Britain's behavior, at least as seen by the Americans, was not seen as respecting the Monroe Doctrine. It was seen as violating it whilst claiming to respect it. Take a look at this article by Henry Cabot Lodge. He's relatively charitable towards Britain on the issue of the Corinto Affair in Nicaragua, but harshly critical of British conduct towards Venezuela. There were plenty of other voices that were critical of Britain with respect to both the Corinto Affair and the Guyana-Venezuela Boundary issue.
Ethno-linguistic nationalism may have been a potent force in Europe, but it was different in the New World. Yes, Americans and Brits had a shared language and America had a history of being a former British colony, but that history also included an American identity built on breaking away from the British empire by fighting a war against it. As for the 2nd Venezuela crisis, the Royal Navy didn't exactly get great press there either; it wasn't just the Germans. Although in the case of Britain, at least there was plenty of condemnation of the Royal Navy's actions in the newspapers on both sides of the Atlantic.

It's not hard to imagine Salisbury bungling the affair, because in OTL he severely misjudged it for months before realizing his error (at least with respect to the American's position). If he doesn't see error, doesn't back down, then Cleveland probably would blink eventually. Despite the bluster, Cleveland didn't want war. The ramifications in America would be a backlash against the Democratic party.

The butterflies in Britain could very well include being more assertive in the 1902-1903 Venezuela crisis. Both Britain and Germany (and later Italy) sent ships to blockade Venezuela. They both later agreed to go to arbitration. The Roosevelt corollary was established. The reason Germany was seen in a harsher light was that they had made noises indicating they would accept temporary occupation of Venezuelan harbors as payment of the debts in question, not because of German newspapers. I wonder what the butterflies on the British actions in that crisis would be if Grover Cleveland had proven to be all bluster, a paper tiger, during the 1895 Venezuela crisis; especially if Britain had ended up getting its most extreme claims in British Guyana-Venezuela boundary dispute. Would someone in the government or the foreign ministry make similar hints? Perhaps not, and if they did it would probably have to do with the mouth of the Orinoco rather than being an effort to get a naval base. If they tried to do something akin to the Corinto Affair in Venezuela (or hinted at it), after having taken the territory constituting their most extreme claims in 1895, that would probably not endear them to the American public. In OTL they hoisted the Union Jack over the island of Patos in 1902. Also note that when chancellor von Bülow spoke of using force to strongarm Venezuela during 2nd Venezuelan crisis, Kaiser Wilhelm II objected, at least at first. His brother was going on a goodwill trip to the Americas, and he didn't want to ruin it by alienating the USA.

If the USA is less Anglophilic and more concerned about British violations of the Monroe Doctrine than in OTL, which would result if Salisbury didn't back down during the 1895 Venezuelan crisis, then even if the events of the 2nd Venezuelan crisis unfolded largely the same way as they did in OTL, they could be perceived very differently.
 

Thomas1195

Banned
Britain wasn't always super respectful of the Monroe Doctrine, and for much of the Venezuela crisis they (and yes, I'm including Salisbury) greatly underestimated the depth of American opposition to the British position on the issue. It wasn't going to lead to a war between the USA and the UK in 1895; that was all bluster on Cleveland's part, but it could absolutely have led to soured relations and a USA determined to be more assertive of the Monroe doctrine in the future. Although they did want to prevent other European powers from colonizing the Americas, and there was talk of a joint statement in the 1820s, the British decision to back down in 1895 is generally seen as when they accepted Monroe Doctrine, or at least accepted that it applied to them. Those "exceptions" you point out might have been considered minor by the British, but they were (with some exceptions) generally not seen as minor by the Americans. Britain mostly saw Venezuela-British Guyana dispute as something that didn't concern the USA. The USA saw the British boundary claims as Britain bullying a smaller, less powerful nation, and one of the USA's neighbors. There is a reason the Great Rapprochement, which laid the grounds for the special relationship, is generally seen as beginning in 1895. Britain's behavior, at least as seen by the Americans, was not seen as respecting the Monroe Doctrine. It was seen as violating it whilst claiming to respect it. Take a look at this article by Henry Cabot Lodge. He's relatively charitable towards Britain on the issue of the Corinto Affair in Nicaragua, but harshly critical of British conduct towards Venezuela. There were plenty of other voices that were critical of Britain with respect to both the Corinto Affair and the Guyana-Venezuela Boundary issue.
Ethno-linguistic nationalism may have been a potent force in Europe, but it was different in the New World. Yes, Americans and Brits had a shared language and America had a history of being a former British colony, but that history also included an American identity built on breaking away from the British empire by fighting a war against it. As for the 2nd Venezuela crisis, the Royal Navy didn't exactly get great press there either; it wasn't just the Germans. Although in the case of Britain, at least there was plenty of condemnation of the Royal Navy's actions in the newspapers on both sides of the Atlantic.

It's not hard to imagine Salisbury bungling the affair, because in OTL he severely misjudged it for months before realizing his error (at least with respect to the American's position). If he doesn't see error, doesn't back down, then Cleveland probably would blink eventually. Despite the bluster, Cleveland didn't want war. The ramifications in America would be a backlash against the Democratic party.

The butterflies in Britain could very well include being more assertive in the 1902-1903 Venezuela crisis. Both Britain and Germany (and later Italy) sent ships to blockade Venezuela. They both later agreed to go to arbitration. The Roosevelt corollary was established. The reason Germany was seen in a harsher light was that they had made noises indicating they would accept temporary occupation of Venezuelan harbors as payment of the debts in question, not because of German newspapers. I wonder what the butterflies on the British actions in that crisis would be if Grover Cleveland had proven to be all bluster, a paper tiger, during the 1895 Venezuela crisis; especially if Britain had ended up getting its most extreme claims in British Guyana-Venezuela boundary dispute. Would someone in the government or the foreign ministry make similar hints? Perhaps not, and if they did it would probably have to do with the mouth of the Orinoco rather than being an effort to get a naval base. If they tried to do something akin to the Corinto Affair in Venezuela (or hinted at it), after having taken the territory constituting their most extreme claims in 1895, that would probably not endear them to the American public. In OTL they hoisted the Union Jack over the island of Patos in 1902. Also note that when chancellor von Bülow spoke of using force to strongarm Venezuela during 2nd Venezuelan crisis, Kaiser Wilhelm II objected, at least at first. His brother was going on a goodwill trip to the Americas, and he didn't want to ruin it by alienating the USA.

If the USA is less Anglophilic and more concerned about British violations of the Monroe Doctrine than in OTL, which would result if Salisbury didn't back down during the 1895 Venezuelan crisis, then even if the events of the 2nd Venezuelan crisis unfolded largely the same way as they did in OTL, they could be perceived very differently.
I see that, but anyway the latest POD is probably the 1895 crisis going differently. After that, Britain probably had a better idea of how the Americans would react than say, Germany.

As for Germany, the problems were deeper, due to the undercurrent "Place in the Sun" mentality among the German political class and naval planners, as both sought to openly defy the Monroe Doctrine and to, for example, establish foothold in the Caribbeans. And these were taken into account by American naval planners as well.
 
I think self-quoting would be the best idea.

Allright, here it is.

A White Victory in the Russian Civil War would have been a lot worse for Russia, if not the world, than what happened in OTL (let alone a Red Victory in general).

▪︎The immediate period following the Reds
defeat (ca. 1921 to 1926).

The White Movement was not a unified front, but the result of various anti-communist uprisings all over Russia. There was no real central authority in the movement, and the various white generals acted more or less like warlords, beeing united only in their goal of crushing soviet power. All those generals had seperate bases of support, with the individual soldier fighting not for "the White Movement", but against Bolshevism, for the holy Rodina, and (most importantly) for his respective general. Assuming the POD is in 1919, with Yudenich capturing Petrograd and Denikin taking Moscow (the most plausible POD for a White Victory in my opinion), you'd end up with the soviet power beeing crushed by around 1921/22 and Russia coming under the control of 4 different white generals (Yudenich in the north, Denikin in south and central Russia, Kolchak in Siberia, and Semyonov in Transamur).

At this point, the White Movement would allmost innevitably fall apart. Though in OTL virtually all of the white generals pledged allegiance to "Supreme Leader Kolchak's" Russian State in Omsk in 1919, none of them would be ready to surrender control over his armies and occupied territories. Paranoia of renewed working class activity would cause large parts of the burgeoisie to just back the general that can best maintain order in their respective region. Some parts of the ruling class would rally around Kolchak and would try to convince the white generals that they need to band together in order to stabilize Russia, however the price of state would most likely be too tantalizing for those who have the means to seize it.

On a more detailed decriptionof why the White Movement would splinter after the Reds defeat, see @Ulyanovsk's posts in this thread.


Now, there are two options:

1.) Russia enters a warlord era, in a similiar way to China, with the various warlo... *cough*, I mean governors, paying lip service to a weak central government, while at the same time ruling over their respective regions with near full authority. Beeing a splintered country would not be, how do I put this eloquently, beneficial for Russia's economic developement. Considering the premise, Denikin would be the most powerfull of the warlords, and a Northward (against Yudenich) or Westward (Kolchak) expedition is possible. However, unlike in China, the most powerfull faction would not be all too superior militarily compared to the others, therefore such an action would likely escalate the unstable situation into another Russian Civil War.

2.) That brings us to the other possibility: A second Russian Civil War, right after the first one. Basically all of the white generals wanted to occupy a leading role in the new state, and, as allready mentioned, all of them had their individual bases of support and armed forces at their disposal. And of course the different factions of the ruling class would want their guy to be the one to unite Russia. Once organized Red Army resistance collapses, Kolchak would demand submission to his "All Russian Government". Denikin, controlling most of Russia's industrial hearthland would refuse of course, seeing the chance to seize power himself. Fighting breaks out, and the other warlords quickly join in the fray as all of them want to expand their territory. A long and brutal second war breaks out (historiography would most likely distinguish between the first phase of the Russian Civil War, i.e. Reds against whites, and the second phase, i.e. the various white armies against one another). The Cossacks may betray Denikin and foreign powers may back different factions or even outright conquer specific regions (Japan might take parts of the Far East, while Finland might take Karelia. Transcaucasia and Ukraine might also take some land). Remaining bolshevik and ethnic minority insurgencies, aswell as spontaneous peasant uprisings, would make the conflict even more chaotic, not to speak of the fact that some of the white generals might attempt to reconquer some of the "lost territories" (i.e. the territories that belonged to the Russian Empire in 1914). Some officers might attempt to depose their respective general and take control of some of the troops themselves. Worst case scenario, Russia completely collapses as a nation, and a dozen breakaway warlord fiefdoms replace what was once one of the worlds great powers. "Best" case scenario, one of the warlords manages to unite most of Russia under his control (I think Denikin is the most promising candidate, for in this TL he would, as allready mentioned, control most of Russia's industrial and population centers). In the latter case, the war would come to an end around 1925/26. Millions more would die on the battlefields, from starvation and through progroms, and the countries agriculture and industry would be all but destroyed.

For the rest of this scenario I will continue with the "One Warlord manages to unite Russia after a long and grueling Second Civil War" possibility, as this is the possibility for which one can make the most accurate predictions.

▪︎The White Regime (ca. 1927 to the 1940s):

Chances of a burgeois-democratic Russia after the civil war are remote to non-existent. The Bolsheviks and Left-SRs had the absolute majority of the people on their side, even before the civil war began. And their popularity only increased as the war progresed. Therefore, had the victorious white forces really established a burgeois-democracy after their victory, the Bolsheviks and Left-SRs would have won the first election by a landslide (which was, of course, unacceptable to the ruling class). Not even to speak of ethnic minorities, seperatism
and the neccesity to suppress remaining rival warlords. Even if the new white regime had somehow gained popular support after some years (and thats a big if), it would still not allow the Bolsheviks and national liberation groups to agitate freely, fearing another revolution. A ban on unions and strikes (1. They violate the direct economic interst of the bourgeoisie. 2. Look what role strikes played in the October Revolution) would be very good for the ruling class, too. Moreover, the russian ruling class would definetly try to reconquer the "lost territories" (i.e. everything that belonged to Tsarist Russia in 1914), and while major aggressive wars are possible under a burgeois-democracy, a more authoritarian form of government would definetly facilitate the economic and psychological preparations for war. And let's also not foget that many of those who fought in the white movement opposed the very idea of democracy (not only the tsar loyalists). Last but not least, a burgeois-democracy would've been hardly able to cope with the massive post-war devastation which, thanks to the war's second phase, would be a lot worse than in OTL (from the ruling classes perspective, strikes and protests against long working hours, high land taxes and the white regime as a whole would be less than ideal in the post-war recovery). Most of the russian ruling class would prefer a fascist or at least very reactionary dictatorship for these reasons.

For another perspective on why the whites would have to govern in an authoritarian way, I'd suggest @David T's post in this thread.


You can be sure that in the 1920s there wouldn't be an 8 hour working day, a brief legalization of homosexuality, an indigenization pollicy towards minorities and a period of indirect soviet democracy from 1917 to 1936.

As allready mentioned, the Bolsheviks and Left-SRs (later the Bolsheviks alone) had the support of the absolute majority of the people (actually the Bolsheviks alone had won the absolute majority of seats in the Second All Russian Congress of Soviets in October of 1917), and it's doubtfull that the whites would try to integrate their enemies into the new society the way the Bolsheviks did in OTL (many white soldiers were given amnesty and the post-civil war purges were actually very limited compared to how they could have been). It's likely that millions of suspectes bolsheviks and bolshevik sypathizers would be murdered or worked to death in Siberian labour camps.

And thats only where things start to go downhill. It's unlikely that the new white regime would be able to pacify the countryside as it would severely lack popular support, at least in the first decade (I know I've mentioned it two times allready but again, the Bolsheviks had the majority of the people on their side. And even many of those that didn't support the Bolsheviks would have opposed a reactionary, potentially military, dictatorship). Bolshevik and ethnic minority insugencies would remain a problem for the Petrograd government for years if not decades to come. More bloody purges would follow in order to suppress these insurgencies, but their effect would likely be limited. Russia is huge and if the people don't support you it's hard to project power beyond the urban regions.

There would be no state led industrialization and collectivization (at least not on the OTL scale). Best case is that Tsarist growth rates of around 3 to 4 percent more or less continue, though not even that is given, considering the massive devastation of the war. It's not even clear how (or if at all) the new regime would have attacked the remainders of the feudal nobility. It's very possible that feudal or at least semi-feudal relations in the countryside persist way into the 50s and 60s (like in India or Nationalist China).

Now to the treatment of the various ethnicities: The white movement massively propagated great russian chauvinism (you know "Russia Unified, Great and Indivisible") and it is allmost innevitable that russia's ruling class continues the pollicy of russification. It would very likely double down on these efforts, way more than the Tsarist regime ever did (the October Revolution and Civil War had clearly proven the "disloyalty" of ethnic minorities to the White Movement. Moreover, as allready mentioned, ethnic minority insugencies would continue to be a problem for the white regime. Therefore it is only logical that the Petrograd government would increase the cultural assimilation efforts). Massive deportations would take place in non-russian territories (the scale depends on which territories the whites are able to get control over. Deportations in a white Russia with Ukraine for example would be very different from deportations in a white Russia without Ukraine). Vocal minorities would be sent to labour camps in Siberia, where they'd be worked to death. Russian would be the official language and it's very likely that the use of other languages would get baned (Ems Ukaz writ large and all over the empire with dracoic punishment in case of "violation". Unlike the Ems Ukaz, these pollicies may likely also concern the spoken word. Immagine someone in Karkov reporting his neigbour to the Okhrana, because he ostensibly heard the man speak ukrainian to his wife while taking a smoke).

These pollicies might have shown good results in some areas, and might have bread massive resentment in others. More insurgencies would basicly be guaranteed. On the jews, there would be massive anti-semitism. During the civil war of OTL, Denikins forces murdered an estimated 150.000 unarmed jews in Ukraine and Southern Russia alone. A proclamation by one of Denikin's generals incited people to "arm themselves" in order to extirpate "the evil force which lives in the hearts of Jew-Communists". Anti-semitism in white Russia would not be late Stalin era "some jews cooperate with our enemy Israel so all of them are under suspicion". It would be "The jews betrayed Jesus - now we kill them!". Russias jewish population would be either directly murdered or worked to death in Siberia. It's doubtfull wheater even a fraction of the jewish minority would have survived these purges at all.

Science and education would be very limited compared to OTL. Mass alphabetization would not taken place. People only have to be able to read if thats neccessary for the production process. In the cities, purely russian schools would likely be established. But the peasants wouldn't need to read, if they could they would only get bad ideas. The russian orthodox church would have a lot of influence in society, non-orthodox faiths would be brutally suppressed.

Without a planned and collective mechanization of agriculture, Russia would remain a country of constant famine every 5 years or so. This, combined with the lack of large-scale immunization campaigns, would cause infant mortality to remain significantly higher than in OTL. Millions would die because of this. Russia would remain the prisonhouse of nations and one of the poorest countries in Europe if not the world.

On some of the general positions of the White Movement, regarding the land question, minorities etc. , I'd suggest @Ulyanovsk's post in this thread.


▪︎The regime's foreign pollicy and relations:

As allready mentioned, White Russias fascist/reactionary regime would try to regain the "lost territories" (i.e. everything that belonged to Tsarist Russia in 1914, maybe even more) very aggressivly. Expect wars in Finland, Ukraine (if it's independent), the Baltics and what's left of Central Asia.

Russia would be heavily economically dependent on France and Britain. In OTL 1913, foreign corporations held 49,7% of the russian governments debt and owned nearly 100% of all petrolium fields, 90% of mines, 50% of chemicals and 40% of metallurgical industries. As the war progressed, the Russian Empire became more and more heavily indebted so that, in 1917, Russia had a total debt of 538 to 568 million pounds to the UK, 3,573 million francs to France and 147 million US dollars (converted) to Japan. The white regime, wanting to keep good relations with the other capitalist powers in order to secure trade, would inherit these debts. France and Britain would most likely continue to massively export capital to Russia in the 20s and 30s, increasing Russias economic dependence on those countries even more. Looking at the numbers above, and taking into account that the level of dependence would increase even more, Russia could end up as a virtual pupet state of France and Britain. French and british corporations would continue to extract value from Russia, the russian people would see very little from their countries incredible riches.

▪︎International implications:

The rise of fascism in Germany had little to do with the USSR. Granted, a socialist state to the east was important to the nazis OTL propaganda, but fascism in Germany rose because the ruling class wanted to regain what was lost in the Great War, and even more. Additionally they wanted to get rid of the archievements of the november revolution (like basic workers rights). So Germany could still become fascist in this scenario, aswell. The details may differ from OTL, but it could still happen.

How this scenario's WW2 would develope is uncertain, and everything I could say now would be pure speculation. What is certain however, is that white Russia could never survive an OTL-like german attack. Without the industrialization of OTL, they would neither be able to build their tanks nor to power them. There would be waaay less of anything, guns, planes, trucks, mines, amuntion, etc.

Another aspect is how the Bolsheviks and USSR affected the western leftist and workers movement. Many were impressed by the successes of socialism, especially during the great depression when the USSR was basicly the only country not affected. Without that (or with only the memories of 1917 to 1921/22) the western socialist and workers movement would be weakened. Thats also true for trade unions.

To sum it all up, Russia would be a very poor, economicly dependent, warmongering, famine-stricken, racist and murderous reactionary dictatorship. It would be a secondary power at best and nowhere near OTL in terms of development. Even if the white regime eventually falls to a homegrown revolution, say in the 50s or 60s, Russia would not be a world power today. Not even close. A white Russia would not have two sides - it would just be absolutely horrible.

This might sound very pesimistic but thats the way the White Movement was and planed to be in OTL, and thats what would happen in this TL.

Maybe this scenario would even end with a German Reich from the Elsace to the Urals, but again, thats speculation.
 
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