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http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/hist_op_research/CMH_70-102-1.pdf
On 14 May, the French requested additional RAF fi ghter support. Th e commander of RAF Fighter Command, Sir Dowding, intuitively opposed the transfer of additional aircraft and pilots to France and tasked the Stanmore group to make an assessment of British and French aircraft losses. In a matter of hours, Eric C. Williams, the deputy section chief, made a study of the problem and concluded that “additional transfers would involve attrition that could not be made good and that Fighter Command would be weakened beyond recovery in the face of the likelihood of a German attempt to invade Britain.”39 Th e section chief, Hugh Larnder, prepared the results of Williams’ study in easily understandable graphic form and delivered the graphs to Dowding, who presented them to the War Cabinet on 15 May. Prime Minister Winston Churchill was inclined to accede to the French request but was convinced by Dowding’s clear presentation of the risks and thus refused to send additional squadrons to France, thereby preserving critical aircraft and pilots for the coming Battle of Britain.40

What if for some reason this report is not presented and Churchill sends more Squadrons to France in May 1940, what would happen in the campaign and then what would happen if France still fell? Would the RAF fighter command be fatally compromised?
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