RAAF CH - 53

In 1969 the Royal Australian Air Force commissioned a tender to acquire heavy lift helicopters to utilise in the army support role. The team leader recommended that the RAAF purchase CH - 53s instead of the Army's preferred aircraft the CH - 47 Chinook. Ultimately the Air Board rejected this proposal and opted for the CH - 47 instead.

What if the Air Board had decided to purchase the CH - 53, how would their use by the RAAF and presumably the Army from 1989 onwards differ if at all from the CH - 47?
 
Ideally the Army would get the shits and wash its hands of operating tactical helicopters forevermore!

But more likely the main difference would come from the CH53D having folding rotor blades and tail and adaptions for naval use, which may see the type go to sea on the Melbourne on occasion. Whether this would be enough to avoid that 6 year gap when we got rid of the Chooks I don't know.
 
Ideally the Army would get the shits and wash its hands of operating tactical helicopters forevermore!

But more likely the main difference would come from the CH53D having folding rotor blades and tail and adaptions for naval use, which may see the type go to sea on the Melbourne on occasion. Whether this would be enough to avoid that 6 year gap when we got rid of the Chooks I don't know.

That was going to be my next question, as to how the employment of tactical helicopters would have changed if the RAAF had remained in control? As it has always been my theory that the RAAF by divesting the rotary winged element, prevented the fleet from undergoing much needed regeneration and replacement - cough Huey Gunship cough.

Agreed, that we would have likely seen their deployment on Sydney or Melbourne, which paradoxically could have led to a replacement for Melbourne.
 
I don't think that there would be any tactical or doctrinal changes if the RAAF kept the helicopters. But the maintenance and crewing problems the army had would most likely not have happened.
 
I don't think that there would be any tactical or doctrinal changes if the RAAF kept the helicopters. But the maintenance and crewing problems the army had would most likely not have happened.
You know I was thinking more about deployments, IMO if the RAAF retains control of the rotary winged element, we would see a greater willingness to deploy them overseas in support of Australian peacekeeping & peacemaking operations. After all it is easier to deploy a helicopter, than a fast jet capability, which would lead to an earlier update.

I acknowledge the number of 'ifs' in that statement, and agreed on the crewing along with the maintenance.
 
Helicopters are handy for: short-range search and rescue, delivering rice to starving survivors, flying wounded survivors to hospitals, delivering SWAT teams to troubled neighbors and a hundred other short-range tasks that are only limited by your imagination.

My question is: what advantage would CH-53 Stallions have over CH-47 Chinooks?
 
I was thinking of particular crises that Australia had an interest in IOTL that they didn't send helos to but ITTL where the RAAF keeps the helos they would be sent. None leap to mind.

However the OTL chook buy went: RAAF officer recommend CH53, back and forth political wrangling gets the recommendation changed, chook ordered Aug 1970, order suspended late 1970 due to engine problems in US fleet, order reinstated march 1972, Melbourne transported chooks to Brisbane February - March 1974. ITTL the decision for CH53 is accepted and the helicopter are ordered in early mid 1970 and a batch is delivered by late 1971 in time for use in the Australian withdrawal from Vietnam.
 
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My thoughts are that continued RAAF ownership would materialise itself by providing greater flexibility to the OTL deployments, for example 9 Sqn deploys a flight of Blackhawks to accompany 1 RAR during OP Solace in Somalia. The pattern repeats itself in Rwanda, and by East Timor 9 Sqn is one of the most deployed units within the RAAF, and this acts as a draw card for recruitment.

CH 53s flying from the deck of HMAS Sydney, could lead to some pretty interesting PODs IMO.
 
Have you done your measurements? CH-53 is a fairly large bird for a frigate. HMAS Canberra would be a better fit.
 
The interplay of people and events is interesting, Read was in charge of the first delegation to investigate the heavy lift helicopter in 1962, he recommended the chook but the long delivery schedule meant the order was canceled. Raw lead the second delegation in 1969, but Raw was the first deputy commander of 1ATF in Vietnam and was responsible for initially withholding 9sqn during the battle of Long Tan, which permanently soured Army perception of the RAAF. When Raw recommend the CH53 the Army objected and the DCAS (Read, who lead the early delegation) agreed and overturned Raw's recommendation on favour of the chook.
 
Have you done your measurements? CH-53 is a fairly large bird for a frigate. HMAS Canberra would be a better fit.

I'm referring to Sydney III, and in time operations conducted from this Melbourne. Which may presage the acquistion of an Iwo Jima class ship to replace Melbourne, an option that attracted interest from the Naval Board in OTL.

But that is moving away from the topic of the CH53 in Australian service.
 
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The only difference I can envisage would be getting the CH53D in service in time for Vietnam and the ability to operate from the Melbourne in the 70s, neither of which would be enough to keep the helicopters in the RAAF after the controversy of Long Tan. Otherwise all the stuff the Chook did 1974-89 would be done by the CH53D.
 
The Chinook had the edge on the Sikorski in payload/range and ceiling. Operating in PNG seems to have been more of a choice factor than from S/L.
 
The Chinook had the edge on the Sikorski in payload/range and ceiling. Operating in PNG seems to have been more of a choice factor than from S/L.

Yes that was the reason DCAS Read gave for overturning Raw's recommendation and I suppose there would be a good deal of truth to that. But part of me thinks that if Raw had acted differently at Long Tan and 9sqn was committed early his recommendation would not have been overturned so easily.
 
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